Informational shocks and food safety: A field study of street vendors in urban India

Transcription

1 Informational shocks and food safety: A field study of street vendors in urban India Gianmarco Daniele, Sulagna Mookerjee +, Denni Tommasi Bocconi University, + Georgetown University Qatar, Monash University In collaboration with InnoAid, Danish-based NGO Project funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Danida) April, 2019

2 MOTIVATION WHO bulletin: an estimated 600 million fall ill after eating contaminated food Consumption of unsafe street food affects the health of millions of people across the world (FAO and WHO, 2002; WHO, 2008, 2015).

3 MOTIVATION WHO bulletin: an estimated 600 million fall ill after eating contaminated food Consumption of unsafe street food affects the health of millions of people across the world (FAO and WHO, 2002; WHO, 2008, 2015). There could be several reasons: Lack of access to infrastructure (Duflo et al, 2012) Vendors lack the necessary incentives, since this is an informal sector Vendors lack awareness, knowledge, or adequate training

4 MOTIVATION Large survey evidence that street-food vendors often lack food safety knowledge (from India, the US, Ghana, South Africa, Haiti, Brazil and Vietnam)

5 MOTIVATION Large survey evidence that street-food vendors often lack food safety knowledge (from India, the US, Ghana, South Africa, Haiti, Brazil and Vietnam) Food experts suggest professional trainings: a standard and cheap approach to improve vendors knowledge and practices

6 MOTIVATION Large survey evidence that street-food vendors often lack food safety knowledge (from India, the US, Ghana, South Africa, Haiti, Brazil and Vietnam) Food experts suggest professional trainings: a standard and cheap approach to improve vendors knowledge and practices Small-scale microbiological studies mostly find a positive effect of the training on both food safety knowledge and self-reported practices (limitations: self-reported data; small samples (from 10 to 60 obs.))

7 MOTIVATION Large survey evidence that street-food vendors often lack food safety knowledge (from India, the US, Ghana, South Africa, Haiti, Brazil and Vietnam) Food experts suggest professional trainings: a standard and cheap approach to improve vendors knowledge and practices Small-scale microbiological studies mostly find a positive effect of the training on both food safety knowledge and self-reported practices (limitations: self-reported data; small samples (from 10 to 60 obs.)) This view has been adopted and empowered by international organizations, as the FAO and WHO

8 THIS PAPER Does food safety training improve vendors behavior? Assumption: training decreases cost of improving food (safety) quality What is the scope for self-regulation?

9 THIS PAPER Does food safety training improve vendors behavior? Assumption: training decreases cost of improving food (safety) quality What is the scope for self-regulation? We conduct an RCT in Kolkata, India, where vendors are randomly assigned eligibility for training workshops. We find that the training significantly improves their awareness and their claimed behavior, but not actual observed behavior.

10 THIS PAPER Our contribution: 1. An economic framework to understand vendors behaviors and test different explanations behind our findings

11 THIS PAPER Our contribution: 1. An economic framework to understand vendors behaviors and test different explanations behind our findings 2. We base our inferences on a larger sample of vendors and statistical power

12 THIS PAPER Our contribution: 1. An economic framework to understand vendors behaviors and test different explanations behind our findings 2. We base our inferences on a larger sample of vendors and statistical power 3. A novel approach to assess and measure food safety standards

13 THIS PAPER Our contribution: 1. An economic framework to understand vendors behaviors and test different explanations behind our findings 2. We base our inferences on a larger sample of vendors and statistical power 3. A novel approach to assess and measure food safety standards 4. Information about each vendors network

14 THIS PAPER Our contribution: 1. An economic framework to understand vendors behaviors and test different explanations behind our findings 2. We base our inferences on a larger sample of vendors and statistical power 3. A novel approach to assess and measure food safety standards 4. Information about each vendors network 5. We measure how lasting the informational shock

15 THIS PAPER Our contribution: 1. An economic framework to understand vendors behaviors and test different explanations behind our findings 2. We base our inferences on a larger sample of vendors and statistical power 3. A novel approach to assess and measure food safety standards 4. Information about each vendors network 5. We measure how lasting the informational shock 6. Policy relevance: ongoing formalization process in India

16 BACKGROUD: STREET VENDING IN KOLKATA Kolkata has a population of about 14 million, and is the third largest metropolis in India.

17 BACKGROUD: STREET VENDING IN KOLKATA Kolkata has a population of about 14 million, and is the third largest metropolis in India. Estimates (NCEUS, 2009) suggest that there are more than 150,000 street food vendors in Kolkata.

18 BACKGROUD: STREET VENDING IN KOLKATA Kolkata has a population of about 14 million, and is the third largest metropolis in India. Estimates (NCEUS, 2009) suggest that there are more than 150,000 street food vendors in Kolkata. Street vendors operate in the informal sector, often in an environment of uncertainty and extortions.

19 BACKGROUD: STREET VENDING IN KOLKATA Kolkata has a population of about 14 million, and is the third largest metropolis in India. Estimates (NCEUS, 2009) suggest that there are more than 150,000 street food vendors in Kolkata. Street vendors operate in the informal sector, often in an environment of uncertainty and extortions. There is an ongoing process of formalization, resulting in a National Act in 2014.

20 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN Our sample is from 10 areas across Kolkata. The vendors were divided into blocks (streets) 74 blocks in the final sample (N = 681 vendors) 26 blocks as a pilot for the training

21 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN Our sample is from 10 areas across Kolkata. The vendors were divided into blocks (streets) 74 blocks in the final sample (N = 681 vendors) 26 blocks as a pilot for the training The randomization was at the block level. All vendors in a treatment block were eligible for training. There were two different treatment blocks: Only training Training, plus promotional material to display at their stalls The training consisted of 3 workshops of 90 minutes each, plus follow-up visits to the vendors stalls.

22 AREA MAP

23 VENDORS

24 P OSTERS AND N APKINS

25 DATA COLLECTION Standard pre/post data collection: Details Baseline: Demographics and business information, plus information on vendor networks Endline: Additional information on awareness and actions taken

26 DATA COLLECTION Standard pre/post data collection: Details Baseline: Demographics and business information, plus information on vendor networks Endline: Additional information on awareness and actions taken Direct observation of daily behavior: Monitoring once every 8 weeks, 4 times per vendor Observations on 18 visible behaviors: Aggregated into 3 indexes of performance (scale 0-1): 1. Facilities (e.g. dustbin, apron, clean towel, clean cooking area and floor) 2. Food handling (e.g. implements used for cooking and serving, food covered) 3. Customers (e.g. disposable utensils, utensils washed with soap, clean serving areas) 4. Total (weighted average)

27 DATA: DEMOGRAPHICS AND BUSINESS Training Training Control Full P-value difference w/signal sample (T1) (T2) (C) T1 = C T2 = C T1 = T2 Panel (A): Socioeconomic and demographic information Male Age Years of vending Some education Member of a Union Panel (B): Business information Cooked food Light snacks Heavy snacks Meals Profits Hours worked Panel (C): Daily problems faced Bribes to police Daily problems faced are: Lack of electricity connection Shortage of capital Competition from vendors Lack of toilets Lack of drinkable water Observations

28 DATA: BASELINE AWARENESS AND BEHAVIOR Training Training Control Full P-value difference w/signal sample (T1) (T2) (C) T1 = C T2 = C T1 = T2 Panel (A): Food safety awareness National act Contamination is caused by: Bacteria Soap, detergent, etc Food colouring Insects Dirt Contaminated water Panel (B): Observed behavior Facilities index Food handling index Customer index Total index Observations

29 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY We aim to measure ITT effects. Empirical specification: Awareness and claimed actions: Difference between treatment and control, using endline Observed behavioral change: Diff-Diff using 6 rounds of monitoring Controls: Results are robust to controls for the vendor s gender, age, education, stall ownership status, years vending, area of vending, proximity to pilot blocks, and interviewer fixed effects.

30 AWARENESS (1) (2) (3) (4) Food Personal Contamination Utensils Hygiene Hygiene Panel (A): Combining Treatments Training (T1 or T2) 0.082*** 0.026* 0.080** 0.097*** (0.030) (0.013) (0.040) (0.035) Observations R-squared Mean Dep. Var. (C) Panel (B): Separate Treatments Training (T1) 0.075** * 0.094** (0.033) (0.018) (0.043) (0.039) Training w/signal (T2) 0.088** * 0.099** (0.035) (0.018) (0.045) (0.039) p-value (T1 = T2) Observations R-squared Mean Dep. Var. (C)

31 CLAIMED ACTIONS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Discussions Get info Improvements Investments Discuss NA Meetings Panel (A): Combining Treatments Training (T1 or T2) 0.204*** 0.132*** 0.230*** *** 0.090*** (0.037) (0.038) (0.052) (0.023) (0.032) (0.030) Observations R-squared Mean Dep. Var. (C) Panel (B): Separate Treatments Training (T1) 0.225*** 0.142*** 0.213*** 0.075*** 0.135*** 0.086** (0.047) (0.048) (0.065) (0.025) (0.038) (0.035) Training w/signal (T2) 0.187*** 0.124*** 0.244*** *** 0.094** (0.044) (0.044) (0.054) (0.027) (0.037) (0.037) p-value (T1=T2) Observations R-squared Mean Dep. Var. (C)

32 OBSERVED BEHAVIOR: COMBINING TREATMENTS (1) (2) (3) (4) Facilities Food handling Customer care Total Index Index Index Index Panel (A): Workshop 1 Training (T1 or T2) post workshop 0.018* (0.010) (0.013) (0.020) (0.010) Observations 3,478 2,648 3,201 3,478 R-squared Mean Dep. Var. (C) Panel (B): Workshop 2 Training (T1 or T2) post workshop 0.026** (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011) Observations 3,478 2,648 3,201 3,478 R-squared Mean Dep. Var. (C) Panel (C): Workshop 3 Training (T1 or T2) post workshop 0.039** * (0.015) (0.014) (0.021) (0.015) Observations 3,478 2,648 3,201 3,478 R-squared Mean Dep. Var. (C)

33 OBSERVED BEHAVIOR: SEPARATE TREATMENTS (1) (2) (3) (4) Facilities Food handling Customer care Total Index Index Index Index Panel (A): Workshop 1 Training (T1) post workshop 0.033** (0.016) (0.018) (0.027) (0.012) Training w/signal (T2) post workshop (0.012) (0.015) (0.026) (0.013) Observations 3,478 2,648 3,201 3,478 Panel (B): Workshop 2 Training (T1) post workshop 0.034** (0.016) (0.017) (0.026) (0.012) Training w/signal (T2) post workshop (0.016) (0.015) (0.024) (0.017) Observations 3,478 2,648 3,201 3,478 Panel (C): Workshop 3 Training (T1) post workshop 0.034** ** * (0.015) (0.015) (0.028) (0.013) Training w/signal (T2) post workshop * (0.026) (0.024) (0.029) (0.023) Observations 3,478 2,648 3,201 3,478

34 WHY ARE BEHAVIORAL IMPROVEMENTS DIFFICULT Supply side: It may be the case that the training did not necessarily make it easier for vendors to undertake these improvements. We collected information at the baseline and endline on how costly it is to make certain changes the cost does not significantly decline post training.

35 COST OF IMPROVEMENT (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Clean water Dustbin Clean cloths Cooking area Disposable cups Panel (A): Combining Treatments Training (T1 or T2) Endline (0.152) (0.100) (0.104) (0.119) (0.143) Observations 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 R-squared Mean Dep. Var. (C) Panel (B): Separate Treatments Training (T1) Endline * (0.174) (0.116) (0.119) (0.124) (0.166) Training w/signal (T2) Endline (0.174) (0.118) (0.111) (0.133) (0.163) p-value (T1=T2) Observations 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 R-squared Mean Dep. Var. (C)

36 WHY ARE BEHAVIORAL IMPROVEMENTS DIFFICULT Supply side: It may be the case that the training did not necessarily make it easier for vendors to undertake these improvements. We collected information at the baseline and endline on how costly it is to make certain changes the cost does not significantly decline post training. Demand side: It may be the case that consumers do not have a sufficiently high willingness to pay for safer food. The vendors who get to signal to consumers do not improve more. Moreover, there is no effect on the profits or prices. This is true even for the subset of the improving vendors. Ongoing follow-up survey on consumers.

37 CONCLUSION A training program may not be sufficient to ensure self-regulation by vendors. Information may not be the key constraint in this context. Both demand and supply side explanations might play role.

38 APPENDIX HIGH COMPLIANCE AND RE-CONTACT WITH THE VENDORS Training Training Control Full w/signal sample (T1) (T2) (C) N take-up N take-up N take-up N take-up Panel (A): Representation in the City of Kolkata # Areas # Blocks Panel (B): Number of observations: pre, during and post intervention Baseline Monitoring # Monitoring # Monitoring # Monitoring # Endline Panel (C): Attendance of the workshops Workshop # Workshop # Workshop # Back to Data