600, Wellington, New Zealand b University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia. Available online: 22 Aug 2006

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1 This article was downloaded by: [Victoria University of Wellington] On: 01 February 2012, At: 20:07 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: Registered office: Mortimer House, Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Psychology, Crime & Law Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: The good lives model and conceptual issues in offender rehabilitation Tony Ward a & Mark Brown b a School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand b University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia Available online: 22 Aug 2006 To cite this article: Tony Ward & Mark Brown (2004): The good lives model and conceptual issues in offender rehabilitation, Psychology, Crime & Law, 10:3, To link to this article: PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

2 Psychology, Crime & Law, September 2004, Vol. 10(3), pp. 243/257 THE GOOD LIVES MODEL AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN OFFENDER REHABILITATION TONY WARD a * and MARK BROWN b a School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand; b University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia There has been a profound shift in attitudes toward offender rehabilitation in the last two decades from a conviction that nothing works to the confident announcement that certain kinds of treatment strategies reliably reduce reoffending rates. The treatment approach currently dominant in the corrections area is the risk/need model where dynamic risk factors associated with recidivism are systematically targeted in treatment and the intensity (i.e. dose) of treatment delivered is related to each offender s assessed level of risk. It is our view that despite the undoubted virtues of the risk/need model there are a number of important conceptual issues that are not adequately addressed by this approach. In this paper we consider four such issues: the importance of adopting a positive approach to treatment; the relationship between risk management and good lives; causal preconditions of therapy; and the impact of therapists attitudes toward offenders. We propose that the Good Lives Model (GLM) of offender rehabilitation has the conceptual resources to resolve the above issues in a constructive and fruitful manner. We outline each issue in turn and discuss the capacity of the GLM to deal with these problems in a way that is clinically useful and theoretically coherent. Keywords: Offender Rehabilitation; Good Lives; Criminogenic Needs INTRODUCTION There has been a profound shift in attitudes toward offender rehabilitation in the last two decades from a conviction that nothing works to the confident announcement that certain kinds of treatment strategies reliably reduce reoffending rates (Hollin, 1999; McGuire, 2000). There has been an impressive array of empirical research on what works to back up the assertion that the best way to reduce recidivism is to teach offenders how to manage aspects of their lives that elevate risk rather than simply presuming a deterrent value to punishment alone (Gendreau, 1996; Andrews and Bonta, 1998). In essence, this research tells us that manual-based cognitive behavioural treatment programmes that are structured, and implemented in a systematic and therapeutically responsive manner by qualified and well trained staff in a supportive environment are more likely to produce the desired effect of lower reoffending rates. In addition, it has been persuasively argued by Andrews and Bonta (1998) that treatment is more effective if the focus is on the management and reduction of dynamic risk factors (i.e. criminogenic needs). It is fair to say that in Canada, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand the dominant approach to offender rehabilitation is the risk/ need model. In this model dynamic risk factors associated with recidivism are systematically *Corresponding author. Tony.Ward@vuw.ac.nz ISSN X print/issn online # 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: /

3 244 T. WARD AND M. BROWN targeted and the intensity (i.e. dose) of treatment delivered is related to each offender s assessed level of risk. It is our view that despite the undoubted virtues of the risk/need perspective there are a number of important conceptual issues associated with offender rehabilitation that it does not deal with very well and that therefore constitute problems for the model. We argue the management of risk is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the rehabilitation of offenders. We propose that the best way to lower offending recidivism rates is to equip individuals with the tools to live more fulfilling lives rather then to simply develop increasingly sophisticated risk management measures and strategies. At the end of the day, most offenders have more in common with us than not, and like the rest of humanity have needs to be loved, valued, to function competently, and to be part of a community. Alongside these promising developments in offender rehabilitation has been the emergence of a positive, more constructive way of solving basic human behavioural and mental health problems / positive psychology. The interest in positive psychology is apparent in the plethora of scholarly articles and books recently published on the subject, addressing both basic and applied psychological issues (e.g. Aspinwall and Staudinger, 2003; Keyes and Haidt, 2003). Seligman has argued powerfully for the need for psychology to adopt a more constructive, strength-based approach to basic and applied research (Seligman, 2002). His plea for the development of strength-based theories and the execution of rigorous empirical work is timely and reminds us that positive psychology does not have to be naive or woolly minded. He states that: We need to ask practitioners to recognize that much of the best work they already do in the consulting room is to amplify their clients strengths rather than repair their weaknesses. (Seligman, 2002, p. 5). In this paper we consider the potential of the Good Lives Model (GLM) of offender rehabilitation, to help clarify four significant conceptual issues facing individuals working in the correctional domain: the question of whether to adopt a positive or negative (i.e. risk reduction) approach to treatment; the relationship between managing risk and promoting human goods; the question of causal preconditions for effective therapy or treatment readiness; and the impact of therapists attitudes toward offenders on therapeutic engagement. These are issues that a comprehensive rehabilitation theory should be able to address adequately. Unfortunately, the risk/need model does not deal with these problems in a systematic way and as such is unable to provide sufficient guidance to clinicians working with offenders. We propose that the GLM of offender rehabilitation has the conceptual resources to resolve the above issues in a constructive and fruitful manner. We will outline each issue in turn and discuss the capacity of the GLM to deal with these problems in a way that is clinically useful and theoretically coherent. To foreshadow the results of the discussion below, we propose that the GLM (1) is a positive strength based approach to treating offenders, (2) conceptualizes dynamic risk factors as distortions in the internal and external conditions required for the acquisition of human goods, (3) outlines the basic skills and capacities necessary to engage in treatment (i.e. treatment readiness, and (4) explicitly addresses the question of clinicians attitudes toward offenders and the relationship between these attitudes and factors such as forgiveness, evil, and the therapeutic alliance.

4 CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 245 WORKING POSITIVELY WITH OFFENDERS We do not have the space to offer a systematic exposition and critique of the risk management rehabilitation model (for a comprehensive critique see Ward and Stewart, 2003a; Ward and Brown, 2003). Our aim is merely to outline the basic assumptions of this approach to rehabilitation in order to provide an appropriate context for the GLM. There are three general principles underpinning the risk /need approach to the treatment of offenders (see Andrews and Bonta, 1998). First, the risk principle, which is concerned with the match between level of risk and the actual amount of treatment received by offenders. Second, the need principle, which states that programmes should primarily target criminogenic needs, that is, dynamic risk factors associated with recidivism that if changed result in reduced reoffending rates. Third, the responsivity principle is concerned with a programme s ability to actually reach and make sense to the participants for whom it was designed. The aim is to ensure that offenders are able to absorb the content of the programme and subsequently change their behaviour. The basic idea underpinning this approach is that the best way to reduce recidivism rates is to identify and reduce or eliminate an individual s array of dynamic risk factors. These factors constitute clinical needs or problems that should be explicitly targeted. Thus treatment programmes for offenders are typically problem-focused and aim to eradicate or reduce the various psychological and behavioural difficulties associated with offending behaviour. These problems include intimacy deficits, deviant preferences, cognitive distortions, empathy deficits, drug and alcohol abuse, and difficulties managing negative emotional states. It is clear that the risk/need model has resulted in more effective treatment and lower recidivism rates (Hollin, 1999). In addition, the emphasis on empirically supported therapies and accountability is a laudable goal. However, alongside these undoubted strengths there are also some areas of weakness. The majority of these concerns revolve around the issue of offender responsivity and point to the difficulty of motivating offenders using this approach. In brief, we argue that as a theory of rehabilitation it lacks the conceptual resources to adequately guide therapists and to engage offenders (Ward and Stewart, 2003b). More specifically the risk /need model does not systematically address the issue of offender motivation and tends to lead to negative or avoidant treatment goals. The focus is on the reduction of maladaptive behaviours, the elimination of distorted beliefs, the removal of problematic desires, and the modification of offence supportive emotions and attitudes. In other words, the goals are essentially negative in nature and concerned with eradicating factors rather than promoting prosocial and personally more satisfying goals. Relatedly, this perspective often results in mechanistic one size fits all approach to treatment and does not really deal with the critical role of contextual factors in the process of rehabilitation. Second, it does not systematically consider the relationship between risk factors and human needs or goods. This is important because in order to motivate offenders to pursue more socially acceptable goals it is necessary that they view the alternative ways of living as personally meaningful and valuable. Third, it does not address the issue of treatment readiness and the causal preconditions for engagement in therapy. The concept of readiness can be broadly defined as the presence of characteristics (states or dispositions) within either the client or the therapeutic situation, which are likely to promote engagement in therapy and which, thereby, are likely to enhance therapeutic change (Ward et al., in press). Finally, it

5 246 T. WARD AND M. BROWN does not explicitly focus on the importance of establishing a strong therapeutic relationship with the offender and it is silent on question of therapist factors and attitudes to offenders. Good Lives Model of Offender Rehabilitation The GLM of offender rehabilitation is essentially a strength-based approach and as such, seeks to give offenders the capabilities to secure primary human goods in socially acceptable and personally meaningful ways (Kekes, 1989; Rapp, 1998; Ward and Stewart, 2003c). Primary goods are defined as actions, states of affairs, characteristics, experiences, and states of mind that are intrinsically beneficial to human beings and therefore sought for their own sake rather than as means to more fundamental ends (Emmons, 1999; Deci and Ryan, 2000; Schmuck and Sheldon, 2001). From the perspective of this model, humans are by nature active, goal-seeking beings who are consistently engaged in the process of constructing a sense of purpose and meaning in their lives. This is hypothesized to emerge from the pursuit and achievement of primary human goods (valued aspects of human functioning and living) which collectively allow individuals to flourish; that is, to achieve high levels of well-being. According to the GLM, the identification of risk factors simply alerts clinicians to problems (obstacles) in the way offenders are seeking to achieve valued or personally satisfying outcomes. Thus the core idea is that all meaningful human actions reflect attempts to achieve primary human goods (Emmons, 1999; Ward, 2002). This applies to all individuals irrespective of their level of education, intelligence, or class. Primary goods are viewed as objective and are tied to certain ways of living that if pursued involve the actualization of potentialities that are distinctively human. Individuals can, therefore, be mistaken about what is really of value and what is in their best interests. Primary goods emerge out of basic needs while instrumental or secondary goods provide concrete ways of securing these goods; for example, certain types of work or relationships (e.g. excellence in work provides mastery experiences, while distinct types of work represent different ways of seeking this excellence). The primary good of excellence in work which provides mastery experiences can be achieved by working as a mechanic, psychologist or teacher. The primary goods of relationships can be achieved in heterosexual or homosexual relationships. Secondary goods are available to individuals by way of the numerous models and opportunities for attaining goods in everyday life (i.e. types of relationships, work) and dictate the form these goods take in specific contexts. The choice to seek a particular cluster of secondary goods will be determined by an offender s preferences, strengths, and opportunities. One individual might realize the primary good of work and mastery (mastery experiences are components of excellence at work) working as a mechanic, while another might train as a computer operator. Secondary goods put flesh on the bones of the more abstract primary goods; when the attainment of human goods is difficult the problem often resides in the type of secondary goods utilized. Thus a person might seek the primary good of intimacy in a relationship characterized by violence, controlling behaviour, and emotional distance. Such a relationship choice will clearly not realize the primary good of intimacy. What is the evidence that there are indeed primary human goods, that human beings seek them, and that their realization will result in higher levels of well-being? Concerning the first and second questions, there is converging evidence from distinct domains of research and knowledge that there is a finite list of basic human goods. These domains include psychological and social science research (Cummins, 1996; Emmons, 1999), evolutionary

6 CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 247 theory (Arnhart, 1998), practical ethics (Murphy, 2001), and philosophical anthropology (Rescher, 1990; Nussbaum, 2000). Support for the ubiquity of goal- or goods-seeking behaviour comes from the self-regulation literature (Austin and Vancouver, 1996). As Emmons (1996) states why are goals important for well-being. Simply, it is because that is how people are designed. Goal-directedness is a human enterprise (p. 331). We propose that it is possible to identify at least nine classes of primary human goods from this literature. We argue that although other researchers might come up with a slightly longer or shorter list, the goods listed below will be present in some form. The list of nine primary human goods is: (1) life (including healthy living and optimal physical functioning, sexual satisfaction), (2) knowledge, (3) excellence in play and work (including mastery experiences), (4) excellence in agency (i.e. autonomy and self-directedness), (5) inner peace (i.e. freedom from emotional turmoil and stress), (6) relatedness (including intimate, romantic and family relationships) and community, (7) spirituality (in the broad sense of finding meaning and purpose in life), (8) happiness, and (9) creativity. This list is comprehensive and is consistent with much recent work on human motivation, well-being, and social policy. Each of these primary goods can be broken down into sub-clusters or components; in other words the primary goods are complex and multi-faceted. To illustrate, the primary good of relatedness contains the subcluster goods of intimacy, friendship, support, caring, reliability, honesty, and so on. The third question concerns whether primary goods are essential ingredients in good lives and as such result in higher levels of well-being. Research into personal strivings by Emmons has shown that there is a positive relationship between well-being and the achievement of goals that are important to individuals, that is, personal strivings (Emmons, 199). For example, the goals of achievement, affiliation, intimacy, power, personal growth and health, self-presentation, independence, emotionality, generativity, and spirituality goals have all been associated with subjective well-being (note their resemblance to the list of primary good noted above). Additionally, Cummins s (1996) research into well-being has identified important domains of life satisfaction and these echo the primary goods listed above (e.g. material well-being, health, productivity, intimacy, safety, community, and emotional wellbeing). Finally, Deci and Ryan have produced an important body of research on the three psychological needs of autonomy, mastery, and relatedness and their importance for happiness and well-being (Deci and Ryan, 2000). These needs cause individuals to seek a number of primary goods and therefore provide direct evidence for their critical role in promoting good lives. The possibility of constructing and translating conceptions of good lives into actions and concrete ways of living depends crucially on the possession of internal (skills and capabilities) and external conditions (opportunities and supports). The specific form that a conception will take depends on the actual abilities, interests and opportunities of each individual and the weightings he or she gives to specific primary goods. The weightings or priorities allocated to specific primary goods is constitutive of an offender s personal identity and spells out the kind of life sought and, relatedly, the kind of person he or she would like to be (see Maruna, 2001). The assumption here is that personal identity is derived from our commitments and resultant ways of life. However, because human beings naturally seek a range of primary goods or desired states, it is important that all classes of primary goods are addressed in a conception of good lives; they should be ordered and coherently related to each other. Additionally, a conception of good lives is always context dependent; there is no such thing as the right kind of life for an individual across every conceivable setting. Therefore, all individuals are hypothesized to live their lives according to a GLM, either

7 248 T. WARD AND M. BROWN explicitly or implicitly. Thus, there is no such thing as the right kind of life for any specific person; there are always a number of feasible possibilities, although there are limits defined by circumstances, abilities, and preferences (Kekes, 1989; Ward and Stewart, 2003b). Psychological, social, and lifestyle problems emerge when these GLMs are faulty in some way. When they do not achieve what they set out to the well-being of individuals living according to such GLM is reduced. In the case of criminal behaviour, it is hypothesized that there are four major types of difficulties: (1) problems with the means used to secure goods, (2) a lack of scope within a good lives plan, (3) the presence of conflict among goals (goods sought) or incoherence, (4) or a lack of the necessary capacities to form and adjust a GLM to changing circumstances (e.g. impulsive decision making). Taking into account the type of GLM problem an offender has, a treatment plan should be explicitly constructed in the form of a good lives conceptualization, that taking into account an offender s preferences, strengths, primary goods, and relevant environments, specifies exactly what competencies and resources are required to achieve these goods. This crucially involves identifying the internal and external conditions necessary to implement the plan and designing a rehabilitation strategy to equip the individual with these required skills, resources, and opportunities. Such an approach to offender rehabilitation is significantly contextualized, and promotes the importance of personal identity and its emergence from daily living (and actions). It is also clearly value laden in the sense that primary human goods represent outcomes that are beneficial to human beings and their absence harmful (to the individual and to others). Therefore, rehabilitation should be tailored to individual offender s particular GLM and should only seek to install the internal and external conditions that will enable its realization. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK AND HUMAN GOODS The second issue concerns the relationship between risk factors and human goods, and the implications of this relationship for treatment. In our view rehabilitation should have a twin focus of promoting human goods (i.e. providing the offender with the essential ingredients for a good life) and reducing/avoiding risk. Either goal on its own is insufficient to successfully rehabilitate individuals and may on the one hand lead to an aversive and rather barren managed lifestyle, and on the other, to a self-indulgent preoccupation with individual welfare over broader concerns about community safety. We propose that the GLM has the conceptual resources to incorporate the two treatment aims within its framework and thus be in the unique position of promoting good lives while also reducing risk. The Concept of Risk The concept of risk is complex and contains a number of distinct features. Blackburn (2000) states that: Risk assessment is the process of determining an individual s potential for harmful behavior. It entails consideration of a broad array of factors related to the person, the situation, and their interaction. (p. 179). The crucial thing to note from Blackburn s definition (see also McGuire, 2000) is that risk involves an estimate or prediction of the possibility of harm to the self or others. This focus strongly points to a value component in the sense that what benefits or harms individuals is a

8 CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 249 question of specific types of goods and their presence or absence. Additionally, the above definition suggests that there are a number of risk factors ranging from personal dispositions to environmental factors that should be canvassed in a comprehensive risk assessment. Some of these factors are causally related to offending behaviour in a fundamental way (for example, antisocial attitudes) while others may simply function as disinhibitors or triggers that precipitate an offence, for example intoxication (Mrazek and Haggerty, 1994). Risk factors tend to fall within four broad domains: (1) dispositional factors such as psychopathic or anti-social personality characteristics, cognitive variables and demographic data; (2) historical factors such as adverse developmental history, prior history of crime and violence, prior hospitalization and poor treatment compliance; (3) contextual antecedents to violence such as criminogenic needs (risk factors of criminal behaviour), deviant social networks, and lack of positive social supports; and (4) clinical factors such as diagnosis, poor level of functioning, and substance abuse (Andrews and Bonta, 1998; Hollin, 1999; Blackburn, 2000; McGuire, 2000). Goods As stated above, primary goods are actions or states of affairs that are viewed as intrinsically beneficial to human beings and are therefore sought for their own sake rather than as means to more fundamental ends. While instrumental goods are actions or states of affairs that reliably result in primary goods, for example, possessing language or being in a relationship that leads to the primary human good of intimacy or relatedness. A good life becomes possible when an individual possesses the necessary conditions for achieving primary goods, has access to primary goods, lives a life characterized by the instantiation of these goods and when this is achieved in balance with the social obligations of community membership. The Relationship between Risk Factors and Human Goods We suggest that the best way to understand the relationship between the risk factors and human goods is to examine the relationship between criminogenic needs and human needs (i.e. the drive to seek primary goods). As stated above, whether or not basic needs can be met in a manner that will promote an individual s well-being depends crucially on the existence of specific internal and external conditions (capabilities). The detection of dynamic risk factors or criminogenic needs signals that there are problems in the way offenders seek human goods. Criminogenic needs are associated with the distortion of these conditions and can be viewed as internal or external obstacles that prevent basic needs from being met in an optimal manner (Ward and Stewart, 2003c). That is, an individual is hypothesized to commit criminal offences because he lacks the capabilities to realize valued outcomes, in his environment, in personally fulfilling and socially acceptable ways (Ward and Marshall, in press). The different classes of criminal needs (i.e. dynamic risk factors) reflect problems achieving the nine types of primary human goods. For example, impulsivity indicates a lack of the internal conditions to achieve the good of autonomy while social isolation indicates a lack of skills necessary to establish strong social relationships, and so on. Thus, human goods reflective of a fulfilling lifestyle are derived from, or made possible by, the meeting of basic psychological needs and the possession of the necessary internal and external conditions. Criminogenic needs function as markers that there is a problem in the way that an individual is seeking primary human goods, a problem that is directly related to his or her

9 250 T. WARD AND M. BROWN acting in an antisocial way. Therefore, an assessment of criminogenic needs is useful in that it points to the type of primary goods that are missing or problematic and focuses the clinician on developing an understanding of the internal and external conditions required to secure access to primary goods in more socially appropriate and personally fulfilling ways. In addition, because of the hypothesized relationship between criminogenic needs and human needs and their associated goods, it is pointless to simply seek to remove such risk factors. It is pointless because such a strategy fails to acknowledge that criminogenic needs come into existence when individuals attempts to secure primary human goods are flawed in some respect. More specifically, their implicit GLMs contain inappropriate ways or means of achieving goods (e.g. seeking intimacy through avoidance), have inadequate scope (e.g. fails to include relationship goods), lack coherence (e.g. there is conflict between the ways intimacy and friendship goods are sought), or the individuals lack the capacities required to live their vision of the good life. To concentrate treatment on modifying risk factors is to mistakenly target what is wrong with an individual rather than what is required to live a different kind of life. It is purely a problem focused perspective that does not suggest constructive alternatives. In our language, detecting risk factors is simply the first step in the rehabilitation process: locating the obstacles (lack of internal and external conditions) preventing someone from living a more prosocial and fulfilling life. The next step requires the explicit construction of a plan that will equip the individual concerned to pursue primary goods in a different way. It will specify a coherent, richer, and more meaningful good lives plan. CAUSAL CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR REHABILITATION: READINESS The third issue concerns the importance of ensuring offenders have the requisite conditions to benefit from treatment. Note that this is not the same thing as possessing the internal and external conditions needed to live a better kind of life; the competencies required for this are installed in treatment. Rather the question concerns the readiness of an offender to enter and effectively engage in treatment. We have argued that treatment readiness of offenders is a function of both internal (person) and external or contextual factors (Ward et al., in press). The person factors are cognitive (beliefs, cognitive strategies), affective (emotions), volitional (goals, wants or desires), and behavioural (skills and competencies). The contextual factors related to these properties are circumstances (mandated vs voluntary, offender type), location (prison, community), opportunities (availability of therapy and programmes), interpersonal supports (availability of individuals who wish the offender well and would like to see him or her succeed in overcoming their problems), and resources (quality of programme, availability of trained and qualified therapist, appropriate culture). We suggest that offenders will be ready to change their offending behaviour to the extent that they possess certain cognitive, emotional, volitional, and behavioural properties and live in an environment where such changes are possible and supported. More specifically, offenders need to possess the capacities and inclination to change their behaviour in general, solve a particular problem, accept a particular intervention, and to do all this at a particular time (now versus some future date). For example, the existence of hostile attitudes and beliefs may make it difficult to accept that therapists will behave in a trustworthy manner and deliver the kind of interventions initially promised to offenders. This pervasive distrustfulness may contaminate

10 CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 251 therapy and greatly reduce the chances of individuals being able to acquire the skills necessary to implement their GLM. A minimal degree of trust is therefore a causal precondition for entering and benefiting from therapy. A particularly crucial set of skills for entering cognitive behavioural treatment (CBT) programmes are those associated with functioning autonomously. It is useful to distinguish between those features that constitute autonomous functioning such as the formation of personal goals and the development and execution of a plan to realize these goals, and the conditions that are causally necessary to be able to engage in such activities. With respect to the capacities needed to function in a minimally autonomous way, Friedman (2003) states: Thus, autonomy competency is the effective capacity, or set of capacities, to act under some significant range of circumstances in ways that reflect and issue from deeper concerns that one has considered and affirmed. The relevant capacities include capacities for having values and commitments, understanding them, taking up valenced attitudes toward them, making choices and undertaking actions that mirror these commitments, and doing the latter with some resilience in the face of at least minimal obstacles. (p. 13). The self-management focus of CBT entails that most clinicians will assume offenders already possess these competencies to a minimally acceptable degree and therefore plan treatment on this basis. This means that individuals who lack these capacities through lack of appropriate socialization or a functional disorder such as a mental illness, will fail to benefit from, or even engage in, treatment. Perhaps the major assumption made about offenders in CBT programmes is that their behaviour is the product of calmly considered rational choices. The CBT intervention is nominally designed to restore offenders to the position of autonomous, self-disciplined and self-regulating individuals. Such individuals are characterized by much of what offenders do not have: they are forward thinking, planful, prudent, responsible, empathetic. They have achieved a mastery of the self and become what Rose (1996, p. 158) terms an entrepreneur of the self, seeking to maximise its own powers, its own happiness, its own quality of life, through enhancing its autonomy. At the same time, these subjects also recognize and accept their obligation to behave in such ways. Some guidance on whether or not the ascription of rational choice to offenders is reasonable can be found in moral psychology. In reviewing this field Thomas (2000) describes two opposing views of the moral self. On the first view, which Thomas terms the robust conception of the moral self, it is assumed that an individual has sufficient wherewithal to grasp moral norms and to act accordingly. On the second, which he terms the fragile conception of the moral self, adverse experiences in early life and childhood impair an individual s capacity to function as a complete moral actor in adulthood. The child who experiences full parental love, for example, will have greater capacity to develop healthy and loving relationships in adulthood than the child who was subject to physical or mental abuse at the hands of his or her parents. Where childhood disability intervenes to condition adult experience, the resulting perception and knowledge would seem to preclude the possibility for rational or autonomous choice as described and assumed in CBT programming. In other words, the competencies required to function in an autonomous manner may be missing and therefore prevent the offender from being able to fully engage in treatment. The (default) expectation that this is possible is incoherent, for it invokes the image of a robust moral self (making the right choices in light of moral knowledge) within the shell a fragile moral self. We have focused on the issue of autonomy (and decision making) to illustrate our general point that there are essential causal preconditions for therapy. In other words in order to be

11 252 T. WARD AND M. BROWN ready for treatment individuals need to possess certain beliefs, values, competencies, and motivations, and also live in an environmental that has the conditions and resources to make therapy possible. The GLM by virtue of its central assumption that individuals require internal and external conditions in order to achieve human goods (or meet needs) is able to accommodate the preconditions requirement. This means extending the reach of the model slightly to include the conditions to engage in therapy in addition to those necessary in order to implement a GLM when released from prison. This is a reasonable extension of the GLM and consistent with its overall thrust. However, the risk /need perspective does not have the conceptual resources to deal with this issue: the targets of interventions are dynamic risk factors and there is simply no room so to speak to focus on the causal conditions required to enter and engage in therapy; as part of the acquisition of the internal and external conditions essential for implementing an offender s GLM. It is possible to object that treatment readiness and all that this concept entails is adequately addressed within the risk/need model by the principle of responsivity. The responsivity principle is used to refer to the use of a style and mode of intervention that engages the client group (Andrews and Bonta, 1998). In other words, it refers to the extent to which offenders are able to absorb the content of the programme and subsequently change their behaviour. Responsivity can be further divided into internal and external responsivity (Ward et al., in press). Attention to internal responsivity factors requires therapists to match the content and pace of sessions to specific client attributes such as personality, motivation, and cognitive maturity. External responsivity instead refers to a range of general and specific issues, such as the use of active and participatory methods. We do not have the space to respond comprehensively to this claim and will simply make two points. First, the construct of readiness and the issue of casual preconditions for therapy is not really the focus of the principle of responsivity. The major concern is the matching of treatment with offender characteristics rather than ensuring offenders have the necessary competencies and values to enter or engage in treatment. The aim is to deliver treatment in a way that is directly responsive to individuals particular learning styles and characteristics. In other words, responsivity is simply a re-embellishment of the longstanding correctional principle of differentiated case management. Second, the advantage of the readiness concept is that it directs clinicians to ask what skills, etc. are required for entry into a particular programme and by doing so provides guidance for pretreatment or programme interventions to equip offenders with the required competencies. In this respect, cognitive skills programmes represent an excellent example of a readiness intervention, alongside motivational interviewing (McGuire, 2002) THERAPISTS ATTITUDES TO THE OFFENDER We propose that motivating offenders and creating a sound therapeutic alliance are pivotal components of effective treatment and should not be viewed as of lesser importance than the administration of strategies and techniques. In addition, it is not possible for therapists to quarantine ethical or moral issues from therapeutic ones when working with individuals who have committed offences against children or adults (Ward, 2002). The fact that an offender has harmed another human being and been punished is likely to evoke therapist beliefs about the nature of unjustified harm (i.e. evil), and also related issues such as forgiveness and revenge. It would be a mistake to simply argue that therapy can proceed without a

12 CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 253 consideration of such issues. The source of therapists attitudes toward the offender arguably reside in their conception of the nature and value of human beings, and the extent to which engaging in harmful actions diminishes that value. It is important for therapists to be nonjudgemental and to convey respect for the offender. We suggest that ultimately the stance individuals take on this issue partially depends on their moral view of human nature (Kekes, 1990). There are three plausible basic positions here. First, human beings are believed to be essentially good and only commit harmful actions if they fail to cultivate more prosocial values and the abilities required to achieve their goals (human goods) in adaptive and socially acceptable ways. Second, some people are fundamentally bad and born criminals, and are initiators of harmful acts. Third, people are equally capable of beneficial or harmful actions by virtue of their natural dispositions and characteristics. In our opinion, a mixed view of human nature as involving both dispositions to behave in ways that increase human welfare and to act in ways that reduce human welfare is more consistent with the scientific evidence (i.e. anthropological, psychological, biological and so on) and everyday knowledge. This means that individuals have innate tendencies to behave both altruistically and aggressively or selfishly toward their fellow human beings. If you accept that it is important to explicitly reflect on offenders status as ethical beings and to allow their basic value as persons to determine the way therapists should deliver therapy, then the related issue of forgiveness is also raised. The fact that someone has been punished and is also in therapy to alter their proclivities for behaving in an illegal manner, means they are likely to have to grapple with the realization they severely harmed another human being. Taking responsibility for abusive behaviour does imply this is the case; acceptance is an important step towards hope and taking responsibility, and seeking forgiveness. And once an offender realizes he has harmed his victim (and also created secondary and tertiary victims / see below) it is likely that he will desire some form of forgiveness. As Govier (2002) argues, to be forgiven means that a person can move on and seek to transform himself. Thus forgiveness can often be a critical element in the process of behaviour change. There are arguably distinct levels of victimization ranging from the primary (the direct recipient of harm), secondary (family and close friends), and finally to tertiary levels (e.g. the community as a whole; all adult females in cases of rape). If you accept that tertiary victims can play an important role in forgiveness, and that forgiveness is often necessary for an offender to accept responsibility and to turn his life around, then it can be a critical therapeutic response. It is unclear whether it is ever appropriate for therapists to take on this role, although an argument can be made for its utility and value. The point is that it is not possible for therapists to sidestep this issue. The attitude they adopt toward the offender arguably reflects their implicit (rarely explicit) forgiveness (or lack of forgiveness) of the individual in question and the belief that he or she is entitled to be treated with respect because of their value as a person. Offenders may be viewed as individuals who have committed wrongs and who have enduring dispositions to commit certain types of harm against others. However, the aim of intervention is not to seek revenge but more that of vindicativeness (Govier, 2002). That is, a therapist should act in a way that allows the offender to vindicate himself by actively engaging in therapy and also by helping him live a better kind of life. Revenge only results in the infliction of further suffering (a wrong) in response to a prior wrong and runs the risk of reinforcing some offence-related risk factors such as grievance/persecution beliefs. By revenge we are referring to punitive actions directed toward offenders by clinicians because

13 254 T. WARD AND M. BROWN they are perceived to be bad people, undeserving of forgiveness or a chance at a new life. These actions may involve aggressive confrontation, a failure to reward or praise efforts at behaviour change, negative interpretations of problematic group behaviour or lack of progress, or simply the failure to do the best for a given individual. These observations are entirely consistent with research work on the impact of therapist and process factors in treatment outcome. Marshall et al. (2003) have concluded that increasing sexual offenders self-esteem, working collaboratively with offenders in developing treatment goals, and the cultivation of therapist features such as displays of empathy and warmth, and encouragement and rewards for progress, facilitate the change process in sex offenders. We suggest that it is much easier to achieve these things if a therapist has a positive view about offenders based on the above considerations. Therapist and process variables reflect underlying assumptions about forgiveness, intrinsic value, and the nature of unjustified harm (i.e. evil). Thus therapists interactions with offenders are partly based on their views of the nature of persons, the source of harm, forgiveness, etc. and their implications for the worth of the offender and his right to live a different kind of life. The GLM fits in well with a constructive view of offender rehabilitation as it is based on a more positive view of human nature and the intrinsic value of human beings. This point has been powerfully argued by Margalit (1996): Even if there are noticeable differences among people in their ability to change, they are deserving of respect for the very possibility of changing. Even the worst criminals are worthy of basic human respect for the possibility that they may radically reevaluate their past lives and, if they are given the opportunity, may live the rest of their lives in a worthy manner. (p. 70). The degree to which offenders perceive the therapist to be trustworthy is also likely to be a function of these basic attitudes toward the offender and other members of the group. The link between trustworthiness and the basic character of the therapist is nicely put by Potter (2002): A trustworthy person... is one who can be counted on, as a matter of the sort of person he or she is, to take care of those things that others entrust to one and...whose ways of caring are neither excessive or deficient. (p. 16). According to Potter we tend to find individuals trustworthy if they are the kind of people who take care of things that we, and others, care about or value. In the context of therapy this would involve secrets, feelings, hopes, desires, and judgements. In addition, trustworthy therapists have a responsibility to communicate to offenders that they are trustworthy, to be aware of their own values and attitudes to the person in question and to critically evaluate them, and should be sensitive to the particular situation of the offender (Potter, 2002). Following on from this, when appropriate they are required to repair breaches in trust and to restore offenders confidence and trust in them. It is critical that the therapist should not naively believe everything that the offender reports during therapy while also not being unduly suspicious and confronting; rather they should take a middle position. In our view trust is essential to the development of the therapeutic alliance and springs directly from the extent to which therapists value and respect the offender and his capacity for change. Research into the therapeutic alliance supports this contention and recently Ackerman and Hilsenroth (2003) in their review of therapist characteristics and techniques that facilitate the development of this bond between therapist and patients, cited trustworthiness as an important factor. It is interesting to note that other therapist characteristics also found

14 CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 255 to increase the positive impact of therapy are arguably related to the value attributed to persons. These characteristics included being honest, respectful, warm, interested, and open. CONCLUSIONS The GLM states that human beings are naturally inclined to seek a number of basic goods that are valued states of affairs, actions, and characteristics. These goods are sought for their own sake and if secured result in high levels of well-being, and if not achieved, result in lower levels of well-being. Typically these goods are instantiated in concrete ways of living, the practices and everyday routines that constitute a life. In light of these remarks, it is not surprising that the GLM is able to deepen our aetiological theories by including an explicit reference to the goods sought by offending behaviour and by doing so, provide clear directions for rehabilitation interventions. Any justifiable intervention should focus on installing and/or strengthening the internal and external conditions necessary for an individual to realize his particular GLM, taking into account his unique circumstances, abilities, preferences, and strengths. A strength of the model is that by virtue of its focus on human goods it provides an explicit avenue by which to motivate offenders. Thus the link between aetiology and treatment is clear and focuses on the notion of human goods, problems in an individual s GLM, and the role of therapy in stalling the internal and external conditions to implement a particular individual s good lives plan. Aside from its ability to provide intelligible treatment targets, the GLM is also explicit about the nature and types of values associated with the rehabilitation of offenders. The source of therapist valuing and respect for the offender as a person is also perfectly clear, it resides in the fact that all human beings are naturally concerned about the welfare of others alongside their own interests. In a sense people are viewed as interdependent and therefore rely on the good will of others when attempting to implement their good GLMs. The GLM supports the importance of maintaining a twin focus in treatment: promoting welfare and reducing harm. The idea that risk factors are internal or external obstacles that frustrate or block the acquisition of human goods provides a useful way of integrating the two approaches. From the perspective of the GLM, treatment should focus first on identifying the various obstacles preventing offenders from living a balanced and fulfilling life, and then seek to equip them with the skills, beliefs, values, and supports needed to counteract their influence. Finally, the importance of human agency and the construction of personal identity are key features of the GLM. Offenders are viewed as seeking the human goods of autonomy and competence, alongside the other primary goods. The selection of an overarching set of primary goods and their related commitments results in a meaningful and rich life characterized by high levels of well-being. References Ackerman, S. J. and Hilsenroth, M. J. (2003). A review of therapist characteristics and techniques positively impacting on the therapeutic alliance. Clinical Psychology Review, 23, 1/33. Andrews, D. A. and Bonta, J. (1998). The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 2nd edn. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co. Arnhart, L. (1998). Darwinian Natural Right: the Biological Ethics of Human Nature. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press. Aspinwall, L. G. and Staudinger, U. M. (Eds.) (2003). A Psychology of Human Strengths: Fundamental Questions and Future Directions for a Positive Psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.