Corrupt collaboration

Transcription

1 Corrupt collaboration + Shaul Shalvi + Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Social Norms and Institutions Ascona May 2015 Funding: Max Planck Society The European Research Council (ERC-AdG COOPERATION) The European Union s Seventh Framework Program (FP7/ ; REA )

2 It s not cheating, it s collaboration. (echeat.com)

3 Cooperation is good; can it also be bad? A cooperative species; deeply ingrained moral sentiment to cooperate Bowles and Gintis 2011 Establishing sustainable cooperative relationships can set successful individuals and groups apart from less successful ones Little is known about negative aspects of cooperation Van Lange and Joireman 2008 In intergroup conflict there are negative externalities to the outgroup Bornstein and Ben-Yossef 1994 Can (moral) cooperative tendencies or a cooperative corporate culture encourage the violation of (other) moral rules?

4 Lying To benefit self: People lie Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008; Shalvi, Dana, and Handgraff 2011; Fischbacher and Föllmi- Heusi 2013; Gächter and Schulz 2015 To benefit others: People lie more Wiltermuth 2011; Gino, Ayal, and Ariely 2013; Conrads, Irlenbusch, Rilke and Walkowitz 2013; Cohen, Gunia, Kim-Jun and Murnighan 2009; Gneezy 2005; Gino and Pierce 2010; Atanasov and Dana 2011 group-serving dishonesty is modulated by oxytocin Shalvi and DeDreu 2014 Self-concept maintenance

5 Corrupt collaboration Corrupt collaboration: The attainment of profits by joint immoral acts Our interest is in cases in which the collaborative effort of individuals necessarily and directly entails the violation of moral rules (lying).

6 Procedure and design Procedure 1. Player A privately rolls a die and reports the outcome 2. Player B learns about A s report Example 1 - Double Player A reported Player B reported 3. Player B privately rolls a die and reports the outcome 4. Player A learns about B s report Payment If the reported outcomes are equal each player receives the reported amount in Euros. If the reported outcomes are not equal both players receive nothing. Payment: A gets 5, B gets 5 Example 2 No Double Player A reported Player B reported Payment: A gets 0, B gets 0 Treatment: Aligned Outcomes

7 Results Aligned Outcomes Hypothetical honesty baseline Actual behaviour (20 dyads, 20 trials) 16.67% doubles 82% doubles

8 Brazen (i.e., bold and shameless) behaviour A always sets the stage, B always gets the job done A is honest, B always gets the job done A mostly sets the stage, B always gets the job done 50% totally brazen B s

9 Varying incentives Remove B s interest in the value of the double Treatment B-High B earns 6 for any double Treatment B-Low B earns 1 for any double B treatments Remove B s interest in reporting a double Treatment B-Fixed B earns 1 regardless of the report Remove A s interest in the value of the double Treatment A-High A earns 6 for any double Treatment A-Low A earns 1 for any double A treatments Remove A s interest in reporting a double Treatment A-Fixed A earns 1 regardless of the report

10 Varying incentives B s are sensitive to the incentives of A players ] ] ]

11 Varying incentives B s are sensitive to the incentives of A players They are also sensitive to the behaviour of A players B s are more likely to be brazen when A is brazen as well Aligned Outcomes: 100% brazen B s when A is brazen 33% when A is not brazen All other treatments: 36% brazen B s when A is brazen 13% when A is not brazen

12 Results comparison of all treatments (n=316) A lot of lying in Aligned Outcomes A lot of lying in general ] ] ] Changing B s incentive has the same effect as changing A s incentives Collaboration leads to more lying than working alone More totally brazen B-players in Aligned Outcomes than in any other treatment

13 Robustness experiment Comparisons of Aligned Outcomes and B-fixed in a different location and with different parameters Three pairs of treatment: Replication: like original, payment in instead of Multiplication: all payoffs are doubled Addition: 2 added to all payoffs

14 Results robustness experiment (n=236) Replication and Multiplication like Original data Less lying in Addition Less brazen B s in Addition

15 Conclusions A dark side of cooperation corrupt collaboration Collaboration reduces concern for self-concept maintenance Corrupt collaboration is More likely when incentives are aligned More likely than individual corruption In some cases collaboration should be monitored, rather than encouraged

16 Thank you