An economic analysis of female Genital Mutilation: How the marriage market affects the household decision of excision

An economic analysis of female Genital Mutilation: How the marriage market affects the household decision of excision Salmata Ouedraogo Sandrine Aïda Koissy-Kpein Abstract: In this paper we study Females Genital Mutilations from an economist s perspective. Females genital mutilations (FGM), a longstanding practice in many African countries, have lately been drawing the attention of both some national health officials and the international community, as they are now recognized as a serious public health issue. Our analysis use information provided by the men s and women s questionnaire to show the impact of the marriage market on occurrence of excision. The empirical results bear evidence of the influence of the marriage market on parents decision of excision. FGM/C appears as a more profitable investment compared to education in poor economy, with the returns in marriage market which appear as more attractive than the returns of women s education in labor market. JEL Classification: I, I, O5 KEYWORDS: Females Genital Mutilations, Schooling Decisions, Marriage Market Returns, Intra Household Allocation, Burkina Faso. Assistant Professor, Department of Economics and Administration, Université du Québec à Chicoutimi, salmata.ouedraogo@uqac.ca Population et Emploi CEPS/INSTEAD Esch sur Alzette Luxembourg, s.koissy kpein@ceps.lu

. Introduction Females' genital mutilations (FGM/C), a longstanding practice in many African countries, have lately been drawing the attention of both some national health officials and the international community, as they are now recognized as a serious public health issue. According to Auffret (98), excision finds its roots in the Neolithic period, going back 6000 years BCE. The practice involves a series of traditional procedures carried out for cultural or other non medical reasons. The World Health Organization (WHO) reports that the specific procedures vary from one ethnic group to another, but also geographically. The WHO also distinguishes four types of Females' Genital Mutilations, which specific details are omitted here for obvious reasons. FGMs occur early in a woman's life, generally around the age of 8 as estimated from women's testimonies. Genital mutilations bear severe consequences for women's health, including at the psychological, gynecological and obstetric levels, and yet remain widespread in many communities. In fact, 8 out of the 53 African countries are reported to be involved in females' genital mutilations along with a few countries of the Arabic Peninsula, and the practice spills over the rest of the world as it affects immigrant populations in Europe and North America. Across the African FGMs belt, including Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Egypt, Mali, Niger and Senegal, females' genital mutilations are commonplace. While excision is almost universal in some countries, including Egypt and Guinea, its prevalence varies significantly from places to places, ranging between 5% and 9% in Mali, Senegal, and Burkina Faso. Worldwide an estimated 00 to 40 million girls and women are said to have undergone this practice. Table below illustrates the scope of FGM/C based on Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) and Multiple Indicators Cluster Surveys (MICS) in a selected sample of African countries.

Table FGM/C in a selected sample of African countries Country FGM/C Prevalence Rate Burkina Faso 7% in 999, 77% in 003, 73% in 006 Ivory Coast 36% in 006 Egypt 95% in 999, 97% in 000, 9% in 008 Eritrea 95% in 995, 89% in 00 Ethiopia 80% in 00, 75% in 005 Mali 94% in 996, 9% in 00, 85% in 006 Senegal 8% in 005, 6% in 0 Source: Data Source "DHS", MICS and authors' calculations Several studies in medicine, demography, and sociology have found that FGMs cause serious health issues for girls and women. Depending on the extent of the genital mutilations, "side" effects range from pain to death and include urinary retention, hemorhagging, fever, psychological trauma (see, e.g., Toubia, 995, Rahman and Toubia, 000). Rahman and Toubia (000) appropriately convey some of the psychological damages of FGMs as they write "Girls have reported disturbances in eating, sleep, mood, and cognition shortly after experiencing the procedure. Many girls and women experience fear, submission or inhibition and suppressed feelings of anger, bitterness or betrayal." Moreover, according to three different studies carried out in six Sub Saharan African countries, including Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Sudan, the likelihood of a cesarean delivery is 30 percent higher for women who experienced FGMs (WHO, 006). Among those women, pre and post natal child mortality rate is 55 percent higher than the average. The probability that children from circumcised women will require intensive care after birth is as high as 66 percent. Although the specific procedures vary according to ethnicity or geographic region, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), they can be grouped into four main types 3 : Type I excision of the prepuce, with or without excision of part or all of the clitoris; 3 Most cases of FGM are Type,, or 4 ; only 0% are type 3 (Yoder and Kahn, 007) 3

Type II excision of the clitoris with partial or total excision of the labia minora; Type III excision of part or all of the external genitalia and stitching/narrowing of the vaginal opening (infibulation); Type IV pricking, piercing or incising of the clitoris and/or labia; stretching of the clitoris and/or labia; cauterization by burning of the clitoris and surrounding tissue; Types I and II are the most commonly practices forms of FGM. The reasons given for the practice can be grouped into several categories: customs and traditions, control over women s sexuality, religion, social pressure, women s economic dependency, the importance of marriage in the cultures where FGM is practiced, the low levels of education in these countries, and finally, poverty. FGM supporters maintain that the procedure is a cultural tradition and that excised women are more feminine. In this paper we study Females' Genital Mutilations from an economist's perspective. The economic interest of this procedure stems from the connection between health, human capital, productivity and growth. To the extent that a significant number of women experience FGM/C health related issues through their entire adulthood, labor and overall economic productivity fall short in societies that subscribe to the procedure. In fact, while women spend time dealing with those issues, the economy misses their contribution to the production process, either through the market or through home production. Since most of those societies also happen to belong to the developing world and many are reported not to be on target relative to the MDGs, gaining deeper insights into the dynamics of this practice is clearly of interest on economic grounds. Then, FGM/C is definitely a serious of public health issue since it has consequences on health of a part of the population. To highlight the link between excision, marriage market and labor market, we compute macro data from DHS and we use information provide by data from the Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie (INSD) of Burkina Faso. The empirical results bear evidence of a link between parents decision of excision, marriage market and labor market. In traditional 4

societies, where women faced discrimination in access to education and in the labor market, FGM/C appears as a more profitable investment compared to education, mainly for poor households. Our analysis also shows the weight of mothers in the decision of excision. We also discuss the policy implications of our analysis prior to empirically testing our theoretical predictions.. A review of the literature on FGMs Most studies on females' genital mutilations in social sciences emphasize the role of social factors. FGMs are either considered as a passage rite leading to adulthood,(see, e.g.,kissaakye, 00), or as a means to control women's sexuality to guarantee a successful marriage by containing women's sexual desire (see, e.g. Gruenbaum, 98 and 00). In most communities where FGMs are commonplace, excision is believed to increase woman's fertility and unexcised woman are considered "unclean". As the practice turns into a social norm with the society marginalizing unexcised women, community pressure goes as far as the isolation of resisting families (Rahman and Toubia, 000). FGM/C is a generally done as a form of following the norms of a respective society. Such has been viewed as an imperative in order to have a girl grow to someone who the society expects to be highly favorable most especially for making the girl bankable in the marriage market. Advocates of FGM/C believe that through this process, women will have the more appropriate sexual behavior, which will assure their virginity and marital fidelity. The procedure is also believed to decrease the woman s libido and would help her do away with sexual acts, as of course when the vaginal opening is covered or narrowed, the aforementioned will be refrained from omitting any sexual acts prior to marriage. And finally, what could be worse than having to open the closure of the vagina on the process of intercourse; like having to undergo the FGM/C process all over again. Likewise, religious motives are often put forward in defending the practice of FGMs as many subscribers believe that the procedure is required by Islam (Kouba and Muasher, 985, Williams and Sobieszczyk, 987). While the Muslim community contests this assumption, many studies suggest that Islam plays a major role in the perpetuation of FGMs 4. 4 At the International Conference on the Population and Reproductive Health in the Muslim world, it was maintained that the practice of excision is based on a faulty interpretation of Muslim education (Rahman and Toubia, 000). 5

From an economic perspective, Sargent (99) points out that economic dependency and the importance given to the institution of marriage also play a crucial role in perpetuating the practice of FGMs. As women are typically denied property rights in most societies that subscribe to FGMs and given their relatively low levels of education and limited opportunities, their marriage reservation value is very low. These features ultimately lower their bargaining power in the marriage market, putting them in a weak position when it comes to resisting FGMs as a pre requisite to a "good" marriage. Arguably, if women could jointly resist FGMs, the story would be completely different from the one currently playing out in the aforementioned communities, hence the premise of our study. Gruenbaum (00) and Melching (003) point out that excision is most often organized by mothers as this is considered the way to properly raise a daughter for a responsible mother. Accounting for an excision cost (including psychological trauma and other health issues) from women's side, and a search cost from men's one, we find that a society can get rid of excision if the former is high enough and / or women place less value on men's attitude towards FGMs. Policy implications are then investigated in the light of our theoretical results. While Sargent (99)'s analysis filters through the current framework, to our knowledge this is the first attempt to formalize the practice of FGMs and to reflect on the potential role of public policies, hence our contribution. Mackie (996) concludes that excision is a badge of honor allowing a family to anticipate a good bride price, and consequently, fortune and security for itself. In addition, FGMs give the women who have undergone it social and community recognition, as an unexcised woman has no status. The contribution of this paper is two fold. First, following the lead of Dufflo (005), we add to the literature on discrimination and human rights violations faced by women in developing countries. In fact, FGM/C is considered, at least, a violation of the physical integrity of young girls. While it can be argued that parents make an altruistic FGM/C decision on behalf of their daughter, the much potential harm to her health are certainly worth the wait for her to make her own decision later on. From this perspective, our exploration into ways to release the social pressure to perform FGM/C on one s daughter is clearly of interest. 6

Second, we add to Chesnokova and Vaithianathan (00) seminal paper on economic analyses of female genital mutilation and cutting. These authors develop a search and match game theoretical model consistent with the anthropological view that FGM/C is a scheme designed by prospective female participants to the marriage market and aimed at improving their market outcome. Assuming that all men prefer to marry circumcised women and that all women prefer to marry rich rather than impoverished men, the authors find that FGM/C may prevail in a society even if it is inefficient in the sense that its private benefit is higher than the social one. Chesnokova and Vaithianathan (00) analysis overlooks the important fact that most communities that subscribe to the practice of FGM/C value marriage as an institution even more than the economic status or the excision preference of prospective male participants to the market. While the economic motive may matter as suggested by the authors empirical evidence that circumcised females live in richer households, beliefs and cultural factors are likely to be at least, as important. One can gain more insights by recognizing the basic fact that FGM/C in such communities is about increasing marriagibility as evident from Chesnokova and Vaithianathan s study. To the extent that prospective female participants to the marriage market or their relatives share the belief that the outcome depends on the woman s excision status, the issue is clearly one of a coordination failure because above all, men s primary goal is to strike a (marriage) deal. Drawing on Naffissatou and Ian (009) suggestive evidence, we use cutting edge econometric techniques to test our theoretical results. In our empirical investigation we implement a probit estimation procedure using data from DHS of 003 in Burkina Faso. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3 lays out and solve the theoretical model. Section 4 addresses empirical issues including data description. Section 5 contains estimation strategy, results and discussion. Then we conclude in section 6. 3. Theoretical framework Marriage is an important economic decision and in some poor countries marriage is the most important key of women`s economic future. Indeed, the marriage market is generally presented as one of the major reason of girl s excision. In countries with high prevalence of female 7

circumcision, a large proportion of women indicate that the practice ensure girl s virginity and also belief that a girl cannot be married unless she is excised or circumcised. There is a belief that the practice ensures a better marriage (UNICEF, 005). It is a concern often not admitted by the communities that think excision can influence sexuality and the behavior of young girls and future women. The question to restrain sexuality in a strict and absolute manner before marriage evidently implies chasity imposed on young girls during the premartial period. The belief that excision deliberately induces a decrease in libido, therefore which guarantees ones virginity therefore will assure a marriage. (Diallo A., 997 ; Gadallah A. et al, 996). In developing countries where the future of women is considered risky, particularly because of discrimination in the labor market, the marriage appears as an alternative to secure future for girls and resources for their family. Consequently, the parents have an incentive to increase the marriageability of their girls and invest in desirable characteristics such as female circumcision (Chesnokova and Vaithianathan, 00). Koissy Kpein (008, p. 33) talks about the economic value of girls and she shows how the marriage of girls can be an important source of income for their families, and how the need to retain this resource often outweighs schooling. Let s suppose a model where parents face two markets in the moment of decision concerning investment in the human capital of girls: marriage market and labor market. We suppose that if the two markets compete, then parents will choose between send their girl to school or make an excision. Suppose a household with parents and one girl. We suppose that each individual lives for two periods. In the first period, parents spend the household income (I ) between consumption (C ) and investment in the capital of their girl (Q). This capital depends on the girl s schooling (S) and excision (E). In the second period, the girl is married or active in the labor market. In this period retired parents only consume C with transfers from their girl, and these transfers depend on investment in the capital in the first period. We also suppose that labor supply of the parents is fixed, the discount factor is assumed equal to one for simplicity, the consumption prices are assumed to be identical for both periods and equal to one, the fecundity is fixed, we consider a household without boys or other children 8

so that only focuses on the girl s demand of excision. The girl s consumption is null. The household has no access to credit and it is constrained by liquidity. Suppose the intertemporal utility function quasi concave and twice differentiable U, increasing in each of its arguments: U U C C, QS, E The household budget constraints are: At the first period: C p s S pe E I () At the second period: C t * T S, E (3), () Where p s and p e respectively represent the cost of schooling and the cost of excision, T(S,E) a function of girl s resources in the second period which depends on education received at the first period and excision and t the share of girl s resources transferred to retired parents. The household maximizes its satisfaction and the Lagrangian of the problem is: L U C C QS E C p S p E I C t T S E C C, S, E,,, s e *, (4), The first order conditions give: L L C C, S, E U C, C, QS, E, C C C C, S, E U C, C, QS, E, C C 0 0 (5) (6) L C, C, S, E U C C, QS, E T S, E S, S p t * 0 s (7) S C, C, S, E U C C, QS, E T S, E L E T S, E Supposes S market and market., E T S, E E r s p t * 0 e (8) E, where r s is the return of schooling in the second period in the labor r e, where r E is the return of excision in the second period in the marriage 9

We can write (7) and (8) respectively as: U U C, C, QS, E U C, C, QS, E U C, C, QS, E S C p t * s r s C C, C, QS, E U C, C, QS, E U C, C, QS, E E C p t * e r E C 0 0 (9) (0) (9) and (0) are equivalent to: C, C, QS, E U C, C, QS, E U C, C, QS, E U t * r p 0 s s S C C M arg inal benefit of investment in education net m arg inal gain of investment in education m arg inal cos t of investment in education C, C, QS, E U C, C, QS, E U C, C, QS, E U t * r p 0 E e E C C M arg inal benefit of investment in excision net m arg inal gain of investment in excision m arg inal cos t of investment in excision () () The first (second) equation suggests that at the optimum, the marginal gain of investment in education (excision) is null; or at the optimum, the marginal of benefice of investment in education (excision) equals the marginal cost of investment in education (excision). The marginal benefice of education (excision) increases with the parents preference for education (excision), the parents preference for consumption in the second period, the part of transfer received from the girl and the return of education (excision) in the labor (marriage) market. The marginal cost of education increases with the preference for consumption at the first period and the cost of schooling (excision). The parents favor excision if the marginal gain of excision is most important than the marginal gain of schooling i.e. U E U C p U C t * r U U p S C U C e E s t * r S (3). Consequently, the parents decision will depend on the costs of schooling and excision, the returns of schooling and excision, and their preference for excision and schooling. 0

In which cases the marginal gain of excision is most important than the marginal gain of schooling? Assumption : Schooling costs are higher than excision costs (p S > p E ). Since schooling concerned a long period while excision is made only once, schooling is certainly cheaper than excision in financial term. This implies that the marginal cost of investment in education is higher than the marginal cost of excision ( So, the parents decide to excise their girl: U C U p C e p s ). If they have a preference for excision: U E U S whatever the importance of the return of education compared to the return of schooling. This situation particularly occurs in countries or ethnic groups where there is a belief around the practice. Mackie (996) talks about a belief trap to denounce the situation that cannot be revised because the believed costs of testing the belief are too high. The author explains that while women may truly oppose to excision, they are unable to stop it and continue to practice it. The situation may also occur in societies where there is a demand for excised women and marriage market takes an important part. The UNICEF report (UNICEF, 005) shows how causes explaining the preference for this practice vary within and between countries. The reasons generally advanced to explain excision are: custom and tradition, religion, preservation of virginity and marriage market. Indeed, the UNICEF report suggest that 70% of women in, The Ivory Coast, Eritrea and Sudan find custom and tradition to be the most compelling reason justifying the continuation of the practice ; 70% of women in Mali believe that excision is required by the religion and 5% of women in Kenya and Mauritania believe that the practice preserve girl s virginity. In the case where the return of schooling is the same as the return of excision (r E =r S ) and the U parents do not necessarily have a preference for excision ( E U S ), then marginal benefice of education equals marginal benefice of schooling. Consequently, the higher costs of investment in schooling compared to those of excision appear as the major cause of excision. The decision here is strategic.

U U If parents have a preference for schooling ( ), the decision of excision is not E S necessarily, but only strategic because of higher cost of schooling. This case may also occur because of customs and environment pressure or the impact of the social network on the decision to excise made by the households, and the social network has a critical impact on a household s decision making process about whether or not to excise a daughter (Ouedraogo, 008). That means that a higher prevalence of excised women in the family, the neighborhood or the community can lead parents to practice excision. In the case where the return of excision is higher than the return of schooling (r E >r S ), the higher cost and lower return of schooling compared to excision conduct to higher prevalence of excised women and girls in the society. This case can appear in countries where there is a demand for excised women. In the case where returns of excision are lower than those of education, the decision of excision may emerge from the societal pressure or belief around the practice or the impact of the social network on the decision to excise. Assumption : Suppose that excision comprises a psychological cost, suffering, pain besides monetary costs which imply that the marginal cost of investment in education equals to the marginal cost of excision. In this case the parents favor excision compared to schooling if U E U C t * r U S U C t * E r S. So, If r E = r S, then U E U S that means that parents simply prefer the practice of excision. U U If the parents are indifferent between excision or schooling ( ) then the girl is E S U excised if C t * r U C E t * r S or r E >r S, that means that the return from excision in the marriage market is most important than the return from schooling in the labor market. Since return of schooling depends on access to labor market and gain in labor market, these imply that all the discrimination women face would affect decision of schooling and decision of excision.

The return of excision may be higher because of the demand for excised women in the marriage market. Indeed, anthropologists and sociologists show how the excised women are more desirable marriage partner. Morison et al. (004), in their study among Somalis migrants living in London, capture this demand since they show that the majority of male would want an excised wife. Always in Somalia, Gallo (986) shows that a majority of male medical students prefer an excised wife, because their family consider that married to a non excised wife is equivalent to be married to a prostitute. The demand emerge from the fact that excised women are view as faithful, more hygienic or beautiful (Missailidis and Gebre Medhin, 000, Chesnokova and Vaithianathan, 00) Assumption 3: suppose that due to psychological costs, but also costs of care from possible complications induced by excision, the marginal cost of excision is higher than the marginal cost of schooling. The girl is excised in the case where the returns of excision are higher compare to those of schooling or when parents have a preference for excision. The model supposes that female circumcision come from lower expected return of girls education in the labor market compared to return of female circumcision in the marriage. He also reveals the importance of beliefs, customs or societies in the decision of practice. The model suggests that in a more general case, if the parents have another possibility to ensure resources during the second period such as pension or if they have other children, especially boys who have a higher probability to succeed in labor market compared to girls, they will have less incentive to invest in female circumcision; and this incentive is also expect to decrease with parents aversion for the practice. By the way, we may expect a lower probability among wealthy families. Our model here is rather simplistic, since it supposes that parents have only the choice between excision and schooling. It supposes that these two options are substitutable. The model can be extended to consider the possibility of a complementarity between the two options. Now suppose difference in the parents preference concerning excision. In this case the household decision making process is no more unitary. The model we use can be considered in the case of the collective model of Chiappori (988, 99) which allows difference among preference in the household. This model is part of the new models of the household which 3

suggest that household members act according to their own interest and their household s economic contribution. In this case, the household s intertemporal utility function can be written as: U U C, C, QS E U C, C, QS, E f, f, f m, m, m, Where π is a weighting factor representing the mother s weight in the decision making process. If π equals one (zero), the mother (father) takes all the decision in the household. C,f, C,f, C,m and C,m respectively represent the father s consumption in the first period, the father s consumption in the second period, the mother s consumption in the first period and the mother s consumption in the second period. We do not develop all the process of modeling here. Koissy Kpein (008, 00) presents the bargaining process of parents concerning the schooling decision of boys and girls, through both a two model periods and a one model period. The author shows how the mother s bargaining power in the decision making process affects decision of schooling. So, in our case, the introduction of the possible heterogeneity between the mother and the father in the decision of excision conducts to several scenarios: If the mother has a preference for excision. Suppose for example that the mother finds advantage on excision or think that men want excised women, or they want to preserve their girls for premarital sex, and so forth. The girls are excised because of: o o the higher weight of the mother in the decision making process; the father s disinterest concerning this decision, even if he has no preference for the practice. if the mother does not have a preference for excision, girls are excised because : o o the father has a preference for excision and has a higher weight in decision making process in the household there is a demand for excised women in the marriage market and the return of excision is higher compared to the return of education in the labor market. 4

Finally, we can conclude from this theoretical framework that the mother s preference is significant variable. The mother s bargaining power in the decision making process affects the decision of excision. 4. Data and Empirical analysis Our empirical analysis uses data from the third round of the Demographic health surveys from Burkina Faso (003). The DHS are nationally representative household surveys and provide data for a wide range of subjects: education, female genital cutting, child health, gender domestic violence, fertility and fertility preference, maternal health and mortality, women s empowerment, and so forth. The DHS surveys collect data using three types of core questionnaires: household questionnaire which collect information on the household and its members, but also allows the identification of eligible members for interview using an individual Women's or Men's questionnaire. In the female genital cutting module, women are asked about their own excision and the number of their daughters excised. Despite the high level of practice among women, we nevertheless notice some disparities related to socio-demographic characteristics. Analysis of the data shows that the practice of FGM is very widespread in Burkina Faso, 93% of men and 97% of women said they knew about FGM. In addition, the statistics suggest that about 75% of the women between 5 49 years old are excised, with a very weak difference between the rural and the urban areas. Indeed, about 75% of the women are excised in rural area and 74% in urban area. The results by age show that the percentage of excised women in older generations is higher than in younger ones. In particular, the percentage of excised women in the 5.9 age group is much lower. As for the type of excision being practiced, in most cases the procedure consists of removing tissue (97.59% in mothers and 98.7% in daughters). Only % of women and % of girls have undergone the more severe infibulations. The majority of girls (3%) were excised in childhood, 9% of them before the age of 9, and most procedures (98%) were performed by traditional practitioners. Education level seems to have a slight influence on the 5

prevalence of excision. Its incidence is lower in women with a secondary or higher education (65%) than it is for women with a primary education (77%) or for those without any education (78%). Finally, the statistics also suggest that 30% of women with girls have at least one excised girl and among excised mothers, only 44% of daughters were or would be excised 5. In DHS, the women s questionnaire provides interesting qualitative information about women s opinion concerning the advantage or benefit but also the no benefit of FGC. The advantages listed are : better hygiene, social acceptance, better marriage prospects, preserves virginity, increase man's pleasure, religious approval, easier birth / prevents child death, other, no benefits and does not know. Concerning the inconvenients, we have: fewer, medical problems, avoid pain, more female sexual pleasure, more pleasure for the man, follows religion, other, none, does not know. Women are also asked about their opinion concerning maintaining the practice ( should circumcision continue? ) and about the men s desire ( Do men want this to continue or not? ). Then we have information about women s age at first marriage or first intercourse. The men s questionnaire offer interesting information about men s opinion concerning FGC. They are also asked about advantage of FGC, and their opinion concerning maintaining the practice. In general, the positive perception of excision remains high in Burkina Faso. For example, 7% of men and 0% of women think that the practice of excision should be continued. The consequences remain highly visible, with 3% of girls experiencing complications after excision; 3% having urinary problems; 7%, excessive bleeding; and, 8%, infections. Despite these complications, 7% of the population gives social acceptance as a justification for the practice. Another 7% give religion as a justification, while a mere 3% give virginity and marriage, and another 4% give other benefits. 5 This result is important. However, does it reflect a downward trend or the fear of legal prosecution, given that FGM has been prohibited in Burkina Faso since 996? In Burkina Faso, a law prohibiting female genital mutilation was promulgated in 996, and was put in effect in February 997. Before this period, a Presidential decree existed which established a National Committee against practicing excision on children or women. The law in 996 had reinforced repression. Since then many exciseuses have been convicted and sentenced to prison. (Joëlle Stolz, Le Burkina Faso has led the way in combatting excison, Le monde diplomatique, September 998) 6

In our analysis, we consider a series of estimation to highlight the link between the marriage market, FGM/C and education; and to check the predictions of our conceptual framework. We first start by an analysis of the link between schooling decision and FGM/C. Since our conceptual framework suggests that FGM/C may be considered as an investment in human capital which competes with the investment in girls education, we expect a negative correlation between these two investments. In other words, we expect that excised girls have a lower probability of school participation. Since the women s questionnaire provides information on women between 5 49 years old, we first consider, for girls between 5 8 years old, the effect of excision on: The probability of achievement of the primary education The probability to attend school The probability to attend school after the primary education In the case where we have a negative and significant effect of excision of the schooling decision of girls of more than 5, the parents make a trade off between the girls returns on the marriage market and the returns expected on the labor market. The variables considered in these estimations: the household wealth, the household size (or number of siblings), the household s head education (a dichotomous variable equals one if the head has completed the primary education), the household s head sex, the type of place of residence (urban vs. rural). To take account the marriage market we consider the median age at first wedding in the neighborhood, and the status of excised or not. Since we only know the status of excision of women of less than 49 years old, we do not have information of the FGM/C status of a large part of mothers, for this reason, we take account the prevalence rate at regional level 6. We perform estimations for all the girls between 5 8 years old in the household and for the daughters of the head, separately. We exclude from our analysis never married girls (58) and we have a sample of 769 girls and 84 daughters of the household s head. The table presents some statistics concerning this first link between schooling and FGM/C. We note that 7.89% of the girls between 5 8 years old have completed primary education, 6 Fourteen regions : Ouagadougou, Center (without Ouagadougou), Boucle de Mouhoun, Centre Sud, Plateau Central, Centre Est, Centre Nord, Centre Ouest, Est, Nord, Cascades, Hauts Bassins, Sahel and Sud Ouest 7

.4% are still in school and 5.7% are still in school after completing primary education. Statistics suggest difference between excised and non excised girls. Indeed, more than 0% of non excised girls have completed primary education while about 6% of excised girls have done it. 5% of non excised girls are still in school and about 9% of them are in school after primary education, vs. 8.36% and 3.43% of excised girls, respectively. We perform Chi tests to show the existence of a link between FGM/C and schooling, which suggest that we cannot reject the hypothesis of an independence among the FGM/C and schooling of girls between 5 8 years old. Table Statistics for schooling and FGM/C of girls between 5 8 years old FGM/C Chi test No Yes All χ² Pr Complete primary education 0.57 5.94 7.89 6.749 0.0 Still in school 5.07 8.36.4.5997 0.00 Still in school after primary education 8.94 3.43 5.7 9.8340 0.00 Source: Authors' calculations Afterward, we compute macro data from DHS and we use information provide by data from the Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie (INSD) of Burkina Faso. So, we have at the regional level macro data on: From INSD 3 regions 7 : o o poverty index (number of poor over total population); the literacy rate, ratio between the number of people of 5 years and over who can read and write with understanding a short simple statement of facts relevant to their daily lives as and the total population 5 years and over 8. From DHS: o o Median age at first marriage in the neighborhood Regional prevalence of excised women 7 3 Regions for Ouagadougou and Center, Boucle de Mouhoun, Centre Sud, Plateau Central, Centre Est, Centre Nord, Centre Ouest, Est, Nord, Cascades,Hauts Bassins, Sahel and Sud Ouest 8 Source : Enquête burkinabé sur les conditions de vie des ménages, enquêtes QUIBB Questionnaire Burkinabé concerning the conditions of income/expenditure/household Survey QUIBB. 8

o o Proportion of women who find an advantage in FGM/C at Regional Proportion of men who find an advantage in FGM/C at Regional We consider the probability for a woman to have on excised girl. These estimations allow accounting the mother s excision, the mother s preference concerning excision, and the mother s preference compared to her husband, and so forth; and also allow accounting for mother s weight in the decision making process. These last estimations concern 694 mothers, 563 excised mothers and 565 mothers who can be matched with their husband (from men`s questionnaires). The independent variables for the estimation are: For the mother: age, number of children, proportion of girls among siblings, whether she ever attends school, her opinion concerning men want FGC maintaining, mother s age at st marriage, opinion concerning benefits in FGC, excised mother, activity (employee or self employed) Household: wealth and residence Husband : never attends school, wants FGC end Interaction terms: husbands wants FGC end but mother finds an advantage, husband finds an advantage but mother wants FGC end Regional: Proportion of men and women who find an advantage at regional level, regional prevalence of excised women, regional level literacy, regional Poverty index Neighborhood: median age at first marriage in the neighborhood 5. Results and discussion The results of the estimations are presented in tables (Appendix Section). The Table concerns, girls between 5 8 years of age, the effect of excision on the probability of achievement of the primary education (a), the probability to attend school (b) and the probability to attend school after the primary education (c). 9

As expected, the results first suggest a negative and significant link between schooling and excision. Indeed, it appears that excised girls have a lower probability of achievement of primary education, a lower probability to attend school and a lower probability to attend school after the primary education, whether they are households head daughters or not. So, the marriage market affects the parents decision concerning schooling or excision. This conclusion is reinforced by the effect of the median age at the first marriage in the neighborhood. It appears that later women married, higher is the girls probability to participate at school. However, the prevalence rate of FGM/C in the region is not significant. Concerning the other variables, the estimations reveal the importance of education since girls of a educated head (who has completed the primary education) have a higher probability to participate at school. By the way, school participation increases with the household wealth and the residence in urban areas. However, the probability to attend school and the probability to attend school after the primary education decrease with the household size; while the probability to achieve the primary education, to attend school and to attend school after the primary education decrease with the number of siblings. The Table presents estimations concerning: () the probability for the mothers to have at least one excised girl () the probability for excised mothers to have at least one excised girl (3) the probability for married mothers to have at least one excised girl which allows accounting for the husband`s opinion of FGC (4) the probability for married mothers to have at least one excised girl with Husband wants FGC end but mother finds an advantage as interaction term (5) the probability for married mothers to have at least one excised girl with Husband finds an advantage but mother wants FGC end as interaction term 0

The results first show that the excised mothers have a higher probability to have at least one excised girl, suggesting maintain of a tradition of excision. This result is reinforcing by the high probability of occurrence in region with high prevalence rate. The decision of excision belongs mainly to the mother. Indeed, the results suggest that girls have a lower probability to be excised if the mothers do not find any benefit to excision. However, they have a higher probability to be excised if their mothers think that men want FGM to continue. From () to (), we note that educated mothers have a lower probability to have excised girls, while the effect of their husband s education or partner is not significant. UNICEF (005) confirms, in a study carried out in 5 countries with high prevalence rates of FGM/C, that support for the practice is higher among women without any formal education. Moreover TOSTAN, the only nongovernmental organization based in Senegal, concluded that basic education is a determinant in the process of eliminating FGM/C. It therefore implemented an educational program in affected communities to increase their educational level. One of the TOSTAN program s greatest achievements has been the voluntary and definitive discontinuance of excision by hundreds of village communities since 998. In 003, the WHO called for the expansion of the TOSTAN program model (Best Practice Model) in the 7 other African countries where excision is practiced. From () to (5) girls have a higher probability to be excised if their mothers are employed or self employed, so have the possibility to be economically not dependant. This may be due to the fact that women take an important part on decision concerning excision. Indeed, the results from (3) to (5) suggest that women have a lower probability to have excised girls if their husbands want FGC end. However, we also note from model (4) and (5) that girls will be excised if the mothers find any advantage to excision, even if their husband want the end of excision; and girls won t be excised if their mothers want the end of excision even if their husband find any advantage to excision. These findings is not necessarily a result of bargaining power within the husband and his wife, but may be due to the fact that excision is culturally women`s affairs or women`s concerns. This conclusion is reinforced by the non significant effect of the proportion of men in the region who find an advantage at FGC and the significant effect of the proportion of women who find an advantage effect on FGC at regional level. Gruenbaum (00)

and Melching (003) point out that excision is most often organized by mothers as this is considered the way to properly raise a daughter for a responsible mother. Concerning the marriage market effect, we first note that mothers excised girls because they think that men want this to continue. Indeed, the probability of excision (() and ()) increases with the fact that the mothers believe that men want the practice to continue, and that even if the mother is also excised. The mother s age at the first marriage and the median age at first marriage in the neighborhood are also decreasing components of mothers decision of excision () and (). That means that women who married young give a great importance to excision, probably because they also accord a great importance to marriage. By the way, the place of the marriage of girls in the neighborhood also affects the decision of excision. Sargent (99) points out that economic dependency and the importance given to the institution of marriage also play a crucial role in perpetuating the practice of FGMs. Estimations () and () suggest that mothers living in the middle and wealthy class have a lower probability of occurrence compared to the poorest household. FGC is also linked with regional poverty since the probability of FGC occurrence increases with the regional poverty index, which is here the proportion of poor among the population. Ouedraogo (008) said that the probability that a daughter will be excised is lower among the richer families and higher among poorer families. This confirms the results of previous studies (Williams and Sobieszczyk, 987) Concerning fecundity, mothers with a higher number of children have a higher probability to have at least one excised girl, and this probability increases with the proportion of girls among the children. These findings are in accordance with our theoretical framework. Indeed, we have shown that parents will have less incentive to invest in FGC if they have a high number of boys who have a have a higher probability to succeed in labor market compared to girls. Here, the higher number of girls among siblings, the higher the probability of excision. Then, the results suggest a higher probability of occurrence for Muslim mothers but also for animist mothers.

6. Conclusion This work tries to understand the decision of female genital mutilation or excision from an economic point of view. After a review of previous research concerning this phenomenon, we have presented a simple conceptual framework, in which FGM/C is considered for the household as an investment in human capital and which is subject to an demand as well as education. Our conceptual framework have shown how preference, beliefs, costs of schooling/excision, return of excision (on the marriage market) and return of education (on the labor market), but also the mother s weight in the decision making process interact and affect the parents decision. The model supposes that female circumcision come from beliefs and the lower expected return of girls education in the labor market compared to return of female circumcision in the marriage. Predictions of the conceptual framework are confirmed by the empirical analysis based on data from the third round of the Demographic health surveys from Burkina Faso (003). The results first reveal the negative effect of the marriage market and excision in the decision of schooling of girls. Then, we note the incidence of poverty, education, beliefs, and marriage market in the decision of excision. It appears from our analysis that excision is a woman s concern; so policy for the eradication of FGM/C should mainly involve and target women. Consequently, awareness campaigns should take into account the fact that women are not necessarily for the political decision in communities, and should not be limited to propaganda among the chiefs, village chiefs or religious leaders Then, improving women`s education could be a good way to eradicate FGM/C. By the way, since return of schooling depends on access to labor market and gain in labor market, these imply that all the discrimination women face could affect decision of schooling vs. excision. 3

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