Experimental examination of reputation of collective sanctioners

Experimental examination of reputation of collective sanctioners Rie Mashima (Kumamoto Gakuen University) Nobuyuki Takahashi (Hokkaido University) E-mail: mashima@kumagaku.ac.jp

Although sanctioning is a well-known solution to SD, the 2 nd -order problem why people engage in costly sanctioning still remains as a theoretical puzzle. Recent empirical studies showed the possibility that sanctioning behaviors can be adaptive because sanctioners can acquire positive reputation from other people, but what kinds of reputation the sanctioner acquires depends on the type of sanctioning (Barclay, 2006; Nelissen, 2008 ; Kiyonari & Barclay, 2008, Horita, 2010, Mashima & Takahashi (2012))

Types of sanctioning 1. Sanction method (punish / reward) Punish : decreasing defector s payoff Reward : increasing cooperator s payoff

Types of sanctioning 1. Sanction method (punish / reward) Punish : decreasing defector s payoff Reward : increasing cooperator s payoff Reputation of sanctioners differed depending on the sanction method (e.g., Barclay, 2006; Nelissen, 2008; Kiyonari & Barclay, 2008; Horita, 2010; Mashima & Takahashi, 2012) Rewarder: positive reputation (friendly, suitable for a partner)

Types of sanctioning 1. Sanction method (punish / reward) Punish : decreasing defector s payoff Reward : increasing cooperator s payoff Reputation of sanctioners differed depending on the sanction method (e.g., Barclay, 2006; Nelissen, 2008; Kiyonari & Barclay, 2008; Horita, 2010; Mashima & Takahashi, 2012) Punisher: positive & negative reputation (suitable for a leader, but feisty) Rewarder: positive reputation (friendly, suitable for a partner)

Types of sanctioning 1. Sanction method (punish / reward) Punish : decreasing defector s payoff Reward : increasing cooperator s payoff Reputation of sanctioners differed depending on the sanction method (e.g., Barclay, 2006; Nelissen, 2008; Kiyonari & Barclay, Punishing behavior involves a risk to be evaluated negatively as aggression. 2008; Horita, 2010; Mashima & Takahashi, 2012) Punisher: positive & negative reputation (suitable for a leader, but feisty) Rewarder: positive reputation (friendly, suitable for a partner)

Types of sanctioning 2. Sanctioning entity (individual / collective) Individual sanction : Each person decides whether or not to sanction defectors (cooperators) individually by himself. Collective sanction : Each person decides whether or not to contribute to maintain a collective sanctioning system (e.g., police, security service). Collective system Mashima & Takahashi (2012) conducted a vignette experiment to compare the reputation of sanctioners by controlling the sanction method and the sanctioning entity.

Results in Mashima & Takahashi (2012) 1. Reputation of individual sanctioners differed depending on the sanction method. Punishers acquired negative as well as positive reputation.

Results in Mashima & Takahashi (2012) 1. Reputation of individual sanctioners differed depending on the sanction method. Punishers acquired negative as well as positive reputation. 2. Collective sanctioners were evaluated positively regardless of the sanction method. Collective system Both punishers and rewarders were evaluated positively. =

Collective sanctioning system may have a function to enhance sanctioners reputation. Question: If so does just introducing a collective sanctioning system always solve a SD problem? No. Our hypothesis: Collective sanctioning system would have such a function only when the system was established by mutual agreement among group members. (i.e., only when the system was internally established.)

Hypothesis When people face with a collective system, they would intuitively assume that it was established based on mutual agreement among group members. (It would be difficult for a collective system against which everyone objects to be established.) It must have been mutually agreed Collective system The perception that the sanctioning system was based on mutual agreement might justify the sanctioning behavior and enhance the reputation of sanctioners. If this perception is the key

Hypothesis An internal collective sanctioning system, which was mutually agreed upon by group members would have a function to enhance sanctioners reputation regardless of the sanction method. introduce or not? An external collective sanctioning system, e.g.) the system which was imposed by authority collective system OK, let s introduce. Introduce the system. collective system

Hypothesis An internal collective sanctioning system, which was mutually agreed upon by group members would have a function to enhance sanctioners reputation regardless of the sanction method. introduce or not? collective system OK, let s introduce. An external collective sanctioning system, which was established without members agreement would not have such a function. Introduce the system. collective system

Hypothesis An internal collective sanctioning system, which was mutually agreed upon by group members would have a function to enhance sanctioners reputation regardless of the sanction method. introduce or not? collective system OK, let s introduce. An external collective sanctioning system, which was established without members agreement would not have such a function. Introduce the system. collective system A vignette experiment to compare the reputation of sanctioners under an internal or an external collective sanctioning system.

Method(1): Vignette experiment 816 respondents from 3 universities read a scenario of SD and answered their impressions of the characters in the scenario. Villagers decide whether or not to cooperate to build and maintain a water channel for agriculture. There is a collective sanctioning system (each villagers voluntarily pays money to the system, and the system sanctions cooperators or defectors). Two characters were described: Sanctioner: paid money to maintain a collective sanctioning system. 3 Non-sanctioner: did not pay money to maintain the system.

Design: Sanction method x Agreement (Both were between-subjects factors.)

Method(2): Sanction method conditions Design: Sanction method x Agreement (Both were between-subjects factors.) Sanction method Punish: The system monitors and gives SD defectors a warning. Reward: The system monitors and appreciates SD cooperators.

Method(3): Agreement conditions Agreement The descriptions of how the collective system had been established differed: With agreement: The system was established as a result of group members discussion. Without agreement: The system was imposed by a local government. No description (control condition): There was no description about how the system was established.

Dependent variable: The difference of positive impression ( - 3 ) We measured 12 evaluations of sanctioners and nonsanctioners. From the results of factor analysis, we constructed a scale of positive impression, which is composed of 9 items (α=0.93). trustworthy suitable for a friend be evaluated with a good impression suitable for a boss suitable for a leader likely to succeed socially respectable fair a person who profits a group ( easily angered, selfish, a person whom I want to keep a distance were excluded based on the results of factor analysis.)

ANOVA Results Dependent variable: ( - 3 ) of positive impression Independent variables: Sanction method (Punish / Reward) Agreement (with agreement / without agreement / control (no description)) Prediction: Both punishers and rewarders would be evaluated positively in the with agreement and the control conditions. ( = ) However, in the without agreement condition, punishers would be evaluated less positively than rewarders ( > ).

ANOVA Results 2 difference of positive impression 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 Punish Reward with agreement without agreement control

ANOVA Results No main effect of agreement (F(2,701) = 0.02, ns.) 2 difference of positive impression 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 Punish Reward with agreement without agreement control

ANOVA Results No main effect of agreement (F(2,701) = 0.02, ns.) Main effect of sanction method (F(1,701) = 7.96, p<.01) 2 difference of positive impression 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 Punish Reward with agreement without agreement control

ANOVA Results No main effect of agreement (F(2,701) = 0.02, ns.) Main effect of sanction method (F(1,701) = 7.96, p<.01) Interaction between sanction method x agreement was found (F(2,701) = 2.81, p<.10) We examined simple main effects of the sanction 2 method in each agreement condition. 1.8 difference of positive impression 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 Punish Reward with agreement without agreement control

ANOVA Results A simple main effect of sanction method was found only in the with agreement condition. ( > ) Simple effects were not found in the without agreement and the control conditions. 2 difference of positive impression 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 > Punish Reward No difference with agreement without agreement No difference control

ANOVA Results Sanctioners The simple main were effect evaluated of sanction positively method regardless was of found the sanction only in with method agreement within condition. the (Reward without > Punish) agreement and the control conditions. However, No difference within between the with punish agreement and reward condition, a conditions punisher in was other evaluated two conditions. less positively than a rewarder. The collective sanctioning system did not work as an enhancer of the reputation of sanctioners only in the with agreement condition! opposite to our prediction Why? we conducted additional analyses to examine the effect of respondents intention and perception on impression. >

The effect of respondents intention and perception There is a possibility that these strange results might have been produced by respondents who had specific intention or perception.

The effect of respondents intention and perception There is a possibility that these strange results might have been produced by respondents who had specific intention or perception. For example, the pattern that the evaluation of punisher was lower than that of rewarder only in the with agreement condition might be found only among respondents whose cooperative intention was low. There were 14 items that measured respondents intention and perception (e.g., intention of cooperation, perception of the sanctioning system) after evaluation of sanctioners and non-sanctioners. Let s examine the effect of intention and perception on the previous ANOVA results.

Outline of additional analyses Purpose: To narrow down the candidate items that might have influenced the results of ANOVA. (skip the details) To examine whether the effect of sanction method and agreement (IV of ANOVA) differed depending on the value of the selected perception (intention) items. Steps of analyses Select the items that had any effects on DV (the diff of positive impression) by conducting step-wise regression analysis. 9 items were selected Select the items that had the simple interaction with conditions. 5 perception items were selected. Test the effect of sanction method and agreement among those whose perception were HIGH among those whose perception were LOW

Outline of additional analyses Purpose: To narrow down the candidate items that might have influenced the results of ANOVA. (skip the details) To examine whether the effect of sanction method and agreement (IV of ANOVA) differed depending on the value of the selected perception (intention) items. Steps of analyses Select the items that had any effects on DV (the diff of positive impression) (Although by I skip conducting the selecting step-wise step,) regression analysis. 9 items 5 perception were selected items were selected as candidates. Select the items that had the simple interaction with conditions. 5 perception items were selected. Test the effect of sanction method and agreement among those whose perception were HIGH among those whose perception were LOW

Results: Effects of respondents intention and perception (1) (3) Test the effect of sanction method and agreement among those whose perception were HIGH among those whose perception were LOW Perceived need of sanctioning for the group Perceived need of sanctioning system for the group People should follow the system since it was instituted Most of the villagers would endorse the system Sanctioning behavior brings benefits to everyone 2 diff of positive impression 1 0-1 -2 LOW perception HIGH Procedure of analysis was based on Aiken (1996).

Results: Effects of respondents intention and perception (1) (3) Test the effect of sanction method and agreement among those whose perception were HIGH among those whose perception were LOW * Conceptually this is the same as 3-way ANOVA (sanction method x agreement x perception). However, we used regression analysis because intention and perception items were continuous variables. 2 diff of positive impression 1 0-1 -2 LOW perception HIGH Procedure of analysis was based on Aiken (1996).

Results: Effects of respondents intention and perception (1) (3) Test the effect of sanction method and agreement among those whose perception were HIGH among those whose perception were LOW Regression with the 2 items revealed the pattern that could explain the previous ANOVA results. perceived need of sanctioning for the group perceived need of sanctioning system for the group diff of positive impression -2-1 0 1 2 3-5 -4-3 -2-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 perceived need of sanctioning diff of positive impression -2-1 0 1 2 3-5 -4-3 -2-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 perceived need of sanctioning system

Results: Effects of respondents intention and perception (1) (3) Test the effect of sanction method and agreement among those whose perception were HIGH among those whose perception were LOW Regression with the 2 items revealed the pattern that could explain the previous ANOVA results perceived need of sanctioning for the group perceived need of sanctioning system for the group Because regression with 2 items showed basically the same pattern, we will show the results about perceived need of sanctioning system for the group only. diff of positive impression -2-1 0 1 2 3-5 -4-3 -2-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 perceived need of sanctioning diff of positive impression -2-1 0 1 2 3-5 -4-3 -2-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 perceived need of sanctioning system

diff of positive impression -2-1 0 1 2-5 -4-3 -2-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 perceived need of sanctioning system WITH-Punish without-punish control-punish WITH-Reward without-reward control-reward Patterns among those whose perception were LOW Patterns among those whose perception were HIGH Test the effect of sanction method and agreement among HIGH and among LOW.

diff of positive impression -2-1 0 1 2 HIGH: No difference between conds. -5-4 -3-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 perceived need of sanctioning system WITH-Punish without-punish control-punish WITH-Reward without-reward control-reward Among those who perceived the need of sanctioning system HIGHER: No difference Sanctioners were evaluated positively regardless of sanction method.

diff of positive impression -2-1 0 1 2-5 -4-3 -2-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 perceived need of sanctioning system WITH-Punish without-punish control-punish WITH-Reward without-reward control-reward Among those who perceived the need of sanctioning system HIGHER: No difference Among those who perceived the need of sanctioning system LOWER: Interaction effect was found. Test simple main effects of sanction method in each agreement condition.

Only in diff of positive impression -2-1 0 1 2 with agreement: Reward > Punish A punisher was evaluated more negatively than a rewarder. -5-4 -3-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 perceived need of sanctioning system WITH-Punish without-punish control-punish WITH-Reward without-reward control-reward Among those who perceived the need of sanctioning system HIGHER: No difference Among those whose perception were LOWER: with agreement: > (p<.0001)

diff of positive impression -2-1 0 1 2 Without agreement: no difference -5-4 -3-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 perceived need of sanctioning system WITH-Punish without-punish control-punish WITH-Reward without-reward control-reward Among those who perceived the need of sanctioning system HIGHER: No difference Among those whose perception were LOWER: with agreement: (p<.0001) without agreement, : no difference

diff of positive impression -2-1 0 1 2 Control cond: no difference -5-4 -3-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 perceived need of sanctioning system WITH-Punish without-punish control-punish WITH-Reward without-reward control-reward Among those who perceived the need of sanctioning system HIGHER: No difference Among those whose perception were LOWER: with agreement: (p<.0001) without agreement, control cond: no difference

The strange pattern that the evaluation of collective punisher was lower than that of rewarder only in the with agreement condition was found only among those who thought that the sanctioning system was not necessary. Among those who perceived the need of sanctioning system HIGHER: No difference Among those whose perception were LOWER: with agreement: (p<.0001) without agreement, control cond: no difference

Summary of results (1) Previous study suggested that a collective sanctioning system has a function to enhance sanctioners reputation regardless of sanction method. We had hypothesized that the existence of agreement is the key. Our prediction was that both punishers and rewarders would be evaluated positively only when the system was mutually agreed upon.

Summary of results (2) The existence of agreement did not enhance the reputation of sanctioners. Our predictions were not supported.

Summary of results (2) The existence of agreement did not enhance the reputation of sanctioners. Our predictions were not supported. Moreover, We don t need the system! Among those who thought that the sanctioning system was not necessary, the existence of agreement had an opposite effect to our prediction. Punishers were evaluated negatively more than rewarders only when the system had been established by mutual agreement. > Why did we get these results?

Problematic manipulation? In order to manipulate the existence of agreement in the with agreement conditions, we gave the following description: Villagers hold a meeting and concluded that it is necessary to introduce the sanctioning system.. What does this mean from the respondents viewpoint? Respondents were merely told that the other villagers have agreed to introduce the sanctioning system. Thus, respondents may have thought that they themselves were not at the meeting. Then, they had no chance to express their opinion even if their opinion was disagree.

Problematic manipulation? This might have weakened the effect of agreement. Furthermore, this manipulation might have produced psychological reactance, especially to those who wanted to disagree with the sanctioning system. The system was mutually agreed upon? I didn t even have a chance to vote! Therefore they might have evaluated collective punishers negatively, as in the individual sanction condition in the previous study. In order to measure the effect of agreement accurately, we need to make participants actually agree upon the sanctioning system. The laboratory experiment is necessary.

Thank you!