Between Micro and Macro: Individual and Social Structure, Content and Form in Georg Simmel

Transcription

1 Michela Bowman Amy LeClair Michelle Lynn Robert Weide Classical Sociological Theory November 11, 2003 Between Micro and Macro: Individual and Social Structure, Content and Form in Georg Simmel Through exposition of his own philosophy, as well as comparisons to other historical periods and other disciplinary examples, Simmel aims to show the great difference between the forms of social life, which are stagnant and permanent, and the content of life itself, which is dynamic and fleeting. This difference between form and content is manifest in interpersonal relationships, within an individual life, and in the social production of culture. For Simmel, this difference is not simply a fact to be noticed; it is the great contradiction of life itself. Furthermore, he argues that the time in which he is writing represents the zenith of the struggle of the dynamism of life to overtake and destroy not only the current forms themselves, but indeed the very idea of forms. He tries to show that while this struggle has been present throughout history, in other times it was mitigated by the presence of shared ideals. In his time, however, this lack of shared ideals leaves a vacuum which allows life to come closer to consuming and discarding the form as such. Simmel s discussion of the interaction between the individual and society focuses primarily on the role of the individual. Simply put, society results from the interaction of individuals, or, in Simmel s words, Societal unification needs no factors outside its own component elements, the individuals (7). Not only does society develop from the interaction of individuals, however; so, too, does the

2 individual develop from his interaction with society: at any given moment, we consist of interactions with others. We are thus comparable to a physical body which consists merely of the sum of numerous impressions and does not have its own existence (17). Indeed, there is a relationship between the individual and society such as between two parties. Simmel employs his concept of sociation in this discussion. Sociation might be best understood as the symbiotic nature of society: Sociation is the form (realized in innumerably different ways) in which individuals grow together into a unity and within which their interests are realized (24). The individual and society are interdependent and cannot properly function without one another. Simmel s discussions of exchange and conflict provide helpful expositions of his conceptual framework applied to actual manifestations of the relationship between individuals and social structures, content and form. In his discussion of exchange, he describes value as distinct from economic value. Value, he says, is a universal substance, suggesting it has meaning or content which exists in itself, without need of reference to anything else. By contrast, the meaning of economic value arises from the form of exchange the context or social structure which characterizes a form of human interaction. So, he explains, the economic value of an object is determined by the exchange of that object for another. Its value is determined not intrinsically, but by its worth to another individual and by the sacrifice an individual feels in giving it up. Throughout his discussion of exchange, Simmel locates the meaning of different kinds of human exchange, what seem to be social forms in his theoretical framework, in their relationship to the content which individuals bring to exchange. He refers to individual desires, preferences, emotions, and needs in a manner that

3 suggests an understanding of these things as primal, intrinsic, and at some level spontaneous. The meaning of the content, the drive, perhaps, that the individual brings to a social interaction, is then transformed in the interaction, the exchange in this case, which gives new meaning to whatever prior content the individual brought to it. Conflict, according to Simmel, is a form of sociation, which exists only in human interaction, but which contains both content brought to it by individuals (their hatred, envy, needs and desires) and meaning gained from the social phenomenon itself. His discussion of conflict introduces further complexity to his understanding of social relationships. He says we ought to distinguish between, those relations which constitute a unit, that is, social relations in the strict sense, from those which counteract unity. He adds, though, that both relations can usually be found in every historically real situation. This suggests that his concept of social forms is not merely that they give structure and meaning to individual drives and needs, but that they have more or less socializing and unifying effects, and that the extent to which this is true is a matter of concern. He argues that conflict can have an integrative effect on a group, and not merely serve to counteract unity. Simmel also writes explicitly about the effects of group characteristics on individuals. He states that the expansion of group circles increases the degree of individuality in society. (252) He points out that individuality is affected by different circles of social interaction. In smaller social circles, such as the family, any one member s individuality is tightly constrained by the limits of variation within the small circle. In larger societal circles, the higher degree of variation within the circle allow the individual within it to have a wider range of choices in determining their

4 own individuality, thereby resulting in a higher degree of heterogeneity among individuals within the circle. (257) Simmel states: the larger circle encourages individual freedom, the smaller one restricts it (269). Conversely, the individuality of the group is diminished when the social circle expands. Those narrow traits possessed by members that comprise the individuality of small social circles are diminished and no longer shared by members when a larger social circle provides a higher degree of differentiation among individuals. That is the traits that make members a part of the small social circle are dropped in favor of other traits that better suit the personality of each individual, thereby severing the bonds that hold them together (259). Simmel generalizes that although social life consists of many overlapping circles of different sizes, individuals will exhibit the greatest attachment to the smallest and the largest of these circles, and a lesser attachment to the intermediary circles that connect the two extremes (267). Individuals are generally likely to sacrifice for family and country, but not so likely say, for municipality. They focus more on the widest and narrowest circles and less on the intermediate ones. Simmel s analysis of the political sphere supports his generalization in this regard. He points out that nations tend to discourage intermediary associations so that the attention of individuals will be directed toward the state level rather than to intermediary circles such as guilds or other non-governmental associations (277-80). The wider social circle that encompasses all of society provides the individual a greater opportunity than intermediary social circles to discover that, which matches his own unique personality and provides him with the greatest opportunity to express his individuality. For this reason, individuals will favor the widest social circle as a point of focus rather than intermediate ones.

5 Simmel s work provides an interesting comparison to Durkheim. As in Durkheim s theory of organic solidarity, the whole cannot function without any one part. Also like Durkheim, Simmel believes that there is a basic underlying commonality of beliefs which makes society possible. Society may be conceived as a purely objective system of content and actions, connected by space, time, concepts, and values (19). Making an argument that parallels Durkheim s theory of solidarity, Simmel argues, A given number of individuals may be a society to a greater or a smaller degree (27). While intuitively this makes sense, it contains the same flaw as Durkheim s theory as well namely, the inability to be tested. Simmel gives us no measures for gauging the degree of society-ness of a group of individuals. Despite these similarities, Simmel s ideas about the role of forms in social life could be understood as contradictory to Durkheim s, since Simmel, unlike Durkheim, does not seem to privilege any aspect of the whole over the parts. Rather, Simmel suggests that there is something about the greatness of society which is transmuted to the individual; the individual is something because he or she is a social being. In Durkheim s theories, the social form was the social fact, worthy of study and attention in its own right; social facts were the stuff of life, and they were, by definition, permanent. Simmel s theory does not dismiss social facts (or social forms) as unimportant in the study of society, but it does contend that these forms are, on the one hand, rigid and permanent and, on the other hand, in danger of being destroyed by the forces of life. While this contradiction in Simmel s theory seems apparent, he states that he specifically does not want to resolve the complexities and questions that his theory raises. In discussing Simmel s work, it might be appropriate to invoke the painfully tedious discussion of structure versus agency. Indeed, Simmel tends to neglect a

6 discussion of social structure in order to privilege the actions of individuals. Does this weaken his theory?