2. Two paradigm cases of self-deception: the cuckold (wishful thinking) and the quarterback (willful self-deception).

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1 PHIL 5983: Belief and Deception Seminar Prof. Funkhouser Van Leeuwen and Funkhouser Van Leeuwen, The Spandrels of Self-Deception 1. Three puzzles of self-deception: 1) apparent contradiction in deceiving and being deceived, 2) too irrational to meet interpretative standards, and 3) seems evolutionarily disadvantageous. Van Leeuwen will address 1 and 3. 3 was long overlooked within philosophy. Van Leeuwen targets Trivers proposal that self-deception is an adaptation with the function of furthering the deception of others and/or producing positive orientation to the future (world?). Van Leeuwen gives three main objections: the theory s predictions do not obtain, there wasn t enough phenotypic variation, and it makes self-deception an implausibly modular feature of the mind. His positive view is that self-deception is a spandrel. 2. Two paradigm cases of self-deception: the cuckold (wishful thinking) and the quarterback (willful self-deception). Ingredients of self-deception: availability of contrary evidence and a desire that explains why that evidence is ignored (misinterpreted, etc.). With these two points in mind, we arrive at the following definition of self-deception: an agent is in a state of self-deception if and only if she holds a belief (a) that is contrary to what her epistemic norms in conjunction with available evidence would usually dictate and (b) a desire for a certain state of affairs to obtain, or to have a certain belief, causally makes the difference in what belief is held in an epistemically illegitimate fashion. (332) 3. Van Leeuwen will focus on Trivers two main claims about self-deception: it furthers the deception of others and positively orients us towards the future. We are familiar with these reasons. The former would be selected, supposedly, because lying gives off cues. 4. Van Leeuwen assumes that having accurate information about the environment is fitness enhancing. Self-deception is prima facie disadvantageous, since it goes against this. Van Leeuwen points out that self-deception would have to specifically target those situations in which lying would be advantageous. But in many of these situations in 1

2 which we would benefit from lying, we would want to retain the truth the food by the river example ( ). If Trivers were correct, we would also expect self-deception to occur in those situations in which lying is advantageous. But we often self-deception in situations in which lying would give us no benefit. And second we often lie when we do not self-deception (nor would we want to self-deceive). Further, self-deception often does not spread e.g., the self-deceived below average driver. This is also confirmed in the study about those who overestimate the prospects that their romantic relationships will succeed, though their friends do not overestimate. Next he considers the supposed value of positive illusions. Distinguish three claims here: 1) the correlation between positive illusions and positive affect, 2) a causal connection between them, and 3) selection for that reason. (336) Van Leeuwen denies the causal claim, and he thinks it is more likely that the causation goes in the other direction (positive affect causes positive illusions). Self-deception is not needed to overcome depression, so Van Leeuwen claims that the burden is on Trivers to explain why it would be selected for this reason. Trivers must assume enough phenotypic variation for self-deception to be an option to select. But why wouldn t the ability to lie without getting caught be within this possibility set? And if so, it would be a better option than self-deception. This is because it is advantageous to have reliable information. Van Leeuwen also objects that Trivers makes self-deception out to be an implausibly sophisticated module. But then the module posited must be quite complex: it must have means to: (a) deceive the main belief formation system; (b) detect when, for the purpose of bringing about X, it must do so; (c) have better information about the situation at hand than the main system (otherwise the misinformation it propagates won t count as deception); and (d) output situation-specific contents for variable situations. This is a tall order. (338) But is this Trivers view? 5. Gould and Lewontin s critique of adaptationism: spandrels. Spandrels are by-products (typically of adaptations), not adaptations themselves. Van Leeuwen claims that the capacity for self-deception is a spandrel: Contra Trivers, I think it is most fruitful to view the capacity for selfdeception as a spandrel, not as an adaptation. That is, the human propensity for self-deception exists not because the trait was selected for 2

3 in our evolutionary history, but because other aspects of our cognitive architecture have the capacity for self-deception as a byproduct. (339) Q: Is the capacity for self-deception the only relevant phenotype? The example of Bob and his girlfriend is supposed to show that Van Leeuwen thinks that the rationale for self-deception is hedonic (avoiding discomfort). He then provides five features of the mind that supposedly give rise to self-deception: motivation to avoid discomfort (anxiety), selective attention to evidence, belief inertia (e.g., confirmation bias and perseverance effects), simplicity bias (e.g., dismissing new evidence that undermines one s accepted world view), and awareness of self-fulfilling beliefs. ( ) 6. It is possible that, though a spandrel, the capacity for self-deception has positive fitness value and at least was not selected against. But things are complicated here in that there are many trade-offs to consider, given that many different components make up our capacity to self-deceive. My own view, which must at present remain a conjecture, is that selfdeception is not on the whole adaptive, but the features of mind that give rise to it are. Thus the capacity for self-deception comes as the downside trade-off of an overall package that is highly adaptive. (343) Funkhouser, Is Self-Deception an Effective Non-Cooperative Strategy? Funkhouser will provide three main objections to Trivers theory. There are three main reasons why Trivers simple and unified theory of self-deception fails. First, we often cannot afford to give up the truth. Second, in many cases of self-deception our false belief is unlikely to spread to others. And third, even in those cases in which the false belief does spread to others we often do not benefit from this deception, or at least such interpersonal deception is not the reason for which we selfdeceive. (2) I. Funkhouser makes a distinction between self-delusion and conflicted self-deception. He claims that the latter variety is often neglected in treatments of self-deception, but that it provides the most interesting and robust form of self-deception. The conflict manifests itself in states (behavioral, phenomenological, emotional, or rational) that support conflicting belief attributions. Such doxastic conflict is probably due to an underlying motivational conflict desires to both retain the truth and believe the false. What would be the evolutionary advantage of such conflict (retaining the truth, in particular)? Trivers (now very familiar) theory of self-deception is presented. 3

4 II. In many cases in which we benefit from deception, we do so only if we retain the truth. Here we see serious problems with the general logic behind Trivers theory. We self-deceive, he says, in order to eliminate the cues that come with deception. But these cues persist because so often when we are deceptive we want to maintain the true belief in ourselves. We want the cognitive load; we are nervous because we want to keep the truth to ourselves but spread a lie. But Trivers examples of so-called selfdeception are not like that. They are cases in which we have no incentive to hide what we take to be the truth about our attractiveness, moral worth, etc. (8) Distinguish five possible doxastic orientations: Ignorance, Truth, Liar, Falsity, and Strategically Conflicted. Funkhouser then offers formulas to determine which strategy is optimal for particular contents and contexts (Table 1). Note the costs and benefits. In particular, see the three reasons Funkhouser provides for why Trivers thinks Falsity is often preferable to Liar. (9) If Strategic Conflict is ever preferable to Falsity, it is going to because of the benefits of holding onto the truth. It is unclear which strategy would better further the deception of others. Strategic conflict does come with the costs of cognitive load. Trivers discusses two psychological studies that purport to demonstrate conflicted selfdeception Gur and Sackeim (1979) and Valdesolo and DeSteno (2008). (These are the voice recognition and moral hypocrisy studies.) Funkhouser argues that neither involves strategic deception, however. First, he denies that the physiological responses in the voice recognition study are sufficient to show doxastic conflict (see the flying example, as well). It also is not done to deceive others. Finally, the subject has no desire/incentive to maintain the conflict. In the moral hypocrisy case, it also seems as if the conflict is not strategic. The hypocrite would prefer not to have the intuitive response it seems to be merely an unavoidable system constraint. Two examples of supposedly real, strategic conflict: bald man and cheating husband. III. In many cases our self-deception or false beliefs are unlikely to spread to others. Three examples of Trivers: attractiveness bias, in-group bias, and moral hypocrisy. In these cases, and many others, the self-deception has advantages besides furthering otherdeception. False beliefs can spread by being self-fulfilling prophesies or signals/testimony. But many times false beliefs lead to others seeing the truth more clearly. IV. 4

5 Funkhouser considers the details of how the self-deceived s false belief can affect others. The bottom line is that Trivers logic works only in those situations in which instilling a false belief in ourselves has positive value, or it has neutral or even negative value that is offset by the benefits accrued by deceiving others. (20) Table 2 considers the costs and benefits (for both self and others) that are produced by spreading these false beliefs. Funkhouser distinguishes eight varieties. Only the Mutually Advantageous and Dominant varieties are always beneficial, so biases with these effects are the best candidates for selection. But with the former it is unclear if the interpersonal deception is the reason for their selection. Dominant self-deception has the greatest positive impact on fitness. And it is likely that such self-deception is self-presenting, rather than world-presenting. Biased self-presenting beliefs, when spread to others, tend to asymmetrically benefit the self. Biased world-presenting beliefs, when spread to others, tend to benefit us equally. (25) V. So is self-deception an adaptation or a spandrel? Funkhouser says it varies by content and context, and he refers to Tables 1 and 2 to help settle the issue. In short, my view is that self-deception is an adaptation if the motivational or incentive-based bias driving self-deception is itself an adaptation. (This seems to be Trivers view as well. He is just more optimistic about when this obtains, and he overlooks other cases of selfdeception.) And in some cases, the motivational or incentive-based bias is an adaptation. But this varies by content in the manner outlined in our earlier discussion of the formulas for determining the optimal doxastic orientation, as well as in the Table 2 taxonomy of self-deception according to how it affects others. (28) Funkhouser objects to Van Leeuwen s claim that the motive for self-deception is hedonic. At least, he points out that this is not the case for many of Trivers examples. Two further complications remain: grain (for individuating deceptive content) and conflicted self-deception. 5