Pandemic Risk Modeling

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Pandemic Risk Modeling Ghalid Bagus,, FSA MAAA CFA Financial Risk Management June 5, 2008 2008 Milliman, Inc.

The material and content contained in this presentation are the proprietary information of Milliman, and Milliman retains all right, title, and interest in such material and content. This presentation, including all content, is copyrighted and protected by international copyright laws and treaty provisions. This presentation summarizes information obtained through discussions with legal counsel and parties familiar with insurance and securities laws. Milliman is providing this information for discussion purposes. We are not providing a legal opinion. The material and content contained in this presentation do not constitute an investment product, nor do they constitute an offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any security.

Topics for discussion What is the current environment with respect to pandemics? Which Milliman projects had a key pandemic modeling component? What makes this risk difficult to model? What methodology is being used to model pandemics? What data exists for calibrating the model? Are there any other models out there? How bad can it get?

Current environment In the past 25 years, at least 30 previously unknown diseases have emerged including HIV, SARS, Ebola, and Hepatitis C and E H5N1 of great concern because it caused greatest number of human cases in recent years it exhibits all features required to start a pandemic except the ability to efficiently transmit between humans As of May 2008 (according to WHO) 383 laboratory confirmed cases 241 deaths 15 countries

Current environment - H5N1 timeline Mid-2003 Outbreaks of highly pathogenic H5N1 began in South-east Asia July 2005 Virus spreads to affect poultry in Russia and Kazakhstan October 2005 Virus is reported in Turkey, Romania and Croatia March 2006 WHO confirms five deaths in Azerbaijan May 2006 WHO confirms first case of infection in Africa (Djibouti) February 2007 WHO confirms first human death in Africa (Nigeria) April 2008 Japan reports H5N1 in wild swans

Current environment - Media

Milliman pandemic modeling projects Mortality catastrophe bond projects Company Structure Bond Notional Countries Covered Swiss Re VITA I $400m France, Italy, Switzerland,UK, US Swiss Re VITA II $362m Canada, Germany, Japan, UK, US Swiss Re VITA III $2,000m Canada, Germany, Japan, UK, US AXA Gie Osiris $442m France, UK, US Scottish Re Tartan $155m US With mortality catastrophe bonds, investors lose principal when general population mortality increases beyond pre-specified levels For mortality catastrophe bonds - bond design, risk analysis, rating agency presentations, investor road shows and calculation agent Economic capital modeling and mortality stress testing

Modeling difficulties What data is available for calibration? When does the pandemic start and when does it end? How lethal and infectious is the virus? How large is the affected region? What is the governmental response? How does individual behavior affect the pandemic?

Modeling methodology - Overview Baseline Model Expected mortality Expected volatility Country specific time series models using historic data using pre-determined age/gender weights 250,000 simulations Pandemic Model Additional mortality due to potential disease calamity Event frequency, severity modeled separately Same model for each country 250,000 simulations Combined Model Combines baseline scenarios, disease scenarios and war scenarios for each country Converts country specific mortality to a country index for each scenario Combines country specific index into a combined index Results Analyzer Determines results: 1.Probability of loss 2.Probability of exhaustion 3.Expected loss 4.Average loss Terrorism Model Additional mortality due to potential non-disease events Trinomial lattice model Same model for each country 250,000 simulations

Modeling methodology - Pandemic model Actuarial model based on a frequency and severity approach Frequency and severity modeled separately based on historical occurrences of influenza epidemics Frequency set at 7.38% per annum based on 31 influenza epidemics over the last 420 years Pandemic Model: Modeled versus Historical Severity Curve Disease epidemics occur in all 100% countries at the same time with Modeled Severity 80% Historical Severity the same severity 60% Severity curve reflects the age 40% 1918 Pandemic and gender distribution of the 20% 1957 Pandemic 1977 Pandemic 2003 SARS underlying cohort being modeled 0% Severity modeled using an Percentile exponential curve Excess Mortality % 1968 Pandemic 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Modeling methodology - Frequency data Pandemics in the past 31 in the last 420 years 4 in the last 100 years Pandemic does not become more likely because a long time has passed since the last one - virus mutation is a random process Debate as to whether current risk level is elevated due to H5N1 prevalence in bird populations Year Description 1580 First recorded influenza pandemic began in Europe 1700's Influenza pandemics in 1729-1730, 1732-1733 and 1781-1782 1800's Influenza pandemics in 1830-1831, 1833-1834 and 1889-1890 1918 Spanish Flu 1957 Asian Flu 1968 Hong Kong Flu

Modeling methodology - Severity data Data points used for the severity curve: 1918, 1957, 1968, 1977 and SARS 2003 Severity curve data is sourced from the CDC (except SARS 2003) Severity data is based on US population experience and applied proportionately to other countries Seasonality element is modeled using a multiple-state model based on epidemiological progression of influenza during a typical influenza season

Modeling methodology - Model results Percentile Probability Mortality Increase Number of US Deaths Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 0.1 1 in 13,500 years 420% 427% 9,660k 9,820k 0.5 1 in 2,700 years 42% 45% 970k 1,040k 1.0 1 in 1,350 years 37% 39% 860k 900k 3.2 1 in 420 years 27% 29% 620k 670k Results are sensitive to age and gender distribution Lower Percentage Distribution of Maximum Additional Mortality Range Upper Percentage Proportion of Scenarios 0 10 98.53% 10 20 0.91 Higher increases for Model 2 due to younger age weighting for Model 2 cohort 20 30 0.33 30 40 0.15 40 50 0.04 50 75 0.01 75 100 0.01 100+ 0.02

Other models - Swiss Re internal model Combination of actuarial and epidemiological model Model starts by estimating excess mortality rates using data from 20 th century pandemics Excess rates are then adjusted for health changes since prior pandemics, vaccines, etc. For a 1-in-500 year event Swiss Re Internal Model estimates excess US deaths of 300k (Milliman Model = 650k) Swiss Re defines recurrence of 1918 pandemic as a 1-in-500 year event

Other models - Lancet 2006 article Model published in The Lancet, Volume 368, December 2006 Statistical model relates excess mortality to per-head income and absolute latitude Model calibrated to vital registration data for the 1918 pandemic only Model projects excess mortality rates for several countries Recurrence of 1918 pandemic would cause 380k US deaths Model does not specify the probability of the recurrence of a 1918 pandemic

Other models - RMS model Epidemiological model Model based on medical research medical trials clinical data published government containment plans Model projects virus infectiousness and lethality effects of human behavior and containment plans

How bad can it get? In most analyses 1918 pandemic sets the upper limit Why was it so bad? No antibiotics, vaccines, etc. were available World War I Outbreaks of contagious disease Why it could be worse No biological or logical reason why not Random genetic mutation could produce a more lethal virus Why it may not be worse Medical management has improved Virological research and knowledge has grown rapidly Surveillance networks have been established Vaccines have been available since the 1950 s

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