TG100 Implementation Guide - FTA

Similar documents
Risk-based QM for Incorrect Isocenter at Day 1 Setup. TG 100 risk based QM development Process Mapping

Therapy symposium Formal Radiation Therapy Safety Processes

Bruce Thomadsen. University of Wisconsin - Madison

COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS AND PERCEPTION HOW THINKING IMPACTS BEHAVIOR

Automatic Fault Tree Derivation from Little-JIL Process Definitions

The Smart Way to Check Treatment Plans and Charts. Anne W. Greener, Ph.D., FACR American Association Of Medical Dosimetrists June 15, 2016

Introduction to ISO Risk Management for Medical Devices

Patient Safety in the Treatment Process

Establishing Special and Common Cause Variation

Deviations Inspection Observations & Issues to Consider for Achieving Compliance

Your Colleagues. Ellen Yorke Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center

RISK ASSESSMENT IN RADIATION THERAPY OF PATIENTS USING PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ANALYSIS OF RADIOTHERAPY DEVICES

5: Family, children and friends

The Helping Orientations Inventory Open Materials 1

THOUGHTS, ATTITUDES, HABITS AND BEHAVIORS

Anticoagulation therapy : improving processes. Hilary Merrett and Fiona Gale, CHKS 18 th October 2010

Prevention of Medical Errors: Concepts and Tools. Perry Johnson, PhD April 30, 2016

EXPLORING SUBJECTIVITY IN HAZARD ANALYSIS 1

Step 4: ISO9001:2015 -Risk Based Planning Cont. Methodology used to Prioritise and Control Risk

Reframing Perspectives

FMEA AND RPN NUMBERS. Failure Mode Severity Occurrence Detection RPN A B

Why Is It That Men Can t Say What They Mean, Or Do What They Say? - An In Depth Explanation

Getting the Design Right Daniel Luna, Mackenzie Miller, Saloni Parikh, Ben Tebbs

Section 4.3 Using Studies Wisely. Honors Statistics. Aug 23-8:26 PM. Daily Agenda. 1. Check homework C4# Group Quiz on

SBRT fundamentals. Outline 8/2/2012. Stereotactic Body Radiation Therapy Quality Assurance Educational Session

Chapter 13 Summary Experiments and Observational Studies

Resilience and Thriving in the Face of Change and Adversity Presenter: Bill Hefferman. all rights reserved PeopleFirm LLC 2016

UCSD EXPERIENCE, DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. Derek Brown

Chapter 13. Experiments and Observational Studies. Copyright 2012, 2008, 2005 Pearson Education, Inc.

Look to see if they can focus on compassionate attention, compassionate thinking and compassionate behaviour. This is how the person brings their

#NPPG2016. ENFit syringes. Andrew Wignell, Paediatric Pharmacist, Nottingham University Hospitals

Audio: In this lecture we are going to address psychology as a science. Slide #2

Guess: Correct or Incorrect. Trial (perform in random order)

Risk Based Environmental Monitoring

MITOCW conditional_probability

MINDSET MATTERS. Marla Warner BSc CWC CAPP Wellbeing and Productivity Coach and Consultant

Root Cause Analysis. Rich Bauer Associate Director Reliability Risk Management/Event Analysis Hands on Relay School March 15, 2019

Membrane Potentials. (And Neuromuscular Junctions)

Root Cause Analysis: Mining for Answers/Delivering Prevention. Rob Stepp, CIH, CSP, ARM, REHS. Department of Occupational Safety & Health

M-PACT (Moving Parents And Children Together)

Performance Assessment Network

Tips and techniques guide Helping you through your working day in ED and beyond

a Mud Puddles to Meteors mini-lesson

Lesson 11.1: The Alpha Value

Healing as a Secret Motive of Synchronicity

Fluoride: Friend or Foe? By Daniel X 5/31/05

FMEA and RCA: the mantras * ; of modern risk management. FMEA and RCA really do work to improve patient safety. COMMENTARY FMEA and RCA.

Unit 3: EXPLORING YOUR LIMITING BELIEFS

FINDING THE RIGHT WORDS IN ADVANCED AND METASTATIC BREAST CANCER (ABC/MBC)

Key Concepts Guide. Rev. March 2015 Page 1 of 13

The Design of Everyday Things Chapters 4-5. Karan Singh Bir, Greg Brill, and Harrison Gregg

Risk analysis to inform physics plan review recommendations

ADDITIONAL CASEWORK STRATEGIES

TOOTH DECAY SESSION 1

Root Cause Analysis. December, 9 th, 2008

NCFE Level 2 Certificate in Understanding the Care and Management of Diabetes. Candidate Assessment Part A / Assessment 1

Section 2 8. Section 2. Instructions How To Get The Most From This Program Dr. Larry Van Such.

Chapter 7: Descriptive Statistics

The Power of Positive Thinking

117 Applying Risk Management Principles to QA in Surgical Pathology: From Principles to Practice. Gregory Flynn MD

Steps to Helping a Distressed Friend: a Resource for Homewood Undergraduates

Emotional Intelligence and NLP for better project people Lysa

HANDOUTS FOR MODULE 7: TRAUMA TREATMENT. HANDOUT 55: COMMON REACTIONS CHECKLIST FOR KIDS (under 10 years)

Systematic Risk Analysis Based Approach to Quality Management Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis

Improvement Science In Action. Improving Reliability

Worries and Anxiety F O R K I D S. C o u n s e l l i n g D i r e c t o r y H a p p i f u l K i d s

A PCT Primer. Fred Nickols 6/30/2011

Grade 8 Health Promotion

Classical Condititoning (CC)

Welcome to this series focused on sources of bias in epidemiologic studies. In this first module, I will provide a general overview of bias.

Southern Safety Tri-Lateral Stop Work Authority/Intervention and Video Update

Five Mistakes and Omissions That Increase Your Risk of Workplace Violence

The Psychology of Street Photography

Anxiety. Top ten fears. Glossophobia fear of speaking in public or of trying to speak

Activities to Accompany the Genetics and Evolution App for ipad and iphone

Does this topic relate to the work the crew is doing? If not, choose another topic.

Helping Your Asperger s Adult-Child to Eliminate Thinking Errors

Chapter 1. Dysfunctional Behavioral Cycles

Respect Handout. You receive respect when you show others respect regardless of how they treat you.

HOW TO OVERCOME THE FEAR OF JUDGEMENT

Applying Risk Management Principles to QA in Surgical Pathology: From Principles to Practice

MALE LIBIDO- EBOOKLET

PSYC1024 Clinical Perspectives on Anxiety, Mood and Stress

what is behavior? by Tio

NCFE Level 2 Certificate in Understanding the Care and Management of Diabetes. Candidate Assessment Part B / Assessment 2

Introduction to Wellness Recovery Action Plan (WRAP) Amanda Berg, AA Peer-Led Recovery Workshop Coordinator

HEPATITIS C LESSONS PART 4

Head Up, Bounce Back

Plenary Session 1. Nelson Repenning MIT Sloan School of Management

A hybrid approach for identification of root causes and reliability improvement of a die bonding process a case study

Calm Living Blueprint Podcast

Patient & Family Guide. Anxiety.

Transition and Maintenance

Scheme of Work End of Key Stage Statements 1a to talk and write about their opinions, and explain their views, on issues that affect themselves and so

Eric E. Klein, Ph.D. Chair of TG-142

Practical Advice for Caring Safely: The ergonomics of providing care for a frail older adult

maintaining gains and relapse prevention

Ohio Academic Standards Addressed By Zoo Program WINGED WONDERS: SEED DROP

THE INTEGRITY PROFILING SYSTEM

The Role of the Certified Diabetes Educator: A Team Effort

Transcription:

FTA In this section, we will talk about Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). What is a fault tree? It is a tool used to trace failure pathways back to the causes and contributing factors. A fault tree analysis starts with the FMEA. Imagine that we have identified a failure mode and its potential cause but it is likely that there are many steps in between these two. With fault tree analysis, we are taking a closer look at the failure pathway. In the analysis, we will ask the questions: How could this failure mode propagate into an error? and What happens in between the underlying cause and the failure? It is possible that some pathways are stronger or weaker than others at catching and preventing failures. Thus, we are able to identify systemic program weaknesses, if present. It is also likely that we have quality checks along the way and we have the opportunity to realize whether they are effective. Do we have the quality checks in the most effective spot in the process to catch or prevent an error? How do I build my own fault tree? Start with the FMEA. Identify a failure mode in need of a quality management plan. Let s take the failure of importing the wrong imaging study such as the wrong 4D phase or the wrong MR sequence and place it on the left side of the fault tree. What could have led to the wrong study being imported? It could be that the wrong images were acquired in the first place. Or it could be that the correct images were acquired but the wrong images were exported. We have the option in a fault tree to choose from an OR gate or an AND gate. When two or more separate events can lead to a failure, we use an OR gate. This means that either pathway would lead to this failure. When two or more events must occur for the failure to propagate, we use an AND gate. In this example, either circumstance could lead to this failure so we use an OR gate. Each of these causes we have identified are also failure modes themselves, with causes of their own. So we keep going in

building the fault tree, adding more causes. At this point we ask: What could have caused the wrong images to be acquired? It could be that the technologist did not have the knowledge of the appropriate imaging studies to acquire due to lack of standard operating procedures. Or perhaps there is some standard in the department but there is inadequate training. Both of these could independently lead to this failure so we use an OR gate. Next, what could have caused the correct images to be acquired but the wrong images are imported? In this case, miscommunication between team members could have occurred or perhaps lack of attention on the part of the team member. Either of these could lead to the failure. At this point, we can keep adding causes until the causes are out of our control. Let s look at another example. Depending on the goal of your project, it may be useful to start an FTA with the overall failure mode. A generalized failure mode that we are all ultimately trying to prevent. In this example, it is the wrong or very wrong dose distribution, location or volume or patient injury due to failure on the first treatment day. Potential causes are: patient data did not match, treatment data incorrect, patient position incorrect, or treatment parameters incorrect.

Let s look a bit further at patient position incorrect. Potential causes of this are: incorrect treatment isocenter, incorrect patient position, incorrect patient orientation or localization imaging failure. If we look further at incorrect treatment isocenter, causes of this could be: inattention, device failure or inadequate training. This is where we can stop. We have the ability to work on and potentially mitigate problems rooting from these causes but causes beyond this would be out of our control. Now that we know how failures can find their way through our processes, we can think about: How do I design my system to prevent errors? With fault tree analysis, we can look at a few things to make our processes more robust: Common causes, OR versus AND gates and quality checks. Common causes are those that pop up frequently as underlying causes in the fault tree. In this example, the causes are color coded by type. We find that there are several common causes: poor image quality, lack of attention, and lack of training. This can be extremely helpful to identify as we may choose to focus our resources on causes that affect multiple failure pathways.

OR vs AND Gates Recognize that when OR gates are present, they represent increased hazard in that multiple, independent causes could lead to an error. AND gates represent increased protection because two or more causes would have to be present for the failure to occur. Let s look at an example where three separate causes could lead to a failure: training failure, inattention/poor performance, and ultrasound images are inadequate. If we redesign the system, adding QA of ultrasound images, we have added a layer of protection to the system. Now both the US images would have to be of poor quality AND the QA of them would have to fail for an error to propagate along this route. This makes the propagation of a failure more unlikely.

Quality Activities It is difficult to know where along the pathway to insert a quality activity such as a checklist or a timeout. Instituting a quality step that prevents multiple failure pathways at once can be an effective use of resources. For example, instituting annual training. However, for high severity failure modes, it may be appropriate to insert a quality step immediately before the failure mode, like an additional timeout. A few tips for doing FTA: Form a team. Make it multidisciplinary and cross-functional with personnel from various disciplines in your department. Start with branches of the fault tree with the highest risk and go from there. Be open to new approaches such as redesigning the system. More tips for general quality management are provided in the next section.