Intentional Horizons

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Intentional Horizons"

Transcription

1 Mind Knowledge Communication Intentional Horizons The Mind from an Epistemic Point of View von Magdalena Balcerak Jackson 1. Auflage mentis 2009 Verlag C.H. Beck im Internet: ISBN schnell und portofrei erhältlich bei beck-shop.de DIE FACHBUCHHANDLUNG

2 Mind Knowledge Communication Edited by Christoph Fehige and Thomas Metzinger Founded by Georg Meggle and Thomas Metzinger

3 Magdalena Balcerak Jackson Intentional Horizons The Mind from an Epistemic Point of View mentis PADERBORN

4 INTRODUCTION This book is a defence of intentionalism. In contemporary analytic philosophy most philosophers of mind are intentionalists of some sort, holding that the phenomenal character of mental states supervenes on their intentional properties. The motivation is typically ontological: the intentional description of mental states is seen as the basis for a reduction of the phenomenal to the physical or the functional. In this dissertation I take a different perspective: I argue that it is more fruitful to see intentionality as the basis for a theory that explains how various different mental acts thoughts, perceptions, emotions and bodily sensations are epistemically significant for us. Once we adopt an epistemological perspective on the mind, we can find a new although fundamentally very traditional way to understand intentionality. And we can formulate an intentionalist theory that not only has more explanatory force, but is also more phenomenologically adequate than accounts available so far. The book has two parts: The first half is primarily a methodological analysis of how we should and should not study intentionality and discuss intentionalism. The second half begins the positive work of developing a successful intentionalist theory based on an enriched epistemic two-dimensional semantics for mental states. Chapter 1 fulfils two functions: First, it develops an analysis of intentionality from a set of pre-theoretical intuitions that we have about the structure, the unity and the epistemic status of our mental states. These intuitions, which connect two fundamental perspectives on the mind the phenomenological and the epistemic perspectives determine the role that intentionality plays. Ever since Franz Brentano famously suggested that intentionality is the mark of the mental, philosophers of mind have tried to formulate a theory of intentionality that could account for our phenomenological and epistemic intuitions, but the ideas about what, exactly, it is that needs to be accounted for are very diverse. I show that the debate about intentionalism in contemporary philosophy of mind branches out in various directions and suffers from the lack of a clear and independent set of questions and problems. Therefore, chapter 1 introduces a coherent terminology and establishes a common ground concerning what intentionality and intentionalism are, so that the intentionalism debate can be reconsidered. The second function of chapter 1 is to lay out the requirements for a good theory of intentionality. I argue that in order for a theory of intentionality to be satisfactory, it has to be

5 12 Introduction phenomenologically adequate, and it must have what I call explanatory force. A theory is phenomenologically adequate if it captures the phenomenal differences between different mental acts presented to us in the first-person-perspective. A theory has explanatory force if it explains what a particular mental act, such as a perception or a thought, contributes to the process of acquiring knowledge about the world and ourselves. Chapter 2 shows how paradigmatic intentionalist theories fail to satisfy these requirements. I discuss Michael Tye s PANIC-Representationalism, Tim Crane s Classical Intentionalism and Charles Siewert s Complementarism. In addition to suffering from certain internal technical problems, each of the three accounts is forced to make a momentous choice: Either it must violate phenomenologically obvious features of mental acts in favour of a simple account of their contents, or else it must give up on specifying what the contents of particular mental acts are. The first choice sacrifices phenomenological adequacy, and the second choice leaves the theory without explanatory force. The discussion in chapter 2 raises the worry that the two adequacy criteria are actually incompatible. The apparent incompatibility arises from certain commitments that form the basis for two philosophical projects: the phenomenological project and the linguistico-analytic one. However, in chapter 3 I argue that these projects not only have common historical roots in the work of Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl, but also that they have structurally similar methodologies. I give a rational reconstruction of Husserl s method of phenomenological reduction and a description of the method of conceptual analysis (as presented by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson) to demonstrate that both forms of philosophical analysis are attempts to reach a priori knowledge through the systematic evaluation of possibilities. The basic idea they have in common is the following: By suspending the referential aspect of our mental acts and engaging in hypothetical reasoning, we can discover necessary truths about the structure of our concepts and the structure of our experience. Following this method, we can balance out our judgments about the phenomenal character and the content of our mental acts and arrive at an intentionalist account that can fulfil both of our criteria. Turning to the second half of the book, I begin in chapter 4 with a positive argument for intentionalism, one grounded in the basic insight of the book that intentionalism should be understood as an epistemological thesis. We are interested in an intentional theory of the mind because all mental acts are, in one way or another, epistemically significant for us. Furthermore, a given mental act has the epistemic significance it does at least partly in virtue of having a specific phenomenal character. I explain what it takes for mental acts to be epistemically significant in virtue of their phenomenal character by appeal to phenomenal inferential roles, and I show how those inferential roles determine a form of content. Beyond answering the general question about meaningfulness, accounting for phenome-

6 Introduction 13 nal character in terms of content guarantees that we can model and evaluate the particular epistemic contributions of particular mental states. In chapter 5, I show that the theory that best fulfils this function is an application of David Chalmers Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics to the contents of mental acts. According to this neo-fregean framework, the content of a mental act is determined by the inferential role it plays in the network of other experiential states, by how it functions in the reasoning processes performed by a subject. More formally, the content can be represented as a function from epistemically possible worlds to extensions. But while Chalmers theory does a much better job of individuating mental states in accordance with our phenomenological judgements about cognitive significance than any rival theory, it has trouble dealing adequately with the contents of rich perceptual states, and with the mental acts involved in a priori reasoning. Hence it is unable to fulfil the phenomenological adequacy criterion. Therefore, in chapter 6 I suggest a major revision and supplementation of simple epistemic two-dimensionalism by introducing a further component of content, intentional horizons. Intentional horizons are organisational functions on the space of epistemic possibilities; they enable us to distinguish the contents of two mental states with respect to the differences in epistemic significance that can result from different past experiences, different cognitive abilities, different background assumptions and different amounts of past reasoning. Intentional horizons provide a solution to the problems encountered within Chalmers framework. Moreover, they show that a successful intentionalist theory must include an account of the cognitive dynamics of mental acts and their contents. Intentional horizons tie the knot between phenomenology, epistemology and semantics. The main aim of this book is to develop an original, positive and constructive contribution to the debate about intentionalism. It aims to do so by simultaneously bringing the debate back to its origins and advancing it beyond its current state, a state in which the basic motivations, questions and problems of intentionality have been lost within very specialised and methodologically scattered projects. Once we adopt an epistemic perspective on the mind we can gain new insight about the connection between phenomenology and semantics that intentionalism draws. We thereby also get a grasp on the fundamental relations between the epistemic, phenomenal and meaning properties of mental phenomena. Given the main aims of the book, there are several things that I will not attempt to provide: 1. It is not my goal to directly argue against as many of the major competing intentionalist positions in the literature as possible. Most importantly, while the position developed here includes an internalist conception of content, the book is not a refutation of externalism. I will not try to show definitively that no reductive externalist account of intentionality can establish a supervenience relation bet-

7 14 Introduction ween intentional and phenomenal properties without violating phenomenological adequacy. But in the course of developing my proposal which also includes a critical examination of some alternative theories and arguments I give reasons to think that an internalist, non-reductive, inferential role-based and multidimensional theory suits the overall purposes of intentionalism better than any such theory. 2. I will not try to reconsider all the major arguments and purported counterexamples that have been presented against intentionalism in the literature. Instead I will focus on giving positive arguments for being an intentionalist, and on building a theory that can capture the phenomenal properties of mental acts, where these are understood as the properties to which we have access from the first-person perspective. 3. I assume that there is a distinctive philosophical methodology that involves different forms of a priori analysis. This is the methodology I am using in this book, and so I do not consider any empirical studies that are related to the topic in question. This is not, however, to deny that in principle such studies might be worth taking into consideration at a later point of enquiry. This methodological focus is also the reason why I restrict myself to the study of those mental phenomena to which we have introspective access conscious mental acts. 4. Despite the fact that ideas formed in the phenomenological tradition most importantly by Edmund Husserl play a central role for my proposal, this book is a contribution to analytic philosophy of mind. Where I do present Husserlian concepts and arguments, my aim is not a historically adequate exegesis of Husserl s writings, but a rational reconstruction of his ideas that can be fruitfully incorporated within analytic discussions of intentionality. The appeal to phenomenology provides a useful addition to the stock of concepts employed by philosophers of mind and, more importantly, a powerful enrichment of the methodology by which we analyse mental phenomena. So while I am not a pluralist about the standards of philosophizing, I am a pluralist about philosophical methods. We should all attempt to give arguments to support our views, and to express those views and arguments as clearly, precisely and concisely as possible. But we should stay open to opportunities to enlarge our repertoire of ways of finding good arguments. 5. Because the book focuses on presenting a big picture centred around a new perspective on the mind, I can only give a sketch of the complex theory of dynamic epistemic two-dimensional semantics that I regard as the best theory of intentionality. More focussed research on how the theory should deal with specific types of mental phenomena is worth developing in future research, in order to spell out how exactly epistemic two-dimensionalism and intentional horizons can capture the diversity of mental acts.

8 Introduction 15 With this background about the structure and the aims of the book in mind, let us now go in medias res, and start by considering the relationship between the philosophy of mind, epistemology and the problem of intentionality.

Our previous accounts of perceptual experience accepted the phenomenal principle:

Our previous accounts of perceptual experience accepted the phenomenal principle: PHL340 Handout 3: Representationalism 1 Representationalism and the Phenomenal Principle An experience s representational content is the way the world must be if the experience is to be veridical. Representationalism

More information

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS. Overview

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS. Overview Lecture 28-29 PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS Overview David J. Chalmers in his famous book The Conscious Mind 1 tries to establish that the problem of consciousness as the hard

More information

Arguments for intentionalism

Arguments for intentionalism Arguments for intentionalism phil 93507 Jeff Speaks August 31, 2009 1 Intentionalism The basic intentionalist thesis is a supervenience claim: it is the claim that there can be no difference in the phenomenal

More information

Review of Tim Bayne s The Unity of Consciousness

Review of Tim Bayne s The Unity of Consciousness Review of Tim Bayne s The Unity of Consciousness Angela Mendelovici amendel5@uwo.ca July 21, 2011 Tim Bayne, The Unity of Consciousness, Oxford University Press, 2010, 341pp., $55.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780199215386.

More information

Empty Thoughts: An Explanatory Problem for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness

Empty Thoughts: An Explanatory Problem for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness Empty Thoughts: An Explanatory Problem for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness word count: 2,420 Abstract Block (2011) has recently argued that empty higher-order representations raise a problem for

More information

Representational Content and Phenomenal Character

Representational Content and Phenomenal Character By David Hilbert, Unversity of Illinois at Chicago, Forthcoming in Sage Encyclopedia of Perception QUALIA Perception and thought are often, although not exclusively, concerned with information about the

More information

REVIEW OF ATTENTION, NOT SELF BY JONARDON GANERI

REVIEW OF ATTENTION, NOT SELF BY JONARDON GANERI Comparative Philosophy Volume 10, No. 1 (2019): 213-217 Open Access / ISSN 2151-6014 / www.comparativephilosophy.org https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100115 CONSTRUCTIVE-ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE (3.1)

More information

The Varieties of Self- Awareness. David Chalmers

The Varieties of Self- Awareness. David Chalmers The Varieties of Self- Awareness David Chalmers Self-Awareness Self-awareness = awareness of oneself One is self-aware if one stands in a relation of awareness to oneself and/or one s properties There

More information

Psychology, Neuroscience, and the Consciousness Dilemma. Katalin Balog

Psychology, Neuroscience, and the Consciousness Dilemma. Katalin Balog Psychology, Neuroscience, and the Consciousness Dilemma Katalin Balog In this paper, I present a dilemma for theorizing about the connection between phenomenality (the what it s like character of mental

More information

Functionalist theories of content

Functionalist theories of content Functionalist theories of content PHIL 93507 April 22, 2012 Let s assume that there is a certain stable dependence relation between the physical internal states of subjects and the phenomenal characters

More information

Research Ethics and Philosophies

Research Ethics and Philosophies Lecture Six Research Ethics and Philosophies Institute of Professional Studies School of Research and Graduate Studies Outline of Presentation Introduction Research Ethics Research Ethics to whom and from

More information

Book Information Jakob Hohwy, The Predictive Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, ix+288, 60.00,

Book Information Jakob Hohwy, The Predictive Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, ix+288, 60.00, 1 Book Information Jakob Hohwy, The Predictive Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, ix+288, 60.00, 978-0-19-968273-7. Review Body The Predictive Mind by Jakob Hohwy is the first monograph to address

More information

Emotions as Evaluative Feelings. Bennett Helm (2009) Slides by Jeremiah Tillman

Emotions as Evaluative Feelings. Bennett Helm (2009) Slides by Jeremiah Tillman Emotions as Evaluative Feelings Bennett Helm (2009) Slides by Jeremiah Tillman Helm s Big Picture (Again) The central thesis: Emotions are intentional feelings of import; that is, they re affective modes

More information

Ian Rory Owen. Psychotherapy and Phenomenology: On Freud, Husserl and Heidegger. Lincoln, NE: iuniverse, Inc., 2006.

Ian Rory Owen. Psychotherapy and Phenomenology: On Freud, Husserl and Heidegger. Lincoln, NE: iuniverse, Inc., 2006. Ian Rory Owen. Psychotherapy and Phenomenology: On Freud, Husserl and Heidegger. Lincoln, NE: iuniverse, Inc., 2006. This new book is the first interdisciplinary study of Sigmund Freud, Edmund Husserl

More information

The scope of perceptual content, II: properties

The scope of perceptual content, II: properties The scope of perceptual content, II: properties Jeff Speaks November 16, 2009 1 What are the candidates?............................ 1 2 Arguments for inclusion............................. 2 2.1 From

More information

Brad Thompson.

Brad Thompson. Forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research THE SPATIAL CONTENT OF EXPERIENCE Brad Thompson bthompso@smu.edu 1. Introduction To what extent is the external world the way that it appears to us

More information

A Direct Object of Perception

A Direct Object of Perception E-LOGOS Electronic Journal for Philosophy 2015, Vol. 22(1) 28 36 ISSN 1211-0442 (DOI 10.18267/j.e-logos.411),Peer-reviewed article Journal homepage: e-logos.vse.cz A Direct Object of Perception Mika Suojanen

More information

24.500/Phil253 topics in philosophy of mind/perceptual experience

24.500/Phil253 topics in philosophy of mind/perceptual experience 24.500/Phil253 topics in philosophy of mind/perceptual experience session 10 24.500/Phil253 S07 1 plan tea @ 2.30 Block on consciousness, accessibility, FFA VWFA 24.500/Phil253 S07 2 phenomenal consciousness

More information

Eliminative materialism

Eliminative materialism Michael Lacewing Eliminative materialism Eliminative materialism (also known as eliminativism) argues that future scientific developments will show that the way we think and talk about the mind is fundamentally

More information

Phenomenal content. PHIL April 15, 2012

Phenomenal content. PHIL April 15, 2012 Phenomenal content PHIL 93507 April 15, 2012 1. The phenomenal content thesis... 1 2. The problem of phenomenally silent contents... 2 3. Phenomenally sneaky contents... 3 3.1. Phenomenal content and phenomenal

More information

Perception, Biology, Action, and Knowledge

Perception, Biology, Action, and Knowledge Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXXVIII No. 2, March 2014 doi: 10.1111/phpr.12092 2014 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC Perception, Biology, Action, and Knowledge CHRISTOPHER

More information

Representationalism About Sensory Phenomenology

Representationalism About Sensory Phenomenology Western University Scholarship@Western Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository November 2015 Representationalism About Sensory Phenomenology Matthew Ivanowich The University of Western Ontario Supervisor

More information

Is it possible to give a philosophical definition of sexual desire?

Is it possible to give a philosophical definition of sexual desire? Issue 1 Spring 2016 Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy Is it possible to give a philosophical definition of sexual desire? William Morgan - The University of Sheffield pp. 47-58 For details of submission

More information

Perception LECTURE FOUR MICHAELMAS Dr Maarten Steenhagen

Perception LECTURE FOUR MICHAELMAS Dr Maarten Steenhagen Perception LECTURE FOUR MICHAELMAS 2017 Dr Maarten Steenhagen ms2416@cam.ac.uk Last week Lecture 1: Naive Realism Lecture 2: The Argument from Hallucination Lecture 3: Representationalism Lecture 4: Disjunctivism

More information

Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory

Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory 1 Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory An Overview Fiona Macpherson The essays in this volume explore the nature of perceptual imagination and perceptual memory. How do perceptual imagination and

More information

Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory

Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory Book reviews Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory, by Uriah Kriegel. Oxford University Press Inc., 2009, 335 pp. BIBLID [0873-626X (2012) 32; pp. 413-417] In the last decades interest

More information

PHIL 512: Seminar in Philosophy of Mind

PHIL 512: Seminar in Philosophy of Mind PHIL 512: Seminar in Philosophy of Mind Information, Representation, and Intentionality: From Brains to Subjects RICE UNIVERSITY, SPRING 2017 COURSE SYLLABUS Time & Location: Tue, 2:30-5:00pm, HUM 227

More information

Comments on David Rosenthal s Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments

Comments on David Rosenthal s Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments Consciousness and Cognition 9, 215 219 (2000) doi:10.1006/ccog.2000.0438, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on Comments on David Rosenthal s Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments

More information

Psychology, Neuroscience, and the Consciousness Dilemma. Katalin Balog. Draft (comments welcome)

Psychology, Neuroscience, and the Consciousness Dilemma. Katalin Balog. Draft (comments welcome) Psychology, Neuroscience, and the Consciousness Dilemma Katalin Balog Draft (comments welcome) In this paper, I present a dilemma for theorizing about the connection between phenomenality (the what it

More information

Skepticism about perceptual content

Skepticism about perceptual content Skepticism about perceptual content phil 93515 Jeff Speaks March 29, 2007 1 Contents v. objects of perception The view that perceptual experiences have contents is the view that perceptual experiences

More information

Explaining an Explanatory Gap Gilbert Harman Princeton University

Explaining an Explanatory Gap Gilbert Harman Princeton University Explaining an Explanatory Gap Gilbert Harman Princeton University Discussions of the mind-body problem often refer to an explanatory gap (Levine 1983) between some aspect of our conscious mental life and

More information

Yet Another Workshop on Phenomenal Intentionality

Yet Another Workshop on Phenomenal Intentionality Yet Another Workshop on Phenomenal Intentionality 29-30 November 2014 CEU Department of Philosophy Nádor u. 9, Monument Building, Gellner Room PROGRAM 29 November 30 November 09:30 10:00 Coffee 10:00 11:15

More information

Whose psychological concepts?

Whose psychological concepts? 1 Whose psychological concepts? Jan Smedslund The Structure of Psychological Common Sense Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1997. 111 pp. ISBN 0-8058-2903-2. $24.95 Review by Bertram F. Malle Socrates charge against

More information

The Reality of Experience. Conference Program

The Reality of Experience. Conference Program The Reality of Experience Chicago IL April 20-22, 2016 Conference Program Hosted by: 2:00-2:10 pm Opening Remarks / Welcome Session A: Chair J. Scott Jordan Wednesday, April 20th: 2:10-3:10 pm William

More information

P H E N O M E N O L O G Y

P H E N O M E N O L O G Y P H E N O M E N O L O G Y In the literature, phenomenology is often contrasted with positivist inspired approaches in research. Positivism is associated with the idea of their being objective, independent

More information

A conversation with Professor David Chalmers, May 20, 2016 Participants

A conversation with Professor David Chalmers, May 20, 2016 Participants A conversation with Professor David Chalmers, May 20, 2016 Participants Professor David Chalmers Professor of Philosophy, New York University (NYU) Luke Muehlhauser Research Analyst, Open Philanthropy

More information

Thoughts, Processive Character and the Stream of Consciousness. (forthcoming in the International Journal of Philosophical Studies)

Thoughts, Processive Character and the Stream of Consciousness. (forthcoming in the International Journal of Philosophical Studies) Thoughts, Processive Character and the Stream of Consciousness (forthcoming in the International Journal of Philosophical Studies) Marta Jorba University of Girona Abstract. This paper explores the relation

More information

AFFECTS, MOODS, EMOTIONS, AND BELONGING

AFFECTS, MOODS, EMOTIONS, AND BELONGING CALL FOR PAPERS AFFECTS, MOODS, EMOTIONS, AND BELONGING Interdisciplinary Coalition of North American Phenomenologists Tenth Annual Meeting University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) May 31 June 3, 2018 The

More information

Functionalism. (1) Machine Functionalism

Functionalism. (1) Machine Functionalism Functionalism As Levine indicates, from a functionalist viewpoint, the status of a mental state is not given by its internal constitution but by its function. For instance, a thought or a pain depends

More information

PERCEPTION AS REPRESENTATION. A CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION OF INTENTIONALISM

PERCEPTION AS REPRESENTATION. A CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION OF INTENTIONALISM e-journal Philosophie der Psychologie PERCEPTION AS REPRESENTATION. A CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION OF INTENTIONALISM von Introduction It is a widely held view that perception is a kind of representation of

More information

Intentionalism and the problem of the object of perception

Intentionalism and the problem of the object of perception Intentionalism and the problem of the object of perception Artigos / Articles Intentionalism and the Problem of the Object of Perception 1 Karla Chediak 2 ABSTRACT: In this paper, I intend to review the

More information

REVIEW. P.M. Churchland, Matter Bnd Consciousness. Revised Edition, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988.

REVIEW. P.M. Churchland, Matter Bnd Consciousness. Revised Edition, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988. REVIEW P.M. Churchland, Matter Bnd Consciousness. Revised Edition, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988. Philosophy of mind is a lively issue these days. The abandonment of behaviorism, together with the

More information

Critical review (Newsletter for Center for Qualitative Methodology) concerning:

Critical review (Newsletter for Center for Qualitative Methodology) concerning: Søren Willert, Universitetslektor, Psykologisk Instituts Center for Systemudvikling, Katrinebjergvej 89G 8200 Århus N, Tel 8942 4422 fax 8942 4460 e-mail swi@psy.au.dk Critical review (Newsletter for Center

More information

Abstracts. An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research. From Mentalizing Folk to Social Epistemology

Abstracts. An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research. From Mentalizing Folk to Social Epistemology Proto Sociology s An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research 3 Vol. 16, 2002 Understanding the Social: New Perspectives from Epistemology Contents From Mentalizing Folk to Social Epistemology

More information

Spectrum inversion and intentionalism

Spectrum inversion and intentionalism Spectrum inversion and intentionalism phil 93507 Jeff Speaks September 15, 2009 1 What is a spectrum inversion scenario?..................... 1 2 Intentionalism is false because inverts could have in common.........

More information

Transparency, intentionalism, and the nature of perceptual content

Transparency, intentionalism, and the nature of perceptual content Transparency, intentionalism, and the nature of perceptual content May 15, 2007 Few acts of introspection have been as philosophically influential as G. E. Moore s examination of his experience of a blue

More information

PHENOMENAL CONSCIUOSNESS: QUALIA & QUINNING QUALIA. Prof. Rajakishore Nath, Department of Humanities & Social Science, IIT Bombay

PHENOMENAL CONSCIUOSNESS: QUALIA & QUINNING QUALIA. Prof. Rajakishore Nath, Department of Humanities & Social Science, IIT Bombay PHENOMENAL CONSCIUOSNESS: QUALIA & QUINNING QUALIA Phenomenal Consciousness Phenomenal Concept of Mind Psychological Concept of Mind The phenomenal concept of mind is the concept of mind as conscious experience,

More information

Consciousness and Intrinsic Higher- Order Content

Consciousness and Intrinsic Higher- Order Content 1 Consciousness and Intrinsic Higher- Order Content David Rosenthal City University of New York Graduate Center http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci Tucson VII, April 7, 2006 OVERVIEW (Some slides were skipped

More information

On Our Experience of Ceasing to Exist

On Our Experience of Ceasing to Exist Oaklander, L. On Our Experience of Ceasing to Exist. The Ontology of Time. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2004. On Our Experience of Ceasing to Exist In a recent article, J. D. Kiernan-Lewis has claimed

More information

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, EPISTEMOLOGY, PARADIGM, &THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, EPISTEMOLOGY, PARADIGM, &THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, EPISTEMOLOGY, PARADIGM, &THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: Is the system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs, and theories that supports and informs your research.

More information

Artificial Intelligence: Its Scope and Limits, by James Fetzer, Kluver Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London. Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Artificial Intelligence: Its Scope and Limits, by James Fetzer, Kluver Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London. Artificial Intelligence (AI) Artificial Intelligence: Its Scope and Limits, by James Fetzer, Kluver Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the study of how to make machines behave intelligently,

More information

INTERVIEWS II: THEORIES AND TECHNIQUES 5. CLINICAL APPROACH TO INTERVIEWING PART 1

INTERVIEWS II: THEORIES AND TECHNIQUES 5. CLINICAL APPROACH TO INTERVIEWING PART 1 INTERVIEWS II: THEORIES AND TECHNIQUES 5. CLINICAL APPROACH TO INTERVIEWING PART 1 5.1 Clinical Interviews: Background Information The clinical interview is a technique pioneered by Jean Piaget, in 1975,

More information

Naturalizing the Mind, by Fred Dretske. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Pp. 208.

Naturalizing the Mind, by Fred Dretske. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Pp. 208. Page 1 Naturalizing the Mind, by Fred Dretske. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995. Pp. 208. In this important book Fred Dretske defends a version of externalism which he calls representational naturalism.

More information

Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will

Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will Book Review Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will Alfred R. Mele Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009 Marco Fenici* fenici@unisi.it Mele s book is a concise analysis of much research in neurophysiology

More information

David Chalmers, The hard problem of consciousness

David Chalmers, The hard problem of consciousness 24.09x Minds and Machines David Chalmers, The hard problem of consciousness Excerpts from David Chalmers, The hard problem of consciousness, in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, edited by Gideon Rosen,

More information

MIND, MEANING AND EXTERNAL WORLD: A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE DEBATE BETWEEN NARROW AND BROAD CONTENT

MIND, MEANING AND EXTERNAL WORLD: A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE DEBATE BETWEEN NARROW AND BROAD CONTENT MIND, MEANING AND EXTERNAL WORLD: A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE DEBATE BETWEEN NARROW AND BROAD CONTENT Manoj Kumar Panda Research Scholar Centre for Philosophy School of Social Sciences Jawaharlal Nehru University

More information

Chapter 11: Behaviorism: After the Founding

Chapter 11: Behaviorism: After the Founding Chapter 11: Behaviorism: After the Founding Dr. Rick Grieve PSY 495 History and Systems Western Kentucky University 1 Operationism Operationism: : the doctrine that a physical concept can be defined in

More information

The Rationality of Perception rewrites perception s rational role and its rational standing. This

The Rationality of Perception rewrites perception s rational role and its rational standing. This The Philosophical Review, 2018 Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. xxv + 220 pp. The Rationality of Perception rewrites perception s rational role and

More information

Research Methodology in Social Sciences. by Dr. Rina Astini

Research Methodology in Social Sciences. by Dr. Rina Astini Research Methodology in Social Sciences by Dr. Rina Astini Email : rina_astini@mercubuana.ac.id What is Research? Re ---------------- Search Re means (once more, afresh, anew) or (back; with return to

More information

1.2. Husserlian Phenomenology And Phenomenological Method

1.2. Husserlian Phenomenology And Phenomenological Method From David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language (Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1982), Chapter III, 1.2, pp. 93-104. Original

More information

Psychology Stage 1 Modules / 2018

Psychology Stage 1 Modules / 2018 Psychology Stage 1 Modules - 2017 / 2018 PSYC101: Psychology An Introduction - (Semester 1) 20 credits This module is an introduction to Psychology as a science. It includes elements which expose students

More information

Theoretical Perspectives in the PhD thesis: How many? Dr. Terence Love We-B Centre School of Management Information Systems Edith Cowan University

Theoretical Perspectives in the PhD thesis: How many? Dr. Terence Love We-B Centre School of Management Information Systems Edith Cowan University Theoretical Perspectives in the PhD thesis: How many? Dr. Terence Love We-B Centre School of Management Information Systems Edith Cowan University Content and purpose of the PhD thesis A candidate s PhD

More information

Williamson applies his argumentative strategy to the following two supposedly clear examples of an a priori and an a posteriori truth, respectively:

Williamson applies his argumentative strategy to the following two supposedly clear examples of an a priori and an a posteriori truth, respectively: WILLIAMSON ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE A PRIORI AND THE A POSTERIORI In his paper How Deep is the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge?, Timothy Williamson argues for the claim that

More information

School of Nursing, University of British Columbia Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada

School of Nursing, University of British Columbia Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada Data analysis in qualitative research School of Nursing, University of British Columbia Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada Unquestionably, data analysis is the most complex and mysterious of all of the

More information

1. What is Phenomenology? What is Phenomenology? What is Phenomenology? The Phenomenology of Perception (PP) Introduction

1. What is Phenomenology? What is Phenomenology? What is Phenomenology? The Phenomenology of Perception (PP) Introduction 1. What is Phenomenology? The Phenomenology of Perception (PP) Introduction Course Outline The Phenomenology of Perception Husserl and Phenomenology Neurophenomenology Email: ka519@york.ac.uk Web: http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~ka519

More information

Subjective Indiscriminability and Phenomenal Error

Subjective Indiscriminability and Phenomenal Error Subjective Indiscriminability and Phenomenal Error fabian.dorsch@uclmail.net November 2008 If I stand here, I saw him. (The Tragedy of Macbeth, III, 4) Introduction 1. The main tenet of the epistemic conception

More information

Reduction. Marie I. Kaiser, University of Cologne, Department of Philosophy, Germany,

Reduction. Marie I. Kaiser, University of Cologne, Department of Philosophy, Germany, Published in: Dubitzky, W./ Wolkenhauer, O./ Cho, K.-H./ Yokota, H. (2013) (eds.): Encyclopedia of Systems Biology, Vol. X. New York: Springer, 1827-1830. Reduction Marie I. Kaiser, University of Cologne,

More information

Identity theory and eliminative materialism. a) First trend: U. T. Place and Herbert Feigl- mental processes or events such as

Identity theory and eliminative materialism. a) First trend: U. T. Place and Herbert Feigl- mental processes or events such as Lecture 2 Identity theory and eliminative materialism 1. The identity theory Two main trends: a) First trend: U. T. Place and Herbert Feigl- mental processes or events such as sensations = physical phenomena.

More information

On the diversity principle and local falsifiability

On the diversity principle and local falsifiability On the diversity principle and local falsifiability Uriel Feige October 22, 2012 1 Introduction This manuscript concerns the methodology of evaluating one particular aspect of TCS (theoretical computer

More information

Attention and Perceptual Consciousness Boston Interdisciplinary Graduate Conference on Consciousness. Adrienne Prettyman University of Toronto

Attention and Perceptual Consciousness Boston Interdisciplinary Graduate Conference on Consciousness. Adrienne Prettyman University of Toronto Attention and Perceptual Consciousness Boston Interdisciplinary Graduate Conference on Consciousness Adrienne Prettyman University of Toronto ** DRAFT Please do not cite. ** Abstract: Chalmers (2004),

More information

CONSCIOUS ATTENTION & DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHT. Thomas Edward Williams UCL Department of Philosophy MPhil Stud.

CONSCIOUS ATTENTION & DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHT. Thomas Edward Williams UCL Department of Philosophy MPhil Stud. CONSCIOUS ATTENTION & DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHT Thomas Edward Williams UCL Department of Philosophy MPhil Stud. 1 Declaration I, Thomas Edward Williams, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my

More information

Perception and Mind-Dependence: Lecture 4

Perception and Mind-Dependence: Lecture 4 1 Recap Perception and Mind-Dependence: Lecture 4 (Alex Moran, apm60@cam.ac.uk) We considered several of the standard arguments against sense data. We saw that none of them were conclusive. But we did

More information

Properties represented in experience

Properties represented in experience Properties represented in experience PHIL 93507 March 4, 2012 1. NATURAL KINDS One topic of recent interest has been the question of whether perceptual experiences can represent natural kind properties,

More information

Chapter 1 Introduction to Psychology

Chapter 1 Introduction to Psychology Chapter 1 Introduction to Psychology Main Idea Through the study of human and animal behavior, people can discover psychological principles that have the potential to enrich the lives of humans. Objectives

More information

Is There Introspective Evidence for Phenomenal Intentionality?

Is There Introspective Evidence for Phenomenal Intentionality? Is There Introspective Evidence for Phenomenal Intentionality? Davide Bordini Department of Philosophy University of Milan davide.bordini@gmail.com Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies [Penultimate draft,

More information

The Unity of Consciousness: Subjects and Objectivity

The Unity of Consciousness: Subjects and Objectivity The Unity of Consciousness: Subjects and Objectivity Abstract: This paper concerns the role that reference to subjects of experience can play in individuating streams of consciousness, and the relationship

More information

CHAPTER 2 APPLYING SCIENTIFIC THINKING TO MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS

CHAPTER 2 APPLYING SCIENTIFIC THINKING TO MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS Cambodian Mekong University is the university that cares for the value of education MN 400: Research Methods CHAPTER 2 APPLYING SCIENTIFIC THINKING TO MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS Teacher: Pou, Sovann Sources of

More information

FINDING THE FEEL : THE MATCHING CONTENT CHALLENGE TO COGNITIVE PHENOMENOLOGY

FINDING THE FEEL : THE MATCHING CONTENT CHALLENGE TO COGNITIVE PHENOMENOLOGY TIM BAYNE Philosophy Department, School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Monash University, Melbourne Australia tim.bayne@gmail.com TOM MCCLELLAND Department of Philosophy, School

More information

Attitudinal Objects Friederike Moltmann IHPST, Paris

Attitudinal Objects Friederike Moltmann IHPST, Paris 1 Attitudinal Objects Friederike Moltmann IHPST, Paris Propositions have played a central role in philosophy of language since Frege. Propositions are generally taken to be the objects of propositional

More information

OPÚSCULO Edmund Husserl s later phenomenology: an approach to mental disorders

OPÚSCULO Edmund Husserl s later phenomenology: an approach to mental disorders OPÚSCULO 1 - Pequenos textos de Filosofia, Ciência e Filosofia da Ciência - Edmund Husserl s later phenomenology: an approach to mental disorders ~ António Fragoso Fernandes CENTRO DE FILOSOFIA DAS CIÊNCIA

More information

Transparently Oneself

Transparently Oneself Transparently Oneself Dorothée Legrand CEPERC, Département de Philosophie Université de Provence France Dorothée Legrand legrand@up.univ-aix.fr PSYCHE 11 (5), June 2005 KEYWORDS: Phenomenal experience,

More information

Introspection, intentionality and the transparency of experience 1

Introspection, intentionality and the transparency of experience 1 From Philosophical Topics 28, 2000, 49-67 Introspection, intentionality and the transparency of experience 1 Tim Crane University College London 1. Introspection and phenomenal character How much can introspection

More information

What is the relationship between the mind and the brain?

What is the relationship between the mind and the brain? What is the relationship between the mind and the brain? Ben White 05.02.2019 Mental Consciousness Belief Desire Thought Memory Sensation Perception Emotion Imagination Rationality What distinguishes the

More information

A Difference that Makes a Difference: Welfare and the Equality of Consideration

A Difference that Makes a Difference: Welfare and the Equality of Consideration 84 A Difference that Makes a Difference: Welfare and the Equality of Consideration Abstract Elijah Weber Philosophy Department Bowling Green State University eliweber1980@gmail.com In Welfare, Happiness,

More information

Naïve Realism and Errors in Experience

Naïve Realism and Errors in Experience Naïve Realism and Errors in Experience Fabian Dorsch & Gianfranco Soldati Abstract. Is the claim that perceptual experiences are by nature relational incompatible with the view that they are intentional?

More information

ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR

ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR LECTURE 3, CHAPTER 6 A process through which Individuals organize and interpret their sensory impressions in order to give meaning to their environment. PERCEPTION Why is Perception

More information

What is analytical sociology? And is it the future of sociology?

What is analytical sociology? And is it the future of sociology? What is analytical sociology? And is it the future of sociology? Twan Huijsmans Sociology Abstract During the last few decades a new approach in sociology has been developed, analytical sociology (AS).

More information

Realism and Qualitative Research. Joseph A. Maxwell George Mason University

Realism and Qualitative Research. Joseph A. Maxwell George Mason University Realism and Qualitative Research Joseph A. Maxwell George Mason University Philosophic realism in general is "the view that entities exist independently of being perceived, or independently of our theories

More information

Husserl s Theory of Noematic Sense

Husserl s Theory of Noematic Sense UDK: 165.62 FILOZOFIJA I DRUŠTVO XXVII (4), 2016. DOI: 10.2298/FID1604845N Original scientific article Received: 2.9.2016 Accepted: 16.11.2016 Olga Nikolić Abstract After Husserl s transcendental turn

More information

Psychology Syllabus. First Year. General Neuropsychology. Workload: 128 hs (64 per semester) Lectures / Laboratory practical classes

Psychology Syllabus. First Year. General Neuropsychology. Workload: 128 hs (64 per semester) Lectures / Laboratory practical classes Psychology Syllabus First Year General Neuropsychology Workload: 128 hs (64 per semester) Lectures / Laboratory practical classes The course will focus on neurobiology, also known as neuroscience, with

More information

DEFINING THE CASE STUDY Yin, Ch. 1

DEFINING THE CASE STUDY Yin, Ch. 1 Case Study Research DEFINING THE CASE STUDY Yin, Ch. 1 Goals for today are to understand: 1. What is a case study 2. When is it useful 3. Guidelines for designing a case study 4. Identifying key methodological

More information

CRIMINOLOGY TODAY. AN INTEGRATIVE INTRODUCTION sixth edition. By FRANK SCHMALLEGER. Pearson Education, Inc.

CRIMINOLOGY TODAY. AN INTEGRATIVE INTRODUCTION sixth edition. By FRANK SCHMALLEGER. Pearson Education, Inc. CRIMINOLOGY TODAY AN INTEGRATIVE INTRODUCTION sixth edition By FRANK SCHMALLEGER Pearson Education, Inc. CRIMINOLOGY TODAY AN INTEGRATIVE INTRODUCTION sixth edition By FRANK SCHMALLEGER Chapter 1 What

More information

Thinking the environment aurally An enactive approach to auditory-architectural research and design

Thinking the environment aurally An enactive approach to auditory-architectural research and design 1 Thinking the environment aurally An enactive approach to auditory-architectural research and design Alex Arteaga (Lecture given in the Architecture and Urban Planning section of the conference Invisible

More information

Examining Experience. Gabriel John Taylor Lakeman UCL. PhD

Examining Experience. Gabriel John Taylor Lakeman UCL. PhD Examining Experience Gabriel John Taylor Lakeman UCL PhD 1 I, Gabriel John Taylor Lakeman, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources,

More information

Can Intentionalism Explain How Attention Affects Appearances?

Can Intentionalism Explain How Attention Affects Appearances? Can Intentionalism Explain How Attention Affects Appearances? Sebastian Watzl Forthcoming in: Themes from Block (eds. A. Pautz and D. Stoljar), The MIT Press Abstract Recent psychological research shows

More information

Transformative Experience

Transformative Experience Transformative Experience L.A. Paul April 3rd, 2015 Handout to accompany Author Meets Critics session, Pacific Division APA Meetings, 2015. 1 1 L.A. Paul. Transformative Experience. Oxford University Press,

More information

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HAPPINESS D A Y 3 T H E G O O D L I F E

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HAPPINESS D A Y 3 T H E G O O D L I F E THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HAPPINESS D A Y 3 T H E G O O D L I F E EXPERIENCE SAMPLING On a scale of 1 (not at all) 10 (extremely) Do you feel: Happy? Relaxed? Awake? AGENDA Grounding Exercise Homework Discussion

More information

Content and the explanatory role of experience

Content and the explanatory role of experience Content and the explanatory role of experience Jeff Speaks August 6, 2015 1. The explanation of singular thought 2. The explanation of demonstrative reference 2.1 Heck s argument for nonconceptual content

More information

1 Qualitative Research and Its Use in Sport and Physical Activity

1 Qualitative Research and Its Use in Sport and Physical Activity 1 Qualitative Research and Its Use in Sport and Physical Activity All research is concerned with seeking the answers to specific questions, and qualitative inquiry is no exception to other social science

More information

THE DYNAMICS OF MOTIVATION

THE DYNAMICS OF MOTIVATION 92 THE DYNAMICS OF MOTIVATION 1. Motivation is a highly dynamic construct that is constantly changing in reaction to life experiences. 2. Needs and goals are constantly growing and changing. 3. As individuals

More information