Running head: ANGER AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 1. The Effect of Third-party Anger on Prosocial Behavior. Bachelor s Thesis. Tilburg University

Running head: ANGER AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 1 The Effect of Third-party Anger on Prosocial Behavior Bachelor s Thesis Tilburg University Pien Vingerhoets 714473 Supervised by Janne van Doorn 2 February 2014

ANGER AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 2 Abstract The current article focuses on the relationship between third-party anger and prosocial behavior in unfair situations. Study 1 tests whether there is an effect of anger on prosocial behavior when prosocial behavior is measured in time. Study 2 examined whether the degree of compensation matters for the effect of anger on prosocial behavior and feelings of anger. Results showed no effect of anger on prosocial behavior, but did find that anger decreases when unfairness is partially compensated by another party, and decreases even more when unfairness is completely compensated by another party. These findings support the idea that anger is a goal-directed emotion. Keywords: anger, prosocial, third-party, injustice, compensation

ANGER AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 3 The Effect of Third-party Anger on Prosocial Behavior Anger is a very often felt emotion for people (Anastasi, Cohen & Spatz, 1948). According to Schimmack and Diener (1997), it even is one of the most commonly undergone emotions of all. Next to being an often occurring emotion, anger regularly is portrayed as a negative emotion. This because anger is mostly negatively evaluated by others (Averill, 1983), and associated with negative feelings and behaviors, like aggression (Berkowitz, 1989). Actions caused by anger are not as one-sided as presumed, though. For example, research by Van Doorn, Breugelmans and Zeelenberg (2013) showed that anger can also lead to prosocial behaviors, like compensation of the victim, if one can restore injustice by behaving prosocially. Van Doorn et al. (2013) make an important distinction between first-party anger and third-party anger. Third-party anger is anger provoked by seeing someone else get harmed, first-party anger results from being harmed yourself. Their results showed that, in an unfair, third-party situation, anger leads to prosocial behavior, and is even preferred over antisocial behavior. Also, an angry person s motivation to act prosocially towards a victim decreases when injustice is already restored by another party. The current studies build on the research done by Van Doorn et al. (2013), and focuses on whether the effect of anger on prosocial behavior is also applicable to other types of prosocial behavior (spending time instead of money); whether anger also decreases along with prosocial behavior when injustice is restored by another party; and whether the degree of compensation matters for the decrease of anger and prosocial behavior. Vitaglione and Barnett (2003) found in their studies a positive relationship between empathic anger and helping behavior towards the victim, as well as punitive behavior towards the perpetrator. Empathic anger was defined as anger caused by harm being done to another person, on behalf of that person, thus similar to our third-party anger. Lotz, Okimoto,

ANGER AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 4 Schlösser and Fetchenhauer (2011) also found a positive correlation between moral outrage (defined similar as the previously described empathic anger) and punitive and compensating behavior. Montada and Scheider (1989) showed the same relationship between moral outrage and helping behavior. The situations used to test the effect of anger on prosocial behavior in these studies all show an injustice taking place. This indicates that the relationship between anger and prosocial behavior revolves around injustice and using prosocial behavior to restore this injustice. Van Doorn et al. (2013) found that the degree of prosocial behavior decreases when the victim is already compensated by another party, this also suggests that the relationship between prosocial behavior and anger revolves around restoring injustice. The same effect was found with punishing behaviors. When injustice was already compensated, people would punish the perpetrator less (Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999; Van de Calseyde, Keren, & Zeelenberg, 2013). This restoring of injustice, thus, can be done by punishing and compensating, but compensating is found to be preferred (Van Doorn et al., 2013). In short, as shown by Van Doorn et al. (2013), anger leads to prosocial behavior in third-party situations, when there is an injustice that can be restored. If prosocial behavior decreases when the victim is compensated, how about the anger? The Feeling-is-for-doing approach (Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans & Pieters, 2008) states that emotions point out that there is a problem, and lead behavior towards handling this problem. So, the emotion that comes with a specific problem, needs to lead to a solution for that problem. Therefore, every emotion leads to distinct behaviors, because every emotion has different problems to solve. Zeelenberg et al. (2008), however, also argue that people can have different goals in different situations, thus the same emotion does not necessarily lead to the same exact behavior every time. Weiner s (1985) attribution theory of emotion and motivation states that people s evaluation of a situation and expected consequences of that evaluation, result in specific emotions. These emotions direct behavior towards achieving

ANGER AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 5 goals that deal with that situation in a desirable way. Weiner (1985) agrees with Zeelenberg et al. (2012) that every emotion leads to their own characteristic behaviors. This implies that when the goal of restoring injustice (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson & O'Connor, 1987; Solomon, 1990) is already achieved by a third party, the behavior and emotion that work towards that goal are no longer required. Nelissen and Zeelenberg (2009) found that inhibiting anger leads to less punishing behavior of the perpetrator by a third-party observer, than when there was no inhibiting of anger. This also indicates that anger, and the feeling of unfairness that evokes this anger, play an important role in motivating injustice restoring behaviors. Study 1 is devoted to replicate the research done by Van Doorn et al. (2013) with spending time helping the victim as a measure of prosocial behavior (instead of spending money on the victim). I do not expect the measure of prosocial behavior to matter, and thus expect anger to lead to prosocial behavior, when justice can be restored by doing so. Furthermore, I expect that when injustice is already compensated by a third-party, prosocial behavior and anger will decrease. This because, when the goal of restoring justice is already accomplished, anger is no longer necessary to motivate towards this goal (Weiner, 1985; Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008), as well as prosocial behavior is no longer necessary to accomplish this goal. Thirdly, the degree of compensation is expected to have an effect on the decrease of experienced anger and prosocial behavior. When the goal of restoring justice is only partially accomplished, anger is expected to decrease less, than when the goal is completely accomplished (Weiner, 1985; Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008). Just like there is expected to be more prosocial behavior when a third-party already partially compensated the victim, than when they completely compensated the victim Study 1 Method

ANGER AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 6 Participants and design. One hundred and forty-five psychology students (29 males, 116 females, M age = 19.90, SD = 2.16) 1 from Tilburg University were randomly assigned to the anger condition and the anger compensation condition 2. Questionnaires were taken at two occasions during the break of lectures. Materials and procedure. The participants in both the anger condition and the anger compensation condition read the following scenario: Imagine: A friend of yours, Tim, just finished building a new bicycle that took him a year to build. He goes to the supermarket with his new bicycle to do some shopping, and puts his bicycle in front of the supermarket. When he comes back from the supermarket he sees that his bicycle got stolen. He can see the thief cycling away with his bicycle, however, having his hands full with his purchases Tim is unable to get his bicycle back. As an emotion manipulation check, participants indicated how much anger, guilt, regret, pride and shame they would feel in the scenario situation, on a slider scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly). Next, participants in the anger condition read: Tim never got his bicycle back. Participants in the anger compensation condition got to read: Tim never got his bicycle back. However, Tim insured his bicycle and the insurance will cover for a new bicycle for him. All participants again indicated how much anger, guilt, regret, pride and shame they felt on a slider scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly). Furthermore, all participants got to read: Tim is moving a week after the situation with the bicycle. He asks if you want to help him move. Then, participants indicated how many hours they would be willing to spend on helping Tim move, as a dependent measure of prosocial behavior. Results 1 Results of the power analysis showed that with two conditions a minimum of 64 participants per condition was needed to achieve a power of 80% and an 2 = 0.12. 2 No difference was found between males (M = 6.50, SD = 5.42) and females M = 5.81, SD = 3.61; t(140)=.826, p =.410 on prosocial behavior. A linear regression analysis revealed that age also had no significant effect on prosocial behavior, β =.094, t =.890, p =.375.

ANGER AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 7 Emotion-manipulation check. After an independent-samples t-test was conducted, no significant difference was found between conditions in the reported anger scores after reading the exact same scenario about Tim s stolen bicycle, in the anger condition (M = 8.00, SD = 1.77) and the anger compensation condition (M = 7.52, SD = 2.05); t(143) = 1.51, p =.133. Also no significant difference was found between the conditions for the reported scores of guilt, regret, pride, and shame (all ts(143) <.999, ps >.321). According to paired samples t- tests, reported anger scores were in both conditions significantly higher than the reported scores on all of the other emotions (all ts(71) >12.43, ps <.001, in the anger condition and all ts(72) > 13.80, ps <.001 in the anger compensation condition; for all mean differences see Table 1 in the Appendix). After reading about the current situation of Tim s bicycle (in both conditions participants read that Tim never got his bicycle back. In the anger compensation condition participants also read that the bicycle was insured, and the insurance would cover the costs of a new bicycle) anger decreased significantly in the anger condition (M =.56, SD = 1.79; t(71) = 2.64, p =.01) as well as in the anger compensation condition (M = 3.32, SD = 2.81; t(72) = 10.08, p <.001). An independent samples t-test showed that the decrease in anger was larger in the anger compensation condition (M =.56, SD = 1.79), than in the anger condition (M = 3.32, SD = 2.81), t(122.30) = -7.06, p <.001. Reported anger scores were in both conditions still significantly higher than the reported scores on all of the other emotions (all ts(71) > 8.66, ps <.001 in the anger condition and all ts(72) > 4.19, ps <.001 in the anger compensation condition; for the mean differences see Table 2 in the Appendix). Prosocial behavior 3. After conducting an independent samples t-test, no significant difference was found in the time participants were willing to help Tim move between the 3 Three values were missing on the dependent measure of prosocial behavior. One outlier was removed from the analysis.

ANGER AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 8 anger condition (M = 6.30, SD = 3.57) and the anger compensation condition (M = 5.35, SD = 3.88; t(139) = 1.52, p =.131, d =.25). Study 2 Method Participants and design. One hundred and ninety-six students (79 males, 125 females; M age = 19.74, SD = 1.75) 4 from Tilburg University were randomly assigned to the anger, anger full compensation, or anger partial compensation condition. Questionnaires were taken at two occasions during the break of lectures. Two persons were excluded from the analyses because they failed to follow the instructions. Materials and procedure. In all three conditions, participants read the following scenario: Imagine: a friend of yours, Tim, just bought a new bicycle which took him 3 years to save for. He goes to the supermarket with his bicycle to do some shopping, and puts his bicycle in front of the supermarket in the bicycle racks. When he comes back from the supermarket he sees that his bicycle got stolen. He can see the thief cycling away with his bicycle, however, having his hands full with his purchases Tim is unable to get his bicycle back. As an emotion manipulation check, participants indicated how much anger, guilt, regret, pride and shame they would feel in the scenario situation, on a slider scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly). Next, participants in the anger condition read: Tim never got his bicycle back. Participants in the anger full compensation condition got to read: Tim never got his bicycle back. However, Tim insured his bicycle and the insurance will cover a new bicycle for him. Participants in the anger partial compensation condition got to read: Tim never got his bicycle back. However, Tim insured his bicycle and the insurance will cover 4 Two persons were excluded from the analyses, because one failed to follow the instructions, and the other was dishonest in his responses.

ANGER AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 9 half the costs for a new bicycle for him. All participants then again indicated how much anger, guilt, regret, pride and shame they felt on a slider scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly). Furthermore, all participants read: a week after this incident with the bicycle, it is Tim s birthday. You are also invited to his birthday. Then, as a dependent measure of prosocial behavior, participants indicated how many euros they would spend on Tim s birthday. Results Emotion manipulation check. The anger manipulation was successful. An ANOVA on anger reported after participants read the scenario about Tim s bicycle getting stolen, revealed no significant effect of Condition, F(2, 192) = 1.56, p =.212, between the anger scores on the anger condition (M = 7.17, SD = 2.35) and anger full compensation condition (M = 7.10, SD = 2.53), p =.984, between the anger scores on the anger condition and the anger partial compensation condition (M = 7.76, SD = 2.35), p =.331, and between the anger scores on the anger full compensation condition and the anger partial compensation condition, p =.242. In all conditions, participants anger scores were significantly higher than the reported scores of all other emotions (all ps <.001; for all mean differences see Table 2 in the Appendix). Also no significant difference was found between the conditions for the reported scores of guilt, regret, pride, and shame (all Fs (2,193) < 1.564, ps >.114). A conducted ANOVA on participant s reported anger after reading about the current status of Tim s bicycle (he never got his bicycle back, insurance covers half of the expenses of all of the expenses) revealed a significant effect of Condition, F(2,192) = 17.96, p <.001, η 2 p =.02. Post-hoc comparisons (Tukey s HSD) revealed that participants in the anger condition (M = 6.83, SD = 2.71) reported significantly more anger than participants in the anger full compensation condition (M = 3.89, SD = 3.10) and the anger partial compensation condition (M = 5.55, SD = 2.65), p <.001 and p =.029. Post-hoc comparisons also showed

ANGER AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 10 that participants in the anger full compensation condition reported significantly less anger than participants in the anger partial compensation condition, p =.002. Participants anger scores were still significantly higher than the reported scores of all other emotions (all ps <.001; for all mean differences see Table 2 in the Appendix). Also no significant difference was found between the conditions for the reported scores of guilt, regret, and shame at this point (all Fs (2, 192) < 2.53, ps >.066). There was a significant difference found on the reported pride score, F(2, 192) = 6.136, p =.002, η p 2 =.06, between the anger condition (M = 0.67, SD = 1.49) and the anger full compensation condition (M = 1.94, SD = 2.60). There was a significant difference found in the decrease of anger between conditions, F(2,191) = 22.20, p <.001, η p 2 =.16. The decrease of anger in the anger condition (M =.33, SD = 1.72) was significantly lower than the decrease of anger in the anger full compensation condition (M = 3.21, SD = 3.30), and the anger partial compensation condition (M = 2.28, SD = 2.17). No significant difference was found between the decrease of anger over the anger full compensation condition and the anger partial compensation condition. Prosocial behavior 5. After conducting an one-way ANOVA, no significant difference was found in money participants were willing to spend on Tim s birthday F(2,184) =.237, p =.789, between the anger condition (M = 11.92, SD = 4.71) and the anger full compensation condition (M = 11.43, SD = 5.25), p =.835, between the anger condition and the anger partial compensation condition (M = 11.39, SD = 4.25), p =.810, and between the anger full compensation condition and anger partial compensation condition, p =.999. General Discussion The current studies try to replicate and expand the research done by Van Doorn et al. (2013) on the effect of third-party anger (anger provoked by seeing someone else get harmed) 5 Three values were missing on the dependent measure of prosocial behavior. Nine extreme outliers were detected and removed from the analyses. No difference was found between the scores of males (M = 13.15, SD = 1.51) and females M = 13.08, SD =.81 ; t(191)=.046, p =.963 on the dependent measure. A linear regression analysis revealed that age had no significant effect on prosocial behavior, β =.354, t = 1.46, p =.145.

ANGER AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 11 on prosocial behavior. Study 1 showed that an unfair third-party situation (i.e., a friend s bicycle gets stolen) leads to anger as being the most dominant emotion experienced. Results also showed that after compensation of the unfairness done to the victim (i.e., the insurance covers a new bicycle), anger significantly decreased. However, anger did not have an effect on prosocial behavior when measured in time invested in the victim (spending time to help your friend move) as well as when measured in money (spending money on a birthday present). Study 2 also found anger as the dominant emotion experienced after reading the unfair situation. Furthermore and in line with Study 2, no effect of anger on prosocial behavior was found. Thus, there was no difference in prosocial behavior found over the different degrees of compensation. The studies in this article have failed to replicate the causal effect of anger on prosocial behavior as found in the studies by Van Doorn et al. (2013). The first study of this article attempted to replicate this effect by using another measure of prosocial behavior, namely time spend moving instead of money spend on a birthday present. What could be argued is that, because the loss of the victim after the unfair situation is in money (costs of a bicycle), the prosocial measure of time does not work the same as a prosocial measure of money. Observers could see spending time helping someone who lost money, as being a less satisfying way of compensating their friend than giving money, because it does not make up for their loss of money. Future research could try to replicate the effect of anger on prosocial behavior measured in time, by having the victim also have a loss of time instead of money. So, keeping the loss of the victim and the type of compensation congruent (as done with money; Lotz et al., 2011; Van Doorn et al., 2013). The previous idea, however, does not explain why we did not find an effect of anger on prosocial behavior in the second study of this article. Unlike the first study, the second study was conducted on a group of students from different studies and years. The group of participants differed between third-year

ANGER AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 12 psychology and first-year law students. These groups could be different to such an extent that it influences the results. For example, psychology is, unlike law school, a social study. It could be the case that the people who choose a social study like psychology are more socially minded, and therefore more susceptible for this kind of prosocial measure, than people who choose a non social study like law students. A limitation of both studies is that the questionnaires were taken during the break of several lectures. Participants could have been thinking of what was told in the lecture, felt rushed because the break only lasts fifteen minutes, or were distracted by the people around them. In the setting of a lab, these confounding variables can be controlled for better (Heiman, 2002). Future research should, thus, conduct the studies in a lab setting and keep the participants as homogenous as possible. For further research, it would be interesting to test whether the degree to which we want to restore someone s justice (and thus feel anger) depends on the relationship (friend, stranger or someone we do not like) we have with that person. For example, you hear Tim s bicycle got stolen, while you saw Tim bullying someone just the other day. Zeelenberg et al. (2008) state that it is common in these situations for people to experience mixed emotions, and this can result in one of the emotions being dominant and motivating behavior, while pushing the other one(s) away. When Tim is in an unjust situation and you do not like him, you can feel angry about it, but you can also feel like he got what he deserves. Empathy did show to be higher for friends or family in unjust situations than for strangers (Hoffman, 1990). Even though the studies do not show a significant effect of anger on prosocial behavior, these results do show support for a goal directed nature of anger. The Feeling-is-fordoing approach by Zeelenberg et al. (2008) showed that emotions signal that there is a problem and direct behavior towards solving this problem. And because every problem elicits other emotions and needs other solutions, every emotion has their own distinct behaviors to solve these problems. Shaver et al. (1987) specifically found that a goal of anger is to restore

ANGER AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 13 injustice. In study 2, after partially compensating for unfairness done to a third-party (i.e., the insurance covers half the costs of a new bicycle), there was significantly less anger reported by the observer, than without compensation, and even less when the unfairness was completely compensated (i.e., the insurance covers the costs of a new bicycle). The unfairness done to the victim, thus, seems to diminish the anger of the observer, when the unfairness is compensated by a third party. So, this shows that when the goal of resolving the unfairness is accomplished, anger, which motivated us towards accomplishing this goal, decreases. This article especially contributes to the literature on goal-directed anger. These studies also add to anger literature by shedding light on the way anger reacts to accomplishing (or partially accomplishing) goals. That anger already decreases when another party partially compensated the victim s loss, and it decreases even more when the victim s loss is completely compensated. The results show that third-party anger caused by an unfair situation, is very specifically motivating us towards restoring the perceived injustice done to another person. Thus, even without showing that anger leads to compensation behavior, these studies do show that anger is not necessarily a negative emotion with negative consequences, as often assumed (e.g. Averill, 1983), but does, to some extent, create a drive towards restoring injustice. In conclusion, the current studies did not accomplish to find support for the effect of anger on prosocial behavior. However, the studies did show evidence for a goal directed nature of anger. Future research, therefore, is important to explore the effect of anger on prosocial behavior.

ANGER AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 14 References Anastasi, A., Cohen, N., & Spatz, D. (1948). A study of fear and anger in college students through the controlled diary method. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 73, 243-249. Averill, J. R. (1983). Studies on anger and aggression: Implications for theories of emotion. American Psychologist, 38, 1145 1160. Berkowitz, L. (1989). Frustration-aggression hypothesis: Examination and reformulation. Psychological Bulletin, 106, 59 73. Goldberg, J. H., Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (1999). Rage and reason: The psychology of the intuitive prosecutor. European Journal of Social Psychology, 29, 781 795. Heiman, G. W. (2002). Research methods in psychology (3rd ed.). Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Hoffman, M. L. (1990). Empathy and justice motivation. Motivation and Emotion, 14, 151 172. Lotz, S., Okimoto, T. G., Schlösser, T., & Fetchenhauer, D. (2011). Punitive versus compensatory reactions to injustice: Emotional antecedents to third-party interventions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 477 480. Montada, L., & Schneider, A. (1989). Justice and emotional reactions to the disadvantaged. Social Justice Research, 3, 313 344. Nelissen, R. M. A., & Zeelenberg, M. (2009). Moral emotions as determinants of third-party punishment: Anger, guilt, and the functions of altruistic sanctions. Judgment and Decision Making, 4, 543 553. Schimmack, U., & Diener, E. (1997). Affect intensity: Separating intensity and frequency in repeatedly measured affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 1313 1329.

ANGER AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 15 Shaver, P., Schwartz, J., Kirson, D., & O'Connor, C. (1987). Emotion knowledge: Further exploration of the prototype approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 1061-1086. Solomon, R. C. (1990). A passion for justice: Emotions and the origins of the social contract. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Van de Calseyde, P. P. F. M., Keren, G., & Zeelenberg, M. (2013). The insured victim effect: When and why compensating harm decreases punishment recommendations. Judgment and Decision Making, 8, 161 173. Van Doorn, J., Breugelmans, S. M. & Zeelenberg, M. (2013). Behavioral consequences of first-party and third-party anger. Manuscript under review. Vitaglione, G. D., & Barnett, M. A. (2003). Assessing a new dimension of empathy: Empathic anger as a predictor of helping and punishing desires. Motivation and Emotion, 27, 301 325. Weiner, B. (1985). An attributional theory of achievement motivation and emotion. Psychological Review, 92, 548 573. Zeelenberg, M., Nelissen, R. M. A., Breugelmans, S. M., & Pieters, R. (2008). On emotion specificity in decision making: Why feeling is for doing. Judgment and Decision Making, 3, 18 27.

ANGER AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 16 Table 1 Appendix Study 1: Means (and Standard Deviations) of all Reported Emotions and Prosocial Behavior as a Function of Condition Condition Anger (n = 72) Anger compensation (n = 73) Emotion measure 1 M (SD) M (SD) Anger 7.99 (1.77) a 7.52 (2.05) a Guilt 1.48 (2.24) a 1.16 (1.58) a Regret 3.04 (3.15) a 2.75 (3.11) a Pride.89 (1.65) a.85 (1.65) a Shame 1.23 (1.84) a 1.27 (1.99) a Emotion measure 2 Anger 7.44 (2.23) a 4.20 (3.30) b Guilt 1.35 (2.09) a.89 (1.59) a Regret 3.12 (3.43) a 1.40 (2.16) b Pride.76 (1.32) a 1.97 (2.59) b Shame.94 (1.68) a.76 (1.26) a Prosocial behavior 6.30 (3.57) a 5.35 (3.88) a Note. Emotions were reported on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly). Means in bold represent the dominant emotion experienced within that condition, with all ts(71) > 8.66, all ps <.001 in the anger condition, and all ts(72) > 4.19, all ps <.001 in the anger compensation condition. Means with a different subscript differ significantly with all ts > 3.47, all ps <.002.

ANGER AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 17 Table 2 Study 2: Means (and Standard Deviations) of all Reported Emotions and Prosocial Behavior as a Function of Condition Condition Anger (n = 63) Anger partial compensation (n = 66) Anger full compensation (n = 66) Emotion measure 1 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) Anger 7.17 (2.35) a 7.76 (2.14) a 7.10 (2.53) a Guilt 1.53 (2.05) a 1.40 (1.85) a 1.74 (2.26) a Regret 2.22 (2.61) a 2.49 (2.95) a 2.13 (2.63) a Pride.58 (1.15) a.99 (1.82) a.52 (.73) a Shame 1.77 (2.30) a 1.89 (2.36) a 1.48 (2.21) a Emotion measure 2 Anger 6.83 (2.71) a 5.55 (2.65) a 3.89 (3.10) a Guilt 1.39 (2.15) a 1.05 (1.34) a 1.19 (1.74) a Regret 1.89 (2.65) a 1.46 (2.17) a 1.03 (1.60) a Pride.67 (1.49) a 1.39 (1.95) ab 1.94 (2.60) b Shame 1.37 (1.95) a 1.29 (1.74) a.96 (1.55) a Prosocial behavior 11.92 (4.71) a 11.43 (5.25) a 11.39 (4.25) a Note. Emotions were reported on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly). Means in bold represent the dominant emotion experienced within that condition, with all ts(62) > 10.94, all ps <.001 in the anger condition, all ts(65) > 3.71, all ps <.001 in the anger partial compensation condition, and all ts(65) > 9.94, all ps <.001 in the anger full compensation condition. Means with a different subscript differ significantly p =.002 (Tukey post hoc).