EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS INTRODUCTION. Ernesto Reuben

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Transcription:

EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS INTRODUCTION Ernesto Reuben

WHAT IS EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS? 2

WHAT IS AN ECONOMICS EXPERIMENT? A method of collecting data in controlled environments with the purpose of furthering our knowledge of economics 3

Experiments in economics? Unfortunately, Economists are we at a can disadvantage seldom test compared particular with predictions researchers in the in social many sciences other fields. by They experiments can't experiment explicitly on economies designed to the eliminate way scientists what are experiment judged to with be the laboratory most important rats disturbing chemicals. influences. Generally, we must rely on evidence cast up by the experiments that happen to occur. since then WHAT IS AN ECONOMICS EXPERIMENT? Thomas Sargent (2011) Milton Friedman (1953) 4

ADVANTAGES OF THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD Control Control of institutions (e.g. voting rules, group composition) and incentives (e.g. earning schemes) Measure confounding variables (e.g. social norms, beliefs) Randomization (avoids self-selection problems) Replication Checks for robustness and false positives It gives an incentive to do it right (reduce p-hacking) Norm to make available: data, instructions, program, and procedures 5

Control ADVANTAGES OF THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD Lab in the field Lab (economics) Lab (psychology) Internet Field RCTs Natural field Replicability 6

WHY RUN AN EXPERIMENT? Test the predictions of particular theories Example Choice 1: A ($4000 with p = 0.20) or B ($3000 with p = 0.25) Choice 2: C ($4000 with p = 0.80) or D ($3000 with certainty) EUT predicts either A-C or B-D but many choose A-D or B-C (Allais Paradox) What is a fair test of a theory? Should a theory be judged only within the domain in which it is intended to apply (Friedman 1953) Duhem-Quine problem: Theories must be applied to be tested if the predictions of the theory fail, is it a problem of the theory or of the application? 7

WHY RUN AN EXPERIMENT? Equilibrium selection and establishing empirical regularities Observe behavior in cases where theory makes unclear predictions or no prediction at all Examples Equilibrium selection: if players are sufficiently patient then any amount of cooperation is sustainable in an infinitely repeated prisoner s dilemma run an experiment to know how much occurs Empirical regularities: subjects do not use backward induction in the beauty contest game lead to the development of the theory of cognitive hierarchy 8

WHY RUN AN EXPERIMENT? Advise policy makers Use experiments as a substitute to theory to determine the effect of different forces in complex situations where theory is impractical or nonexistent Examples Test the performance of different auctions in order to sell spectrum rights Test different ways of regulating a privatized electricity market Accurate measurement of variables of interest Example Use experiments to measure risk and time preferences and test whether these measures explain saving decisions in the field 9

SOME EXPERIMENTAL JARGON Treatment variables The variables of interest that are (randomly) assigned by the experimenter Between-subject variation Different people experience different treatments Pros: avoids contamination between treatments Cons: you must trust that randomization worked Within-subject variation Same people experience different treatments Pros: Controls for individual characteristics Cons: order effects and it doesn t work for some treatment variations (e.g. framing) 10

SOME EXPERIMENTAL JARGON Common procedures Anonymity: participants do not know the identity of other participants Double-blind: the experimenter does not know who did what Matching in repeated games: partners (always the same people), strangers (interact with randomly selected people), or perfect strangers (interact only once with another subject) Incentive compatibility: monetary incentives are aligned with the variable of interest (lying is costly) Independent observation No interaction between data points 11

SOME EXPERIMENTAL JARGON Elicitation methods Direct response: decisions are made when it is time to do so Pros: decisions approximate decisions outside the lab? Cons: you might require a lot of observations Strategy method: contingent decisions are made for all relevant nodes Pros: you observe all counterfactual decisions Cons: potential differences in behavior (hot vs. cold), demand effects By and large, there is evidence that behavior varies between the direct response and strategy method, but it is far less common for treatment effects to vary (Brandts & Charness, 2011) 12

HOW TO CONDUCT AN EXPERIMENT? Formulate a research question Choose a design that answers the research question Treatment variable(s) Within vs. between variations Estimate the required number of independent observations Prepare the experiment Write the instructions of each treatment and debriefing questionnaire Prepare a script for the session Prepare the computer program/materials Get money and IRB authorization Run pilot experiment Improve the design/instructions Run the experiment Recruit subjects Run the experiment Analyze the data, write the paper, submit, publish, desk-rejection, and celebrate submit again, rejection, rewrite, submit again, another rejection, cry, submit yet again, R&R!, reanalyze, rewrite and resubmit, R&R again, add silly footnotes, resubmit, publish, and sleep 13

COMMON CRITICISMS External validity due to lack of realism The gift exchange game (Fehr et al. 1993) Firm chooses a wage and earns π F = (100 w) e Worker chooses an amount of effort and earns π W = w c(e), where the cost of effort is given by the function below e 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 Common finding: firms choose w > 0 and workers reciprocate with e > 0 Is choosing an effort level the same as exerting effort in a real job? This is a valid point but, in defense of experiments, they use real people making real money, theories are even more abstract, and realism can be studied by adding it in controlled steps 14

COMMON CRITICISMS External validity due to representativeness of the subject pool Roth et al. (1991) find that the willingness of students to accept unfair offers in ultimatum games is Israel (Jerusalem) < United states (Pittsburgh) = Yugoslavia (Ljubljana) < Japan (Tokyo), and conclude We conjecture that the observed subjectpool differences are cultural in character Most experiments are run with a very unrepresentative sample Self-selected university undergraduates in rich countries Residents of small rural villages in poor countries Although in many cases it does not to matter, examples where the subject pool can have a significant effects on behavior are easy to find Again, a valid point but, in defense of experiments, this The problem of external is plausibly less important for treatment comparisons, validity is arguably a and subject pools effects can be systematically studied problem of lack of theory 15

COMMON CRITICISMS Experimenter demand effects (the Hawthorne effect) Weak form: People behave differently when they know they are being observed Strong form: People desire to please the experimenter by conforming to the hypothesis they perceive the experimenter prefers It is a minor problem in many experiments, especially if the decision environment is interactive and rich, such as in sequential bargaining or market experiments. Moreover, being observed is not an exclusive feature of the laboratory. Falk & Heckman (2009) 16

METHODOLOGICAL NORMS Monetary incentives (performance pay) Advantages Subjects make more effort / pay more attention less noise and more consistent choices Equalizes marginal gains across subjects Disadvantages Its expensive and limits stakes Clear evidence that monetary incentives leads to differences in behavior e.g., more risk aversion and less generous behavior with monetary gains 17

METHODOLOGICAL NORMS No deception Advantages Subjects believe the instructions and do not try to outguess the experimenter Does not impose an externality on other researchers Disadvantages Makes it harder (more expensive) to study rare situations Makes it harder to design some experiments 18

METHODOLOGICAL NORMS Abstract instead of concrete wording in most cases Advantages of abstract wording You do not lose control because subjects are not role-playing (e.g. subjects might roleplay a manager s behavior) Disadvantages of abstract wording Can hinder subjects understanding the experiment 19

REFERENCES Brandts, Jordi, and Gary Charness. 2011. The Strategy Versus the Direct-Response Method: a First Survey of Experimental Comparisons. Experimental Economics 14 (3) (January 21): 375 398. Falk, Armin, and James J. Heckman. 2009. Lab experiments are a major source of knowledge in the social sciences." Science 32 6 (5952): 535 538. Fehr, Ernst, Georg Kirchsteiger, and Arno Riedl. 1993. Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (2) (May 1): 437 459. Roth, Alvin E., Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Shmuel Zamir. 1991. Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study. American Economic Review 81 (5) (December): 1068 1095. 20