Subjects are motivated not only by their own payoffs but also by those of others and the relationship between the payoffs of the players of the game

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Subjects are motivated not only by their own payoffs but also by those of others and the relationship between the payoffs of the players of the game ultimatum games resistance to unfairness dictator games altruism accounts for giving behavior Solidarity means a willingness to help people in need who are similar to oneself but victims of outside influences such as unforeseen illness, natural catastrophes, etc

Subjects were recruited in a students restaurant and the experiments were performed on the spot Each subject participates in exactly one three-person-game in which each of the subjects can independently win either DM 10,00 with probability 2/3 or zero with probability 1/3 Before the random draws are made, the subjects have to decide, how much in the case of their winning they are willing to give to a loser No loser = no gifts Pledge to help a loser is conditioned on winning and on the presence of losers = contioned gifts Egoistical behavior (21%) ->x1=x2=0 risk neutrality random entitlements -> problem s mitigation through conditional gifts (Hoffman&Spitzer) not sufficiently motivated by a desire to mitigate ex post inequality Fixed total sacrifice (52%)->x1=x2>0 x1 =2*x2 >0 assumption: subject in the group first decides how much he or she is willing to give and then distributes the amount decided upon among the losers If everyone in the group follows this strategy a single loser receives four times as much as one of two losers

Fixed gift to loser (16%)->x1=x2>0 give the same amount to each loser regardless of whether there are one or two losers in the game if everyone in the group follows this strategy a single loser receives two times as much as one of two losers Intermediate behavior (11%) ->2x2>x1>x2>0 behavior of these subjects is intermediate between these two norms since it differs from `fixed total sacrifice' insofar as the interests of the two recipients of the conditional gift x2 are considered more strongly, but not to the full extent of equalizing x1 and x2 if everyone in the group follows this strategy a single loser receives two times as much as one of two losers x1 - conditional gift for the case that there is exactly one loser in the group, x2 - the amount conditionally given to each of two losers in the group

Is fixed total sacrifice the result of utility maximization? It is not possible that exact fixed total sacrifice behavior arises from utility maximization under the assumptions of altruism, separability, risk aversiveness, and symmetry with respect to both players Decision process which first fixes the total amount to be sacrificed for solidarity and then distributes it (up to rounding) among the losers regardless of their number Similar in dictator game (Bolton) Gender has a marked influence on behavior Egoistical behavior of giving nothing in both conditions is much more common among males than among females (Fishers exact test yields a significance of p<0.001) Conditional gift behavior of males is clearly less generous than that of females Unproportional gender structure of experiment s participants

Economist are maybe indoctrinated to maximize profits or because of selfselection (Frank-> indoctrination effect) Those who are strongly interested in their own economic success may be more likely to study economics than others Different distributions for males and females Different responses to the educational influences ->Gender effect is valid for both economists and non-economist -> Educational effect is typical for males only

Similar to dictator game, but: all of them are both potential donors and potential recipients motivational element of trust in reciprocity Similar to public good, but: conditional gifts are specifically made from winners to losers do not increase the total amount available Behavior seems to be guided by different principles arising from bounded rationality and social norms