How Are We Protecting the U.S. Swine Herd?

Similar documents
Foot and Mouth Disease in UK and Our National Plan. Colleen S. Bruning-Fann DVM, MS diplomate ACVPM

Table Top Exercise: Foot and Mouth Disease. Local Preparedness and Response for Animal Disease Emergencies

Update to Iowa Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) and Livestock Emergency Management Plans

What s the Game Plan for Swine in Case of a Foreign Animal Disease Outbreak?

SWINE PROGRAMS AT USDA APHIS VETERINARY SERVICES

Foot and Mouth Disease

Secure Egg Supply Plan & Permitted Movement Database

Active Observational Surveillance (AOS) for FMD, CSF, and ASF: An Overview May 2017

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 4 Combined with 8, 12, 17, 21 and 37 APPROVED

PREVENTION PRACTICES FOR CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER (CSF)

Goals. Transboundary or. We are Here to Help. Awareness that animal biosecurity is addressed at the. Who s who during an outbreak

How to prevent transmission to/from domestic pigs

CFIA Animal Health, Welfare and Biosecurity Division Biosecurity Recommendations for Travellers to Keep African Swine Fever Out of Canada

MINNESOTA FAD RESPONSE PLAN

FAD PReP STRATEGY DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION OF PHASES AND TYPES OF A FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE OUTBREAK AND RESPONSE

Foot and Mouth Disease Continuity of Business Planning for the U.S. Dairy Industry

Veterinary Services Swine Activities

National FMD Response Planning

African Swine Fever What do we know, what has been done and are there unknown risks? September 27, 2018

Tom Kompas Australian Centre for Biosecurity and Environmental Economics Crawford School of Economics and Government Australian National University

Controlling Emerging Swine Health Challenges

FINLAND S ANIMAL HEALTH SERVICE (FAHS)

Outbreak Terminology: Phases, Zones and Premises. Dr. Patrick Webb Director, Swine Health Programs

Veterinary Services. Swine Health Activities

CHAPTER 2 THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF FMD

Indiana State Board of Animal Health

Mission of the Community Veterinary Emergency Team to Greece

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza:

Points to consider in the prevention, control and eradication of FMD Dr. Paul Sutmoller* and Dr. Simon Barteling**

A Secure Milk Supply (SMS) Plan in Preparedness for an FMD Outbreak Response Current Focus and Progress to Date

CSF eradication strategies in Japan

SWINE PROGRAM ACTIVITIES 2016

FMD Preparedness and Response: Overview of Capabilities And Critical Activities

CHAPTER 8 ESTIMATION OF THE OUTBREAK COST

FMD STATUS AND CONTROL STRATEGY IN JAPAN

The Threat of Agroterrorism and Zoonotic Diseases in the United States

ANIMAL HEALTH AND PROTECTION ACT SWINE IMPORTATION REGULATIONS

Practical Biosecurity for Pig Farmers, Smallholders and Pet Pig Keepers in Scotland

Secure Food Supply Plans What s New? Danelle Bickett-Weddle, DVM, MPH, PhD, DACVPM Center for Food Security and Public Health Iowa State University

Local Preparedness and Response for Animal Disease Emergencies


AVIAN INFLUENZA. Frequently Asked Questions and Answers

CHAPTER 3 CONTROL AND ERADICATION OF FMD

MPI is satisfied the current quarantine measures in place are sufficient to manage the situation.

Agricultural Animal Care and Use Program (AACUP) Guidelines for Reducing Risks of Transfer of Disease in UIUC Swine Units

African Swine Fever facing Romania. (main problems and measures)

Fact Sheet. Data, Information & Economic Analysis Livestock Marketing Information Center

PCVAD A PRODUCER S GUIDE TO MANAGING. Porcine Circovirus Associated Diseases

Regional Status and FMD s Control Strategies in North Africa

Recognizing European Union (EU) and EU Member State Regionalization Decisions for African

Update on PEDV. Lisa Becton, DVM, MS National Pork Board

Current Vaccinology Considerations in North American Foreign Animal Disease Events

African swine fever outbreak in Latvia. SCoPAFF AHW meeting, Brussels,

Missions of the Community Veterinary Emergency Team to LATVIA

Global and Regional Strategies for HPAI and CSF

Foot-and-Mouth Disease Fostering a New Preparedness Paradigm: Facilitating a Conversation Among Public and Private Sector Stakeholders

Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Iowa Concern Hotline Frequently Asked Questions Updated :30pm

Government structure on Food safety and Animal health system in Japan

Biosecurity: Understanding its importance when working on livestock farms

Poultry Biosecurity PREPARING FOR FALL AI THREAT

EU measures for surveillance and control of ASF in feral pigs

LANACM13 Plan, manage and evaluate site hygiene and biosecurity

Workshop on Contingency planning and practical activities in surveillance on Bluetongue and FMD

HPAI Biosecurity Checklist R

Foodborne Outbreak Linked to Pork Consumption. Jennifer Koeman, DVM, MSc, MPH, DACVPM National Pork Board

California Custom Processing Plant Quality Assurance Plan

Swine Enteric Coronavirus Disease (SECD)

ASF cases and outbreaks in Poland

Ñëàéäû èíæåíåðíîé ñëóæáû àñòü 2.pptx. Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance (Rosselkhoznadzor), FGBI «ARRIAH» 1

West Virginia State Laws Affected by H.R. 4879

U.S. Breeding Cattle Exports to Vietnam Are Approved

INFLUENZA FACTS AND RESOURCES

BIOSECURITY / SECURITY CHECKLIST For the Swine Farmer, Swine Industry Facility Manager SWINE INDUSTRY

CHAPTER 7 MODELING A FMD OUTBREAK IN TULARE COUNTY

Foot-and-mouth disease. Andrew McFadden MVS, BVSc Veterinary Epidemiologist

ArcGIS for revealing space-time patterns of livestock diseases spread

African swine fever in Lithuania. SCoFcAH 21 August 2014, State Food and Veterinary Service, Lithuania

A. No. There are no current reports of avian influenza (bird flu) in birds in the U.S.

PINOY PORCINE PRACTITIONERS, INC. Unit 201 Saint Rafael Suites, 941 San Rafael Street, Plainview, Mandaluyong City 1550 Philippines

MANUAL ON AFRICAN SWINE FEVER FOR PIG PRODUCERS

High Path Avian Influenza. October 14, 2015 Reservoir Migrating Wild Waterfowl

Secure Egg Supply. Maintaining a Secure Egg Supply During a Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak

Overview of biosecurity systems in EU Member States. Milos Juras Food and Veterinary Office Unit F6 Animal and Welfare Grange, Dunsany (MH) - Ireland

Animal Health Requirements for poultry meat etc. to be exported to Japan from Finland

HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA POLICY UPDATES

Animal Disease Surveillance in South Africa. Submitted by South Africa

And Current Situation

PEDV: Swine Exhibition Risk Assessment Guide

Management of animal health emergencies in North America: prevention, preparedness, response and recovery

VETERINARY EXTENSION

HPAI: Federal Planning Efforts

PRRS Regional Elimination

Indiana State Board of Animal Health

American Poultry Association

VETERINARY SERVICES POLICY STATEMENT

Biosecurity. Goal (learning objective) Lesson directions and outline. Supplies. Pre-lesson preparation

FMD Report - Syria 6 th Regional FMD West Eurasia Roadmap Meeting - Almaty, Kazakhstan 28 to 30 April 2015

Biosecurity is many things:

Biosecurity in Backyards/Small Holders Production System

Transcription:

How Are We Protecting the U.S. Swine Herd? Beth Lautner, D.V.M., M.S. Vice President, Science and Technology National Pork Board Introduction The occurrence of a foreign animal disease (FAD) in the U.S. would be devastating to pork producers. Recent events, the Classical Swine Fever (CSF) outbreaks in The Netherlands, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, Foot-and Mouth Disease (FMD) in Taiwan, the Nipah virus outbreak in Malaysia, and FMD in the U.K. and Europe have heightened interest by producers and practitioners in what the U.S. is doing to prevent the incursion of a FAD. Many would view the risk of entry of a FAD or an emerging disease as increasing. Risks to U.S. Swine Herds The increased risk is attributed to several factors. There are many international visitors to the U.S. that may have contact with U.S. herds and recently been on farms in their own country. Tour groups of producers from other countries to view U.S. animal agriculture are extremely common. In addition, many U.S. producers travel internationally to view production practices in other countries. Veterinarians, animal scientists, and animal agriculture students are frequently consulting with or conducting research in other countries and then returning to work with U.S. herds. With free trade agreements, there is the potential for an increase in the flow of various products from a larger number of countries. This increase in diversity may contribute to increased risk. A major concern is the illegal importation of products that may carry infectious diseases. Border controls are critical to intercept this type of contraband. Animals may also be illegally imported and therefore, not be subjected to U.S. import testing requirements. Recently, there has been a heightened awareness of the potential for bioterrorism to be directed to animal populations. Key Diseases of Concern to the U.S. Pork Industry The three main diseases of concern to the U.S. pork industry are Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) and other vesicular diseases, Classical Swine Fever (Hog Cholera) and African Swine Fever. FMD is a highly contagious viral disease that affects cloven-hoofed animals such as cattle, swine, sheep, goats and deer. Signs of the disease include fever and blister-like lesions on the tongue and lips, in the mouth, on the teats and between the hooves. Animals can recover from the disease, but FMD causes severe losses in meat and milk production and leaves the animal debilitated. Due to the contagious nature of the disease and its drastic consequences, infected herds are normally destroyed. Humans can potentially serve as carriers if the virus contaminates clothes, footwear and the body, particularly the throat and nasal passages. Foot-and-Mouth Disease can be confused with other vesicular diseases, Vesicular Stomatitis, Swine Vesicular Disease, and Vesicular Exanthema. Whenever mouth or feet blisters or other typical signs are seen, laboratory tests must be completed to determine whether the disease causing them is FMD. Animals, people, or materials such as contaminated clothing, footwear,

equipment, vehicles, hay, or meat products can spread the FMD virus. The virus can persist in contaminated products for significant times depending on the temperature and ph conditions. There are seven separate types and more than 60 subtypes of the FMD virus. Immunity to one type does not protect against other types. The control strategies for FMD include stamping out (depopulation), pre-emptive slaughter, ring vaccination with later depopulation, and routine vaccination. There are many reasons why FMD vaccine is not used routinely or in outbreaks. They include trade restrictions, the need for repeated vaccinations, availability of differential tests, continued costs of vaccinations, ability for vaccinated animals to become infected, and the need to match the type of vaccine with the FMD virus. Classical Swine Fever (CSF), also known as Hog Cholera, is a highly contagious viral disease of swine. CSF was eradicated from the U.S. in 1978 after a 16-year effort. It is transmitted most commonly by direct contact with infected swine. It also can be transmitted through contact with body secretions or consumption by swine of untreated food wastes containing pork from infected animals. The disease may be either acute or chronic or congenital. Clinical signs may vary and include high temperatures, piling, conjunctivitis, purplish discoloration of the skin, alternating constipation and diarrhea, a staggering gait, and reproductive problems. CSF may be confused with several other swine diseases. These include African Swine Fever, erysipelas, Salmonella septicemia, Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome, and Porcine Dermatitis and Nephropathy Syndrome. African Swine Fever (ASF) is a tick-borne, contagious viral disease of swine. It can have either an acute or chronic form. Clinical signs include fever, reddened skin, diarrhea, and abortion. ASF can be confused with CSF and similar diseases. Role of Government Many animal diseases have been eradicated from the U.S. through government programs. Until recently, industry also viewed foreign animal disease (FAD) prevention and response as solely a government responsibility. U.S. government efforts to prevent the entry of a FAD focus on people movement, importation of live animals, and importation of animal products. Within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), there are numerous agencies that have important responsibilities in emergency management. Veterinary Services (VS) is the animal health arm of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), USDA. VS personnel in the field, headquarters, or laboratories work to prevent entry of pests and pathogens, to diagnose and control outbreaks, evaluate risks of FADs, provide FAD training and information, monitor for diseases, and respond to potential FAD emergencies. If a FAD were diagnosed in the U.S., one of the two Regional Emergency Animal Disease Eradication Organizations (READEO) would be activated. READEO team members are trained to confirm the presence of the disease, conduct epidemiological studies, appraise the value of animals that may have to be destroyed, dispose of infected and exposed animals, clean and disinfect premises, set and enforce regulations against disease spread, and conduct vaccination programs.

While VS has a prominent role in emergency management, other USDA agencies provide valuable services. APHIS, Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) inspectors are responsible for inspections at U.S. ports of entry. One of the aids in this detection is the PPQ Beagle Brigade, dogs especially trained to sniff passengers and luggage and detect meat products. In addition, disposal of foreign garbage at ports and airports is closely supervised. APHIS, International Services (IS) maintains officers in foreign countries to facilitate trade and provide assistance and information on FAD outbreaks in other countries. The USDA s Agricultural Research Service (ARS) conducts research on foreign animal diseases primarily at its Plum Island, New York facility. Currently, the two major research programs at Plum Island are African Swine Fever and FMD. ARS scientists participate with APHIS in FAD training programs and development of FAD diagnostic tests. Checkoff Funded Foreign Animal Disease and Biosecurity Activities Pork producer activities have focused on educational initiatives for producers and veterinarians, research, and national coordination. Checkoff funds have been used to develop a variety of resources to help producers keep their herds safe. A key emphasis has been on biosecurity information for producers. Educational initiatives include: PORK QUALITY ASSURANCE Program New section on biosecurity including prevention of foreign animal diseases World Pork Expo Directory Information Section on foreign animal disease and on-farm biosecurity Pork Report Article - "Step Up Your Biosecurity Measures" Sent to 110,000 producers and stakeholders Radio Interviews with Farm Broadcasters and News Hotline Tape Presentations on Biosecurity and Foreign Animal Disease Prevention Foreign Animal Disease Awareness Video Educates producers about the threat of foreign animal diseases and what producers need to do to protect their farms Foreign Animal Disease and Biosecurity Sections on Web Site www.porkboard.org or directly at www.porkscience.org Mailings to American Association of Swine Veterinarians (AASV) Information on foreign animal diseases sent to all AASV members Biosecurity information has focused on preventing entry of both domestic and foreign animal diseases. Specific precautions related to foreign animal disease prevention include: Limit Visitors - Use a Sign-in Log Require International Visitors to Observe Pig Free Times Based on Diseases Present in Country Are From or Have Visited - USDA Recommends Five Days for FMD Countries Require International Visitors or Employees Who Have Traveled Internationally to Shower and Wear Farm-Supplied Clothing Prohibit International Visitors or Employees From Bringing Imported Food Onto Pork Production Site

Prohibit Bringing Any Clothing or Equipment Used at International Pork Production Sites With regard to research, checkoff funds have been invested in research projects on FMD at the USDA Agricultural Research Service s Plum Island Animal Disease Center. This research has focused on development of vaccines and improved diagnostic tools. In addition, detailed pork producer biosecurity research priorities have been presented to USDA. The National Pork Board also participated in a review of the FAD research programs at Plum Island. A literature review has been conducted by Dr. Sandy Amass at Purdue University to summarize the current state of knowledge with regard to biosecurity precautions needed for disease prevention. At the national level, the pork industry has worked with other commodity groups, State and Federal animal health officials and veterinarians to ensure implementation of critical prevention and response capabilities. The industry has been involved in several activities working to prevent an outbreak, including representation on the Secretary of Agriculture s Advisory Committee on Foreign Animal and Poultry Diseases, participation in the Animal Health Safeguarding Review, and participation in foreign animal disease test exercises for Classical Swine Fever and FMD at the state and national level. The most recent FMD exercise in November 2000 tested the response capabilities of the U.S., Canada and Mexico. During the exercise, the National Pork Board's Swine Health Committee offered input and producer views on various control and eradication strategies and on how best to communicate with producers during an outbreak. Since 1996, pork producers have been very active participants in the National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS) Steering Committee's programs to develop a unified Federal and State government and industry approach to preventing and responding to foreign animal diseases. The NAHEMS Steering Committee is composed of animal agriculture industry associations, State veterinarians, veterinary practitioners, and USDA. Recently, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the National Emergency Management Association have joined the Steering Committee. The Steering Committee believes that a sense of shared responsibility between the animal industry, practitioners, and State and Federal government animal health officials should replace the attitude of emergency management being solely a Federal responsibility. The Steering Committee has been very active in the last four years. Conference calls are held monthly. Two-day meetings take place quarterly. Topical subcommittees carry out specific projects as needed. Key accomplishments include the development of the model for shared emergency management responsibilities, drafting a strategic plan for the U.S. National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS), and development of Standards for State Animal Health Emergency Management Systems. Currently, pork producers are taking the lead in developing standards for animal agriculture industry to meet to participate in emergency management activities. Pork Producer Response to Recent FMD Outbreak in Europe The National Pork Board was very actively working to ensure that all precautions were taken to ensure that the U.S. remain free of FMD during the recent outbreak in Europe. The National Pork Board's Swine Health Committee communicated its concerns to USDA and several meetings were held with USDA's Veterinary Services and Plant Protection and Quarantine and U.S. Customs Service. Information on FMD was sent to swine veterinarians to increase their

awareness of the disease and their reporting responsibilities. The pork industry reviewed its communication and response plans. The importance and need for state plans was discussed with state producer associations. Conclusion Pork producers have a role in preventing and responding to a foreign animal disease. It is important that each producer institute appropriate biosecurity measures in their operations and that their producer organization is actively engaged with other industry groups, veterinarians, and State and Federal animal health officials in addressing foreign animal disease threats.