SYNTHESIS REPORT. The Impact and Effectiveness of Various Counter Narcotics Media Campaigns

Transcription

1 SYNTHESIS REPORT The Impact and Effectiveness of Various Counter Narcotics Media Campaigns October 2008

2 CONTENTS SUMMARY 4 1. BACKGROUND 8 2. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 8 3. ANALYSIS Phase I: Assessment of the Impact of CN Media Products 9 Phase 1: Findings and Conclusions 3.2 Phase 2: Assessment of Responses to CN Media Products 12 Phase 2: Findings and Conclusions 3.3 Phase 3: Assessment of the Impact of MCN Messages and Review of Phases 1 and Phase 3: Findings and Conclusions 4. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 22 ANNEXES 27 ANNEX 1 ANNEX 2 ANNEX 3 ANNEX 4 ANNEX 5 ANNEX 6 ANNEX 7 ANNEX 8 ANNEX 9 Approach and Methodology Phase 1 Findings Phase 2 Findings Phase 2 Analysis: Poster Samples Phase 2 Analysis: Radio Samples Focus Group Illustrations of CN Messages Phase 3 Findings Phase 3 Analysis: Poster Samples Phase 3 Analysis: Radio Samples 2

3 Synonyms and Acronyms AL CN OPC MCN UNODC Alternative livelihoods Counter narcotics Opium poppy cultivation Ministry of Counter Narcotics United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Acknowledgements The following organisations and individuals contributed to the preparation of this report: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Kabul) Christina Oguz (Country Representative); Elisabeth Bayer (Deputy Country Representative); Patrick Halewood (Project Coordinator); Andrew Weir (Consultant) The CETENA Group (Kabul) 3

4 SUMMARY BACKGROUND The spread of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan over the past twenty years has been accompanied by increasing counter narcotics (CN) efforts from the government and the international community. The growing use of print media and radio to disseminate CN messages is part of this effort. In 2007, UNODC initiated a study with the CETENA Group to review and evaluate the impact of this work, to identify problems and constraints and to make recommendations on future research and direction. The study took place between October 2007 and March The Overall Objectives of the research were to: Assess sources of information on anti opium poppy planting/cultivation messages: where messages have been heard and which sources had the greatest impact. Assess which media tools/formats/styles have had the greatest impact on the decision making of opium poppy cultivators. Determine why CN messages have failed to deter farmers and identify the factors which encourage them to ignore these deterrent messages. The Target Groups were: Primary Focus: Opium poppy farmers and those connected to the opium trade; Secondary Focus: Those involved with the dissemination of anti-opium poppy cultivation messages including local officials, Mullahs and those displaying CN material such as shop owners. Methodology Fieldwork was carried out in three phases in 5 provinces: Herat, Kandahar, Badakhshan, Balkh and Nangarhar. Sources of Information: The primary sources of information were Focus Groups of between 10 and 15 people from the target groups in the five target provinces. The consultant s radio network was a secondary source of information. Feedback from listeners on the above objectives is included in the analysis. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The key issue with CN awareness campaigns is that, in Afghanistan, opium poppy cultivation (OPC) rather than being a marginal, and illegal, activity carried out by a few farmers under the influence of opium traders and traffickers has become a mainstream (albeit illegal) income-earning opportunity in many rural areas. The destruction of rural infrastructure particularly irrigation as well as other rural assets such as timber forests, natural pistachio forests and orchards, and public grazing land has reduced licit livelihoods opportunities in rural areas. The situation is compounded by the weakness of the licit rural economy: fractured value chains, a lack of improved seed and fertilizer, inadequate transport infrastructure, as well as poor processing, storage and marketing facilities and a dearth of non-farm income earning opportunities in rural areas. Summary 4

5 Consequently, instead of focussing on a few marginal farmers engaged in OPC, CN awareness campaigns, to be effective, need to be part of a mainstream effort to rehabilitate the licit rural economy. As shown by experience to date, CN messages alone are ineffective. Findings and Conclusions To be effective, methods of reaching communities in urban areas as well as remote rural areas should include (i) improving radio coverage in rural areas and encouraging the use of radios as an information and educational tool; and, (ii) improving the relevance, quality and distribution of posters to ensure that the CN messages reach urban areas, schools and Mosques, as well as villages in remote areas. The target audience appreciated and understood illustrations as an effective way of communicating CN messages. However, the style and design is critical for effectiveness. Illustration methods which are not common in Afghanistan are frequently regarded as foreign and generally elicit negative responses. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) is frequently not recognised as the instigator of the CN awareness programme. Furthermore, the ministry is often blamed for the government s failure to deliver on CN promises such as alternative livelihoods which is not MCN s responsibility. MCN needs to clarify its role and that of other government departments in the minds of the rural (and urban) population: including the role of technical ministries and the private sector in providing licit livelihoods opportunities as well as the role of law enforcement agencies in eradication and in catching and punishing offenders. Poster designs should be as simple as possible; particularly when intended for largely illiterate rural audiences. Abstract and metaphorical images, which are not understood, should be avoided. As there is still not a strong link between OPC and criminality in the minds of most rural people, messages need to focus on clearly identifying OPC as a criminal act. A key problem with the CN campaigns was that people still do not believe in the long term benefits of giving up OPC. In future, CN messages, as part of a comprehensive national campaign, should focus on reversing these attitudes. The differing interpretations of the statements in the Quran referring to intoxicants and other drugs highlight the need for national religious scholars to clarify and disseminate their views on this crucial religious and social topic. Improved clarity on these issues would enable a more coherent approach to be developed for the country, in order to increase the effectiveness of religious exhortations against OPC. Public CN awareness campaigns cannot be effective in isolation and, to increase the chances of success, need to be: (i) co-ordinated with the development of the licit rural economy to provide alternatives to OPC, and; (ii) accompanied by credible threats of punishment (including eradication). The threat of localised violence related to OPC (mentioned in Balkh and Badakhshan) is much more real to farmers than any links between OPC and terrorism, which do not appear to be a concern at the local level. Campaigns focussing on the risk of local violence (criminality and disruption to the community) are more likely to be effective than focussing on issues of terrorism which farmers do not see as important. Summary 5

6 CN media campaigns need to take into account the diverse cultural and social realities of the various provinces and ethnic groups. For example, messages promoting Islamic prohibitions may be more effective in the south and east while messages that threaten eradication and punishments may be more relevant in provinces such as Balkh and Badakhshan; which have experience of substantial eradication and appear to be less influenced by religious exhortations than farmers in the south and east. Written CN messages (in the appropriate national and/or local language) need to be focussed on literate target groups (such as teachers and Mullahs) who are in a position to pass them on to school children and to a wider, largely illiterate, rural audience. Although the radio should be a primary means of broadcasting CN messages, there is a need to ensure that: (i) radio coverage is more widespread particularly in remote rural areas; and (ii) people have access to radios in order to be able to listen to the CN messages. Greater pre-testing of CN campaigns is required with substantial field research prior to production and dissemination to produce fewer but better-targeted CN public awareness messages. It is essential to investigate in advance the way in which the intended audience will interpret the proposed messages and not take for granted that certain images will be received in the ways that were intended. A regional focus should be developed for poster and radio messages to build on the regional differences in perceptions and responses to CN initiatives. A regional emphasis should include the use of appropriate languages for both radio and poster messages. For example, Dari is not appreciated in the south and east (where Pashtu would be most effective). In the north, although many of those involved in OPC are ethnic Pashtuns, Dari would reach a wide audience and the use of languages such as Uzbek would also be appropriate for some audiences. The government should facilitate the increased involvement of influential public figures and Mullahs in CN public awareness campaigns, particularly in the south. There is a need for a clear balance between positive and negative images. Merely demonizing OPC itself without explaining its consequences and showing (as well as providing) alternative income generating opportunities is not effective and is likely to be counter productive. A comprehensive CN campaign should offer realisable alternatives to OPC. Such a campaign should not be limited to the financial benefits but should also emphasise the religious and social benefits for both the farmers and the community. Since many in the target audience are illiterate, use of the radio offers a major opportunity to disseminate CN messages in more detail than is possible through other media such as posters or billboards. There is a need to determine the coverage of both government and commercial radio throughout the country to identify areas that are not currently reached adequately. Subsequently, the government and the private sector should improve radio coverage in order to increase the effectiveness of CN and other campaigns. Public CN awareness campaigns will continue to be ineffective as long as they are not accompanied by practical action from the government and the international community to introduce farmers to realistic alternatives to OPC as part of a comprehensive programme of rural development. Summary 6

7 Recommendations for Research and Action A key element of the effectiveness of the CN awareness programme is the relationship between government and farmers. Farmers generally expect the government to provide support to enable them to stop OPC. Research is needed into: (i) what farmers understand their own responsibilities to be; and, (ii) what is needed to initiate bottom up (and other) approaches that could break the farmers reliance on the government to provide solutions. The decision-making role of women in households has not been covered by the current research. Research on the role of women in household CN decision-making would improve the effectiveness of CN awareness programmes. The perspectives of the various target audiences in the different regions of the country vary substantially. There is therefore a need to identify clearly these differences and then to develop regional CN awareness campaigns to accommodate them. Farmers involved in OPC need to be made aware of the increasing prevalence of opium and heroin addiction, its negative effects on households and communities, and, importantly, of the direct link between OPC and addiction. There are considerable differences in farmers perceptions and interpretations of the Quran s position on opium production and use; on the illegality of OPC as opposed to opium use and on what is un-islamic and what is not. The appropriate religious authorities should clarify these issues and their findings should be widely disseminated as part of a comprehensive CN awareness programme. There is widespread recognition (particularly in the north) of the need to protect children from being harmed by OPC and the need to educate them on the dangers of narcotics. In addition, teachers have highlighted the potential for children to transmit CN messages to their parents and other family members. A school-based CN awareness creation programme could have a significant impact; with CN messages incorporated into the school curriculum. In Badakhshan, for example, given the strongly negative reaction of the adult population to CN messages, a focus on children who may be receptive to the CN messages and could influence their families, would likely be effective. Public CN awareness campaigns cannot be effective in isolation and, to increase the chances of success, need to be: (i) co-ordinated with the development of the rural economy to provide licit alternatives to OPC, and; (ii) accompanied by credible threats of punishment (including eradication). Summary 7

8 1. BACKGROUND The spread of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan over the past twenty years has been accompanied by increasing counter narcotics (CN) efforts from the government and the international community. The growing use of print media and radio to disseminate CN messages is part of this effort. In 2007, UNODC initiated a study with the CETENA Group to review and evaluate the impact of this work, to identify problems and constraints and to make recommendations on future research and direction. The study, which took place between October 2007 and March 2008, resulted in three reports which form the basis of this paper OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY The Overall Objectives of the research were to: Assess sources of information on anti opium poppy planting/cultivation messages: where messages have been heard and which sources had the greatest impact. Assess which media tools/formats/styles have had the greatest impact in the decision making process of opium poppy cultivators. Determine why CN messages have failed to deter farmers from opium poppy cultivation (OPC) and identify the factors which encourage farmers to ignore these deterrent messages. The Target Groups were: Primary focus: Opium poppy farmers and those connected to the opium trade; Secondary focus: Those involved with the dissemination of anti-opc messages including local officials, Mullahs and those displaying CN material such as shop owners. Methodology Fieldwork was carried out in three phases between October 2007 and March 2008 in 5 provinces: Herat, Kandahar, Badakhshan, Balkh and Nangarhar. Details of the overall approach and methodology are given in Annex 1. 1 Cetena Group (December 2007): The Impact of CN Media Campaigns. Consultants Report Phase 1. Cetena Group (January 2008): The Impact of CN Media Campaigns. Consultants Report Phase 2. Cetena Group (February 2008): The Impact of CN Media Campaigns. Consultants Report Phase 3. 8

9 Sources of Information: The primary sources of information were Focus Groups 2 of between 10 and 15 people from the above target groups in the five target provinces. 3 The consultant s radio network was a secondary source of information. Directors asked their listeners questions related to the above objectives. Their feedback is included in the analysis below. 3. ANALYSIS 3.1 Phase 1: Assessment of Impact of CN Media Products Objective: To analyze the general reach and impact of CN messages in the five target provinces. Phase 1: Findings and Conclusions The detailed findings from Phase 1 Focus Groups, by target province, are given in Annex 2. Counter Narcotics Messages Although the primary sources of CN messages were radio, posters and Mosques; radio and poster coverage varied geographically, as did the authority of Mullahs. Posters are generally confined to the main towns and are rarely seen in rural areas. Radio coverage is not universal and is limited in the rural areas of several provinces; Badakhshan, for example. TV coverage is largely confined to the main towns where it is an important source of CN information. Although people have seen posters and billboards and heard radio announcements, the CN messages have not had any noticeable impact on either farmers involvement in OPC or on their attitude to the production and use of opium. In Herat there was a feeling that OPC was not a major issue in the province and that CN campaigns did not apply to them particularly. 2 The focus groups were used as a qualitative research tool and comprised groups of villagers (or teachers or local leaders) who were asked by a moderator from the consultants about their attitudes towards opium poppy cultivation and related issues. The questions were designed to stimulate discussion in a setting where participants were able to discuss the topics with other group members. The moderator guided the groups through the discussions which investigated the groups attitudes towards opium poppy cultivation. The proceedings were loosely structured, with the moderator encouraging a free flow of discussion. These discussions were recorded and subsequently analysed to form the basis for this report 3 All the participants in the Focus Groups were men. Although the consultant piloted some Focus Groups with women, there was neither the time nor the resources to include the views of women in this study. Follow-up studies to elicit the views of women on CN campaigns are planned. 9

10 Threat of Punishment Fear of punishment from the authorities for OPC was only mentioned in Balkh; elsewhere it was not an issue and in Badakhshan it was specifically stated that there was no fear of government punishment. Threats of punishment for OPC that do not result in action against farmers are counter productive and reduce the credibility of the government at national and local level. Economic Necessity The main justification given by participants for OPC was that it is financially so lucrative that it overrides any alternatives or objections. Generally, farmers grew opium poppy of their own accord without external pressure. Some farmers were ambivalent about OPC as a means to provide for their families but felt that poverty was a worse option. In Kandahar, farmers were aware that most of the profits of OPC accrue to the traffickers. Alternative Livelihoods (AL) Public awareness campaigns that stress the benefits of AL without licit livelihoods options actually being available are counter productive and increase resentment against the government. Few farmers commented on AL but those who did said that the government was not helping and that they did not have any reasonable alternatives to OPC. Farmers had more faith that their local authorities could provide AL options than they had in the ability of the national government to do so. Islam and the Quran The Mullahs preaching was respected as having the highest moral authority and all their statements were according to Islam and the Quran. Generally, farmers recognised the illegality of OPC under Islamic law rather than under government law. In Nangarhar and Kandahar the Islamic prohibition on OPC seems to be felt more strongly than in the north although it seems to have had little practical impact on OPC levels. In Badakhshan, although Mullahs made statements against OPC, they do not appear to have as much moral authority as they do elsewhere and farmers in Badakhshan said that the Mullahs cannot force them to change their actions. 10

11 Despite being aware of Islamic law and the exhortations of the Mullahs, farmers continue OPC out of economic necessity; although some believed that continuing OPC would eventually lead to problems for the country. In Badakhshan, although the participants trusted the opinion of scholars and other respected figures in their country and their community, farmers did not always agree with their opinions and they were not convinced that they will be punished by God because, they said, there is no reference in the Quran to opium poppy as something harmful. This position contrasted with the view in Herat where there was consensus that OPC was bad because it was against Islam and encouraged addiction. General Conclusions (Phase 1) The differing interpretations of the statements in the Quran referring to intoxicants and other drugs highlight the need for national religious scholars to clarify and disseminate their views on this crucial religious and social topic. Improved clarity on these issues would enable a more coherent approach to be developed for the country, in order to increase the effectiveness of religious exhortations against OPC. There is genuine support, in principle, for the government s public awareness campaigns against OPC and, on the whole, people agree with the CN messages. However, there is a justified feeling that the broadcast messages promoting alternative livelihoods in these media campaigns are not supported with practical actions in rural areas. Although this seems to be most keenly felt in Nangarhar province, where the virtual elimination of OPC in 2005 was not followed up with adequate rural investment, farmers everywhere recognise a lack of practical action on the part of the government to develop the licit rural economy. Public CN awareness campaigns cannot be effective in isolation and, to increase the chances of success, need to be: (i) co-ordinated with the development of the rural economy to provide licit alternatives to OPC, and; (ii) accompanied by credible threats of punishment (including eradication). Evidence from Balkh, where threats of eradication have been widely implemented, suggests that it is counter-productive for the government to make threats of punishment for non-compliance, if it is not prepared (or able) to carry them out. There is an opportunity for public CN awareness campaigns focussed at the local level to promote the work of local authorities (and development agencies) which seem to command greater respect in the provinces than the central government and may have the capacity to deliver on small promises in a more timely fashion than the central government. The threat of localised violence related to OPC (mentioned in Balkh and Badakhshan) is much more real to farmers than any links between OPC and terrorism, which do not appear to be a concern at the local level. Campaigns focussing on the risk of local lower level violence (criminality and disruption to the community) are more likely to be effective than focussing on issues of terrorism which may not be seen as important by farmers. 11

12 CN media campaigns need to be designed to take into account the different cultural and social realities of the various provinces and ethnic groups. For example, messages promoting Islamic prohibitions may be more effective in the south and east while messages that threaten eradication and punishments may be more effective in provinces such as Balkh and Badakhshan; which have experience of substantial eradication and appear to be less influenced by religious exhortations than farmers in the south and east. Written CN messages (in the appropriate national and/or local language) need to be focussed on literate target groups (such as Mullahs and teachers) who are in a position to pass them on to a wider, largely illiterate, rural (and urban) audience. Although the radio should be a primary means of broadcasting CN messages, there is a need to ensure that: (i) radio coverage is more widespread particularly in remote rural areas; and (ii) people have access to radios in order to listen to the CN messages. 3.2 Phase 2: Assessment of Responses to CN Media Products Objective: To assess which media tools/formats/styles have had any impact on the decision making process of opium poppy cultivators. Phase 2: Findings and Conclusions The detailed findings from Phase 2 Focus Groups, by target province, are given in Annex 3. Posters Although only about half the poster samples 4, used during the research had actually been released, participants recalled having seen most, if not all of them on public display. This may reflect the widespread use of CN images which are not sufficiently different from each other, leading to confusion. However, the fact that CN images are widely recognised provides an opportunity to develop effective public awareness campaigns based on such posters. Responses varied among the sample provinces. Whereas in Nangarhar, people liked most posters particularly those with Islamic imagery and a moral lesson people in Badakhshan found negative imagery offensive and felt that the messages would create an inappropriate image of Afghanistan abroad. Positive messages, mention of the Quran and a clear choice between enlightenment (through the pen) and destruction (through opium poppy) as in sample 3 were appreciated; as were the messages in samples 4 and 5, because they were clear and easy to understand. 4 See Annex 4. 12

13 Sample 4 was popular because it projected a clear message, with bright and optimistic imagery, that OPC could have a negative impact on future generations. Phase 2: Poster Sample 4 Why do intelligent people do work that they later regret? In Herat, people felt that samples 10 and 11 were offensive to Islam because they showed terrorists and OPC. In general, people were sceptical about the effectiveness of CN public awareness campaigns. In the first place, illiterate people could not understand the messages and, secondly, promises of AL made by the government were seldom kept. In Badakhshan, in particular, many people appeared not to understand, or misinterpreted, the CN messages in the posters. There is a clear difficulty communicating with an illiterate audience whose members have limited experience of interpreting images. This was particularly relevant when sample 10 was criticized for showing a farmer growing opium poppy. Although the poster was designed to discourage people from OPC; this was not immediately clear to the target audience. People in the south were far more likely to identify a link between OPC and its negative consequences. This can be seen in their appreciation of negative messages such as those in sample 7. In other provinces participants were less likely to appreciate the negative consequences to the extent that in Badakhshan participants felt that OPC was being unfairly demonized. There is a continuing problem of penetrating remote areas with radio messages (as well as with posters). Evidently radio is not accessible to everyone as several groups said that they did not listen to the radio. In these places, in Badakhshan for example, 13

14 exposure to CN messages was largely restricted to those who travelled outside their village. Phase 2: Poster Sample 10 Opium poppy cultivation feeds terrorism. In Kandahar and Nangarhar it appeared that greater involvement of Mullahs and other influential figures would lend weight to the CN messages. However, in places such as Badakhshan, there was much more scepticism about the authority of Mullahs and less agreement with what they said on CN issues. The sample posters that had more abstract images such as samples 6 and 11 were rarely mentioned as they had little impact on the participants. Abstract focus on the issue of narcotics and its relation to terrorism is not generally recognized by the rural audience as being particularly important to them. Thus, abstract poster designs should be avoided as people find them difficult to understand. It is important to ensure that images are relevant to the target audience. For example, although pictures of bearded men with machine guns may be associated with terrorists by a western audience, such people look entirely ordinary to an Afghan audience and such images do not convey the intended message. In summary, there was a strong preference for posters with simple images and, with some notable exceptions, for those with a reference to the Quran (such as sample 3). However, even though these images were popular their actual impact appears to be negligible. 14

15 Phase 2: Poster Sample 3 Which one of them did God order? Radio and TV People who had access to radio heard CN messages on both government and commercial radio. However, many had no access to radio, particularly in remote rural areas (such as Badakhshan). Although there was no clear indication of which radio messages were most effective, there was simultaneously a desire to hear about AL and a deep rooted scepticism, based on experience, about the government s ability to fulfil promises about AL. People liked most of the radio and TV samples 5 because, in particular, they: addressed Afghan farmers, showed that the law was being implemented against drug traffickers, or gave a positive message stressing that the government wished to support the people. There was a general feeling that the public awareness campaigns had failed to persuade farmers to stop OPC and some felt that the radio messages were useless as the government could not keep its promises. Although many people liked the radio messages that offered AL, most were sceptical that the government would deliver on its promises. 5 See Annex 5. 15

16 Many people said that they did not understand the radio messages, indicating that they were inadequately pre-tested. Those who had access to radio felt that radio was a more important medium for CN messages than posters or billboards. As TV is largely confined to the major towns, it was not an important source of CN information for farmers involved in OPC. Many people recalled a speech by President Karzai on TV and radio that Afghans should follow the law and felt that CN and other messages from the President on TV and radio would be effective. Even though it was not related to CN, people remembered a speech that was broadcast by the influential former president Sibghatullah Al-Mojaddedi and suggested this would be a good model for public information messages on CN. Several focus groups suggested that dramas built around CN messages would be a good way to engage people s interest and that such messages should remind people that there is a law in Afghanistan against OPC and that it will be enforced. The responses of farmers in Badakhshan were markedly different from those in other areas of the country. For example, they felt that sample 2 was offensive to Islam and Afghan culture because they asserted that, since OPC addresses the economic needs of their communities, they cannot be criticized for OPC which provides the main financial income for rural communities and is the main reason why emigration from the area has been reduced. They also felt that they cannot be held responsible for the negative impacts of OPC. The feedback from the consultant s radio stations in the target provinces (Speenghar Radio/Nangarhar, Amo Radio/Badakhshan) confirmed much of the more detailed information from focus groups. Listeners to the radio stations talked about how financial considerations were the main reason why farmers continued with OPC. There was a consensus that OPC was bad for Afghanistan because of its damaging effects on society and individuals. The feeling was, however, that those who continued to grow opium poppy did not regret their choice as it was a lucrative source of household income. Billboards The graphics and written messages need to be simple, if billboards are to have any impact. The siting of billboards is important; they need to be placed where they can be seen by their target audience. Although it is important to put up billboards before the OPC period begins; in practice, they often go up after farmers have decided to cultivate. 16

17 Billboards should always show that farmers can cultivate alternative crops and that the government will support them. As the majority of the people are illiterate, billboards did not have much impact. Billboards are not an important source of CN information for the many farmers who do not travel much outside their villages. General Conclusions (Phase 2) Although some CN public awareness products have been successful in reaching their intended audience; it is clear that there is considerable wastage and that most CN messages are not easily remembered and are indistinguishable from each other. Greater pre-testing of CN campaigns is required with substantial field research prior to production and dissemination in order to produce fewer but better targeted CN public awareness messages. It is essential to determine in advance the way in which the intended audience will interpret the proposed messages and not take for granted that certain images will be perceived in the ways that were intended. A regional focus should be developed for poster and radio messages to build on the regional differences in perceptions and responses to CN initiatives. A regional emphasis should include the use of appropriate languages for both radio and poster messages. For example, Dari is not appreciated in the south and east (where Pashtu would be most effective). In the north, although many of those involved in OPC are ethnic Pashtuns, Dari would reach a wide audience and the use of languages such as Uzbek would also be appropriate. Influential public figures and Mullahs should be encouraged to support CN public awareness campaigns, particularly in the south. There is a need for a clear balance between positive and negative images. Merely demonizing OPC itself without explaining its consequences and showing alternative income generating opportunities is not effective and may even be counter-productive. A complete CN campaign should offer realisable alternatives to OPC. Such a campaign should not be limited to the financial benefits but should also emphasise the religious and social benefits for both farmers and the community. Much more attention needs to be given to the design and pre-testing of CN messages in order to produce culturally appropriate local messages. Posters that look foreign are, in many instances, immediately rejected and those whose messages are not clear are treated with scepticism at best and indifference at worst. Poster designs need to be thoroughly field tested and subsequently modified before being widely distributed. Since many in the target audience are illiterate, use of the radio offers a major opportunity to disseminate CN messages in more detail than is possible through other media such as posters or billboards. There is a need to check the coverage of both government and commercial radio throughout the country to identify any areas that are not currently reached adequately. 17

18 Subsequently, if any such areas are found, the government should improving radio coverage in order to increase the effectiveness of CN and other campaigns. CN messages will continue to be ineffective as long as they are not accompanied by practical action from the government to provide farmers with practical alternatives to OPC. 3.3 Phase 3: Assessment of the impact of MCN messages and Review of Phases 1 and 2. Objective: To assess the reach and impact of specific CN messages distributed by the Ministry of Counter Narcotics. More information was collected on the objectives covered in Phases 1 and 2, in order to: Assess sources of information regarding anti opium poppy planting/cultivation messages (i.e. where messages have been heard and which sources provided the greatest impact). Determine why messages have failed to deter farmers and what factors override these CN messages. Assess which media tools/formats/styles have had any or greatest impact in the decision making processes of opium poppy cultivators. In addition to questions and discussions on media samples the participants were invited to illustrate their own ideas for CN messages to provide an open channel for people to express their views on the most important CN messages. Examples of these pictures and corresponding comments from the consultants are given in Annex 6. Phase 3: Findings and Conclusions The detailed findings from the Phase 3 Focus Groups, by target province, are given in Annex 7. Posters The distribution of posters in rural areas is limited (and, it appears, haphazard, at best) as few people had seen the poster samples 6 and said that they were not displayed in their villages and that rural people were rarely exposed to such public awareness campaigns. Reactions to the samples varied: In Balkh, samples 2 and 3 produced negative reactions: with some participants not understanding the message in sample 3 and others criticizing sample 2 for its negative imagery: saying that the depiction of a 6 See Annex 8. 18

19 young man using drugs could encourage other young people to try drugs. On the other hand, in Herat, people liked samples 1 and 2 because they clearly demonstrated the positive and negative consequences of not cultivating and cultivating opium poppy respectively. Phase 3: Poster Sample 1 Elimination of Opium Poppy: a way forward to progress, prosperity, security and blessings. Phase 3: Poster Sample 2 Think of the future of your children and youth. 19

20 Phase 3: Poster Sample 3 Drug Offenders: according to the law you will go to prison for a long time and face a cash fine of thousands of Afghanis In general, people felt that illustrations were effective for communicating messages, usually understood the posters and could describe their meaning without prompting. Commonly, people said they had seen posters in the provincial capital at various Mosques, but said that posters could rarely be seen elsewhere. In Badakhshan many thought all the samples looked foreign and that as a result they were against Afghan culture and the Islamic religion because foreigners wanted to trample the Islamic religion. This view produced a negative reaction which invalidated the meaning of the messages. In Badakhshan, focus groups took an exceptionally disinterested stance and were not convinced that the posters would have any effect on OPC in the region. There was some anger that money had been spent on such activities which, in essence, sought to diminish the income of the farmers. The participants in Badakhshan seemed resistant to all the themes covered by the samples. The only point that they could all agree on was that OPC had negative consequences for their children. The printed messages had a poor reach across the country outside the major towns usually the provincial centre. In Jalalabad and Kandahar the reach was good; it was adequate in Herat and Mazaar and very poor in Faisabad. The key problem remains that messages are usually confined to the provincial centres and do not reach the villages. 20

21 General comments from Focus Group participants It is important to show both the negative aspects of OPC and the positive incentives of not growing opium poppy. Many people felt that the crime associated with opium was the smuggling and did not feel that OPC was a serious crime. People should be informed more about the harmful effects of OPC. There is no point in publishing posters without real alternatives to OPC being offered by the government to develop their region. Eradication messages should always be accompanied by AL messages. In Kandahar, people felt that Mullahs were the most powerful source for delivering messages. Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) Some suggested that the posters were likely to have come from a foreign organization. Others recognized that the messages were probably from the MCN, although they were not all sure (even though the MCN logo was on each poster). Some disliked the use of the MCN logo, because they thought it incorporated elements from the Quran. Therefore, destroying or damaging the poster would be a blasphemous act. Many were aware of the work of MCN and credited the falls in OPC in the north and east to the Ministry. Since many people did not recognise the MCN logo on the posters, many of the participants suggested that people may not easily recognize the Afghan ownership of these CN messages. Radio People particularly liked radio sample 2 7 as they felt the presence of the Mullah character made the message particularly convincing; but also because the singing, the language and the action of consulting with white beards closely resembled real life in an Afghan village. Generally people were very much in favour of this kind of radio drama and suggested that poems could also be used to deliver CN messages. However, audiences in remote villages did not get a good radio signal. CN messages made promises that were seldom kept. 7 See Annex 9. 21

22 CN messages should not be complex given the limited education of rural audiences but should be long enough to allow the message to be understood. In Badakhshan some said they had no time for radio as they were too busy with their daily jobs and those who had heard the radio messages had a negative view because, in the past, radio messages had made promises that were never fulfilled. People said they were unlikely to trust any kind of radio messages in the future. General Conclusions (Phase 3) People are overwhelmingly in favour of using illustrations in printed CN messages and generally feel that illustrations provide clear and interesting messages, especially to illiterate people. Although the illustrations were generally well received it is important to note that certain groups (particularly in Badakhshan) thought that the illustrations looked foreign and could therefore not be trusted. Complex messages are often not clearly understood in rural areas and abstract or metaphorical images are particularly liable to misinterpretation. There is not a strong link between OPC and criminality in the minds of most rural people. 4. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The key issue with CN awareness campaigns is that, in Afghanistan, OPC rather than being a marginal, and illegal, activity carried out by a few farmers under the influence of opium traders and traffickers has become a mainstream (albeit illegal) income-earning opportunity in many rural areas. The destruction of rural infrastructure particularly irrigation as well as other rural assets such as timber forests, natural pistachio forests and orchards, and public grazing land has reduced licit livelihoods opportunities in rural areas. The situation is compounded by the weakness of the licit rural economy: fractured value chains, a lack of improved seed and fertilizer, inadequate transport infrastructure, as well as poor processing, storage and marketing facilities and a dearth of non-farm income earning opportunities in rural areas. Consequently, instead of focussing on a few marginal farmers engaged in OPC, CN awareness campaigns, to be effective, need to be part of a mainstream effort to rehabilitate the licit rural economy. As shown by experience to date, CN messages alone are ineffective. 22

23 Overall Conclusions To be effective, methods of reaching communities in urban areas as well as remote rural areas should include (i) improving radio coverage in rural areas and encouraging the use of radios as an information and educational tool; and, (ii) improving the relevance, quality and distribution of posters to ensure that the CN messages reach urban areas, schools and Mosques, as well as villages in remote areas. The target audience appreciated and understood illustrations as an effective way of communicating CN messages. However, the style and design is critical for effectiveness. Illustration methods which are not common in Afghanistan are frequently regarded as foreign and generally elicit negative responses. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) is frequently not recognised as the instigator of the CN awareness programme. Furthermore, the ministry is often blamed for the government s failure to deliver on CN promises such as alternative livelihoods which is not MCN s responsibility. MCN needs to clarify its role and that of other government departments in the minds of the rural (and urban) population: including the role of technical ministries and the private sector in providing licit livelihoods opportunities as well as the role of law enforcement agencies in eradication and in catching and punishing offenders. Poster designs should be as simple as possible; particularly when intended for largely illiterate rural audiences. Abstract and metaphorical images, which are not understood, should be avoided. As there is still not a strong link between OPC and criminality in the minds of most rural people, messages need to focus on clearly identifying OPC as a criminal act. A key problem with the CN campaigns was that people still do not believe in the long term benefits of giving up OPC. In future, CN messages, as part of a comprehensive national campaign, should focus on reversing these attitudes. The differing interpretations of the statements in the Quran referring to intoxicants and other drugs highlight the need for national religious scholars to clarify and disseminate their views on this crucial religious and social topic. Improved clarity on these issues would enable a more coherent approach to be developed for the country, in order to increase the effectiveness of religious exhortations against OPC. Public CN awareness campaigns cannot be effective in isolation and, to increase the chances of success, need to be: (i) co-ordinated with the development of the licit rural economy to provide alternatives to OPC, and; (ii) accompanied by credible threats of punishment (including eradication). 23

24 The threat of localised violence related to OPC (mentioned in Balkh and Badakhshan) is much more real to farmers than any links between OPC and terrorism, which do not appear to be a concern at the local level. Campaigns focussing on the risk of local violence (criminality and disruption to the community) are more likely to be effective than focussing on issues of terrorism which farmers do not see as important. CN media campaigns need to take into account the diverse cultural and social realities of the various provinces and ethnic groups. For example, messages promoting Islamic prohibitions may be more effective in the south and east while messages that threaten eradication and punishments may be more relevant in provinces such as Balkh and Badakhshan; which have experience of substantial eradication and appear to be less influenced by religious exhortations than farmers in the south and east. Written CN messages (in the appropriate national and/or local language) need to be focussed on literate target groups (such as teachers and Mullahs) who are in a position to pass them on to school children and to a wider, largely illiterate, rural audience. Although the radio should be a primary means of broadcasting CN messages, there is a need to ensure that: (i) radio coverage is more widespread particularly in remote rural areas; and (ii) people have access to radios in order to be able to listen to the CN messages. Greater pre-testing of CN campaigns is required with substantial field research prior to production and dissemination to produce fewer but better-targeted CN public awareness messages. It is essential to investigate in advance the way in which the intended audience will interpret the proposed messages and not take for granted that certain images will be received in the ways that were intended. A regional focus should be developed for poster and radio messages to build on the regional differences in perceptions and responses to CN initiatives. A regional emphasis should include the use of appropriate languages for both radio and poster messages. For example, Dari is not appreciated in the south and east (where Pashtu would be most effective). In the north, although many of those involved in OPC are ethnic Pashtuns, Dari would reach a wide audience and the use of languages such as Uzbek would also be appropriate for some audiences. The government should facilitate the increased involvement of influential public figures and Mullahs in CN public awareness campaigns, particularly in the south. There is a need for a clear balance between positive and negative images. Merely demonizing OPC itself without explaining its consequences and showing (as well as providing) alternative income generating opportunities is not effective and is likely to be counter productive. 24

25 A comprehensive CN campaign should offer realisable alternatives to OPC. Such a campaign should not be limited to the financial benefits but should also emphasise the religious and social benefits for both the farmers and the community. Since many in the target audience are illiterate, use of the radio offers a major opportunity to disseminate CN messages in more detail than is possible through other media such as posters or billboards. There is a need to determine the coverage of both government and commercial radio throughout the country to identify areas that are not currently reached adequately. Subsequently, the government and the private sector should improve radio coverage in order to increase the effectiveness of CN and other campaigns. Public CN awareness campaigns will continue to be ineffective as long as they are not accompanied by practical action from the government and the international community to introduce farmers to realistic alternatives to OPC as part of a comprehensive programme of rural development. Recommendations for Research and Action A key element of the effectiveness of the CN awareness programme is the relationship between government and farmers. Farmers generally expect the government to provide support to enable them to stop OPC. Research is needed into: (i) what farmers understand their own responsibilities to be; and, (ii) what is needed to initiate bottom up (and other) approaches that could break the farmers reliance on the government to provide solutions. The decision-making role of women in households has not been covered by the current research. Research on the role of women in household CN decision-making would improve the effectiveness of CN awareness programmes. The perspectives of the various target audiences in the different regions of the country vary substantially. There is therefore a need to identify clearly these differences and then to develop regional CN awareness campaigns to accommodate them. Farmers involved in OPC need to be made aware of the increasing prevalence of opium and heroin addiction, its negative effects on households and communities, and, importantly, of the direct link between OPC and addiction. There are considerable differences in farmers perceptions and interpretations of the Quran s position on opium production and use; on the illegality of OPC as opposed to opium use and on what is un-islamic and what is not. The appropriate religious authorities should clarify these issues and their findings 25

26 should be widely disseminated as part of a comprehensive CN awareness programme. There is widespread recognition (particularly in the north) of the need to protect children from being harmed by OPC and the need to educate them on the dangers of narcotics. In addition, teachers have highlighted the potential for children to transmit CN messages to their parents and other family members. A school-based CN awareness creation programme could have a significant impact; with CN messages incorporated into the school curriculum. In Badakhshan, for example, given the strongly negative reaction of the adult population to CN messages, a focus on children who may be receptive to the CN messages and could influence their families, would likely be effective. Public CN awareness campaigns cannot be effective in isolation and, to increase the chances of success, need to be: (i) co-ordinated with the development of the rural economy to provide licit alternatives to OPC, and; (ii) accompanied by credible threats of punishment (including eradication). 26

27 ANNEXES ANNEX 1 ANNEX 2 ANNEX 3 ANNEX 4 ANNEX 5 ANNEX 6 ANNEX 7 ANNEX 8 ANNEX 9 Approach and Methodology Phase 1 Findings Phase 2 Findings Phase 2 Analysis: Poster Samples Phase 2 Analysis: Radio Samples Focus Group Illustrations of CN Messages Phase 3 Findings Phase 3 Analysis: Poster Samples Phase 3 Analysis: Radio Samples 27

28 ANNEX 1: Approach and Methodology Overall Research Objectives To assess sources of information on anti opium poppy planting/cultivation messages: where messages have been heard and which sources had the greatest impact. To assess which media tools/formats/styles have had any or greatest impact in the decision making process of poppy cultivators. To determine why CN messages have failed to deter farmers and identify the factors which encourage farmers to ignore these CN messages. Target Groups and Areas The target groups were primarily focussed on: Opium poppy farmers and those connected to the opium trade (primary focus); Those involved with the dissemination of anti-opium poppy cultivation (OPC) messages including local officials, mullahs and those displaying CN material such as shop owners (secondary focus). Phase 1 (Assessment of Impact of CN Media Products) Objectives To assess sources of information on anti opium poppy planting/cultivation messages: where messages have been heard and which sources had the greatest impact. To determine why CN messages have failed to deter farmers and identify the factors which encourage farmers to ignore these deterrent messages. Focus Groups Focus Groups were organised to elicit participant responses addressing the above research objectives, in order to ascertain: The effectiveness of CN messages based on their source, the frequency of repetition and placement (sites of posters and billboards). The effectiveness of certain kinds of message: including threats through law, religious prohibition, and social pressure. how the CN messages are understood and analysed within specific regions and how these processes differ among regions according to such factors as local power dynamics ANNEX 1: Approach and Methodology 28

29 How messages encouraging OPC provided by regional drug lords are understood and responded to. Phase 2 (Assessment of Responses to CN Media Products) Objective To assess which media tools/formats/styles have had any impact on the decision making process of opium poppy cultivators. Focus Groups were organised to: Ascertain the factors that characterise effective CN messages and how these messages are constructed with particular reference to visual stimuli. Understand how the CN messages are understood and analysed by individuals within the cultural and social context of Afghanistan in general and specifically in the regions within the scope of the study. Phase 3 (Review of Phases I and II) To identify and assess reactions to the most recent CN campaign in order to determine the effectiveness of the campaign and how peoples perceptions may have changed during the period of the campaign. Phase 4 (Consolidation and Reporting) As well as written reports at the end of Phases I, II and III, the consultant will produce a Powerpoint presentation to bring together the different aspects of the research and produce a set of coherent results to answer the research questions posed at the start of the process as well as explaining how these conclusions were reached. The presentation will also include suggestions on how the coordination of media messages can be improved and what mechanisms would be required. Reporting CG will write a final report which will be a synthesis of all reporting done up to this point as well as the written outcomes of the Product Development Workshop. ANNEX 1: Approach and Methodology 29

30 ANNEX 2 Phase 1: Findings Balkh (4 focus groups, 51 people, age range 20 to 80 years) The findings from the focus groups in Balkh can be summarised in 5 categories, as follows: 1. Economic Necessity economic benefits of OPC were more significant than the prohibitions in the public awareness campaigns Economic necessities forced people to grow opium poppy. economic benefits of OPC were high enough to override other concerns Farmers saw the economic benefits of OPC without any coercion. Although OPC was not a decent way to live they also felt that poverty was worse. 2. Threat of punishment Stressed the damaging effects of opium addiction as well as the likelihood of opium poppy growers eventually going to jail. Genuine fear that people would go to jail for growing opium poppy Threat based public awareness campaigns which referred to potential punishment for those cultivating opium poppy did have an effect. The only effective prohibition was threats from the government to eradicate; but, there was resentment. The only real source of fear was government threats of punishment for those who grew opium poppy. 3. Counter Narcotics Messages Public awareness messages portrayed an accurate image of the damaging effects of OPC. Had generally heard counter narcotics public awareness messages through the radio, but also cited TV, local authorities and the messages of the mullah. 4. Islam and the Quran OPC was a sin as told to them by the mullah. ANNEX 2 Phase 1: Findings 30

31 Mullah s preaching was respected as being the highest moral authority pointing out that all his speeches were according to Islam and the Quran. Concurred with the counter narcotics messages and generally stated that poppy led to disruption in the community. General perception that OPC was bad, not least because in the locality there had been fights and even killings as a result of disputes over opium poppy. 5. Alternative Livelihoods The government was not helping people with alternative sources of income. Public awareness campaigns that stress the benefits of alternative livelihoods increase resentment if the government did not fulfil its promises to provide AL. Unable to access sheep, cows or goats to rear and OPC provided high returns. Kandahar (2 focus groups, 27 people, age range 28 to 65 years) 1. Economic Necessity Understood that opium poppy is grown for economic reasons but suggested that the majority of the profit went to traffickers and sought help from the government to find alternative livelihoods. Ordinary farmers were kept out of the large profits that others derived from OPC. 2. Threat of punishment Appreciated the government s efforts and suggested that more advertising would be good but stressed that this needed to be accompanied by strong action in targeting influential figures who grow poppy in the region as well as traffickers. Future campaigns should take account of these feelings and try and drive a wider gap between the poor growers and the wealthier people involved in the business. 3. Counter Narcotics Messages Received their messages primarily from radio, TV and posters. Public awareness campaigns provided an authentic representation of the harmful effects of OPC. ANNEX 2 Phase 1: Findings 31

32 Agreed with the messages and regretted that people continue with OPC. General support for the GoA s continued efforts to eradicate OPC. Received their messages from the radio, TV and posters. 4. Islam and the Quran Condemned OPC for being illegal under Islam rather than because of the GoA law. The primary prohibition on OPC was from Islam. Ignoring Islam, OPC would eventually lead to poverty for everyone in the region. 5. Alternative Livelihoods 6. Other No comments Resentment regarding the continued lack of security and bombarding by US warplanes. Badakhshan (3 focus groups, 37 people, age range 28 to 60 years) 1. Economic Necessity Financial incentives were stronger than any threat. Farmers grew opium poppy without any external pressure being placed upon them. Financial factors overrode other feelings regarding OPC. Problems such as poverty led people to grow poppy. 2. Threat of punishment No significant fear of government intervention. Nobody in the area had been punished for OPC and there was little fear that this would take place. ANNEX 2 Phase 1: Findings 32

33 3. Counter Narcotics Messages Main sources of counter narcotic messages were radio, TV posters and the preaching of the mullah. They also saw billboards but only when they went to the city Appreciated there were many different sources of CN information and the GoA had approached the problem using a variety of means. Children were being educated about counter narcotics at schools and brought messages home. Although people did not feel that the children received much or particularly sophisticated information there was an appreciation for this approach. General agreement with counter narcotics messages and an appreciation that OPC harms us and our children. In the locality there had been violence arising from disputes about opium poppy. agreed with the messages that they heard and talked about OPC being prohibited by Islamic and GoA law as well as being damaging to people s health. Most public information messages they heard were largely to do with health and agriculture: a few people said that they had heard and seen counter narcotics messages on radio, TV and a few posters. 4. Islam and the Quran The mullah makes statements against OPC but people do not listen to the mullah and ultimately the mullah cannot force them to change their actions. 5. Alternative Livelihoods 6. Other No comments No comments Nangarhar (3 focus groups, 28 people, age range 25 to 40 years) 1. Economic Necessity Minority of people who continued with OPC did so because they had no other choice as a result of financial problems. ANNEX 2 Phase 1: Findings 33

34 Farmers grew opium poppy for economic reasons. This was a free choice by the farmers and, unlike in the past, they were not under pressure from traffickers who had leant them money. 2. Threat of punishment No comments 3. Counter Narcotics Messages Majority of the public information messages refer to IEDs but some on OPC. Radio, posters and billboards are the main sources of counter narcotics information. Some had seen messages on TV but only when they visited the city. The media message that they most frequently mentioned was the fact that OPC is illegal. They had heard information that OPC was illegal and that opium poppy fields would be eradicated. Most endorsed the use of messages and were generally positive about the information. Were negative about any messages which involved women and were in Dari. Also talked about flyers that their children received from school. Generally positive and felt that public awareness campaigns had helped discourage OPC in the region. Sceptical about a recent radio campaign that threatened fines of up to 100,000 Afs. on farmers caught cultivating opium poppy. Some suggested that this would never happen as few people had been jailed or punished for cultivating poppy in the past. 4. Islam and the Quran Generally positive about the messages but stressed that the prohibition of OPC under Islam should be at the fore of these messages in the future. The prohibition of OPC under Islam should be emphasised more. When the mullah delivered messages against Islam he was considered authoritative and was listened to by the vast majority of people. 5. Alternative Livelihoods Suggested that the GoA offered very little support to allow people to grow alternatives to opium poppy. ANNEX 2 Phase 1: Findings 34

35 Some positive feedback on initiatives by the Nangarhar governor and it was felt that he did provide certain alternatives. Felt that if future campaigns continue to promote alternative livelihoods that do not exist then the gap between people s expectations and the reality will increase and only make GoA attempts to persuade people to stop OPC more difficult. 6. Other Angry that promises by the government had not been fulfilled but more positive about the role of the district council that had promised alternatives in return for the farmers giving up OPC. Disappointed by a specific campaign that had told people that the regional PRT would provide support for farmers who wanted alternative livelihoods but never delivered. Herat (3 focus groups, 33 people, age range 18 to 45 years) 1. Economic Necessity No comments 2. Threat of punishment Some felt that the provincial authorities (rather than the GoA) would soon annihilate the drugs trade in Herat. 3. Counter Narcotics Messages Radio and TV were the main source of CN information. They also mentioned elders and local authorities. Generally supportive of counter-narcotic campaigns but there was little acknowledgement that the campaigns were directed towards people within their province. Blamed the fact that Herat is targeted by counter-narcotic media campaigns because it is next to Helmand, Kandahar and Farah. They stated that if there is a problem in Herat it is restricted to either few farmers or traffickers who bring drugs from the other provinces. General feeling that OPC was not such an issue in Herat. Broad approval of CN messages but felt that they did not necessarily apply to the region. ANNEX 2 Phase 1: Findings 35

36 In future, CN messages should be designed to exploit the differences between traffickers, who are viewed as outsiders and a source of shame to Herat, and those growers who are viewed as being exploited by outsiders. 4. Islam and the Quran Consensus that OPC was bad because it was against Islam and encouraged addiction. Agreement that OPC is bad because it is against Islam and its effects people s health but at the same time felt that it is not a problem in Herat. Any OPC occurs in very remote areas in the province and that those people who grew opium poppy were against Islam. 5. Alternative Livelihoods 6. Other No comments Suggested that the few people who grew opium poppy did so under pressure from traffickers. ANNEX 2 Phase 1: Findings 36

37 ANNEX 3 Phase 2: Findings Balkh (4 focus groups, 40 people, age range 20 to 70 years) Posters 8 Impact of Posters Some said they had seen the sample posters, others said they had not. Feedback on specific samples confused in some groups: e.g. some liked sample 3 and found it easy to understand others found it unclear. Had seen many posters with CN messages and remembered images showing eradication and people being arrested. Liked imagery in sample 3 for its religious text and some expanded on the pen metaphor suggesting that the pen (or written works) connected educated people. Found sample 4 and sample 5 easy to understand and were attracted by the clear photo in sample 4. Many disliked negative images such as those portrayed in samples 7, 10 and 11: others did not object but suggested that the message in sample 7, for example, was not clear. Felt that in sample 7 the use of the map of Afghanistan negatively portrayed the country in a bad light; and thought it was not right to show Afghanistan bleeding. Suggested that samples showing addiction, poppy growing and terrorists were against Islam. General comments on posters People are mostly illiterate and unable to read CN slogans. Had seen CN posters located in most of the parts of the city, at different shops, near mosques and schools and on main streets. Thought people paid attention to posters and billboards. Felt that the simpler the messages, the more effective they were. Older people wanted to see more posters and billboards that had messages reminding people to be good Muslims. 8 The Poster and Billboard Samples referred to in the Annex are illustrated in Annex 4. ANNEX 3 Phase 2: Findings 37

38 Suggested that material should be in three languages (Dari, Pashto and Uzbek). Liked posters with some kind of short story as part of the images. Radio and TV 9 Impact of radio and TV Although many had access to radio, very few had access to TV. Sources of information were Radio Naw bahar, Radio Azadi, Radio Arzo and Tolo TV. Some groups had not heard any of the sample messages. Some liked sample 1 as it specifically addressed Afghan farmers but preferred sample 3 as it shows the law is being implemented against drug traffickers and sample 5 which had a positive message stressing that the GoA wished to support the people. Approved of messages that referred to punishing individuals connected to the drugs trade. Some disliked all the messages criticizing them for essentially being all the same. General comments on radio / TV Liked to hear about criminals being punished as well as messages that stressed that the GoA wanted to support farmers. Messages should concentrate on preventing people from getting addicted to drugs. Messages were useless as the government would not keep the promises they made in the radio messages. Felt radio was far more important than posters or billboards. Some often did not understand the radio messages. Preferred messages in which government promises support to those who do not cultivate opium poppy. 9 The radio samples referred to in this Annex are given in Annex 5. ANNEX 3 Phase 2: Findings 38

39 Thought messages were generally produced by the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Health, ISAF and the Ministry of Counter Narcotics. Billboards Awareness of CN messages on billboards was restricted to those who had travelled outside the village. Positive comments about billboards; referred to a billboard of a tractor destroying opium poppy fields. Had seen CN billboards located at the four entrances to Balkh city and in Mazar-i-Sharif. But had not seen in some districts or rural areas Some did not think that there were many billboards but others said there were many billboards around their area and that people see them often. Liked one billboard which showed a picture of narcotics and a handcuffed criminal. Impact of messages would be greater if billboards were placed six months before the cultivation season and remained until the end. Wanted more billboards with examples of alternative livelihoods, using images of cotton fields as an example. Nangarhar (4 focus groups, 43 people, age range 20 to 40 years) Posters Impact of Posters in general groups liked the samples Liked sample 4 because of a positive image focusing on children with a message that emphasized the importance of future generations and it clearly shows the consequences of growing poppy (i.e. its destruction). Also positive feedback on sample 5 as the contrast between good and bad was clear and concise. Favourable comments about samples 7a and 7b as this design had an understandable and convincing counter narcotics image. Liked sample 12 which had a message that was easily understood. All groups had seen a CN poster with an image of a scorpion which had left a lasting impression. ANNEX 3 Phase 2: Findings 39

40 Other images recalled from the posters were a person holding drugs, and poppy cultivators being arrested. Recalled a poster depicting an opium poppy field being eradicated by the authorities; a picture of an opium poppy capsule inside hands; and one with the image of a skeleton and a poppy flower which looked like a dragon. Referred to an image they had seen of a pair of hands handcuffed in poppy flowers which they had liked and had left a lasting impression. General comments on Posters Posters which were graphically simple can be understood by everyone. liked to see posters with Islamic imagery and offered a moral lesson to the people Suggested that the posters should be placed around the city before the cultivation period. Posters for Nangarhar province should be in Pashto. Posters were located, in prominent places such as: near the municipal offices, the tax office, in front of the public hospital, at the centre of the village, at schools, at the bazaar and the mosque. The number of posters increases before the OPC period begins. Radio / TV most did not recognize the samples Liked sample 4 as it showed cooperation with the government which was important and sample 3 as it gave practical advice. Heard CN messages on Nangarhar Millie Radio, Radio Sharq, Radio Nargis, Radio Nawa, Arman FM and the BBC. felt the most successful messages is that of a father who dreams that his son had been bitten by a snake and who goes on to say that before the law is applied to you apply it yourself ; because it gave a good visualization of the severe punishment that can result for a man who cultivates opium poppy Few people have access to TV because no electricity in rural areas. Only when they occasionally visit the provincial capital are they able to follow programs and watch messages on TV. TV is a medium for city people. ANNEX 3 Phase 2: Findings 40

41 Effective CN radio messages could also focus on children as in the sample poster 4. Most preferred to listen to radio messages that offered alternative livelihoods even though people were sceptical that the government would deliver on such promises. Messages usually focused on punishment for OPC whether it is from God or the GoA. Both TV and radio commercials very popular. Heard the majority of the messages before and after news. TV advertisement mentioned describes a police man destroying a poppy field. Had noticed that the logo of the Ministry of Interior is shown at the end of many CN messages but they believe that ISAF, the National Army and the Ministry of Counter Narcotics also produce CN messages. Even though it was not related to CN, people mentioned a message that was broadcast with a speech given by the influential former president Sibghatullah Al-Mojaddedi. They suggested this would be a good model for important public information messages on CN. Billboards Had seen sample 12 whilst travelling to and from the provincial capital and had positive comments on the message. Liked sample 12 which had a message that was easily understood. many billboards with CN messages in the centre of the city, at the customs office, at the municipal offices, the hospital Some billboards were placed very close to opium poppy fields. Billboards are set up before cultivation and during harvesting and this is the right moment to inform the people. Some felt that messages on the billboards were not clear; written and visual messages should be simple and direct. Would never approve images with female figures. Billboards at the bazaar next to the commercial billboards limit their impact. When the graphic and written messages are simple the impact is bigger. ANNEX 3 Phase 2: Findings 41

42 Billboards better than posters because people sometimes destroy posters which are not replaced. Billboards are changed every month or two months. Believe that the local authorities always put up the billboards during the cultivation period. More billboards should be located inside the city. Kandahar (4 focus groups, 45 people, age range 20 to 50 years) Posters Had seen all the samples in the area. Liked sample 4 because it had a clear photo and a clear slogan. Samples 7a and 7b had a forceful message that was clearly presented. Liked the way sample 10 illustrates the link between humanity (or the loss of it) and the growing of opium poppy. Liked samples 7a and 7b because the message was powerful and clear. Had seen samples 4, 10 and 7 on highways as well as in high security areas. Would like to see more messages with concrete and realistic facts and information about alternatives to OPC. Had seen posters at the entrances to Kandahar city and inside the city as well as on the highway between Kandahar and Kabul. Radio and TV Had heard samples on the radio Liked sample 1 because it offered factual information and clear alternatives to OPC; and sample 5 was convincing because it mentioned the international community being the support of the international community for the CN effort. Should make greater use of scholars and Imams to deliver messages through the media and in the mosques. ANNEX 3 Phase 2: Findings 42

43 Most remembered a speech by President Karzai on TV that Afghans should follow the law. TV messages in which the President gives CN messages would be good. Would like to see more broadcasts on alternative livelihoods and CN messages incorporating speeches by Mullahs. CN messages after the evening news should be increased. Had seen messages with images of poppy eradication on TV CN messages were heard on Afghan Azad Radio, Kandahar Millie Radio and Killid radio and seen on HEWAD TV and Millie TV. Messages should remind people that there is a law in Afghanistan against OPC. Suggested that people have to become accustomed to recognizing the authority of the GoA. People should be reminded that Islamic law also prohibits the use of drugs. Respected figures of the country and the community and spiritual leaders should participate in public awareness messages against OPC (either through the public media or by preaching at the mosques). Suggested CN public awareness campaigns had not been effective. Public awareness is very expensive and more money should be spent on development. CN messages will continue to be ineffective so long as they are not accompanied by any real alternatives for farmers. Billboards Had seen sample 12 Had seen billboards with CN messages located in and around Kandahar as well as on the route to Spin Boldak, the Kabul-Kandahar road and the Kandahar Herat road. Billboards are important but they have limitations. A mobile team equipped with cinema and other audio visual equipment could be used to travel to the districts and inform people. ANNEX 3 Phase 2: Findings 43

44 Herat (4 focus groups, 47 people, age range 19 to 50 years) Posters Some had seen samples 3, 4, 5, and 12 but most had not seen any. Most liked sample 3 as it was easy to understand and offered a peaceful solution to the issues of OPC. Liked samples 3 and 5 as easy to understand and the metaphor of the pen as a contrast to opium poppy was appealing. Liked samples 4 and 9 because the former was very clear and understandable and the latter had an aggressive image of an officer destroying poppy fields. Some felt that samples 10 and 11 were offensive to Islam as they showed terrorists and farmers cultivating opium poppy. Not always clear that the participants understood what information the images were trying to provide. The participants were sceptical about the utility of public awareness campaigns Printed messages were difficult to understand by illiterate people and that the images alluded to promises for alternative livelihoods that were seldom kept. Radio Did not often listen to the radio and some had not heard the samples but suggested that radio was a powerful medium and should be used more. Some had heard sample 1 and found it convincing. Liked all the samples. Heard CN radio messages on Herat Millie and Killid radio stations and seen CN messages on Tolo TV and Herat TV. Recall a particular advert on TV that was broadcast after the prayer with the slogan, If you do not apply the law, the law will be applied to you. Had seen CN messages on TV which was popular amongst people in the region. Talked about a TV message in which an individual is sent to jail for trafficking opium. ANNEX 3 Phase 2: Findings 44

45 Although many people watched TV, few had access to their own personal TV but had heard CN messages on the Herat TV channel. Mentioned a message already referred to in which the slogan was translated as, If you don t follow the law the law will follow you. Had heard many radio messages and agreed with the content but their financial problems forced them to grow opium poppy. The local mullah often preaches against opium cultivation in the mosque. The public awareness campaigns had failed to persuade farmers to stop opium poppy cultivation. Suggested that dramas around CN messages would be a good way to engage people s interest. Billboards Stressed the importance of putting up posters and billboards before the cultivation period begins; but often posters and billboards go up after farmers have already decided to cultivate. Suggested that billboards should always show that farmers can cultivate alternative crops and that the government will support them. As the majority of the people in the area were illiterate, the posters and billboards did not have much impact in their community Badakhshan (5 focus groups, 53 people, age range 20 to 60 years) Posters Had seen several of the samples including 1, 3 and 10. People were ambivalent about the messages and had both positive and negative opinions. Most liked sample 3 as it had a positive message and provided an alternative that was not based on economic promises that would likely not be kept: particularly liked the mention of the Quran and suggested that it offered a clear choice between enlightenment (through the pen) and destruction (through opium poppy). Disliked samples 7a and 7b as the message was offensive because it was so negative; made similar comments about the imagery in sample 6. ANNEX 3 Phase 2: Findings 45

46 Did not like samples 1, 6, 8, 10, and 11; because the images were negative and the participants did not feel that their actions in growing opium poppy had such negative consequences. Most liked sample 4 as it offered a clear message which showed that opium could have a negative impact on future generations. One person commended sample 11 for showing the link between poppy and terrorism. Many appeared not to understand the CN messages in the samples. Many felt that these messages would create a negative image of Afghanistan abroad. Instead of such negative images they would prefer more positive images such as reconstruction. Radio Had heard samples 1 and 2 but found them unconvincing Those who had heard sample 1 disliked the message as they did not believe that real alternatives to OPC existed and they maintained that growing opium remained the only significant source of income. Felt that sample 2 was offensive to Islam and Afghan culture because they asserted that cultivation addresses economic needs in the community and that they cannot be criticized for providing for their families. They deny that they can be held responsible for the negative impact of OPC. Although sample 3 was generally liked there was some disdain when messages referred to alternative livelihoods as they were sceptical as to whether this existed. Disliked the samples that offered alternative livelihoods as they were sceptical whether these existed in practice. Felt some of the messages were too negative in their outlook. Some also disliked messages that that talked about the role of the GoA as they felt that the GoA was hypocritical in its stance as many government people were involved in the drugs trade. Radio was the only medium through which they received CN messages which have not convinced them to reduce or stop OPC. Claim that there was no significant awareness of CN campaigns, although the majority of the people in the focus groups cultivate opium poppy ANNEX 3 Phase 2: Findings 46

47 No access to TV and no posters have ever been placed around the village We don t listen to any TV to know which messages are broadcast. There is no radio in our village. No poster against narcotics is seen. No poster has been installed in our village. There were very limited CN public awareness messages either in print or on the radio in their area. Did not believe that poppy cultivation was related to opium use and addiction and that community member s of the village were not addicted. Believe that CN campaigns have created a bad image of them and people should distinguish between a cultivator and addicts. Although some had seen CN messages on TV; generally they did not have any access to TV in the villages. However, they suggested that if they did have access to TV they would like to see images that would provide proof of the harmful effects of opium. Complained about certain radio messages that talked about the destructive aspects of poppy cultivation; because opium is the main financial income for the community and the main reason why emigration from the area has been reduced. The area had no access to TV. Disagree with the content of the public awareness messages that stress that growing opium poppy is sinful. If there are public awareness messages that stress that poppy is against the Quran there should also be public awareness about other un-islamic practices. Disagree that OPC harms their community because no member is an addict: on the contrary opium is used as a medicine It has been a long time that I am growing poppy but it didn t have any bad effects on our village. No one in our village uses opium. OPC has helped their children and members of their community to survive and get educated. Limited exposure to CN public awareness campaigns because generally have not had access to either radio or TV. Although they trusted the opinion of scholars and other respected figures in their country and their community, they did not always agree with them. ANNEX 3 Phase 2: Findings 47

48 Opinions Opium was not totally bad as it was good for insomnia and some diseases. Not convinced that they will be punished by God because there is no reference in the Quran to opium poppy as something harmful. Defended OPC; although not an easy choice, OPC was the result of difficult financial pressures. ANNEX 3 Phase 2: Findings 48

49 ANNEX 4 Phase 2: Poster Samples [ Eliminate Narcotics ] Sample 1a Sample 1b Sample 3: [ Which one of them did God order? ] ANNEX 4 Phase 2: Poster Samples 49

50 Sample 4: [ Why do intelligent people do work that they later regret? ] Sample 5: [ Choosing is easy. Can you make the right choice? ] Sample 6: [Do not pollute your hands with this filthy product] ANNEX 4 Phase 2: Poster Samples 50

51 Sample 7a Sample 7b [ Don t irrigate opium poppy with your blood ] Sample 9 Sample 10 [ Opium poppy cultivation feeds terrorism. ] ANNEX 4 Phase 2: Poster Samples 51

52 Sample 11 [ Opium is an important source of finance for the enemies of our country ] Sample 12 [ Elimination of opium poppy cultivation. Residents of Nangarhar; if you cultivate opium poppy, we will destroy it. ] ANNEX 4 Phase 2: Poster Samples 52

53 ANNEX 5 Phase 2: Radio Samples Sample 1: Grow legal grains! The Afghan Government punishes severely those people or farmers that grow poppy! Those who don t grow poppy will be given a prize by the government! The Afghan government has provided financial aid to the people who don t grow poppy! The aid is an investment for development projects like streets, drain systems and barriers. Those farmers who grow legal seeds like wheat, beans and saffron are proud members of their homeland and their nation. Save Afghanistan from the disaster of illegal poppy cultivation and drug production that diminish the greatness of Afghanistan! Decide to grow legal grains! Sample 2: Afghan farmers! You know that poppy cultivation is an illegal action. You know that poppy grain is a distractive grain. You know that the extract of this grain brings disaster and the disaster from this grain destroys Afghanistan and your economy! Do you want to see your country destroyed? Do you want the illegal cultivation of poppy to weaken your economy? Do you want Afghanistan to be wellknown in the world as a poppy producer? If you don t want all these stop growing poppy and decide to grow and produce legal grains! Sample 3: The prisons are getting filled with drug criminals! According to the counter narcotics law cultivation, production, trafficking, import and export of drugs are illegal! The drug traffickers force the farmers to grow poppy for their own benefits! From the illegal money that the drug traffickers obtain and the drug trafficking they destroy the Afghan family and community! The actions of the drug traffickers disgrace Afghanistan s honour! Let s get rid of this disgrace and not help the drug traffickers that put your family s life in danger! Help to improve Afghanistan! Stop poppy cultivation! Sample 4: If you are trafficking and producing drugs, you put your life and your family s life in danger. You should know that the Afghan government is constantly looking for the drug criminals and traffickers. If you keep on doing illegal actions you will be put in prison. In this case you will always live under pressure knowing that the Afghan government arrests you following the counter narcotics law! Why do you put your self under pressure? Why do you put your and your family s life in danger? Make sure that your family and everybody in general lives with honour and pride! Stop growing poppy! Sample 5: The government of Afghanistan and its international partners are committed to terminate the poppy trafficking around the provinces of Afghanistan. Those provinces, such as yours, where poppy cultivating has stopped will be honoured for their achievement with development funds that can be used for the construction of schools and hospitals, the establishment of rural agricultural development projects, and the improvement of transportation infrastructure. For more information on legal crops, farming techniques, or agricultural training contact your provincial office of the Ministry of Agriculture. Stay poppy-free and help build a better future for the people of Afghanistan! ANNEX 5 Phase 2: Radio Samples 53

54 ANNEX 6 Focus Group Illustrations of CN Messages Balkh Province This drawing shows a concept commonly used in CN design (such as sample 5 in Annex 8). It suggests that people in Balkh have absorbed CN messages and that they are capable of understanding and repeating messages that use abstract or metaphorical designs. However, it is not clear that such a sophisticated level of understanding has been reached in all areas of the country and such images still remain confusing in some areas. ANNEX 6 Focus Group Illustrations of CN Messages 54

55 Balkh Province (continued) Education (signified by the pen) is a consistently strong theme as an alternative to opium poppy cultivation. This symbolism appears not to have simply development connotations but also has religious meaning as literacy allows an individual to read the Quran. Nangarhar Province There were no illustrations from this province. ANNEX 6 Focus Group Illustrations of CN Messages 55

56 Kandahar Province This illustration shows the much harsher attitudes of people in the south towards OPC. It seems unlikely that such an illustration with its extreme religious prohibition would be as well received in the north of the country. ANNEX 6 Focus Group Illustrations of CN Messages 56

57 Kandahar Province (continued) Stronger messages come from participants in the south, encouraging the government to show a strong and even violent role in opium poppy eradication. In this illustration the role of the Mullah as the centre of dissemination of all moral messages is shown to be the highest priority. ANNEX 6 Focus Group Illustrations of CN Messages 57

58 Herat Province The illustration shows a certain lack of understanding (or perhaps lack of interest) of CN issues. This seems to be an un-thoughtful reproduction of messages seen in the past. Opium poppy is portrayed as having destroyed licit fruits but it is unclear why this has happened. It seems unlikely that the illustrator has been seriously affected by CN messages. ANNEX 6 Focus Group Illustrations of CN Messages 58

59 Herat Province (continued) In the same way as the last illustration the drawing shows little appreciation for the causal link between opium poppy and destruction. It may be a failure of CN messages in general that people often fail to make this causal link; which leads to misunderstanding and ultimately a lack of belief in the CN messages. ANNEX 6 Focus Group Illustrations of CN Messages 59

60 Badakhshan Province The importance of education (symbolised by the pen) has shown itself to be a potent symbol as an alternative to OPC. However, this illustration is interesting in itself as a comment on the current situation as it shows the real tensions that Afghan s feel about OPC. The morally preferable alternative is clear but it is economic problems that dictate the predominance of the opium poppy over the pen. ANNEX 6 Focus Group Illustrations of CN Messages 60

61 Badakhshan Province (continued) This illustration shows the simplest form of CN message with the clear dichotomy between right and wrong. However, it is unclear how well the illustrator has accepted the CN message. It seems unlikely that people truly understand the reasons why opium poppy is bad but rather simply have grasped the abstraction that growing opium poppy is wrong. ANNEX 6 Focus Group Illustrations of CN Messages 61

62 ANNEX 7 Phase 3: Findings Balkh (3 focus groups, 35 people, age range 25 to 75 years) Posters Some had seen the posters before, others had not. Samples 10 two and three produced negative reactions: with some not understanding the message in sample three and others criticized sample two for its negative imagery: the depiction of a young man using drugs could encourage other young people to try drugs. Described the link between cultivation and usage looking at sample two. Others thought the person in sample three was a smuggler. None thought that sample three depicted a farmer as OPC is still not closely associated with criminality. One group had only seen the matchbox sample five which they claim was quite common in the area. Primary school teachers liked the style of the illustrations suggesting that they were good for illiterate people. Sample four was popular because of its positive and hopeful message. Most liked the style of the posters: only one person criticized the depiction of human beings through drawings as being un-islamic. In general, people felt that illustrations were effective for communicating messages. Suggested that the posters were most likely to come from a foreign organization. Generally understood the posters and could describe their meaning without prompting. Would like to see more of these kinds of posters and suggested that they needed to be more visible in places frequented by large amounts of people. Often people did not know where the posters came from; only two participants in one group suggested that they may come from the MCN. 10 See Annex 8 ANNEX 7 Phase 3: Findings 62

63 Radio Some disliked the use of the MCN logo, because it incorporated elements from the Quran and suggested that if the posters fell on the ground people would unwittingly be committing acts of blasphemy by standing on it. Were aware of the work of MCN and credited the falls in OPC in the North and East to the Ministry. Most were familiar with the radio messages but many had not heard them. Were positive about the messages and felt that they were useful Particularly liked sample two as they felt the presence of the Mullah character made the message particularly convincing. Unconvinced by sample three suggesting that it was not dramatic. General Comments Felt CN messages were effective and had an important influence. When OPC was at its peak there had been drought and they had no option but to grow opium poppy. Better economic conditions and better information on the negative effects and consequences of OPC (criminality, Islam and the effect on young people were specifically mentioned) would turn attitudes against OPC. Only prolonged government intervention and investment in local communities could ensure a permanent end to OPC. Important to educate children against narcotics, stressing that children will also transmit the message to their parents and other family members and would have a significant impact. Primary school teachers recommended that public awareness campaigns target schools to discourage drug usage. They had never received negative comments from parents when counter narcotics messages had been given out in their children s schools. Nangarhar (4 focus groups, 43 people, age range 25 to 45 years) Posters Had seen all the samples before and were positive about their potential impact on the local communities. ANNEX 7 Phase 3: Findings 63

64 Misinterpreted some of the samples: in sample one, for example, they inferred a promise that may not have been intended - that it if people give up illegal crops their legal harvests will be consequently much better. Most liked sample four as it showed an optimistic vision of what a future without OPC could look like Had seen posters in Jalalabad at various mosques, but said that the posters could not be seen outside of the provincial capital. Felt the images were clear and that they would be of interest to people passing them in the streets. Thought the samples came from MCN but possibly also from the chief of police because of the counter narcotic efforts of these agencies. Radio Had heard the radio messages before. Liked both messages and identified that they were linked but ultimately preferred sample two as it contained a Mullah speaking; but also because the singing, the language and the action of consulting with white beards closely resembled life in a real Afghan village. Generally very much in favour of this kind of radio drama and suggested that poems could also be used to deliver CN messages. General Comments Some complimentary about MCN suggesting that they were making significant CN efforts. Others held MCN responsible for failing to deliver on promises on alternative livelihoods. In general they felt that the main problem with OPC was that people still did not believe in the long term benefits of giving up poppy cultivation and that future messages should focus on reversing these attitudes. The government had to do more to provide physical support that would persuade people not to grow opium poppy. Children should receive specific CN education so that they can inform their parents about the various issues. ANNEX 7 Phase 3: Findings 64

65 CN messages should be incorporated into the schools curriculum including providing colouring books for very young children that contain CN themes. Herat (4 focus groups, 46 people, age range 30 to 70 years) Posters Most had not seen the samples because they were not displayed in their villages and rural people were not often exposed to such public awareness campaigns. Some had seen CN posters but not the samples they were shown: suggested that the samples were generic and similar to the ones they had seen. Many who had not seen the samples felt that most messages were clear and easy to understand. Most liked all the samples, and found them clear; disappointed that they had not seen them before. Liked samples one and two because they clearly demonstrated the positive and negative consequences of not-cultivating and cultivating opium poppy respectively. Liked and understood the slightly abstract sample one as it showed that crops like wheat, grapes and pomegranates are better than opium because they are good for people s health and, according to Islamic law, they are legal. Liked sample two because it showed that OPC was illegal and that trafficking, the consequence of OPC, had the potential to damage the future of their own children and to damage the country. Sample two was effective because people felt it was specifically referring to their region. Some confused by sample five because they did not understand why the soldiers were holding the family in a prison (even though the soldiers were supposed to be shown setting the family free). Liked the illustrated samples and said they provided messages that were easy for an illiterate audience to understand. Need to explain the messages even more simply as not everyone could understand. Important to show both the negative aspects of OPC and the positive incentives of not growing opium poppy. ANNEX 7 Phase 3: Findings 65

66 Felt that the crime associated with opium was the smuggling and did not feel that OPC was a serious crime. In general posters were only seen by people who travelled to the provincial capital. Liked illustrated posters as they were the best way to show messages to illiterate audiences. Campaigns should not focus on OPC but on drug usage and smuggling which they associated with criminality. Although OPC is illegal it is after harvest that the real destructive acts and criminality become significant; Need to locate the posters in places where people frequently gather. Recognized that the messages were probably from the MCN though were not sure (even though the MCN logo was on each poster). Some suggested that the posters may have come from foreign agencies. Radio Most had heard the radio messages before and said counter narcotics messages were frequently played on the radio stations they listened to. Messages made promises that were seldom kept Audiences in remote villages did not get a good radio signal. Preferred sample two because a Mullah delivered the messages, it mentions the importance of Islam; and is more convincing than the others because of the persuasive power of asking people to adhere to Islam. Positive about all the messages and said that as they were from the government and religious leaders, they should not be criticized. Messages should be broadcast more frequently. Messages should not be complex given the limited education of rural audiences and should be long enough to allow the message to be understood. Radio was a strong tool for disseminating public awareness messages Had heard people passing on messages verbally that they had heard on the radio. ANNEX 7 Phase 3: Findings 66

67 Radio messages were a good source of information; but only after discussion in the focus group did they fully understand the messages. A forum for discussion (such as a radio talk show) would help people understand the messages. General Comments In favour of CN education and felt there were powerful reasons for directly children targeting, given cases that they were familiar with of student s fathers being addicts. Messages given by a Mullah were the most powerful way to change people s opinions on counter narcotics. Supportive of MCN but not confident that the ministry could carry out its promises by providing alternative livelihoods and punishing those who break the law. Said that MCN s credibility was at risk and its failure would undoubtedly lead to a rise in OPC. Expected that representatives from MCN would visit their village and suggested that only this physical presence could ensure that people would not grow opium poppy. Thought that when the MCN representatives arrived they would help provide alternative livelihoods and help with other problems. Eradicating opium poppy was the responsibility of the government and that they did not have the power to take decisions and change the situation. Badakhshan (4 focus groups, 42 people, age range 20 to 50 years) Posters Had not seen the posters before and were not aware who produced them. Were aware of CN public awareness campaigns and some had seen public information messages on television. Took an exceptionally disinterested stance and were not convinced that the posters would have any effect on OPC in the region. Some liked sample one as it had a positive message that promoted a genuine alternative to OPC. ANNEX 7 Phase 3: Findings 67

68 Some liked sample four as it showed how farmers can grow crops legally and happily while they found sample two too disturbing. Many thought all the samples looked foreign and that as a result they were against Afghan culture and the Islamic religion because foreigners want to trample the Islamic religion. displaying posters in mosques would increase their impact There is no point in putting out posters without real alternatives offered by the government to develop their region. Such media campaigns had totally failed to change attitudes in the region. Some anger that money had been spent on such activities which, in essence, sought to diminish the income of the farmers. One of the participants said, Don t show us these pictures they are useless, and it doesn t help us. If the posters would have any benefit for us we would hang them on schools, mosques and other places but they don t have any benefit for us so we don t like them. Some agreed that people should be informed more about the harmful effects of OPC. In the past they had received posters with counter narcotics messages Radio and TV Some said they had no time for radio as they were too busy with their daily jobs. Had a negative view of the radio messages because, in the past, radio messages had made promises that were never fulfilled and they were unlikely to trust any kind of radio messages in the future. The majority did not have radio or TV and so did not get any messages through these media. General Comments There is no other way to support their families other than to grow opium poppy. Public awareness on counter narcotics was a good idea for schools. There were some drug addicts in the region and people feared that their own children might use drugs. ANNEX 7 Phase 3: Findings 68

69 Some were uncomfortable that part of their income was derived from opium poppy, expressing particular concern that items for their children such as clothes, books and food had been paid for by OPC. Some felt that, as their region was secure and allegedly free from drug addiction, they did not associate with the negative consequences of OPC portrayed in public awareness campaigns. Kandahar (3 focus groups, 37 people, age range 20 to 50 years) Posters Had seen some of the poster samples at the bazaar and elsewhere in Kandahar city; including schools, crossroads and electricity pylons. Liked sample one as it had the most positive message. Liked sample three as it gave a strong message on the consequences of breaking the law. Had seen the dangler (sample 7) in several cars. Posters had a positive impact but those that used the Quran were blasphemous. All the messages were positive and in keeping with the prevailing values of the community. Samples should show positive and negative messages. Eradication messages should always be accompanied by alternative livelihoods messages. Messages focusing on drug abuse should also show children attending school. Message should be strong, Mullahs were the most powerful source of delivering messages. Radio and TV Had seen TV messages on Hewad TV and Millie TV and governmental stations. Generally positive about the radio messages, particularly sample two as it contained a message from a Mullah. ANNEX 7 Phase 3: Findings 69

70 General Comments Agreed that CN efforts were a good thing and acknowledged the role of the government in taking the lead. Generally familiar with current CN campaigns and could distinguish between pre-harvest and post-harvest campaigns. Priority target should be school children to discourage them from using drugs; therefore the best place to put these messages would be in schools. ANNEX 7 Phase 3: Findings 70

71 ANNEX 8 Phase 3: Print Samples Sample 1a Sample 1b [ Elimination of Opium Poppy: a way forward to progress, prosperity, security and blessings. ] Sample 2a Sample 2b [ Think of the future of your children and youth. ] ANNEX 8 Phase 3: Print Samples 71

72 Sample 3a Sample 3b [ Drug Offenders: according to the law you will go to prison for a long time and face a cash fine of thousands of Afghanis. ] ANNEX 8 Phase 3: Print Samples 72

73 Sample 4 [ Haram: Unlawful cultivation, unlawful harvest, insecurity, violence and terrorism. ] [ Halal: Lawful cultivation and harvest, security, progress and development. ] Sample 5 (matchbox) ANNEX 8 Phase 3: Print Samples 73

74 Sample 7 (Dangler) [ If we do not get rid of opium poppy, we will get rid of Afghanistan ] Sample 8 (Ruler) [ We do not want opium poppy. ] ANNEX 8 Phase 3: Print Samples 74