LINKING FAMILY STRUCTURE AND PERCEIVED VICTIMIZATION RISK: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON

Transcription

1 The Pennsylvania State University The Graduate School College of the Liberal Arts LINKING FAMILY STRUCTURE AND PERCEIVED VICTIMIZATION RISK: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON A Thesis in Crime, Law & Justice by Lacey Nicole Wallace 2011 Lacey Nicole Wallace Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts May 2011

2 The thesis of Lacey Nicole Wallace was reviewed and approved* by the following: David Johnson Professor of Sociology, Demography, and Human Development and Family Studies Thesis Advisor Jeremy Staff Associate Professor of Crime, Law, and Justice and Sociology Paul Amato Arnold and Bette Hoffman Professor of Family Sociology and Demography John McCarthy Professor of Sociology and Department Head *Signatures are on file in the Graduate School. ii

3 ABSTRACT This study examines the potential impact of family structure on perceived risk of victimization as well as the potential mediating effect of social integration on this outcome. Unlike other similar studies, this analysis is grounded in an international context. The primary data for this study come from the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) for the year Supplementary, country-level data are obtained from sources including the United Nations, Transparency International, and the World Values Survey, among others. Data are analyzed using two-level hierarchical linear modeling (HLM2). Findings show that social integration and victimization history mediate the relationship between family structure and perceived risk. No country-level predictors are significant. iii

4 Table of Contents List of Tables... v List of Figures... vi Introduction... 1 Review of the Literature... 4 Defining Perception of Risk... 4 Defining Family Structure... 5 What Do We Know About Perceived Risk and Fear of Crime?... 6 Family Structure, Social Integration, and Perceived Risk... 8 Nation-Level Context Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Vulnerability/ Victimization Argument Social Disorder Argument Social Integration Argument Routine Activities Theory Why Family Structure? Grid Theory and the Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map of the World Data Measures Sample Characteristics Methods Results Discussion and Conclusion References Appendix A: Counties Included in the 2000 ICVS (Source VanKesteren 2008, 2010) Appendix B: Years Used for Data Unavailable in iv

5 List of Tables Table 1: Grid-Group Cultural Theory Table 2: Country-Level Descriptive Statistics by World Region Table 3: Selected Individual Level Descriptive Statistics by World Region Table 4: Partnership Status by Region Table 5: HLM Regression of Perceived Risk on Independent Variables and Controls (Level 1) Table 6: Frequency of Victimization Experiences in Last Year Table 7: HLM Regression of Perceived Risk on Independent Variables and Controls Table 8: Percent of the Explained Variance in Perceived Risk in Table 7 Models Accounted for by Level 2 Variables Table 9: Contribution of Family Structure v

6 List of Figures Figure 1: Within-Nation Theoretical Diagram Figure 2 : Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map of the World (Inglehart, Welzel 2005, pg 64) vi

7 Introduction Although criminologists are typically concerned with criminal behavior and the actual occurrence of crime, much research has also been devoted to perceptions of crime risk and fear of crime. Contrary to what one might expect, many studies show that fear of crime, perceptions of victimization risk, and actual victimization are weakly related (Adams & Serpe 2000; Killias 1990). Furthermore, fear of crime is not entirely explained by actual risk of being victimized (Killias 1990). If perceived victimization risk and victimization history do not fully account for fear of crime, what factors do account for variation in fear of crime? One proposed theoretical model suggests that fear (or perceived risk) is based on a calculated assessment of three components: 1) demographic characteristics that make an individual vulnerable; 2) interpretations and understandings of local threats; and 3) familiarity with local crime occurrences (Baumer 1985). Although there are varying explanations regarding how (and why) certain factors operate within these three components, existing research shows that variables such as sex, age, income, physical fitness, high crime rates in an area, social integration, presence of others (such as children or bystanders), and the presence of protection devices (alarms, door locks, etc.) all help to account for variation in perceived risk of victimization (Adams 2000; Killias 1990). The amount of variation accounted for by these variables, however, depends upon the location in question, the crime considered, and the measurement employed (Adams 2000; Baumer 1985). Although research in this area has been quite thorough, one factor of interest has been largely neglected: the role of family structure. Why would family structure affect perceptions of victimization risk and fear of crime? 1

8 First, marriage or partnership may affect individual characteristics that influence vulnerability, such as income (D Vera & Fry 2010). Second, a person's family structure is also likely to influence an individual's degree of social integration and ties to the surrounding community, affecting perceptions and assessments of local threats (Stevens & Westerhoff 2006). Marriage, for example, provides the additional social ties of one s significant other. Threat and risk perceptions may also be influenced by role expectations associated with marital status or parenthood. Females, for example, might see themselves as safer with a male partner while males may experience the effect of partnership differently. In this study, I examine these possible influences of family structure as indicated by partnership status, number of children in the household, and number of persons in the household overall. In addition to examining the potential impact of family structure on risk perception, I aim to improve upon known findings further by expanding my research beyond the confines of a single-nation study. As noted by Reese (2009), nations vary in their political structures, social norms, economic systems, and other factors. Each of these arenas may shape how crime is defined, viewed, controlled, and punished within a given country. Although we know a fair bit about fear of crime and perceptions of risk at the individual level, understanding how these nation-level processes impact these patterns adds to our existing knowledge (Adams & Serpe 2000; Killias 1990). To this end, I use data from the 2000 International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS; Van Kesteren 2010 and 2008) 1. A study of this nature is important for a few key reasons. First, an elevated fear of crime, by itself, can have lasting and potentially harmful effects on individuals. As Adams (2000) notes, fear of crime can be viewed as a chronic source of stress. As such, it can result in lower 1 Note that the International Crime Victim(s) Survey is listed in some references as the International Crime Victimization Survey. 2

9 life satisfaction, depression, and a decreased ability to cope with negative life events (Adams 2000). Other potential costs of the fear of crime include the cost of security measures and the cost of lost productivity due to energy-consuming changes in behavior, among others (Dolan & Peasgood 2007). In order to reduce unjustifiable fear, research must first identify exactly what factors affect fear of crime and how. This study builds on existing knowledge by focusing on family structure. Second, much of existing research has focused on a particular type of crime (such as burglary) or a particular location (country, county, etc.). Hence, findings have varied considerably in some ways. To address this, the present study makes use of a very large dataset that is based on nationwide samples from multiple countries. Third, the use of international data allows for an examination of how family structure influences perceptions of risk in nations with varying levels of development, crime rates, prevalence of each type of family structure, and other factors. This provides me the opportunity to determine if the effects of family structure on perceived risk are universal (apply in many countries) or dependent on cultural or nation-specific factors. The goals of this study are two-fold. First, using only individual-level data, I examine the impact of family structure on perceptions of risk. I will determine the extent to which there is a direct effect as well as the extent to which victimization history and social integration mediate this effect. On the basis of existing research, I control for factors such as age, sex, and income that may impact family structure (and perceptions of risk) in unexpected ways. Second, I use multi-level analysis to examine the impact of family structure on perceptions of risk across the nations included in the 2000 ICVS. At the country-level, I assess whether the Human Development Index (HDI), corruption, crime rates, migration rates, and value orientation predict variation in perceived risk of victimization. 3

10 Review of the Literature Defining Perception of Risk Before engaging in a study of perceptions of victimization risk, it is necessary to have in mind a specific idea of what we mean when we use this phrase. Although this may seem to be an unnecessary exercise in semantics, existing literature suggests that fear of crime and perceptions of risk are actually two distinct concepts. As defined by Princeton University's Wordnet, fear can be described simply as an emotion experienced in anticipation of some specific pain or danger... (Princeton University 2010). The key idea behind this particular definition is its emphasis on emotion rather than rational calculation of risk. To use this definition would require some measurement of fear of crime as an emotional response to anticipated harm from victimization. For example, a survey question could ask (Farrall & Gadd 2004): Have you ever felt fearful about the possibility of becoming a victim of crime? How often? To describe this emotional aspect of fear of crime, I will use the term fear, following the convention of other authors (Adams & Serpe 2000, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987). This notion of fear of crime, however, is distinct from a person's logical assessment of his risk of or vulnerability to criminal victimization. Like other authors (Adams & Serpe 2000, Ferraro & LaGrange 1987), I will term this more cognitive concept perceived risk. As outlined by Killias (1990), perceived risk has three primary components. First is the person's assessment of his level of vulnerability. This assessment may be based on occupation, gender, area of residence, past victimization experiences, or any of a number of other factors (Killias 1990, pg 99 Table 1). A second factor is the degree of control a person may expect to have over a criminal event in progress. These expectations may be based on a person's self-ranking of physical fitness, the likelihood of others being present, etc (Killias 1990, pg 99 Table 1 ). Lastly is a 4

11 person's assessment of the severity of the consequences of a criminal act, whether they be financial, emotional, physical or otherwise (Killias 1990). Each of these three components of perceived risk is largely a cognitive event, rather than an emotional response. To further demonstrate the difference between the emotional and cognitive aspects of fear of crime, let us consider burglary. To address the emotional aspect of fear of crime, a survey may ask a respondent to indicate the degree to which he feels anxious or worried about being burgled while away from home (Adams & Serpe 2000, pg 623). Here, note the emphasis on how the respondent feels. To assess perceived vulnerability, a survey might instead ask a person about his chances of being burgled (UNICRI 1999, question 39), his ability to withstand the loss financially, his ability to defend himself (Adams & Serpe 2000, pg 624) if he is home during the burglary, etc. Each of these measures would tap the cognitive assessment of risk, rather than the emotions associated with perceived risk. Although these two ideas are certainly related, the use of perceptions of risk as a dependent variable for this study requires this more precise distinction. Defining Family Structure Although I have outlined precise definitions of perceived risk and fear of crime, a similar exercise must be conducted with the term family structure. Like perceived risk, its definition varies by author, often with a specific aim in mind. Typically, the term is used to refer to a person's partnership status, number of parents in the household, number of children, relationships with other members of the household, or some combination of the above (see Blum et.al 2000, Heimer & Matsueda 1987, and Hao 1996 for examples). Given the limitations of the ICVS data, I will only be using partnership status, number of children in the household, and number of persons in the household overall as variables in the analysis. For the purposes of the present 5

12 study, I include the following categories of partnership status: single (not married, not living with a partner in a marriage-like relationship), legally married (definition may vary by nation), living with a partner as a couple (but not married), divorced/ separated, and widowed (UNICRI 1999, question 39). Although the age of majority varies by nation (and within nation), I define a child as anyone under the age of 16, using the ICVS as a guide. Rather than use terms such as nuclear family, blended family, etc. to conceptualize family types, the lack of more detailed information in the ICVS about the household (such as child's relationship to each adult) leads me to treat partnership status and number of children/ persons in household as two distinct measures, albeit of the same concept. Although perhaps a more appropriate term may be household structure, I choose family structure to emphasize the theoretical basis of my study. What Do We Know About Perceived Risk and Fear of Crime? Previous research has identified a number of variables that affect or are correlated with perceived risk of victimization. As Liska and colleagues (1988) note, some factors affect fear of crime and perceived risk by placing people in circumstances or areas that are known to elevate risk of victimization (see also Franklin et.al and Baumer 1985). The poor, for example, are more fearful than those of other higher socioeconomic status (Adams & Serpe 2000). Using the idea from Liska and colleagues (1988), this may be because the poor are more likely to live in areas plagued by drug or other crime problems. Similarly, racial minorities, the less educated, and residents of urban areas are more fearful of crime than whites, the well educated, and residents of rural areas (Adams & Serpe 2000, Liska et.al. 1988). Again, these are people who may be more likely to live in areas where criminal risk is elevated or at least perceived by residents to be elevated. Other variables may impact fear of crime because they affect a person's assessment of 6

13 vulnerability (Franklin et.al. 2008). First, females are more generally more fearful than men (Adams & Serpe 2000). Using the ideas of perceived vulnerability proposed by Killias (1990), it may be that females see themselves as less physically capable of defense in an altercation (loss of control), foresee serious consequences from rape, or feel they are at higher risk because of certain crimes to which men are less vulnerable (such as rape). Fear expressed by the elderly may also operate in a similar fashion, with perhaps more fear of physical harm due to heath problems or overall frailty (Greve 1998). Fixed incomes are also common among the elderly, which could possibly make financial harm more serious for this group than for younger age brackets (Killias 1990). Lastly, those with children at home express greater perceived risk and fear (Adams & Serpe 2000). As Adams and Serpe note, this may because the mass media emphasizes the vulnerability of children. This particular finding will help to guide the present study, as it is one component of family structure. Beyond basic demographic characteristics, a person's perception of disorder in the surrounding area, such as gang activity or noise problems, also contributes to perceived risk of victimization (Franklin et.al. 2008; Ross & Jang 2000). Although these elements of disorder may not be criminal, they may be interpreted as indicative of other social problems, such as crime. Perceived risk cannot be fully explained by actual risk of victimization. As Stafford and Galle (1984) discuss, perceptions of victimization risk mediate the relationship between actual risk and fear of crime. These perceptions are affected by sources as diverse as the media, members of the surrounding community, and a person's experiences with crime. These sources of information may lead to an inaccurate perception of victimization risk, thereby leading to fear levels that may or may not match with actual victimization risk. Even behavior that is just offensive or disorderly may impact a person's perceived risk (Stafford & Galle 1984). Further, a 7

14 person's sources of information about criminal risk, as well as his perceptions of risk, vary based on a number of demographic characteristics such as race, gender, or age. Family Structure, Social Integration, and Perceived Risk Beyond the impact of children in the home (Adams & Serpe 2000), an examination of family structure as a predictor of perceived risk is largely neglected in the literature. If all persons had roughly the same family structure, the premise of this study would be moot. However, as the rates of marriage/ divorce and the average number of children in a household typically vary year to year and country to country, the statistics concerning these variables serve as an important backdrop for this study. Although I will provide descriptive statistics later for the ICVS sample, here I will focus on other sources of information. To start with the United States, in 2000 (the same time at which the ICVS data were collected), the U.S. Census results indicated that approximately 54% of persons ages 15 and older were currently married, 18% were widowed, divorced, or separated and 27.1% were never married (Kreider & Simmons 2003). These findings were not uniform among racial, gender, and age groupings, however. Asians, for example had the highest percentage of currently married (around 60%) and the lowest percentage of divorced/ separated (around 4%) (Kreider & Simmons 2003). In contrast, African Americans had the lowest percentage of currently married (42% for males, 32% for females) (Kreider & Simmons 2003). Although not addressed by the U.S. Census, the March 2000 Current Population Survey (CPS) indicates that 3.7% of households in the U.S. are classified as unmarried partner (cohabiting) households (Fields & Casper 2001). As this report notes, however, this is likely an underestimate due to social undesirability issues and the possibility that a household may contain another cohabiting couple. The CPS also found that the average number of persons in a household in 2000 was 2.62 persons (Fields & Casper 2001). 8

15 These statistics for the U.S. are not universal. In Japan, for instance, an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report estimates that 47.5% of Japanese were currently married in 2002 while 2% were cohabiting (OECD 2010, Table SF3.3.A). In Norway, in contrast, 44.1% of adults were currently married in 2001 while 10.7% were cohabiting (OECD 2010, Table SF3.3.A). As these figures demonstrate, rates of marriage and cohabitation are quite variable, although marriage is the modal relationship status. As such, my examination of the impact of family structure across nations is a useful contribution to the study of victimization and perceived risk. Although it is possible that the effects (if any) of family structure are universal, it is also quite possible that cultural, legal, and other differences may lead this effect to differ among nations. Should this be the case, determining the correlates of these variations may open avenues for future research. Current research on the effects of family structure on perceived risk is unfortunately lacking. As mentioned previously, those living with children seem to be more fearful of crime (Adams & Serpe 2000). I expect that the same finding will be replicated with the present study. The impact of partnership status or number of persons in the household is less clear. As Liska and colleagues (1988) note, married persons are more likely to focus their social activities around home and family. As such, they may be less likely to spend time in areas or situations that could make them vulnerable to crime. This may make them perceive less risk overall. However, being part of a relationship (currently or in the past) may make a person vulnerable to crime within the home, in the form of assault (Maxfield 1987). This risk may differ based on relationship status. Shackelford (2001, 2005), as one example, finds that women in cohabiting relationships are at a higher risk for murder by their partners than married women. His findings held in both Australia and the United States, suggesting that this is not a phenomenon unique to a 9

16 single nation. Thus, it is clear that having measures of perceived risk both in the home and elsewhere is necessary for a clear picture of how family structure impacts perceived risk. Liska and colleagues (1988) also note that social isolation may increase fear of crime, although this effect may decrease or vanish when gender is controlled. This finding would suggest that single persons or those living with fewer persons may express more fear. As the above finding hints upon, family structure and social integration are linked. Using the convention of Adams and Serpe (2000), I define social integration as the degree to which a person is attached to or feels that he is part of a community. As this is fairly broad, I also borrow ideas from Stevens and Westerhof(2006) who refer to it as involvement in social events or other relationships. From the ICVS data, I use measures of time in residence (UNICRI 1999, question 2), home ownership (UNICRI 1999, question 45), and visiting behavior (UNICRI 1999, questions 43 & 43a) to operationalize this concept. The ICVS also includes a measure of neighborhood cohesion (UNICRI 1999, question 36), but this question was not asked of respondents in all regions. As addressed by Stevens and Westerhof (2006), marriage has the potential to increase one's social connections, perhaps through a partner's contacts. This provides a network of social and financial support on which individuals can depend should a victimization event occur. It is also quite possible, and suggested in this study, that the presence of these contacts factors into the calculation of perceived risk, notably one's interpretation of a threat. However, marriage also has the potential to isolate the married couple from other social relationships. Using cross-national data from the Netherlands and Germany, the Stevens and Westerhof found that Germans were more reliant (in terms of social support) on their partners and children than respondents from the Netherlands (Stevens & Westerhof 2006). The authors suggest that Germans may be more 10

17 family-focused because of less governmental support in that area (Stevens & Westerhof 2006). This finding indicates that social welfare policies may impact how family structure relates to social integration. Low levels of social integration may contribute to fear by isolating individuals from social and financial support. Those less integrated are likely to feel more vulnerable to crime (as found by Adams and Serpe 2000; Ross & Jang 2000). Since family structure appears to have influence on social integration, this is one way that family structure may impact fear of crime or perceived risk. In general, studies have found that social integration in various forms can lessen fear of crime or perceived risk of victimization, although results are somewhat mixed. Riger and colleagues (1981), for example, find that feelings of attachment to the community and residential ties to the community seem to decrease fear. Taylor and colleagues (1984), additionally, find that more formal ties to community organizations lessen fear of crime. As a result of these findings, I expect that homeownership, time in residence, and greater frequency of visiting behavior will be associated with lower levels of perceived risk. Interestingly, Riger and colleagues do not find that social interaction among neighbors is related to fear (or perceived risk) of crime. Kanan and Pruitt (2002), additionally, find little evidence for a social integration effect. However, it is possible that mixed findings among some studies may be related to the underlying concepts that the survey questions were meant to measure. As an example, Rountree and Land (1996), after separating out perceived risk and fear of crime measures, find that social integration decreases overall perceived risk while actually increasing burglary-specific fear. Thus, it is crucial that fear and perceived risk be measured separately and accurately. Given the available findings overall, it seems likely that social integration will impact perceived risk of victimization. However, it should be noted that social integration can be influenced by more 11

18 than just family structure and other basic controls; national and cultural context may play some role. One cross-national study, conducted by Hollinger and Haller (1990), relates social integration to sociocultural characteristics. The typology used by the authors distinguishes between public and private value orientation among nations. Those nations with a public orientation are more individualistic, characterized by social networks that include a large number of persons that are not family members. Countries with a private orientation, in contrast, are more family-focused in their social arrangements, with a greater focus on the collective (Hollinger & Haller 1990). It is argued that development and urbanization contribute to a more public orientation, although the authors find that housing types are more important in affecting social networks (Hollinger & Haller 1990). Countries such as the United States are characterized by detached, single-family homes that are often spread across fairly large geographical distances (Hollinger & Haller 1990, pg120). Thus, residents in countries such as these rely less on both family and neighborhood. Although not directly related to fear of crime or perceived risk, these findings help to explain cross-national differences in the ways people interact (i.e. social integration). Nation-Level Context Although I have heretofore focused on family structure and other predictors of perceived risk and fear of crime, I have as yet neglected the second aim of my study: to ground this research in an international context. As briefly mentioned in the previous section, value orientation and other national characteristics can shape social integration. However, these characteristics can also shape family structure patterns and perceived risk assessments. International comparisons of perceived risk, unfortunately, are largely absent from the 12

19 literature, although some factors have been indicated as possible predictors. One factor mentioned in a cross-national study by Reese (2009) is the variation in crime rates. A recent United Nations report (Harrendorf et.al. 2010) found that the overall homicide rate worldwide was 7.6 per 100,000 persons. However, this was quite variable by region. Rates around 20 or 30 per 100,000 persons were found in areas such as Southern Africa and the Caribbean while rates of 3 per 100,000 were found in parts of Europe. Similar variation is found with other crimes as well. Using the notion of perceived vulnerability/ risk (Killias 1990), those residing in nations with higher crime rates may feel that their risk of criminal victimization is higher. Thus, crime rates may impact perceived risk directly. Contrary to this expectation, a recent study by Reese (2009) finds that nations with higher crime rates exhibit lower levels of fear of crime, perhaps due to some sort of desensitization effect. However, crime rates are the only nation-level factor considered in the analysis. Only a select few individual-level variables, which do not include family structure, are included as well. My analysis will build on this research by examining more variables at each level of analysis. As the countries included in the ICVS vary in their level of development and industrialization, I should note here that some have argued that crime rates may be associated with development and industrialization (Soares 2004). That is, a positive association between higher crime rates and development would imply that something about development leads to crime rate increases. Soares (2004) puts this issue to rest. His analysis finds that the positive relationship between level of development and crime rates is due to crime reporting behavior. As per capita income increases (as it does with development), likelihood of reporting crime increases. Thus, development does not cause crime; it simply affects the likelihood that crime will be reported (Soares 2004). Use of a victim-based survey, as opposed to police reports or 13

20 other official data sources, allows me to somewhat bypass the issues concerning variations in reporting behavior since the ICVS likely accounts for many crimes not reported to or recorded by policing agencies. A second potential factor affecting family structure and fear of crime is the racial/ ethnic composition of the population. As Bennet and Flavin (1994, pg 362) explain, the subcultural diversity perspective posits that being around groups whose behaviors, values, etc. may be different from one's own will increase fear of crime and perceived risk. This behavior has sometimes been termed the dangerous groups or racial threat perspective/ theory (Chiricos 2001). Further, racial/ ethnic composition of the population may impact marriage patterns. In The United States, interracial marriage has become more common, but it is still relatively rare (Qian & Lichter 2007). Additionally, some groups are more likely to marry whites than others. As a result of these trends, the marriage market is still largely governed by race, age, and location (Qian & Lichter 2007). Changes in numbers of those available matching on these characteristics have the potential to affect the likelihood of marriage. As an example, Charles and Luoh (2010) find that rising male incarceration results in lowered likelihood of marriage among certain groups of women. Although this is a finding within the United States, it is not unlikely that similar processes may be relevant in other countries. To partially investigate the race/ ethnicity issue, I include the net migration rate at the nation-level in my analysis. Lastly, as briefly discussed under Family Structure, Social Integration, and Perceived Risk, a country's orientation towards collective (perhaps family-oriented) versus individualistic values is another nation-level characteristic to consider, especially given the number and variety of nations included in the 2000 ICVS. As discussed previously, national orientation may impact the types of social relations engaged in by varying family structures, as well as the family 14

21 structures themselves (presence of extended kin, for example). Degree of social integration, in turn, may impact fear of crime. Adams and Serpe (2000), for example, find that social integration in a community reduces fear of crime. It is also likely that a nation's orientation will influence the scope of its social policies, which may explain some of the differences observed by Stevens and Westerhof ( see my discussion under Family Structure, Social Integration, and Perceived Risk ). A more precise description of how I classify nations according to orientation will be detailed under Theoretical Background. 15

22 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses As mentioned previously (see section entitled What do we know about perceived risk and fear of crime? ), explanations of perceived risk typically focus on characteristics that place a person in situations that increase risk or perceived risk of criminal victimization. Some, however, are geared towards explaining what factors will reduce perceived risk, sometimes called inhibiting factors (Franklin et.al. 2008). Here, I discuss three approaches to explaining perceived risk: vulnerability, disorder, and social integration. The first two address what factors may contribute to placing persons at increased risk or perceived risk while the last touches on factors that may reduce perceived risk of victimization (Franklin et.al. 2008). I briefly discuss Routine Activities Theory as another perspective on this issue. In this section, I also describe how I intend to distinguish nations based on value and cultural orientation. I first outline some of the premises of Grid Theory (Bennett & Flavin 1994), followed by the Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map of the World that I intend to use for the present study. Within each section, I briefly note the hypotheses I make with regards to each theoretical perspective informing the study. Vulnerability/ Victimization Argument Summarized succinctly, this perspective posits that perceived risk of victimization is a result of a person s assessment of personal vulnerability based on basic demographic characteristics (Bennett & Flavin 1994, Franklin et.al. 2008). Elements of perceived vulnerability can be split into physical and social characteristics (Skogan & Maxfield 1981). Physical characteristics can include physical fitness (ability to defend oneself), health (seriousness of consequences stemming from an attack), vulnerability to attack (based on gender, for example), and other characteristics that contribute to a person s assessment of vulnerability to physical 16

23 attack. These characteristics partially explain why the elderly (who may be less physically fit, less healthy, and appear more vulnerable to potential offenders) and women (who may be vulnerable to rape or other attacks by males) commonly express more fear (Bennett & Flavin 1994). Social characteristics, in contrast, include factors such as economic circumstances, education, or past victimization experiences (Bennett & Flavin 1994) that may also increase risk. It is argued, for example, that those with lower levels of education (or income) may not have adequate financial resources to cope with criminal victimization (Bennett & Flavin 1994). These persons may also live in more impoverished neighborhoods where crime is more prevalent. Further, those with fewer connections or less access to community, political, or social resources (as a result of demographic characteristics) may perceive themselves as less capable of coping with the consequences of victimization (Franklin et.al. 2008). Family structure, from this point of view, would relate more to social characteristics than physical characteristics. This is because there is no reason to expect that married persons might be physically stronger than others, that single persons would be healthier than married persons, etc. One social characteristic that would be expected to play a role is income. Those living with a partner (married/ cohabiting) potentially have a second income to draw on for support. This means that these persons may have the financial resources to withstand a victimization event, leading to a reduction in perceived risk. Further, due to social integration and social ties with those connected to the partner, these persons may have more developed emotional support systems as well, again leading to decreased perceived risk. Lastly, those with more persons present within the household may perceive themselves as being less at risk to crimes such as burglary because someone is more likely to at home at any given time. Conversely, however, a greater number of children within the home may increase perceived risk, as respondents may feel 17

24 that there are more vulnerable persons within the home. However, the ICVS measures used in the present study do not address safety concerns regarding children. I draw on this perspective in the present study by including measures of age, gender, income bracket, education, partnership status, number of children in household, and past victimization experiences (within last five years) at the individual level as variables at Level one in my analysis. At the nation level (Level two in the analysis), I include per capita income as an indicator of overall financial vulnerability. I expect to replicate findings from prior research that show that those who are older, female, low-income, less-educated, and have had previous victimization experiences in the last five years will express greater perceived risk of victimization than those who are young, male, higher income, well-educated, and have not been previously victimized in the last five years. I expect that respondents will express greater perceived risk in nations with lower per capita income. Lastly, I expect that respondents who are married or cohabiting will express less perceived risk for the reasons outlined above. Social Disorder Argument This perspective asserts that perceived risk of victimization is at least partially a function of the perceived social or physical disorder of a community (Franklin et.al. 2008). Although not necessarily indicative of crime, cues that indicate disorder imply that a community is unable or unwilling to establish social control, leading to a feeling of vulnerability (Bennett & Flavin 1994, Frankilin et.al. 2008). Community characteristics that indicate disorder include loiterers, unsupervised groups of young people or gang activity, visible drug use or dealing, graffiti, trash, etc (Bennett & Flavin 1994, Franklin et.al. 2008). Here, disruptive behaviors are described by Franklin and colleagues (2008) as social incivility while physical characteristics of the surroundings (such as trash or abandoned vehicles) are physical incivilities (pg 208). As Bennett 18

25 and Flavin (1994) note, higher overall neighborhood income is expected to prevent elements of disorder, as wealthier residents have greater political power over residence and police activity within their neighborhoods. Although I focus on international rather than inter-community variation, I include a measure of per capita income at the nation-level that may get at this idea that the more affluent have greater control over their surroundings. I expect that respondents will express less perceived risk in nations with higher per capita income. Further, I include nation-level measures of crime rates, human development, and corruption that may be indicative of the kind of disorder addressed by the social disorder perspective. I expect that nations with high crime rates, lower human development, and high corruption will have more respondents expressing greater perceived risk. Unfortunately, this perspective offers little in the way of explaining why family structure might impact perceived risk of victimization. Although an exact measure is unavailable in the ICVS, the impact of female-headed households is one potential avenue for future investigation. As Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) find, higher crime rates in urban areas can be partially explained by more female-headed households. It is possible that the presence of these forms of households gives the impression of social disorder, increasing perceptions of victimization risk. Social Integration Argument Put simply, the social integration argument posits that perceived risk of victimization is reduced through social integration into the neighborhood or overall community (Franklin et.al. 2008). As stated previously (see section entitled Family Structure, Social Integration, and Perceived Risk ), I define social integration as the degree to which a person is attached to or feels that he is part of a community, particularly as evidenced by level of involvement in social 19

26 events or other relationships. According to this perspective, those who are familiar with neighbors (friendships), have organizational ties to the community (such as church, neighborhood, or other groups), or take part in neighborhood activities will display reduced assessments of perceived risk (Franklin et.al. 2008). Although taking a different approach, I also restate here the basic premise of the subcultural diversity or dangerous groups perspective. This approach states that fear of crime is elevated through close residence to those from varying ethnic or religious groups (Bennett & Flavin 1994; Chiricos et.al. 2001). Although not necessarily criminal in nature, the behaviors and values of these varying groups, to the degree that they are different from one s own, may inspire fear (Bennett & Flavin 1994). As Chiricos and colleagues find (2001), a racial group may feel threatened once populations of other racial groups reach a certain size. The wellresearched racial threat hypothesis would suggest that social control efforts would be mobilized at that point. I group this idea with social integration as fear is likely to only emerge if levels of cohesion (i.e. social integration) among members of different racial/ ethnic groups are low. I draw primarily on this theoretical perspective for the present study. At the individual level, I include measures of family structure, time in neighborhood, home ownership, and frequency of visiting others or being visited. I argue that those who have lived in their neighborhoods for longer periods of time, own their homes, and visit others (or are visited) frequently are more socially integrated than those who have lived in their neighborhoods for short periods of time, rent their homes, or report infrequent visiting behavior. Thus, these respondents will express less perceived risk than others. I also argue that those who are married or cohabiting and those with a greater number of persons in the household will be more socially 20

27 integrated as a result of their ties with significant others and household members. These are persons who have more social, emotional and financial ties to draw on in case of emergency, leading to decreased perceptions of risk. Again, I expect that these respondents will express less perceived risk since they are more socially integrated (a mediation effect). At the nation-level I include the net migration rate to incorporate ideas from the subcultural diversity perspective. I expect that those residing in nations with greater net migration rates will express greater perceived risk of victimization than those residing in nations with lower net migration rates. Routine Activities Theory Routine Activities Theory suggests that crime is the result of the intersection of a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of capable guardians against crime (Cohen & Felson 1979). Although not a direct application of the theory, it would not be a large jump to guess that perceived risk might also be increased in these circumstances. Thus, for example, we would expect to see greater perceived risk in areas where police forces are perceived to be absent or ineffective (absence of capable guardians), in known crime areas (motivated offenders), or among persons that perceive themselves as vulnerable (suitable targets). The latter notion has been discussed as the Vulnerability/ Victimization Argument. Although the ICVS does not include appropriate measures of these ideas at the individual level, I can examine these at the national-level. Namely, I include corruption as a measure of police effectiveness and crime rates as a measure of criminal activity. Why Family Structure? Since family structure is a key variable in this study, I will briefly summarize the theoretical reasoning behind my expectation that perceptions of risk will vary by family structure, and that that this may be influenced by the overall national environment. First, I argue 21

28 that family structure influences social integration which in turn influences perceptions of risk. Those in established partnerships may be more likely to have residential and other ties to their communities that encourage trust, provide social support, provide financial support, or even imply that crime is of less concern. Thus, family structure could have an indirect effect through social integration (the social integration perspective). Second, family structure influences lifestyle and behavior in other ways that can affect history of victimization or perceived vulnerability overall, which could also affect perceived risk. For example, single persons may be more likely to go to bars or enter other environments that place them at greater risk of harm, increasing perceived risk of being out alone. Further, those with partnerships may be less likely to leave home alone overall. A single person may also perceive risk of burglary since he or she may have a greater likelihood of leaving a home unattended while away. These ideas are based on Routine Activities/ Lifestyles Theory which posits that crime occurs when a suitable target, a motivated offender, and the absence of capable guardians against crime intersect. Thus, I expect to see a direct effect of family structure as well as an indirect effect acting through history of victimization and social integration. Lastly, although these characteristics will be controlled for in this study, family structure may impact income or other characteristics that may increase or decrease vulnerability. Regarding international variation in these effects, I expect that a nation's value orientation will impact the meaning of and norms surrounding family structure in ways that may influence perceived risk (see below for detailed discussion). Namely, there will be differences in what forms of partnership are acceptable, how the family can contribute to survival/ safety, and how the family interacts with the surrounding community. This is particularly the case in nations where survival or traditional religious values are of high importance, making distinctions among 22

29 family structures (single vs. partnership, cohabiting vs. married, etc.) more pronounced. Further, I expect high crime rates, corruption, low per capita income, and other national characteristics to lead to greater perceived risk directly or through their influence on social integration. Figure 1: Within-Nation Theoretical Diagram 2 Grid Theory and the Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map of the World Since the previously discussed theoretical perspectives are only of limited use in explaining international variation in perceived risk of victimization, I include here a brief discussion of two ideas that help me to classify nations by cultural and value orientation as well as to explain why perceived risk of victimization may vary based on national orientation. First, is Grid Theory, a perspective that classifies cultures based on the dimensions of group and grid (Douglas 1982). The group dimension refers to how closely people are integrated and bonded with one another. High scoring on the group dimension would reflect a culture where individuals have a strong sense of identity, are supportive of one another, and have close relationships (i.e. strong social integration). This would be a culture characterized by high level of trust. Grid, in contrast, refers to the relative positioning of persons within the culture. High grid, for example, would mean that most persons are relatively equal in their abilities and placement in society. Low grid would refer to a more hierarchically organized culture with highly specialized roles and 2 Note that double-arrows imply correlation. 23

30 power imbalances (Straker; Douglas). Cultures vary on both of these dimensions, creating a four-category classification system. These ideas are summarized in Table 1 below (see Straker). Table 1: Grid-Group Cultural Theory Low Group High Group Low Grid Weak interpersonal ties Low similarity among individuals strong power imbalances and low cohesion Strong interpersonal ties Low similarity among individuals Collectivist High Grid Weak interpersonal ties Strong similarity among individuals Individualism and self-reliance Strong interpersonal ties High similarity among persons Egalitarianism Based on this classification system, we would expect that the degree of trust and fear present in a given society may vary based on cohesion (group) or social ordering (grid). For example (ignoring other factors temporarily), I argue that those in high group, high grid cultures are likely to be high in trust and low in perceived risk due to a strong level of interdependence and social balance. I would expect the exact opposite for a society based on the low group, low grid system. Here, individuals have little reason to depend on one another and thus limited group cohesion to draw on for social support. As is evidenced by my broad predications, this theory is a bit difficult to apply in practice, as these are vague categories and these dimensions may vary considerably within societies. For the present study, I, instead, make use of the Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map of the World as a similar, yet more practical, classification system. The Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map of the World (see Figure 1 below) was developed by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel using data from the Wold Values Survey (WVS). This survey is a cross-national study of many countries aimed to determine the values, beliefs, and ideas that persons in varying cultures have. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) determined that many of 24

31 these ideas and beliefs can be derived from two constructs: traditionalism/ secular-rationalism and survival/ self-expression values. Traditionalism/ secular-rationalism refers to the degree of importance attached to religious values within a society, with traditionalist societies placing a higher value on religion. Survival/ self-expression is related to a nation's level of modernization. In a developing, pre-indisutrial society, residents value and emphasize physical and economic security, as these guarantee survival. In more affluent, developed nations, residents may take survival as a given and places more value on self-expression, altruism, and self-fulfillment. Societies with high self-expression values tend to also be high in trust and political activism. According to Inglehart, these two dimensions account for 70 percent of cross-national variance in the World Values Survey (Inglehart Inglehart-Welzel... ). The scoring of countries on these two dimensions is reflected in Figure 1 below. Scores closer to -2.0 on the x-axis reflect strong survivalist tendencies while scores closer to -2.0 on the y-axis reflect strong traditionalist values. Those closer to 2.0 reflect the opposite for each dimension. 25

32 Figure 2 : Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map of the World (Inglehart, Welzel 2005, pg 64 3 ) For the present study, a score above 0 on the survival-self-expression scale reflects a selfexpression value orientation. A score above 0 on the traditional-secular scale reflects a more secular orientation. Using this cutoff, I classify countries as falling into one of four categories: survival-traditional, survival-secular, self-expression-traditional, and self-expression-secular. Based on the above framework, I expect that survival cultures will express greater perceived risk of victimization than self-expression cultures. This is because these are cultures where survival is not taken as a given and where physical and economic insecurities run high. Further, a focus on survival may inhibit trust of others, dampening the effects of social integration. The impact of family structure may be greater in these nations since the difference between being alone and living with others may be substantial. However, a greater number of children may be 3 Figure obtained from 26