Attitude Accessibility and Motivation as Determinants of Biased Processing: A Test of the MODE Model

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1 Attitude Accessibility and Motivation as Determinants of Biased Processing: A Test of the MODE Model Robert A. Schuette Russell H. Fazio Indiana University The roles of attitude accessibility and motivation in the biased processing of infurmation were examined as a test of the MODE model. Subjects evaluated two studies with conflicting conclusions regarding capital punishment's crime deterrence efficacy. Attitude accessibility was manipulated by having subjects express their death penalty attitudes either once (low accessibility) or repeatedly (high accessibility) during an initial phase of the experiment. Motivation was manipulated via fear of invalidity; half the subjects were told their evaluations of the capital punishment studies would be publicly compared to an expert panel's conclusions. The relation between attitude and judgment was found to depend on both attitude accessibility and motivation. Judgments were more attitudinauy cong;ruent in the low-fear-ofinvalidity/repeated-expression condition than in the other conditions. Zanna and Fazio (1982) suggested that the attitudebehavior consistency literature can be roughly organized into three "generations" of research, each guided by a distinct question. ''Is there an attitude-behavior relation?" and 'When or under what conditions do attitudes predict behavior?" were the central questions behind the first and second generations of research, respectively. The question driving a more recent third generation of research has been "How do attitudes guide behavior?" The recently proposed MODE model aims to provide a theoretical explication of the multiple processes by which attitudes can guide behavior (Fazio, 1990). In its general form, the MODE model postulates that judgments and behavior can stem from either of two processing modes-a fairly spontaneous process based on the automatic activation of a relevant attitude or a more effortful, deliberative process involving careful consideration of the available information. The spontaneous process requires that one's attitude toward the object be activated from memory on observation of the attitude object. The automatically activated attitude then serves as a filter that influences subsequent object-relevant information processing, in the same way that any activated construct can affect the interpretation ofinformation (e.g., Higgins, Rholes, &Jones, 1977). By virtue of its accessibility, the attitude affects one's construal of the object in the immediate situation. According to the model, then, a prerequisite for the spontaneous mode is that the attitude be relatively accessible from memory. Although the individual need not be aware that the attitude has been activated, the evaluation associated with the attitude object in memory must receive some activation if the attitude is to influence ensuing processing, judgments, or behaviors. Numerous studies have found attitudes that are capable of such automatic activation to influence behavior more strongly than do less accessible attitudes (see Fazio, in press, for a review). This spontaneous attitude-to-behavior process can be contrasted to a more effortful, deliberative process. In- Authors' Note: This research was supported by Research &ientist DevelopmentAwardMHOO452 and GrantMH38832 from the National Institute of Mental Health to Russell H. Fazio. The research was conducted while RobertA. Schuette was supported by an NSF Graduate Fellowship. We thankjenni Bradley, Leigh Fogle, Cheryl Jamieson, and Teresa Robeson for their assistance in data coding and analysis, and Edward Hirt for his helpful comments on an earlier version of the article. Address correspondence to Russell H. Fazio, Department of Psychology, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN PSPB, Vol. 21 No. 7,July by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc. 704 from the SAGE Social Science Collections. All Rights Reserved.

2 Schuette, Fazio / THE MODE MODEL 705 stead of being guided by a relevant, preexisting attitude, construals of the object in the immediate context arise in a more inductive, ''bottom-up'' fashion. In assessing the object, individuals might carefully examine the available information, scrutinize the specific attributes that characterize the object, and note the positive and negative aspects of each attribute. Ajzen and Fishbein's (1980) theory of reasoned action is illustrative of such a deliberative attitude-behavior process. Their theory proposes that people arrive at an attitude toward a specific behavioral alternative through a thoughtful analysis of the likely consequences of the particular option and an evaluation of the desirability of those potential outcomes. The resulting attitude and perceptions of the normative expectations of significant others are weighed and integrated to decide ultimately on an intention to behave in a certain way. The extensive deliberation that is essential to the theory of reasoned action stands in dramatic contrast to the relative effortlessness of the spontaneous process described earlier. The MODE model attempts to integrate spontaneous and deliberative processes within the same framework by specifying the conditions that promote each process. Specifically, motivation and opportunity are the two factors that are postulated to determine which of these two processes will occur (MODE is an acronym for motivation and opportunity as determinants of attitude-tobehavior processes; Fazio, 1990). The MODE model states that, to the extent that they are capable of automatic activation, preexisting attitudes will govern people's judgments and behavior-unless the individuals are motivated to engage in deliberative processing and are given sufficient opportunity to do so. Recent work has found support for the MODE model. Sanbonmatsu and Fazio (1990) presented subjects with sentences describing the positive and negative attributes of two department stores: Smith's department store was excellent in most ways but had a poor camera department, whereas Brown's department store was weak overall but had a very good camera department. Following exposure to the stimulus sentences, and consolidation and expression of their attitudes toward each store, subjects were asked to decide at which store they would shop if they wanted to buy a camera. Subjects could base their decisions on either their earlier-formed overall attitudes toward each store or on a more detailed review of the specific attributes of each store. The latter required effortful recall of the specific attributes of each store's camera department. In terms of the MODE model, a relatively effordess, attitudinally driven process would lead to selecting Smith's, whereas a more deliberative attribute-based process would lead to selecting Brown's. Motivation to deliberate was manipulated using a fear of invalidity procedure adapted from Kruglanski and Freund (1983). Specifically, high-fear-of-invalidity subjects were told that their answers would be compared to the responses of other subjects and that they would have to explain the reasoning behind their decisions to the experimenter and the other subjects. Low-fear-of.invalidity subjects were given no such instructions. Opportunity was manipulated by varying the time allotted to make the decision. High-time-pressure subjects were given 15 s to answer the question, whereas low-time-pressure subjects had no time limit. As predicted by the MODE model, only subjects given sufficient motivation and opportunity (i.e., high-fear-of-invalidity/low-time-pressure subjects) displayed evidence of a deliberative attributebased decision. These subjects were significandy more likely to select Brown's over Smith's for buying a camera, indicating that they had expended the effort to retrieve the specific attribute information regarding each store's camera department. In Sanbonmatsu and Fazio's (1990) study, subjects had to rely on previously formed attitudes toward each store or retrieve attribute information from memory to answer the store selection question. Thus this can be thought of as a memory-based decision (Hastie & Park, 1986). The quality of the subject's response was largely governed by the particular bits of information culled from long-term storage. The specific attributes of each department store that had been presented during the initial phase of the experiment were unambiguously desirable or undesirable. Motivation and opportunity served to induce the subjects to expend the effort required to retrieve the attributes of the camera departments from memory. In contexts involving more ambiguous information, motivation also may influence the thoroughness with which subjects consider possible interpretations of the available information. Such a context is the focus of the present research. The information that subjects were asked to judge was open to varied interpretations. Furthermore, the experiment involved a stimulus-based task instead of a memory-based one. By stimulus-based, we mean that the information relevant to the decision task was present at the time of the decision. Consequendy, deliberative processing would not involve more effortful and thorough retrieval of specific information from memory. Instead, it would concern expending the effort to scrutinize the information more carefully and completely. In this sense, deliberative processing in a stimulusbased context parallels the approach that message recipients have been characterized as pursuing when exposed to a persuasive communication that addresses a personally relevant issue (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Under such conditions, individuals have been found to carefully assess the validity of the persuasive arguments.

3 706 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN It is now well established that stimulus-based judgments can be influenced by relevant attitudes (e.g., Hastorf & Cantril, 1954; Houston & Fazio, 1989; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). For example, Lord et al. (1979) had subjects with extreme attitudes toward the death penalty evaluate the quality of two studies that supposedly examined the effectiveness of the death penalty as a crime deterrent. The "pro-death penalty" study concluded the death penalty was effective, whereas the "condeath penalty" study concluded that it was not. Subjects evaluated the study whose conclusion agreed with their attitude as being better conducted and more convincing than the study whose results conflicted with their attitude. Clearly, attitudes are one variable that can bias information processing. The MODE model offers specific predictions regarding the conditions under which such attitudinally biased information processing will occur. First, the attitude must be accessible from memory when the information is encountered. Indeed, Houston and Fazio (1989) found that the degree to which biased processing occurred in the Lord et al. (1979) paradigm varied as a function of attitude accessibility. More evidence of biased processing was observed among subjects fot whom preexisting attitude accessibility was measured as relativelyhigh (Experiment 1) and among subjects for whom attitude accessibility was enhanced experimentally (Experiment 2). A second factor that the MODE model identifies as critical is that of motivation. Without extensive motivation to deliberate, individuals are likely to readily accept the interpretation of an ambiguous item of information that is implied by their accessible attitude (see Fazio, Powell, & Herr, 1983). That is, they are unlikely to engage in any additional cognitive effort to consider other possibilities. However, when properly motivated, individuals may make an effortful, deliberative examination of the stimulus information in such a manner as to overcome any biasing effects of an accessible attitude. A third critical factor is that of opportunity. When sufficiently motivated to deliberate, individuals must have sufficient opportunity to do so, or they may come to rely on their preexisting attitudes to render judgments (see Jamieson & Zanna, 1989). Thus the influence of accessible attitudes should be most apparent when people lack either the motivation or the opportunity to deliberate. The purpose of the present study is to examine the hypothesis that the relation between attitudes and information processing is moderated jointly by attitude accessibility and motivational level. The experiment aims to test the MODE model in a stimulus-based context involving ambiguous information that is open to varied interpretations. All subjects in this study were provided sufficient opportunity to process information as thoroughlyas theywished. However, attitude accessibility and motivation were manipulated to provide a more precise consideration of the antecedent conditions for biased information processing. The stimulus materials and the method used in the Lord et al. (1979) death penalty study were adapted for this research. The accessibility of attitude toward the death penalty was manipulated by varying the number of times subjects expressed their attitudes across two questionnaires. Repeated attitudinal expression has been found to increase the relative accessibility of that attitude (e.g., Fazio, Chen, McDonel, & Sherman, 1982). Motivational level, or fear of invalidity, was varied by leading some subjects to believe that their responses would be critically evaluated by others and compared to an objectively "correct" answer. Individuals with relatively inaccessible attitudes are theorized to lack a basic prerequisite for attitudinally biased processing and, therefore, are expected to show a relatively small relation between their attitudes toward the death penalty and their judgments of the summarized research studies. Enhancing the accessibility of attitudes toward the death penalty, via repeated attitudinal expression, should enhance biased processing, just as in Houston and Fazio (1989). However, this influence of attitude accessibility should itself be moderated by motivation. Subjects who lack sufficient motivation to do otherwise will readily accept the interpretations implied by their highly accessible attitudes and, hence, will display biased processing when evaluating the studies. In contrast, subjects with accessible attitudes who are motivated by a fear of invalidity will work to counter the influence of their attitudes when evaluating the studies. Hence these individuals are predicted to display relatively less evidence of having processed the stimulus materials in an attitudinally biased manner. In short, the MODE model predicts that attitude accessibility and motivation will have an interactive effect on biased information processing. The relation between attitudes and judgments is predicted to depend jointly on attitude accessibility and motivation. Attitudinally biased processing is predicted to be relatively more extensive among those subjects for whom attitude accessibility has been enhanced and for whom fear of invalidity is low. METHOD Sul1ects A total of 222 Indiana University undergraduates participated in the experiment in fulfillment of a class requirement. Subjects participated in groups of four to nine. Data from seven subjects were omitted from all analyses because of missing or uncodable responses.

4 Schuette, Fazio / THE MODE MODEL 707 Procedure The study employed a 2 (Repeated vs. Single Attitude Expression) x 2 (High vs. Low Fear of Invalidity) between-subjects design. Attitude accessibility was manipulated as in Houston and Fazio (1989). Subjects completed two attitude checklists in which they expressed their attitudes toward a number of current public issues. Subjects first completed a Current Issues Survey containing 34 semantic differential scales dealing with various public issues, each issue appearing three, four, or five times. For half the subjects, the death penalty was one of the three issues that was interspersed through the first survey a total of five times, each time with a different semantic differential scale (repeated-expression condition). The five semantic differentials were approve/ disapprove, good/bad, support/oppose, con/pro, and appropriate/inappropriate. The other half of the subjects first completed surveys that did not include the death penalty as one of the issues (single-expression condition). All subjects then completed a second Current Issues Survey on which they expressed their attitudes concerning 14 issues, including the death penalty, using a 7-point scale ranging from definitely in favor to definitely opposed. Thus subjects in the single-expression condition expressed their attitudes toward the death penalty only once, on the second survey. In contrast, subjects in the repeated-expression condition expressed their attitudes a total of six times. 1 Subjects were then asked whether they would participate in a supposedly separate experiment that another researcher was conducting. Mter agreeing to do so, which all subjects did, they were introduced to a second experimenter who informed them that the study concerned layperson's ability to analyze the quality of scientific research. Subjects were told they would judge two recent studies concerning capital punishment. Subjects in the high-fear-of-invalidity condition were led to believe that their judgments would be compared to those of a Blue Ribbon Panel of eminent social scientists that recently had evaluated research on capital punishment, including the two target studies. The experimenter further remarked, Both studies received clear and unanimous judgment from the panel, but I am not going to tell you yet how they voted. They might have felt that both studies were very good, both were poor, or possibly that one was excellent while the other was mediocre. The point is, we want to compare your judgment of the validity of the research with that of the panel. In other words, we want to see if educated laypersons like yourself can analyze a report of a study carefully enough so that your judgments of the quality of the study will match the currect answer provided by the expert members of the Blue Ribbon Panel.... In fact, what I will do is prepare a summary sheet with your names on it, and the judgments that each of you provided, along wi th the judgments of the Blue Ribbon Panel. I'll pass out copies of these results and then we will have a brief discussion concerning why, in your view, your personal judgments did or did not match those of the panel. These instructions were intended to motivate subjects to consider the details of the descriptions carefully. Essentially, subjects in this high-fear-of-invalidity condition were made to feel some evaluation apprehension about whether their personal judgments would correspond to that of the expert panel, and about the ensuing group discussion (see Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990). No mention of a Blue Ribbon Panel or subsequent discussion was made in the low-fear-of-invalidity condition. Subjects were then given the summaries of two death penalty studies to evaluate, one at a time. (The subjects proceeded in a self-paced fashion, so as to ensure sufficient opportunity for the subjects to be as deliberative as they wished.) Each subject read one study that found that the death penalty was an effective crime deterrent and one study that found it was not effective at deterring crime. Each summary included a description of the study's methodology and data, along with criticisms of the study and the authors' reply to those criticisms (for a more complete description of the materials, see Houston & Fazio, 1989; Lord et al., 1979). Mter reading each study, subjects rated how well conducted the study was (-8 = very poorly done, +8 = very well done) and how convincing the results were (-8 = completely unconvincing, +8 = completely convincing). Subjects also provided an open-ended evaluation of each study for which they were asked to "write a paragraph explaining first, what you think can be concluded on the basis of this study, and second, why you think that it was or was not well conducted." Two judges made a global evaluation of each essay, ranging from -2, meaning the subject felt the study had no merit, to +2, meaning the subject felt the study was flawless. Intercoder reliability on this global rating was.86. Two other judges performed a second, more molecular coding of the essays, which we shall refer to as the attribute shading measure. For this measure, the judges' task was to assess the extent to which subjects shaded specific information presented in the study summaries in a positive or negative direction. For any of the subject's statements that made reference to a specific attribute of the study as mentioned in the summary description, the judges noted whether the subject discussed the attribute as a positive (coded as + I) or a negative (coded as -I) feature. (The judges agreed on 91.1 % of these codings.)

5 708 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN A total score for each essay represented the extent to which the subject had shaded specific characteristics of the study in a particular direction. For both the global evaluation and the attribute shading codings of the essays, the average rating of the two judges was calculated. These average ratings were used in all subsequent analyses. RESULTS The experiment concerns subjects' assessments of the pro and con studies, and the extent to which subjects differentiate between the two studies as a function of their attitudes. Hence a difference score was computed by subtracting the value for the con study from the value for the pro study for each of the dependent measures, the two scalar ratings, and the two essay codings. Attitudes toward the death penalty were expected to be especially predictive of these difference measures in the low-fear-of-invalidity /repeated-expression condition. This hypothesis was tested via hierarchical multiple regressions that focused on the significance of the predicted Attitude x Fear of Invalidity X Expression interaction. This three-way interaction concerns the extent to which the relation between attitude and judgment depends jointly on fear-of-invalidity and expression conditions. Attitude, as measured by the rating all subjects provided on the second questionnaire, was entered into the regressions first, followed by dummy variables coded for fear-of-invalidity condition and for repeated-expression condition. The two-way interactions between these variables and, finally, the three-way interaction were then entered. The impact of the critical three-way interaction is summarized in Table 1. The Attitude x Fear ofinvalidity x Expression interaction produced a marginally significant increment in the proportion of explained variance in each of the three measures that involved subjects' summary assessments: the subjects' ratings of (a) how well conducted and (b) how convincing the studies were and (c) thejudges' ratings of the global evaluation expressed in the subjects' open-ended essays. The three-way interaction on judges' assessments of the extent to which subjects shaded specific attribute information in a positive or negative direction also achieved a marginal level of statistical significance. A similar regression was conducted on an overall composite measure. The composite scores were computed by transforming the score from each measure for each study into z scores and summing the standardized scores across the four measures related to the pro study and the four related to the con study. In effect, these two totals can be viewed as two scales, each composed of four individual items. The internal consistency, as assessed by TABLE 1: Test of the Predicted Three-Way Interaction (Attitude x Fear of Invalidity x Expression) Measure Increase in R2 F p= WeD conducted Convincing Judged global evaluation Judged attribute shading Composite Cronbach's alpha, of each of these two scales was very high-.853 for the pro total and.849 for the con total. The difference between these two totals served as the overall composite measure. The regression analysis revealed the three-way interaction on this composite measure to be stronger than it had been for any of the individual measures examined singly. The three-way interaction attained a conventional level of significance. Thus the overall regression analysis indicated that the relation between attitude and judgments depended jointly on attitude accessibility and motivation, just as predicted. The nature of the interaction revealed by the regression analysis is readily discerned by examining the correlations between attitude and judgment within each of the four conditions. The within-cell correlations between attitude and each of the difference measures (pro study - con study) employed in the regression analyses are presented in Table 2. A positive correlation represents attitudinally biased processing; that is, the more positive the correlation, the more subjects' evaluations of the studies corresponded with their attitudes. Such biased processing clearly was most evident in the lowfear-of-invalidity /repeated-expression conditions,just as predicted by the MODE model. Only subjects with accessible attitudes who had little fear of invalidity displayed a significant correlation between attitudes and judgments. Biased processing was less apparent among subjects whose attitudes were relatively less accessible and among those who were strongly motivated to reach a valid assessment.. DISCUSSION The present findings indicate that the relation between attitude and judgment depends jointly on attitude accessibility and motivation. Only subjects who had repeatedly expressed their attitude and who lacked sufficient motivation to consider the information thoroughly judged the empirical studies in an attitudinally congruent fashion. Single-expression subjects possessed attitudes that were presumably too inaccessible to influence their decision-making processes and thus showed no relation

6 Schuette, Fazio i THE MODE MODEL 709 TABLE 2: Correlations Between Attitude and Evaluation of the Studies Within Each Condition High Fear of Invalidity Low Single Repeated Single Repeated Expression ElCfJression ElCfJression Expression Measure (n -53) (n =55) (n -56) (n - 51) Well conducted * Convincing * Judged global evaluation * Judged attribute shading * Composite.Hi * *p<.ool. between their attitudes and their judgments. Indeed, the effect of repeated expression observed within the lowfear-of-invalidity condition replicates the results ofhouston and Fazio (1989), who found attitude accessibility to moderate the attitude-judgment relation. However, the present study reveals that this influence of accessible attitudes on information processing can be averted when individuals become concerned about the possibility of reaching an invalid conclusion. Repeated-expression subjects for whom fear of invalidity was enhanced showed no relation between their attitudes and their judgments. For these subjects, the biasing influence of an accessible attitude apparently was nullified by their high fear of invalidity. When properly motivated, then, individuals can overcome the potential biasing influences of even a relatively accessible attitude. Unfortunately, the means by which individuals in the high-fear-of-invalidity / repeated-expression condition might have done so are not comprehensively addressed by the current investigation. 2 However, the importance of one specific mechanism is confirmed by the present findings. The judges' coding of the extent of attribute shading evident in the essays suggested that these subjects were more objective, or two-sided, in their treatment of specific study characteristics than were subjects in the low-fear-of-invalidity / repeated-expression condition. Recall that this attributeshading measure concerned the extent to which subjects judged specific attributes presented in the study summaries in a positive or negative direction in their essays. Although a regression analysis revealed no differences between conditions in terms of the number of study characteristics that were mentioned in the essays, the interpretation that subjects made of those characteristics that they did mention appeared to vary as a function of attitude, fear ofinvalidity, and expression. Subjects in the low-fear-of-invalidity / repeated-expression condition seem to have readily accepted the interpretation implied by their highly accessible attitudes. The attributes of the study whose outcomes concurred with their attitudes were interpreted relatively positively, and the attributes of the study whose findings were attitudinally incongruent were interpreted relatively negatively. In contrast, subjects in the high-fear-of- invalidity/repeated-expression condition appear to have resisted such attitudinal influence in the sense that they did not display attitudinally biased shading of the studies' attributes. It appears that the fear of invalidity motivated these subjects to expend the necessary effort to objectively weigh both the positive and the negative value of the studies' attributes. These findings parallel the results of a study by Lord, Lepper, and Preston (1984) that also employed the Lord et al. (1979) death penalty paradigm. Lord et al. (1984) found that instructing subjects to consider whether they would have made the same evaluations if the studies had produced results supporting the opposite side of the issue (termed the "consider-the-opposite" strategy) attenuated the effects of initial attitudes on judgments of the studies. Subjects for whom fear of invalidity was heightened in the current study appear to have spontaneously adopted a functionally similar consider-theopposite strategy when examining the characteristics of each study. Regardless of the specific mechanisms involved in the high-fear-of-invalidity / repeated-expression condition, the present findings clearly confirm the MODE model's predictions concerning the roles of attitude accessibility and motivation in spontaneous versus deliberative decision making. The more accessible an attitude, the more likely it is that the attitude will influence an individual's interpretation of ambiguous information-unless the individual is motivated to process the available information deliberatively. Under these circumstances, the individual will attend to the data in a more objective, thorough fashion and construct a judgment on that basis, thus averting the influence of even a relatively accessible attitude. The research by Sanbonmatsu and Fazio (1990) and the present work illustrate two very different, but nonetheless parallel, forms of deliberative processing. In the memory-based decision task employed by Sanbonmatsu and Fazio, high fear of invalidity motivated subjects to expend the effort necessary to retrieve specific attribute information from memory, instead of simply inferring a decision from preexisting, general attitudes. The attributes themselves were objectively desirable or undesirable qualities and, once retrieved, would promote a decision in favor of the store with the superior camera department. In contrast, the present context involved consideration of all)biguous information available in the immediate situation. Any given attribute could have been interpreted as an asset or as a liability of the study

7 710 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN in question. High fear of invalidity apparently motivated subjects to expend the effort to consider the value of the attributes more thoroughly and objectively, instead of simply accepting the interpretation implied by their attitudes. In either case, deliberative processing presumably entailed greater than typical effort expenditure and hence required that the individual be sufficiently motivated. NOTES 1. Attitude extremity was not affected by this repeated-expression manipulation. Analyses of the absolute value of the final attitude expression revealed that attitudes in the single- and repeated-expression conditions did not differ with respect to their deviation from the neutral point, t < 1 (see Downing,judd, & Brauer, 1992, and Fazio, in press, for detailed discussions of the conditions under which attitude polarization is promoted by repeated expression). 2. One possibility that is not confirmed by the data is that high fear of invalidity motivated subjects to moderate their judgments toward neutrality-in effect, motivated them to refuse to take a stand. Cialdini, Levy, Herman, and Evenbeck (1973) did find that subjects who anticipated discussion on a topic publicly shifted to a more moderate (i.e., more neutral) position on the topic, without actually changing their original attitude. However, in the present context, there was no evidence of such moderation. The absolute value of scores from each dependent measure (the four individual items, as well as the total composite) was subjected to 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVAs with fear of invalidity and expression as between-subjects factors and death penalty study (pro or con) as a within-subjects factor. In none of the analyses was there any tendency toward relatively less deviation from the neutral point in the high-fear-<>f-invalidity conditions. 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