ASF in wild boar prevention and management

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ASF in wild boar prevention and management Vittorio Guberti ISPRA Ozzano E. (BO) 30 January 2019 Preparing European hunters to eradicate African Swine Fever Jagd und Hund Dortmund

The problem In the EU only more than 300.000 km2 of forest and agricoltural land are involved More than 500.000 wild boars

2014: ASF epidemiology in wild boar Direct cycle (direct contacts mainly)

ASF a truly density dependent infection. The virus could have fade out locally due to reduced wild boar density 4.5 Positive animals 4 3.5 Density dependent transmission 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 Wild boar density THRESHOLD: very few wild boar left..no disease 10 8 6 4 2 1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.2

Virus survival in carcasses (winter) Spring-summer cycle (direct contacts mainly)

ASF in not a truly density dependent infection. The ultimate persistence of the virus is guaranteed by carcasses 4.5 Prevalence 4 3.5 Density dependent transmission 3 2.5 2 1.5 Wild boar Density INDEPENDENT transmission 1 0.5 0 NO THRESHOLD 10 8 6 4 2 1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.2

Virus survival in carcasses (winter) Despite very few wild boar still alive, the virus survives in carcasses and thus still available for the next breeding season or incoming animals. When new born or neighbouring animals will be infected and a new cycle will initiate Spring-summer cycle direct contact mainly

An example Endemic status Epidemic wave

Each one of the dot is a small wild boar population; The virus is maintained in each one of this small populations the virus is independently form what happens in the neighbouring ones; Contacts among the small infected populations favour the persistence of the virus 2015 2016 2017 2018

2014 So...it was realised that this management of hunted wild boar was a RISK

2019

Today I have A terrible headache

To hunt or not to hunt? Hamlet. again? Vittorio Guberti, ISPRA, Italy

The 4 phases of a transmissible disease Epidemic Invasion Introduction Endemic Fade out

PREVENTION Wild boar depopulation before ASF will arrive Wider Area for Medium Term Actions (WAMTA)

EFSA, 2014 2-4 years before the possible introduction of the virus

Poland: tendency to spread within areas with wild boar density > 1 individual/km 2 2014 30 cases 2015 53 cases 2016 28 cases

0,15-0,3 WB/km 2. Density of wild boars (individuals per 10 km 2 of hunting ground) in hunting districts by hunters estimations (census) in spring 2016.

What about this Threshold? The threshold exists (at least it should exist!!) It exists for any infection that spreads in a density dependent pattern; Nt is a deterministic threshold (a precise N. of individuals that could be espressed also by density i.e. 0,5/1000ha); It is simply the number of WB, no gender and age classes have to be considered/known; Nt addresses preventive measures aimed in reducing the wild boar population size BEFORE the arrival of the infection; FREE AREAS

Why we do not have a precise figures yet? Because of the role of carcasses The ASF threshold is determined mainly by carcasses presence Carcasses last for months during winter, weeks during summer Winter in Estonia comparable with winter in south Belgium? The threshold exists (at least it should exist!!) It technically impossible (very difficult) to estimate a so flexible parameter!!! So the threshold is: reduce as much as possible before the arrival of the infection: <0,5 WB/kmsq

Can we prevent ASF managing the wild boar population at the threshold? Deterministic (exact) threshold estimation; Precise host population size estimates: Zlin=> initial estimate 2WB/kmsq Final estimate 9WB/kmsq Feasibility BY NOW ALL ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED WHEN THE VIRUS ARRIVES: NO PREVENTION.BUT REACTION

Epidemic Epidemic Invasion Introduction Endemic

The epidemic phase Usually we dtect the virus during this phase not before The infection spreads in the wild boar population: the chain of infection is fully activated; The intensity and the duration of the epidemic results from the interaction between the two populations (host and infection agent) driven by wild boar population size and density; DENSITY DEPENDENT

Epidemic phase: considerations Wildlife diseases are detected during the epidemic phase and rarely (if ever) during the invasion phase; 1 detected positive = 3-6 in the forest Countries ask for a threshold to be reached during the epidemic: during the epidemic THERE IS NOT A THRESHOLD

Is the epidemic phase manageable? NO!!! The infection rate is always higher than any hunting rate Hunting will favour an artificial endemic evolution of the infection with VIRUS PREVALENCE HIGHER THAN NATURAL Hunting will increase the probability of spreading the disease (100 year of wildlife diseases management);

Hunting effort needed to cull the last infectiuous wild boar 1 infected out of 1000 = shooting 258 animals there is 95% probability to hunt the last 1 infectious animal 3 infected wild boar out of 1000 = hunting 951 wild boar will have 95% probability to hunt the last 3 infected wild boars More infected wild boars you have higher effort is needed: feasibility?

EPIDEMIC PAHSE when we first detect the virus Do nothing PASSIVE surveillance Do not get tired of surveillance; Be accurate when collecting data; Be patient and wait the end of the epidemic revealed by surveillance;

Epidemic evolves endemic Epidemic Invasion Introduction Endemic

ENDEMIC PHASE: few infected animals During the endemic phase it is possible to observe the fade out of the virus or to shot the very few infected wild boars There is time to: Implement biosecurity measures Trainings Set timing and efforts

MESSAGE: Threshold is a preventive measure During the Epidemic/endemic eradication is aimed in removing the last infectious animal The probability to remove the last infectious animal is LOW during the epidemic (when the virus is detected) During the endemic phase, the probability to eliminate the last infectious animal is higher The virus naturally reaches its minimum prevalence but carcasses make specific the epidemiological landscape of ASF During the endemic phase, the removal of carcasses is probably more important than any WB density reduction

ASF frequently asked questions

Agricoltural damages ASF kills more than hunters; In sourrouding areas IT IS REQUESTED TO INCREASE THE HUNTING EFFORT

Zlin; Czech epublic Higest risk fenced area Low risk area Intensive hunting area 5305 hunted wild boars at 13 October 2017 High risk area (fenced plus buffer Designed according wild boar home range

Artificial feeding Wild boar population dynamic: Increasing number in good years (mast years; scarce snow cover etc.) Decreasing number in bad years: population crashes Artificial feeding mimics good years: so the wild boar population is boosted each years without any demographic crash;

Driven hunts Driven hunts are certainly more efficient in increasing the hunting bag However it has been proven that animals increase their home ranges and thus making more probable the geographical spread of the virus IT ASKED TO INCREASE THE HUNTING EFFORT

Hunting and wild boar movement Drive hunting with dogs: increase of range size during the hunting season Home range displacements during the hunting season (up to 15 km)

Fences Fences mimic habitat fragmentation; Habitat fragmentation reduces the geographical spread of the infection; There is more time to properly organize actions The whole infected area has more probability to reach the endemic phase at which it is worth to hunt/cull animals Fences have a very low probability to halt the infection without any further appropriate actions

Zlin

Etalle

France at Belgian border

Final message: ASF in wild boar has some probability to be erdadicated when: EARLY detected: report dead animals; small areas are easily managed with higher probability of eradication; Hunting/culling only when few infectious animals are still present (higher eradication probability; less virus contamination etc.) Increasing hunting effort where and when requested Compliance of the prescribed management and Biosecurity measures