Personality, Gender, and the Ways People Perceive Moral Dilemmas in Everyday Life

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1 Journal of College and Character ISSN: X (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: Personality, Gender, and the Ways People Perceive Moral Dilemmas in Everyday Life Gillian Wark To cite this article: Gillian Wark (2001) Personality, Gender, and the Ways People Perceive Moral Dilemmas in Everyday Life, Journal of College and Character, 2:2, To link to this article: The Authors Published online: 01 Feb Submit your article to this journal Article views: 234 View related articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at Download by: [ ] Date: 19 December 2017, At: 11:53

2 Journal of College and Character Volume 2, Issue Article 2 Personality, Gender, and the Ways People Perceive Moral Dilemmas in Everyday Life Gillian Wark University of British Columbia Copyright c 2001 by the authors. All rights reserved.

3 Personality, Gender, and the Ways People Perceive Moral Dilemmas in Everyday Life Gillian Wark Abstract This study examined the relations among personality, gender, and the ways people perceive moral dilemmas in their everyday lives. Participants were 117 young women and men who responded to Gibbs, Basinger, and Fuller s (1992) Sociomoral Reflection Measure and to antisocial, prosocial, and social pressure types of real-life moral dilemma. Participants completed measures assessing shame and guilt (Harder, 1987; Tangney, 1990) and identity (Bennion & Adams, 1986). The female participants reported feeling more guilt about the prosocial dilemma and viewed the social pressure dilemma as more care-oriented than males did. Scores on the shame and guilt measures were not related to guilt associated with the real-life dilemmas. Identity-achieved scores were negatively related to feeling guilty about social pressure dilemmas involving parents. Discussion focuses on the relevance of personality, gender, and family influences for a model of real-life moral reasoning, with implications for development and education.

4 Personality, Gender, and the Ways People Perceive Moral Dilemmas in Everyday Life Peer Reviewed Article Gillian Wark Department of Psychology University of British Columbia Abstract This study examined the relations among personality, gender, and the ways people perceive moral dilemmas in their everyday lives. Participants were 117 young women and men who responded to Gibbs, Basinger, and Fuller s (1992) Sociomoral Reflection Measure and to antisocial, prosocial, and social pressure types of real-life moral dilemma. Participants completed measures assessing shame and guilt (Harder, 1987; Tangney, 1990) and identity (Bennion & Adams, 1986). The female participants reported feeling more guilt about the prosocial dilemma and viewed the social pressure dilemma as more care-oriented than males did. Scores on the shame and guilt measures were not related to guilt associated with the real-life dilemmas. Identity-achieved scores were negatively related to feeling guilty about social pressure dilemmas involving parents. Discussion focuses on the relevance of personality, gender, and family influences for a model of real-life moral reasoning, with implications for development and education. Personality and the Consistency of Moral Judgment in Everyday Life In the past, moral reasoning research has focused on how people view hypothetical dilemmas and situations, such as those exemplified on Kohlberg s measure of moral development (1984; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) and on the Sociomoral Reflection Measure (SRM; Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992). However, the use of hypothetical dilemmas has posed a problem for researchers interested in predicting and understanding how people come to view moral dilemmas in everyday life in particular ways. Much research (see Wark & Krebs, 1996, for a review; Wark & Krebs, 1997, 2000) suggests some people view different moral dilemmas in different ways and some people view them in similar ways. It is possible that these individual differences stem from gender differences and /or differences in experiences and personality. In a recent study (Wark & Krebs, 1997), participants who displayed consistency in moral reasoning--that is, they tended to view different dilemmas in similar ways--tended to make Stage 3 moral judgments. It was suggested that these individuals may have focused more on or had been more preoccupied with issues about conscience, guilt, self-respect, identity, and with care-oriented issues, such as those about relationships--issues which are characteristic of Stage 3 moral reasoning--than those individuals classified as inconsistent in moral judgment and who may have been more focused on or vulnerable to situational factors. Individuals who are concerned with maintaining and/or establishing an identity (i.e., those who are identity-achieved or in identity-moratorium, respectively), who project issues

5 of guilt into a variety of situations, and/or who interpret dilemmas as care-oriented may be more likely than others to interpret different situations in similar ways. In other words, pervasive personality characteristics, such as personal attributions of shame, guilt, and identity, may influence people to view different situations in similar ways because they may project particular issues onto most situations (see also Wark & Krebs, 2000). The primary purpose of the present research was to investigate the relations among personality characteristics such as shame, guilt, and identity, gender, and the ways people view moral problems in their everyday lives. First, I set out to determine gender-related and dilemma-related differences in real-life perceptions. The results of previous research are mixed, with some suggesting that males report experiencing antisocial dilemmas more often than do females, that females attach more significance to prosocial dilemmas than do males, that females rate real-life dilemmas as involving more moral concerns than do males (Wark & Krebs, 2000), and that females rate real-life dilemmas as involving more difficult decisions than do males (Wark & Krebs, 1997). Discovering gender differences in perceptions of different types of real-life dilemmas may help us to understand why men and women tend to report different types of real-life dilemmas. Perhaps men and women report those real-life dilemmas they feel most guilty about, and men and women may feel most guilty about different types of dilemmas. In a couple of studies (Ford & Lowery, 1986; Wark & Krebs, 1997), dilemmas involving care-oriented issues were seen as involving particularly difficult decisions. Thus, it could be expected that people (perhaps particularly women) experience more guilt associated with prosocial types of dilemmas, i.e. those involving mostly care-oriented issues. As in previous research (Wark & Krebs, 1997, 2000), I expected both male and female participants to view the antisocial dilemma as involving more justice-oriented and less careoriented issues than both the prosocial and social pressure types of dilemmas. To examine these issues, I asked male and female participants to report and discuss an antisocial, prosocial, and social pressure real-life moral dilemma and to rate each on a number of dimensions, including how often they experienced similar types of dilemmas, how care- and justice-oriented each type of dilemma was, and how much guilt the participant experienced with each type of dilemma. Second, I wanted to assess the relations among personality characteristics, moral maturity, and perceptions of real-life dilemmas. Previous research (Wark & Krebs, 1996, 1997) reported that people tend to make Stage 2 and Stage 3 moral judgments to real-life dilemmas. If issues centered on guilt and identity are characteristic of Stage 3 moral reasoning, then these personality characteristics should be positively related to moral reasoning. More specifically, high scores on measures of guilt and high scores on measures of identity-achievement (and, perhaps, moratorium) should be related to higher stage reasoning (Stage 3) on the real-life dilemmas. Further, because care-oriented reasoning is related to Stage 3 reasoning (see Wark & Krebs, 1996, 1997), high scores on measures of guilt and high scores on measures of identity-achievement (and, perhaps, moratorium) should be related to high real-life dilemma ratings of care. I also expected to find a positive relation between measures of guilt and real-life dilemma ratings of guilt. The relation between identity and real-life dilemma ratings of guilt was explored. To examine these issues, I asked participants to complete the SRM (Gibbs et al., 1992), personality measures on shame and guilt (Harder, 1987; Tangney, 1990) and identity (Bennion & Adams, 1986). To summarize, in this study it was hypothesized that, in comparison to men, women would (1) report experiencing the antisocial dilemma less often, and (2) report feeling more guilt associated with the prosocial dilemma. It was hypothesized that both men and women would view the antisocial dilemma as more justice-oriented and less care-oriented than the

6 other dilemmas. It was hypothesized that moral maturity would be positively related to (a) scores on the guilt scales, (b) scores on the identity-achieved and identity-moratorium scales, and (c) real-life dilemma ratings of care and guilt. Further, it was hypothesized that scores on the shame and guilt measures would be positively related to ratings of (a) guilt associated with the real-life dilemmas and (b) ratings of care for each real-life dilemma. No expectations were made for the relation between identity and perceptions of real-life dilemmas. Method Participants Participants were 117 University of British Columbia undergraduate students (54 males; 63 females) who volunteered for the study to fulfill a psychology course requirement.1 There were no differences between male and female participants on demographic characteristics: mean age for men = 19.2 (range = 17-33), compared to 19.8 (range = 17-53) for women, t(115) = 0.8, ns; SES ratings on a scale ranging from one to five for men = 3.3, compared to 3.0 for women, t(123) = 1.9, ns; mean grade point average for men = 3.2, compared to 3.3, for women, t(61) = 1.2, ns. Procedure After giving informed consent, participants completed a package of questionnaires containing (a) a request for demographic information, (b) the SRM, (c) instructions to report and make judgments about three different types of real-life dilemmas, (d) the Personal Feelings Questionnaire, (e) the Test of Self-Conscious Affect, and (f) the Extended Objective Measure of Ego Identity. The package of questionnaires took approximately 2 hours to complete.2 Measures and Scoring Sociomoral Reflection Measure (SRM): The questions on the SRM were scored according to the procedure outlined by Gibbs et al. (1992). The scoring system produces two equivalent scores: (a) global stage scores that range from Stage 1 to Stage 4, including transitional stages such as 1/2, 2/3, etc., and (b) moral maturity scores that range from 100 to 400 (see Gibbs et al., 1992, pp ). One-quarter of the dilemmas were scored blindly by a second expert scorer. Interrater reliability was 97% agreement, r(30) =.90, within 25 moral maturity scores (one-quarter stage). Real-Life Dilemmas: Participants were asked to think about, identify, and describe dilemmas they had experienced in which they (a) were faced with the temptation to meet their own needs or desires, acquire resources, or advance their own gain by, for example, violating rules or laws, behaving dishonestly, immorally, or unfairly (the antisocial dilemma), (b) had to make a decision about whether or not to take responsibility for helping someone important to them (the prosocial dilemma), and (c) had to make a decision about whether to do what their parents want and expect, or to do what they want when, for example, making life(style) choices (the social pressure dilemma). These types of dilemmas have been employed successfully in previous studies (e.g., Wark & Krebs, 1996, 1997, 2000; Wark, 2000). Participants were then asked to respond to a set of probe questions such as, "What did you see to be the issues involved at the time?", "What made it a moral conflict?", "What options did you consider?", "Do you think you did the right thing? Why or why not?", and "Is there another way to see the problem?". Approximately two-thirds of a page was supplied for participants to describe the dilemma and a quarter of a page was supplied for participants to answer each probe question. After participants described each real-life dilemma, they

7 were instructed to respond to the following questions, set up in an 8-point Likert format, which asked to what extent they (a) reported feeling guilt associated with the dilemma, (b) viewed it as involving care-oriented issues, (c) and viewed it as involving justice-oriented issues.3 Personal Feelings Questionnaire: This measure by Harder (1987) assesses degrees of shame and guilt by asking respondents to rate the extent to which they have experienced 22 adjectives of feelings on a Likert-scale format. Test of Self-Conscious Affect: This measure by Tangney (1990) assesses degrees of shame and guilt by asking participants to respond to 15 scenarios by rating them on a Likert-scale format. The Extended Objective Measure of Ego Identity (EOMEIS-2): This measure by Bennion and Adams (1986) assesses respondents ideological and interpersonal identity statuses in both a qualitative and quantitative manner. Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which identity-related statements applied to them using a Likert-scale format. Qualitatively, the measure enables the classification of individuals into one or a combination of the following four identity statuses: achievement, moratorium, foreclosed, and/ diffused. Quantitatively, the measure assigns individual scores on each of the identity statuses. The quantitative scores were employed in the present study. Results Gender- and Dilemma-Related Differences in Perceptions of Real-Life Dilemmas A 2 X 3 (Gender X Dilemma) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on real-life dilemma ratings of experience. This analysis failed to reveal a significant main effect for Dilemma, F(2, 113) = 1.62, ns. As well, the main effect for Gender was not significant, F(1, 113) = 0.3, ns, and the Gender by Dilemma interaction was not significant, F(2, 113) = 0.6, ns. Although the trend was in the expected direction, the male participants did not report experiencing the antisocial dilemma significantly more often than did the females (Ms = 4.0 vs. 3.8; SDs = 1.9 and 1.8, respectively; t(114) = 0.4, ns). A 2 X 3 (Gender X Dilemma) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on real-life dilemma ratings of care. This analysis revealed a significant main effect for Dilemma, F(2, 112) = 24.34, p <.00. As expected, post hoc comparisons revealed that the antisocial dilemma was rated lower in issues of care than both the prosocial and social pressure dilemmas. The main effect for Gender was not significant, F(1, 112) = 3.43, ns, nor was the Gender by Dilemma interaction, F(2, 112) = 0.6, ns. However, planned comparisons revealed that the female participants rated the social pressure dilemma as involving more issues of care than the male participants did (Ms = 6.0 vs. 5.4; SDs = 1.3 and 1.7, respectively), t(113) = 2.1, p <.04. A 2 X 3 (Gender X Dilemma) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on real-life dilemma ratings of justice. This analysis revealed a significant main effect for Dilemma, F(2, 113) = 14.72, p <.00. As expected, post hoc comparisons revealed that the antisocial dilemma was rated higher in issues of justice of care than both the prosocial and social pressure dilemmas. The main effect for Gender was not significant, F(1, 113) = 0.3, ns, nor was the Gender by Dilemma interaction, F(2, 113) = 0.1, ns. A 2 X 3 (Gender X Dilemma) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last factor, was conducted on real-life dilemma ratings of guilt. This analysis failed to reveal a significant main effect for Dilemma, F(2, 111) = 1.9, ns. The main effect for Gender was significant,

8 F(1, 111) = 10.2, p <.002, with women reporting more overall guilt than men associated with the real-life dilemmas, but the Gender by Dilemma interaction, F(2, 111) = 0.4, ns, was not. However, planned comparisons revealed that the female participants reported feeling more guilt associated with the prosocial dilemma than did males (Ms = 3.2 vs. 2.1; SDs = 2.5 and 2.2, respectively), t(113) = 2.6, p <.01. Gender Differences in Measures of Shame and Guilt Female participants had significantly higher shame scores on Tangney s (1990) measure than did male participants; Ms = 47.2 vs. 42.9; SDs = 7.8 and 8.0, respectively, t(115) = 2.9, p <.004. Gender Differences in Measure of Identity Female participants had significantly higher ideological-foreclosed identity scores on the EOMEIS-2 than did male participants; Ms = 37.4 vs. 34.7; SDs = 6.7 and 6.4, respectively, t(114) = 2.2, p <.03. Relation between Moral Maturity and Shame and Guilt and Identity Moral maturity on the SRM was not significantly correlated with scores on either shame and guilt measure. Also contrary to expectation, moral maturity was significantly (a) negatively related to scores on the ideological-achieved scale, r(115) = -.19, p <.04 and (b) positively related to scores on the ideological-diffused scale, r(115) =.31, p <.001. Relation between Moral Maturity and Perceptions of Real-Life Dilemma None of the correlations between moral maturity on the SRM and real-life dilemma perceptions was significant. Relations between Shame and Guilt and Perceptions of Real-Life Dilemmas Contrary to expectation, none of the relations between measures of shame, guilt, and reallife dilemma ratings of guilt were significant. The relation between Tangney s guilt scale and ratings of care for the prosocial dilemma was significantly positive, r(116) =.2, p <.04. Relations between Identity and Perceptions of Real-Life Dilemmas Analysis of the relations between identity scores and real-life dilemma ratings revealed that scores on the ideological-achieved scale were significantly negatively related to ratings of (a) justice for the antisocial dilemma, r(114) = -.21, p <.03, (b) care for the social pressure dilemma, r(112) = -.24, p <.01, and (c) guilt for the social pressure dilemma, r(113) = -.30, p <.001. Scores on the ideological-moratorium scale were also related significantly negatively to ratings of guilt for the social pressure dilemma, r(113) = -.21, p <.03. Scores on the ideological-foreclosed scale were significantly positively related to ratings of care for the antisocial dilemma, r(114) =.21, p <.03. Scores on the ideologicaldiffused scale were significantly positively related to ratings of justice for the social pressure dilemma, r(113) =.25, p <.01. As with the ideological-achieved scale, scores on the interpersonal-achieved scale were significantly negatively related to ratings of guilt for the social pressure dilemma, r(114) = -.25, p <.01 (see Table 1). Table 1 Significantly Positive Correlations Between Identity Scores and Real-Life Dilemma Ratings Antisocial Dilemma Social Pressure Dilemma Identity Care Justice Guilt Care Justice Guilt

9 Ideological Achieved Moratorium -.21 Foreclosed 0.21 Diffused 0.25 Interpersonal Achieved -.25 Note. Only statistically significant correlations are shown. See text for further details and reported levels of significance. Relations among Perceptions of Real-Life Dilemma The relations among perceptions of each real-life dilemma were tested (see Table 2 for the significant correlations). Table 2 Significant Correlations among Real-Life Dilemma Ratings Dilemma Antisocial Dilemma Prosocial Dilemma Social Pressure Dilemma Ratings Care Justice Guilt Care Justice Guilt Care Justice Guilt Antisocial Care ** Justice * Guilt * Prosocial Care *.26** Justice 1.0 Guilt 1.0 Social Pressure Care 1.0 Justice 1.0 Guilt 1.0 Note. Only statistically significant correlations are shown. *<.05 **<.01

10 Discussion One of the goals of this study was to determine what, if any, gender differences there were in perceptions of real-life moral dilemmas. Consistent with expectation and with previous results (Wark & Krebs, 1996, 1997, 2000), both male and female participants viewed the antisocial dilemma as involving more justice-oriented issues and less care-oriented issues than both the prosocial and social pressure dilemmas. As well, there were no gender differences in overall perceptions of care or justice across dilemmas. Contrary to expectation and to previous results (Wark & Krebs, 2000), the male participants in this study did not report experiencing the antisocial dilemma significantly more often than did the females.4 Consistent with expectation, the female participants reported feeling more guilt associated with the prosocial dilemma than did males. When asked to report and discuss any type of real-life dilemma, women have been found to report more prosocial types of dilemmas than do men (see Wark & Krebs, 1996, for a review). If these are the types of dilemmas about which women feel most guilt, it makes sense that these are the types foremost or salient in their minds, which may lead them, more than men, to report prosocial dilemmas more often than other types. Why women feel more guilt about prosocial dilemmas is a question worth further investigation. Perhaps socialization processes lead women to feel more guilt about situations in which they must make a decision whether or not to help or care for another--situations that may involve conflicts with traditional female roles. Interestingly, in the present study, the female participants reported feeling more guilt overall associated with the real-life dilemmas. A content analysis of the specific responses made by participants may reveal more interesting guilt-related gender differences. Consistent with the findings of Wark and Krebs (1996, 2000), the female participants in this study rated the social pressure dilemma as involving more issues of care than did the male participants. As discussed in Wark and Krebs (2000), this difference may stem from a gender difference in the nature of the relationships the university-aged participants currently have or have had in the past with their parents or guardians. Research on the nature of parent-child dialogues suggests that parents, particularly mothers, discuss important matters in more care-oriented ways with their daughters than with their sons (see Pratt, Arnold, & Hilbers, 1998). In another study, mothers have been found to use a more care-oriented approach than do fathers when intervening in young children s disputes (Lollis, Ross, & Leroux, 1996; see also Walker, 1997, for a discussion). As discussed in Wark and Krebs (2000), such interaction differences may predispose women to be more sensitive to care-oriented issues than men in conflicts that involve their parents. In the current study, the nature of the conflicts our participants had with their parents was not investigated. This will be explored in a content analysis in a subsequent study. Further research on parentchild and parent-adolescent conflicts, the relation to moral orientation and to guilt, for example, from a developmental perspective is encouraged. The female participants in the current study had significantly higher shame scores on Tangney s (1990) measure than did male participants. Although no expectations were made with regard to gender differences in identity, it was interesting to find that the female participants had significantly higher ideological-foreclosed identity scores on the EOMEIS-2 than did male participants. High scores on the shame scale and on the identity measure, however, did not seem to be related to any of the other gender differences found in this study. In Wark and Krebs (1997) it was suggested that those individuals who consistently made Stage 3 moral judgments, as assessed by Colby and Kohlberg s (1987) measure, across situations may have been preoccupied with issues about care and guilt--issues which typify

11 Stage 3 moral reasoning. Thus, it seemed reasonable to expect a positive relation between feeling guilty, as a pervasive personality characteristic, and seeing issues of care in a dilemma. This relation was found, but only between Tangney s guilt scale and ratings of care for the prosocial dilemma--a dilemma that has been viewed as more care-oriented than other types of dilemmas in previous studies (e.g., Wark & Krebs, 1996, 1997, 2000). Further, only one positive relation was found between dilemma ratings of guilt and care and this was for the antisocial dilemma. Moral maturity was not significantly correlated with scores on either shame and guilt measure. Contrary to expectation, moral maturity was significantly negatively related to scores on the ideological-achieved scale, and positively related to scores on the ideologicaldiffused scale. Contrary to expectation, none of the correlations between moral maturity and real-life dilemma perceptions was significant. Moral maturity in this study was based on responses to a non-real-life dilemma. Perhaps real-life moral reasoning has a stronger relationship to real-life dilemma perceptions. This will be explored in a subsequent study. Contrary to expectation, none of the relations between measures of shame, guilt, and reallife dilemma ratings of guilt were significant. These results suggest that the guilt and shame that people see associated with themselves in general may be different from or is not associated with the guilt they feel toward particular circumstances. It also may be true that the measures employed in this study measured different guilt-related traits or attributes. There were some relations found between identity scores and perceptions of real-life dilemmas. Among the few relations were the following and, perhaps, the most interesting. Scores on the ideological-achieved scale were significantly negatively related to ratings of justice for the antisocial dilemma and to care and guilt for the social pressure dilemma. Scores on the interpersonal-achieved scale also were significantly negatively related to ratings of guilt for the social pressure dilemma. Participants who were more identityachieved felt less guilt about real-life dilemmas involving their parents, and participants who were less identity-achieved felt more guilt about these dilemmas. It is possible that individuals who have a better sense of themselves feel more confident--less guilty--when making decisions that may go against their parents demands or wishes. Consistent with this, scores on the ideological-moratorium scale were also related significantly negatively to ratings of guilt for the social pressure dilemma. The moratorium identity-status is similar to the achieved identity-status in that both involve exploration of possible identity alternatives and paths. People who are identity-achieved have committed themselves to an identity, but people who are in moratorium have not yet made a commitment. A content analysis of participants responses to the social pressure dilemmas should prove fruitful and may reveal more interesting relationships between identity and guilt. Conclusion The variables examined in this study represent a subset of variables currently being examined in a larger study--one examining a broader sample of moral reasoning (moral judgment and moral orientation) and personality (Wark, 1999, 2000). Relations among personality characteristics and moral stage consistency as well as moral orientation consistency will be examined across different types of real-life dilemma. How these relations may be related to perceptions of real-life dilemmas and gender will also be examined. If moral consistency and consistency in the ways we view--that is, the issues we see in and how we react to--real-life moral dilemmas is a characteristic that is desirable and one that should be fostered through education, we must consider how it relates to gender and individual differences in personality and whether or not consistency is the most adaptive form of functioning in everyday life. As well, how young women and men perceive their

12 relationships with their parents should be considered as it may influence the ways parentchild conflicts are viewed and resolved. References Bennion, L. D., & Adams, G. R. (1986). A revision of the extended version of the objective measure for ego identity status: An identity instrument for use with late adolescents. Journal of Adolescent Research, 1, Colby, A., & Kohlberg, L. (1987). The measurement of moral judgment. (Vol. 1). New York: Cambridge University Press. Ford, M., & Lowery, C. (1986). Gender differences in moral reasoning: A comparison of the use of justice and care orientations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, Gibbs, J. C., Basinger, K. S., & Fuller, D. (1992). Moral maturity: Measuring the development of sociomoral reflection. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Harder, D. W. (1987). Additional construct validity evidence for the Harder Personal Feelings Questionnaire measure of shame and guilt proneness. Psychological Reports, 67, Kohlberg, L. (1984). Synopses and detailed replies to critics. In L. Kohlberg (Ed.), Essays on moral development (Vol. 2): The psychology of moral development (pp ). New York: Harper & Row. Lollis, S., Ross, H., & Leroux, L. (1996). An observational study of parents socialization of moral orientation during sibling conflicts. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 42, Pratt, M., Arnold, M. L., & Hilbers, S. M. (1998). A narrative approach to the study of moral orientation in the family: tales of kindness and care, in E. E. Aspaas Skoe & A. L., von der Lippe (Eds.), Personality Development in Adolescence: a cross-national and lifespan perspective, London: Routledge. Tangney, J. P. (1990). Assessing individual differences in proneness to shame and guilt: Development of the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, Walker, L. J. (1997). Is morality gendered in early parent-child relationships? A commentary on the Lollis, Ross, and Leroux study. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 43, Wark, G. R. (2000). The consistency of moral judgment in everyday life. Unpublished manuscript, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia. Wark, G. R. (1999, November). Personality and the consistency of moral judgment in everyday life. Poster presented at the 25th Annual Association for Moral Education Conference, Minneapolis, MN. Wark, G. R., & Krebs, D. L. (2000). The construction of moral dilemmas in everyday life. Journal of Moral Education, 29, Wark, G. R., & Krebs, D. L. (1997). Sources of variation in real-life moral judgment: Toward a model of real-life morality. Journal of Adult Development, 4,

13 Wark, G. R., & Krebs, D. L. (1996). Gender and dilemma differences in real-life moral judgment. Developmental Psychology, 32, Footnotes 1. Participants in the Wark and Krebs (1996, 1997, 2000) studies were drawn from a similar population as participants in the present research. In the former research, participants were undergraduate students from Simon Fraser University, and in the latter research, participants were undergraduate students from the University of British Columbia. 2. The methodology and results presented in the present study represent a subset of a larger study (Wark, 1999) assessing the relations among personality, moral judgment consistency, and moral orientation. (Some of these results were presented as Honors Projects by Jacoba Harlaar and Kevin Mclaren at the University of British Columbia.) For example, participants also completed a general personality measure (the IASR-B5; Trapnell & Wiggins, 1990), a request to compare the real-life dilemmas they described on a rating scale, and a request to list as many additional recent real-life dilemmas they could recall. 3. Other dimensions were also assessed, including how difficult the dilemma was to discuss, how moral and how significant the dilemma was, how recent the dilemma was, and how close the participants felt to the other people involved in the dilemmas, but are not reported in the present study. 4. The format of the dilemmas used in Wark and Krebs (2000), in which it was found that men reported experiencing antisocial dilemmas more often than women, was different from the format used in the present study. More specifically, participants in Wark and Krebs (2000) listed issues they saw to be involved in general descriptions of real life dilemmas, whereas participants in the present study reported and described types of real-life dilemma they had actually experienced. Perhaps the latter format predisposes people to view their experiences with such dilemmas as more frequent (because of the saliency) than otherwise. This has been discussed in Wark and Krebs (1997). Author s Notes The research described in this article was supported by Postdoctoral Fellowship # from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The help of Dr. Lawrence Walker at the University of British Columbia is gratefully acknowledged. Correspondence regarding this article should be sent to Gillian Wark, Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, V6T-1Z4, (604) , wark@sfu.ca.