Cognitive Anthropologists: Who Needs Them?

Transcription

1 Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (2012) Copyright Ó 2012 Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights reserved. ISSN: print / online DOI: /j x Cognitive Anthropologists: Who Needs Them? Annelie Rothe Department of Psychology, University of Freiburg Received 16 June 2011; received in revised form 3 February 2012; accepted 23 February 2012 Abstract During the last decades, the cognitive sciences and cognitive anthropology have increasingly veered away from each other. Cognitive anthropologists have become so rare within the cognitive sciences that Beller, Bender, and Medin (this issue) even propose a division of the cognitive sciences and cognitive anthropology. However, such a divorce might be premature. This commentary tries to illustrate the benefits that cognitive anthropologists have to offer, not despite, but because of their combination of humanistic and scientific elements. It argues that the cognitive sciences (among others) profit from these benefits, as culture will become crucial for cognitive research. At the same time, problems within cognitive anthropology are discussed, including, for example, the responsibility of cognitive anthropologists to promote young academics. Finally, ideas are presented that might support future interdisciplinary collaboration. Keywords: Cognitive anthropology; Cognitive science; Cognition; Culture; Interdisciplinarity; Sociocultural anthropology 1. Introduction In their article Cultural psychology: Who needs it? Shweder and Sullivan (1993) hailed the reemergence of cultural psychology as an essential interdisciplinary subfield. The authors declared the 1990s to be the decade of ethnicity, when anthropologists and psychologists (and linguists and philosophers) unite to deepen our understanding of the varieties of normal human consciousness (Shweder & Sullivan, 1993, p. 517). Much earlier, the cognitive sciences had started out as a similar, although thematically and methodologically very different endeavor. They called for the incorporation of various cognitive approaches provided by different sub-disciplines in order to transcend what is typically achieved in any of the contributing disciplines (Bechtel & Herschbach, 2010, p. 240). However, the originally intended interdisciplinary interplay no longer includes all Correspondence should be sent to Annelie Rothe, Department of Psychology, University of Freiburg, D Freiburg, Germany. Annelie. Rothe@psychologie.uni-freiburg.de

2 388 A. Rothe Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (2012) constitutive sub-disciplines. Particularly cognitive anthropology, and with it cultural variety and ethnicity, was relegated, or indeed relegated itself, to the fringe (cf. Bender & Beller, 2011). As Beller, Bender, and Medin (this issue) suggest, the cognitive sciences frivolously scorned the holistic, emic and cultural perspective on cognition adopted by cognitive anthropologists. Instead, they endorsed a primarily nomothetic approach, accepting that anthropologists are no longer among their members. The following question therefore arises: Can we no longer assume a need for cognitive anthropology in cognitive research? Or, to put it more provocatively: Who needs cognitive anthropologists (if they are needed at all)? Admittedly, even if cognitive anthropologists were marginalized within the cognitive sciences, they should still thrive in the area of sociocultural anthropology. It might therefore be somewhat misplaced to call cognitive anthropology into question. However, cognitive anthropologists do not experience a home-field advantage among post-modern anthropologists either. Since mainstream sociocultural anthropology opposes the scientific approach of cognitive anthropology, it would not lament the exclusion of its cognitive sub-discipline. If we were to ask ourselves whether the cognitive sciences are in need of cognitive anthropologists, on the face of it, the answer would be negative and would call for a divorce. This commentary provides a second look at the benefits that cognitive anthropologists have to offer and points at the desolate, though changeable, shortcomings prevalent in cognitive anthropology. The title can be interpreted in two different ways: The first, who needs them, focuses on what in particular cognitive anthropologists have to offer. This section outlines some unique advantages that might be of value to different stakeholders. The second, who needs them, targets these very stakeholders. It focuses on who would benefit from strengthening cognitive anthropology. From a young researcher s perspective, this section comprises not only theoretical considerations but also pragmatic implications that arise from the present shortcomings of cognitive anthropology. 2. Who needs them? Reasons why cognitive anthropologists enrich science are not necessarily obvious. Cognitive anthropologists seem to stray from sociocultural anthropology to the cognitive sciences without a proper slot in which they can fit and sometimes without acknowledgment from their colleagues (Bender, Hutchins, & Medin, 2010). Unsurprisingly, it is suggested that cognitive anthropology is moribund or even dead (Blount, 2011, p. 12). However, there is life in the old dog yet, and in fact, cognitive anthropologists offer various benefits to other disciplines. Although also considered a burden, one of the very strengths of cognitive anthropologists is their two-fold perspective. On the one hand, cognitive anthropologists strive for an emic, context-related perspective on human cognition and behavior in order to understand culturally shared characteristics from the insiders of a cultural group. This feature is unique to cognitive anthropologists in the cognitive sciences and relates them more closely to humanistic approaches. On the other hand, cognitive anthropologists go beyond thick descriptions of cultural specificities and strive to find underlying principles

3 A. Rothe Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (2012) 389 that explain the observed data patterns. In this respect, cognitive anthropology is first and foremost scientific (Blount, 2011) and shares its explanatory perspective with the other cognitive sciences. This dualism has at least three valuable consequences. First, cognitive anthropologists possess a well-equipped toolbox of methods for collecting and analyzing data that account for cultural specifics and are rarely accessible to other cognitive sciences. As sociocultural anthropologists, they apply participant observation and other ethnographic fieldwork methods. They thus provide epistemic know-how to gather culture-specific and context-related knowledge within different cognitive domains. As scientific anthropologists, they also pursue a scientific aim of inquiry: They apply systematic data collection and statistical analyses to model general principles that underlie culture-specific observations. Cognitive anthropologists thus use a multi-method approach that applies descriptive, exploratory, and analytical explanatory methods, and they have also developed methods that combine both perspectives (e.g., Boster, 2011; Weller & Romney, 1988). Cultural Consensus Analysis, for example, was developed to assess culturally shared knowledge (Romney, Weller, & Batchelder, 1986), and it has already inspired other fields (e.g., Aßfalg & Erdfelder, 2012). Second, cognitive anthropologists provide a missing link between research focusing on variations within or across cultures and research focusing on general models and theories of cognition. In sharing the emic objective of sociocultural anthropology and the explanatory objective of scientific anthropology, cognitive anthropologists tie the two perspectives together, which allows them to scrutinize how cognition is embedded in specific contexts and how it varies within and between cultural groups. This is essential for a comprehensive and externally valid understanding of human cognition that identifies universal and culture-specific aspects of cognition. Unfortunately, the epistemic value of culture and context has remained widely neglected within the cognitive sciences, even though cultural influences might be crucial for cognition (cf. Bender & Beller, 2011). Cognitive anthropologists can provide this missing link, as they are ideally educated in emic and etic research approaches. In this regard, they seem predestined for interdisciplinary research and the cognitive sciences. Third, cognitive anthropologists possess the strength of theory building, which leads to new hypotheses and innovative research questions. Their extensive fieldwork allows cognitive anthropologists to discover new research topics that are grounded in human experience and concrete contexts (cf. Bloch, 1991), to gain insights from a non-western angle, and to build innovative theories that give rise to alternative models. This advantage can enhance interdisciplinary collaboration and inspire cognitive research. In summary, although cognitive anthropologists are torn between sociocultural anthropology and the cognitive sciences, this very feature equips them with multifaceted advantages. So who might profit from the work of cognitive anthropologists? 3. Who needs them? In the following, different stakeholders who might benefit from supporting and collaborating with cognitive anthropologists are discussed.

4 390 A. Rothe Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (2012) 3.1. The cognitive sciences need them The cognitive sciences were originally allied in an interdisciplinary research venture to obtain a comprehensive picture of human cognition. In retrospect, these particular collaborations across the disciplinary divide have pushed the field forward to unforeseen heights (Davelaar, 2010, p. 1). Unfortunately, this very core characteristic is at risk of dissolving in the mainstream of cognitive psychology (Gentner, 2010). From this point of view, cognitive science needs to reconsider its interdisciplinary foundation; as otherwise, it would betray its original ideals. Calling for a divorce between cognitive science and cognitive anthropology would clearly increase this risk. Most notably, it would deprive cognitive science of a valuable holistic perspective on cognition, profound ethnographic knowledge, and unique methods that are sensitive to cultural variation and context information. Further, cognitive science would miss out on opportunities for innovative theories and new hypotheses based on alternative, emic perspectives. Since an increasing number of studies are providing evidence of cultural or linguistic dependencies of cognitive processes and categories, cognitive science can no longer assume their universality. For example, the recent revival of interest in Sapir and Whorf s account of language culture shaping thought (e.g., Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003; Majid, Bowerman, Kita, Haun, & Levinson, 2004) and studies of cross-cultural psychology show that culture does influence basic cognitive functions (e.g., Lin & Han, 2009; Oyserman, Sorensen, Reber, & Chen, 2009). However, even if cognitive science acknowledges the role of culture, it could still recruit cross-cultural psychology instead of cognitive anthropology. The methodological similarities between cross-cultural and cognitive psychology might support this. Nevertheless, cognitive science would continue to degenerate into cognitive psychology, already one of the biggest fields in the cognitive sciences, effectively shielding itself from what the other disciplines have to offer. In addition, cross-cultural psychology itself might not be the best choice for integrating culture and cognition, and this for two reasons. First, mainstream cross-cultural psychology might not assess cultures in their diversity. Although it explores factors or dimensions that account for cultural differences, the dimensions that have been identified so far lead to gross oversimplifications: To put it in exaggerated terms, cultures are categorized by dichotomous distinctions such as independent versus interdependent self-construals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), holistic versus analytic cognitive styles (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001), or individualistic versus collectivistic societies (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1995). 1 These distinctions undermine not only inter-cultural but also intra-cultural diversity. Grouping cultures into West versus the rest leaves cultural uniqueness completely aside and disregards the dynamics and the heterogeneity within a single culture (Medin, Bennis, & Chandler, 2010). Second, the procedures of cross-cultural psychology might include epistemic and statistical pitfalls. Although etic and emic perspectives are regarded as ostensibly important for the study of culture (cf. Gelfand & Diener, 2010), most cross-cultural research applies etic approaches. Commonly, psychologists produce hypotheses, paradigms, and results within their home field of a Western culture and apply these to other cultures for comparison. However, this procedure entails what Medin et al. (2010) termed the home-field

5 disadvantage: Psychologists consider their Western perspective and paradigms to be culturally unmarked standards that reveal cultural aberrations when applied to other, marked cultures. In addition, these paradigms and their effects are highly sophisticated in order to fit the selective samples of exotic Western undergraduates (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). When applying them in other cultural contexts, significant differences do not necessarily reflect valid cultural differences but might be due to statistical phenomena such as regression to the mean (Medin et al., 2010). Consequently, if cognitive science refers to cross-cultural psychology as an expert in culture, it might run the risk of still falling short of cultural diversity, of missing out on emic perspectives, and of falling into the trap of cultural differences where there are merely artificial statistics. By contrast, cognitive anthropologists might support cognitive scientists in deriving theories from emic and culturally sound information; they can help to establish culturally adequate methods and to overcome the selective sampling of undergraduates Sociocultural anthropology needs them A. Rothe Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (2012) 391 In anthropology, a rift has emerged between the humanities and the sciences, which gave rise, for example, to a heated debate when the executive board of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) recently decided to delete the term science from a statement of its long-range plan. The same rift exists in sociocultural anthropology, with the majority of anthropologists endorsing the humanities. Unsurprisingly, many sociocultural anthropologists do not even tolerate cognitive approaches. That s not what we do in here was once a reply to some students who referred to memory or cognitive representation in one of my classes on knowledge production. Although the AAA emphasized in a later response note that pluralism is one of anthropology s greatest strengths, sociocultural anthropology does not appreciate its cognitive sub-discipline even though it might provide a crucial perspective for understanding human culture. In this regard, it will become crucial for sociocultural anthropology to break the circle of postmodern deconstruction that even abandoned culture as the core concept of the discipline. Despite plausible reasons (cf. Kahn, 1989), other disciplines can hardly comprehend that an expert negates his or her own field of expertise. If sociocultural anthropology wants to assert its position, it has to overcome the postmodern crisis and develop new approaches to culture. Cognitive anthropologists could offer such an alternative perspective because they combine specific emic understandings with more general cultural patterns. In this way, they do not essentialize or stereotype culture but try to derive patterns of differences or similarities between informants of the same or a different cultural context. The unique methods of cognitive anthropology might help sociocultural anthropology to overcome its crisis and to smooth the way to scientific disciplines. Following a more pragmatic view, cognitive anthropologists endow sociocultural anthropology with a pluralistic research profile that is adaptable to new academic demands and developments. This becomes increasingly important in times of limited funding resources and the closure of smaller departments. The collaboration with other cognitive sciences would provide sociocultural anthropology with a powerful lobby and valuable proponents in committees.

6 392 A. Rothe Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (2012) In summary, sociocultural anthropology should value its pluralism. Re-integrating cognitive anthropology does not imply the betrayal of humanistic ideals, but rather fosters their combination with scientific approaches. This might help sociocultural anthropology to overcome its identity crisis and to remain the expert on culture Cognitive anthropologists in charge of their field of research Each scientific endeavor needs scientists to invent and pursue research questions, to discuss and criticize each other in order to keep this particular field of research alive. A scientific enterprise without tangible agents is not perceived as a vital and appealing research venture, either by students or by established scientists new to the field. Therefore, two stakeholders make an appearance in this section: the personified research field of cognitive anthropology and students of sociocultural anthropology. In line with Beller, Bender, and Medin (this issue), cognitive anthropology appears as a dying subfield of anthropology: fossilized, overaged, and depopulated. Not only doctoral students but also assistant professorships and mid-level faculties seem to be rare. From the student perspective, there is indeed a missing link between established professors and younger scholars. Three aspects highlight the necessity of cognitive anthropologists to promote their field more strongly. First, financial policies and university-wide developments have led to fewer funding resources and more fixed-term contracts. Particularly in small departments like anthropology, this causes a lack of post-doctoral positions and long-term stability, which render continuity in research and collaborative alliances more difficult. Second, fieldwork and the Lone Ranger model of anthropological research might prevent cognitive anthropologists from developing a culture of promoting young scientists. Thus, cognitive anthropologists might simply see no need to pass on their expertise knowledge, to bring doctoral students to conferences, or to encourage continuation of their own research through collaboration with younger scholars. Third, the dualism of cognitive anthropology (see Section 2) forces cognitive anthropologists to disperse across different departments and institutions. Germany provides a sad example of this. 2 Archeology, and biological and sociocultural anthropology are typically hosted by different departments, which consolidates the divide between scientific and humanistic subfields. As most German professors of sociocultural anthropology refer to the humanities, cognitive anthropologists, if they exist, attend diverse research institutions or programs, making cognitive anthropologists rather inaccessible to other disciplines and (under)graduates. Due to these circumstances, cognitive anthropologists must actively re-institutionalize their field within academic education, at universities or at conferences, and assume responsibility for the younger generation. Correspondingly, students of sociocultural anthropology constitute another stakeholder. For example, in Germany, teaching in cognitive anthropology is the exception rather than the rule. Within the regular undergraduate program of sociocultural anthropology, I encountered cognitive anthropology only once as an episode during a scientific history class. One student even described cognitive anthropology as the old school of cultural anthropology and considered its topics or methods as not reflecting the state of the art despite recent publications. When looking at the teaching curricula of ten randomly chosen German universities

7 A. Rothe Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (2012) 393 in the academic year , the situation is not more promising: Of approximately 400 bachelor and master courses examined, two explicitly dealt with cognitive research questions of knowledge distribution and cognitive concepts, one contrasted cognitive with hermeneutic-interpretative approaches, and two dealt with psychological issues of emotions or personhood. Although these numbers are not representative of cognitive anthropology in general, they still hint at the ample potential for improvement in teaching. As it is crucial to get doctoral students involved, it is essential to first attract their interest and to teach them the state of the art of the field! 4. An impetus for change Cognitive anthropologists offer unique advantages to different stakeholders that follow from their conjunction of scientific and humanistic elements. Cognitive science and sociocultural anthropology could profit from these benefits and are well advised to support cognitive anthropology. Cognitive anthropologists, however, have to become active themselves. If the cognitive sciences open the door for a rapprochement, cognitive anthropologists should stop licking their wounds and enter it. Of course, they should not jump through hoops, but they should be open-minded and motivated to take this opportunity. What they have to gain is scientific and administrative support by the powerful lobby of the cognitive sciences. This includes a platform to exchange research findings, funding of joint projects, research grants for (post-) doctoral students, and even a place for scientific affiliation if sociocultural anthropology continues to dismiss its sub-discipline. What steps can be taken to reactivate the exchange between the cognitive sciences and cognitive anthropology? To facilitate a fruitful exchange, courses and workshops should be offered jointly by anthropologists and other cognitive scientists to students from the different sub-disciplines. This would widen students scientific horizon and foster openness to other research traditions. Additionally, student workshops in methods of cognitive anthropology and cognitive science should be administered to anthropology students as they raise interest in cognitive topics, build up methodological competence, and transmit expertise to younger generations. To support interdisciplinary research and to promote long-term networks, cognitive anthropologists should partially abandon their research traditions and engage in joint projects with other scientists and younger scholars. On the other hand, interdisciplinarity entails many risks. Although it is politically supported, the acceptance of research proposals and manuscripts or the evaluation of job applications is too often based solely on disciplinary criteria. These convictions of proper research and acts of scientific self-preservation can hinder younger scientists from embarking on their own interdisciplinary collaboration. To overcome these obstacles, mono-disciplinary journals should also publish interdisciplinary studies. Senior cognitive scientists should acknowledge interdisciplinary research when attending review committees and decision-making bodies. Changing these conditions might encourage junior scientists to acknowledge the work of other disciplines and to embrace an interdisciplinary approach.

8 394 A. Rothe Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (2012) 5. Conclusion How can we answer the question of who needs cognitive anthropologists? From an anthropological perspective, cognitive anthropology itself needs them to re-institutionalize their own discipline and pass on their expertise to younger scholars. Sociocultural anthropologists should support these efforts as they might also profit from cognitive anthropologists. Indeed, the cognitive sciences should actually be the first in line. Culture will become increasingly important for their field and cognitive anthropology will be the perfect choice to integrate culture and cognition. Although interdisciplinary research must overcome many obstacles, prospects of change exist one way might be to call for a decade of cognition and ethnicity within the cognitive sciences. Notes 1. Although many studies in (cross-)cultural psychology do not fit this stereotype, quite a few very influential publications focus on dichotomous, a priori categorizations. Since these publications often serve as the state of the art, they might increase the risk of restricting culture to very few variables. 2. Although other academic systems, for example, of the United States and Great Britain, differ from Germany, the devastating state in Germany might still indicate crossnational challenges. References Aßfalg, A., & Erdfelder, E. (2012). CAML-Maximum likelihood consensus analysis. Behavior Research Methods, 44, Bechtel, W., & Herschbach, M. (2010). Philosophy of the cognitive sciences. In F. Allhoff (Ed.), Philosophies of the Sciences (pp ). Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. Beller, S., Bender, A., & Medin, D. L. (2012). Should anthropology be part of cognitive science? Topics in Cognitive Science, 4, Bender, A., & Beller, S. (2011). The cultural constitution of cognition. Frontiers in Psychology, 2 (67), 1 6. Bender, A., Hutchins, E., & Medin, D. L. (2010). Anthropology in cognitive science. Topics in Cognitive Science, 2, Bloch, M. (1991). Language, anthropology and cognitive science. Man (N.S.), 26, Blount, B. G. (2011). A history of cognitive anthropology. In D. B. Kronenfeld, G. Bennardo, V. C. de Munck, & M. D. Fischer (Eds.), A companion to cognitive anthropology (pp ). Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. Boster, J. (2011). Data, method and interpretation in cognitive anthropology. In D. B. Kronenfeld, G. Bennardo, V. C. de Munck, & M. D. Fischer (Eds.), A companion to cognitive anthropology (pp ), Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. Davelaar, E. J. (2010). Cognitive science future challenges of an interdisciplinary field. Frontiers in Psychology, 1 (7), 1 2. Gelfand, M. J., & Diener, E. (Eds.). (2010). Culture and psychological science. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5, Gentner, D. (2010). Psychology in cognitive science: Topics in Cognitive Science, 2,

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