War and Relatedness Enrico Spolaore and Romain Wacziarg September 2015

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War and Relatedness Enrico Spolaore and Romain Wacziarg September 2015 Online Appendix Supplementary Empirical Results, described in the main text as "Available in the Online Appendix" 1

Table AUR0 Effect of controlling for genetic distance on the geographic coefficients (Section 1). (1) (2) With GD Without GD Fst genetic distance, -0.1988 - weighted (9.317)** Log geodesic distance -0.0163-0.0293 (5.567)** (10.055)** Log absolute difference in 0.0014 0.0050 longitudes (0.731) (2.414)* Log absolute difference in -0.0011-0.0006 latitudes (0.887) (0.413) 1 for contiguity 0.1546 0.1582 (10.095)** (9.842)** Number of landlocked -0.0262-0.0298 countries in the pair (9.471)** (9.962)** Number of island 0.0082 0.0097 countries in the pair (2.923)** (3.200)** 1 if pair shares at least 0.0194 0.0187 one sea or ocean (4.909)** (4.479)** Log product of land areas 0.0089 0.0100 in square km (18.992)** (19.380)** 1 for pairs ever in colonial 0.0732 0.0732 relationship (5.094)** (4.977)** 1 if countries were or are the 0.0195 0.0169 same country (1.846) (1.544) Pseudo-R 2 0.275 0.259 Standardized effect (%) -23.839 - Robust t statistics in parentheses ; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All specifications were estimated with 13.175 observations. The standardized magnitude is the effect of a one standard deviation increase in genetic distance as a percentage of the mean probability of conflict. Probit marginal effects reported. For dummy variables, marginal effects are for discrete changes from 0 to 1. All marginal effects were multiplied by 100 for readability. 2

Table AUR1 - Alternative measures of genetic distance (section 2.2) (Dependent variable: dichotomous indicator of conflict; estimator: probit) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Fst GD Fst GD, 1500 Nei GD, Nei GD between match weighted between plurality plurality groups groups Baseline specification Nei GD, 1500 match Fst genetic distance, -19.8786 weighted (9.317)** Fst genetic distance, between -15.0180 plurality groups (9.013)** Fst genetic distance between -17.6859 plurality groups, 1500 match (10.158)** Nei genetic distance, -8.6777 weighted (6.371)** Nei genetic distance, between -6.8593 plurality groups (6.597)** Nei genetic distance between -7.8798 plurality groups, 1500 match (6.906)** Log geodesic distance -1.6281-1.8900-1.6367-1.9945-2.1355-2.0534 (5.567)** (6.510)** (5.527)** (6.539)** (7.175)** (6.717)** 1 for contiguity 15.4610 15.0015 16.3279 15.8122 15.3951 16.2050 (10.095)** (9.839)** (10.134)** (10.070)** (9.898)** (10.038)** Pseudo-R 2 0.275 0.273 0.274 0.268 0.267 0.267 Standardized effect (%) -23.839-21.302-24.484-18.337-17.192-18.274 Robust t statistics in parentheses ; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Probit marginal effects reported in all columns. For dummy variables, marginal effects are for discrete changes from 0 to 1. All marginal effects were multiplied by 100 for readability. The standardized magnitude is the effect of a one standard deviation increase in genetic distance as a percentage of the mean probability of conflict. All specifications were estimated with 13,175 observations. 3

Table AUR2 - Sample breakdown by type of conflict (1816-2001 panel) (section 3.1) (Dependent variable: dichotomous indicator of various types of conflicts, as specified in the second row) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Probit IV probit Probit IV probit Probit IV probit Baseline specification Instrumenting with 1500 GD Territorial conflicts Territorial conflicts Non territorial conflicts Non Territorial conflicts Fst genetic distance, -19.8786** -30.6802** -3.8905** -5.0580** -17.5326** -27.7474** weighted (-9.317) (-8.843) (-6.124) (-4.713) (-8.831) (-8.403) Log geodesic distance -1.6281** -1.0182** -0.3151** -0.2598** -1.5132** -0.9498** (-5.567) (-3.090) (-3.734) (-2.724) (-5.664) (-3.148) 1 for contiguity 15.4610** 16.2256** 5.3732** 5.5734** 9.6554** 10.2752** (10.095) (5.465) (9.316) (3.399) (8.094) (4.544) Pseudo-R2 0.275 0.362 0.260 Standardized effect (%) -23.84-36.79-12.95-16.84-23.74-37.57 Robust t-statistics in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 13,175 observations used in all columns. Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The standardized effect refers to the effect of a one-standard deviation increase in genetic distance as a percentage of the mean probability of each of the various types of conflicts. Probit marginal effects are reported in all columns. For dummy variables, marginal effects are for discrete changes from 0 to 1. All marginal effects were multiplied by 100 for readability. 4

Table AUR3 Continent fixed-effects and sample breakdown by region (Section 3.3) (Dependent variable: dichotomous indicator of conflict; estimator: probit) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Full set of Europe, with Removing all Asia Africa America continent Europe Gen. European dummies b Dist. countries Same continent dummy F ST genetic distance a -20.2080** -5.7423** -1,494.7018** -12.9864** -39.4754-7.3404-49.8330* (-9.381) (-2.668) (-2.711) (-6.892) (-1.465) (-0.458) (-2.339) Log geodesic -1.7186** -0.9434** 1.4474-0.7379** -1.8233-2.0350-1.9795 Distance (-5.834) (-3.823) (0.279) (-2.845) (-0.939) (-1.829) (-0.824) Same Continent -0.4118 dummy (-1.500) # of observations 13,175 13,175 291 7,777 860 848 581 Pseudo-R 2 0.275 0.314 0.428 0.350 0.392 0.354 0.382 Standardized effect (%) -24.23-6.886-38.40-19.71-12.85-3.684-21.47 Robust t statistics in parentheses ; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Probit marginal effects reported in all columns. For dummy variables, marginal effects are for discrete changes from 0 to 1. All marginal effects were multiplied by 100 for readability. The standardized magnitude is the effect of a one standard deviation increase in genetic distance as a percentage of the mean probability of conflict. a : Weighted genetic distance in all columns except column (2), where Fst genetic distance between plurality groups from the European genetic distance matrix is entered instead. The coefficient is larger because Fst genetic distance within Europe has a much smaller range than in the World matrix (the standardized magnitude is also larger but is of an order of magnitude similar to that for the rest of the World). b : Continent dummies are defined as: Both in Asia dummy, both in Africa dummy, both in Europe dummy, both in America dummy, dummy if one and only one country is in Asia, dummy if one and only one country is in Africa, dummy if one and only one country is in Europe, dummy if one and only one country is in America, dummy if one and only one country is in Oceania (the dummy for both in Oceania is dropped as it predicts failure perfectly there were no conflicts involving two countries in Oceania in the sample). Note: In our baseline sample of 13,175 pairs, the number of pairs having experienced intracontinental interstate conflicts between 1816 and 2001 is 112 in Asia (out of 866 pairs), 75 in Africa (out of 1; 048 pairs), 68 in the Americas (out of 581 pairs) and 71 in Europe (out of 291 pairs). There were no conflicts among the 27 country pairs located in Oceania. 5

Table AUR4 - Further regressions for Europe (Section 3.3) (Dependent variable: dichotomous indicator of conflict; estimator: probit) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Europe, with European European elevation control regression, pre- regression, post- European regression baseline European regression, post- 1945 1900 1900 Fst genetic distance, -1494.7018-1495.5535-137.5111-1241.7268-1797.3285 Europe (2.711)** (2.715)** (0.790) (2.327)* (2.792)** Log geodesic distance 1.4474 1.1623-1.8758 2.9202-0.4008 (0.279) (0.209) (1.068) (0.573) (0.081) 1 for contiguity 9.7531 9.2481 2.0125 10.9977-1.7973 (1.021) (0.955) (0.667) (1.143) (0.258) Min average elevations - 0.0025 - - - across paths (0.146) # of observations 291 291 259 291 267 Pseudo-R 2 0.428 0.428 0.411 0.420 0.378 Standardized effect (%) -38.396-38.418-7.197-33.305-48.117 Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Probit marginal effects reported in all columns. For dummy variables, marginal effects are for discrete changes from 0 to 1. All marginal effects were multiplied by 100 for readability. The standardized magnitude is the effect of a one standard deviation increase in genetic distance as a percentage of the mean probability of conflict. a : Fst genetic distance between plurality groups from the European genetic distance matrix. 6

Table AUR5 Sample breakdown by historical sub-period (Section 3.3) (Dependent variable: dichotomous indicator of conflict; estimator: probit) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 1816-2001 1816-1900 1901-2001 1946-2001 1919-1989 1990-2001 baseline Fst genetic distance, -19.8786-1.1213-18.8533-11.8279-13.5510-3.9197 weighted (9.317)** (5.750)** (8.879)** (-6.933)** (7.537)** (-5.027)** Log geodesic distance -1.6281-0.0682-1.6896-1.0813-1.0343-0.3474 (5.567)** (2.418)* (5.848)** (-5.185)** (4.229)** (-4.706)** 1 for contiguity 15.4610 0.3185 15.0125 9.9743 10.1606 3.3041 (10.095)** (2.849)** (10.047)** (9.216)** (8.636)** (7.686)** Pseudo-R 2 0.275 0.286 0.271 0.280 0.252 0.331 Standardized effect (%) -23.839-9.439-23.331-19.69-20.668-16.04 Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The standardized magnitude is the effect of a one standard deviation increase in genetic distance as a percentage of the mean probability of conflict for the sample used in each regression. Probit marginal effects are reported in all columns. For dummy variables, marginal effects are for discrete changes from 0 to 1. All marginal effects were multiplied by 100 for readability. 13,175 observations used in all columns. 7

Table AUR6. Baseline Specification, including WVS Cultural Distance Measures (Section 3.4) (1) (2) (3) Add cultural distance index Baseline, cultural distance sample Add cultural distance index by category Fst genetic distance, -24.3524* -22.6859-14.1999 weighted (-2.063) (-1.883) (-1.199) Log geodesic distance -4.6049** -4.5961** -4.5953** (-3.136) (-3.145) (-3.189) 1 for contiguity 20.3632** 19.6727** 20.4120** (4.377) (4.233) (4.388) Index of cultural distance -0.0143 (WVS, 98 questions) (-0.764) Index of cultural distance 0.0063 (WVS, category A) (0.095) Index of cultural distance 0.0023 (WVS, category C) (0.026) Index of cultural distance 0.5606** (WVS, category D) (2.955) Index of cultural distance -0.1942** (WVS, category E) (-2.952) Index of cultural distance -0.0901 (WVS, category F) (-0.827) Index of cultural distance 0.5097 (WVS, category G) (1.715) Pseudo-R2 0.221 0.221 0.229 Standardized effect (%) -10.35-9.638-6.033 Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The standardized magnitude is the effect of a one standard deviation increase in genetic distance as a percentage of the mean probability of conflict. The table reports marginal effects from probit estimates. For dummy variables, marginal effects are for discrete changes from 0 to 1. All coefficients were multiplied by 100 for readability. 2,513 observations used in all columns. Controls: In addition to reported coefficients, all regressions include controls for log absolute difference in longitudes, log absolute difference in latitudes, number of landlocked countries in the pair, number of island countries in the pair, dummy for pair shares at least one sea or ocean, log product of land areas in square km, dummy for pairs ever in colonial relationship, dummy for countries were or are the same country. 8

Table AUR7 - Nonlinearities and sample splits (Section 3.5) (Dependent variable: dichotomous indicator of conflict; estimator: probit) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Baseline Excluding Major power Proximity Contiguity Spline Quadratic contiguous pairs interaction interaction interaction Fst genetic distance, -19.8786-18.5357-20.4475-20.5701-20.4463-17.3704** -18.3955 weighted (9.317)** (9.379)** (9.274)** (9.270)** (9.463)** (-3.904) (3.093)** Fst Gen. Dist * major -3.1786 power dummy (0.517) Dummy=1 if at least one 4.2005 country is a major power (5.875)** Fst Gen. Dist. * proximity 7.8304 (1.689) Fst Gen. Dist. * contiguity 30.8443 (2.432)* Fst Gen. Dist * dummy -2.1460 for FST GD > median (-0.637) Squared Fst genetic -6.7332 distance, weighted (0.258) Log geodesic distance -1.6281-1.4809-1.3552-1.4900-1.6451-1.6317** -1.6325 (5.567)** (5.065)** (4.746)** (4.982)** (5.642)** (-5.580) (5.531)** 1 for contiguity 15.4610 15.6847 15.2255 10.1116 15.4360** 15.4319 (10.095)** (10.214)** (10.056)** (5.971)** (10.102) (10.095)** Observations 13,175 12,928 13,175 13,175 13,175 13,175 13,175 Pseudo-R 2 0.275 0.202 0.287 0.275 0.276 0.275 0.275 Standardized effect (%) -23.839-27.343-24.521-24.668-24.520-20.83-22.060 Robust t statistics in parentheses ; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The standardized magnitude is the effect of a one standard deviation increase in genetic distance as a percentage of the mean probability of conflict. Probit marginal effects are reported in all columns. For dummy variables, marginal effects are for discrete changes from 0 to 1. All marginal effects were multiplied by 100 for readability. 9

Table AUR8 Regressions explaining the intensity of conflict (Section 3.5) (Dependent variable and estimator as described in the second row) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Same as (1) for Maximal OLS on index Same as (4) for the subsample conflict of casualties the subsample with conflict intensity, IV with casualties OLS on maximal conflict intensity Total casualties index, IV with 1500 GD with 1500 GD index > 0 Fst genetic distance, -1.1810 0.4048-1.9351-2.8008 15.7310-4.5377 weighted (9.340)** (0.801) (9.977)** (5.397)** (0.942) (5.097)** Log geodesic distance -0.1501-0.0296-0.0959-0.4262-2.3870-0.3016 (5.103)** (0.530) (2.984)** (2.195)* (0.982) (1.424) 1 for contiguity 1.9217-0.1019 1.9290 5.3173-3.8857 5.3342 (13.879)** (1.121) (13.911)** (5.199)** (1.170) (5.217)** Constant 0.1134 3.2893-0.1842-0.7472-23.8304-1.4326 (0.546) (9.463)** (0.821) (0.589) (1.655) (1.029) Observations 13,175 756 13,175 13,175 406 13,175 Adjusted R 2 0.173 0.046 0.171 0.064 0.131 0.064 Beta coefficient on Fst GD -8.011 3.132-13.126-4.223 4.346-6.842 Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The standardized beta is the effect of a standard deviation change in genetic distance as a percentage of the standard deviation of the dependent variable). Controls: In addition to reported coefficients, every column includes controls for log absolute difference in longitudes, log absolute difference in 10

Table AUR9 - Further tests for nonlinearities and further geographic controls (Section 3.5) (Dependent variable: dichotomous indicator of conflict; estimator: probit) (1) (2) Distance interaction term Add distance squared Fst genetic distance, -14.3834-20.1657** weighted (-0.630) (-9.456) Interaction of log distance -0.6279 and Fst gen. dist. (-0.241) Log distance, squared 0.2668* (2.532) Log geodesic distance -1.5944** -5.8207** (-5.087) (-3.453) 1 for contiguity 15.5388** 13.2547** (10.018) (8.852) # of observations 13,175 13,175 Pseudo-R 2 0.275 0.276 Standardized effect (%) -17.25-24.18 Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Probit marginal effects reported in all columns. For dummy variables, marginal effects are for discrete changes from 0 to 1. All marginal effects were multiplied by 100 for readability. The standardized magnitude is the effect of a one standard deviation increase in genetic distance as a percentage of the mean probability of conflict. 11

Table AUR10: Panel analysis, 1816-2001 (Section 3.5) (Dependent variable: dichotomous indicator of conflict) (1) (2) (3) (4) Add some Add dummy time-varying for both controls democracies Baseline specification Add difference in national capabilities index Fst genetic distance -1.3230** -0.9305** -0.9313** -0.8092** (-5.796) (-8.642) (-8.922) (-8.417) Log geodesic distance -0.1518** -0.0743** -0.0735** -0.0534** (-4.671) (-4.379) (-4.487) (-3.998) Log absolute difference -0.0165-0.0027-0.0003-0.0163 in longitudes (-0.796) (-0.270) (-0.029) (-1.933) Log absolute difference -0.0607** -0.0280** -0.0250** -0.0258** in latitudes (-3.309) (-3.100) (-2.927) (-3.474) 1 for contiguity 0.8463** 0.4443** 0.4227** 0.4862** (7.235) (7.760) (7.760) (8.399) Number of landlocked -0.2059** -0.1267** -0.1197** -0.1009** countries in the pair (-6.224) (-7.541) (-7.553) (-6.800) Number of island 0.1720** 0.0503** 0.0551** 0.0540** countries in the pair (4.371) (2.593) (2.969) (3.116) 1 if pair shares at least 0.0674 0.1002** 0.1029** 0.0679** one sea or ocean (1.648) (4.212) (4.501) (3.364) Log product of land areas in 0.0979** 0.0544** 0.0511** 0.0376** square km (13.164) (15.532) (15.762) (12.083) 1 for pairs ever in colonial 0.2483** 0.1152** 0.1478** 0.1270** relationship (3.066) (2.797) (3.413) (3.227) 1 if countries were or are the 0.0229 0.0457 0.0444 0.0679 same country (0.262) (1.005) (1.021) (1.592) Number of peaceful years -0.0070** -0.0066** -0.0059** (-14.021) (-13.545) (-13.687) Number of other conflicts 0.0037** 0.0035** 0.0035** in year t (16.334) (16.748) (18.425) Dummy for alliance active -0.0667** -0.0593** -0.0604** in year t (-5.150) (-4.686) (-5.505) 1 if both countries are -0.0935** -0.0910** democracies (polity2>5) (-8.670) (-8.088) Absolute difference in 1.1408** National Capabilities Index (13.621) Pseudo-R 2 0.210 0.295 0.300 0.321 Standardized effect -12.11-8.513-8.521-7.395 Robust t statistics in parentheses (clustering at the country pair level); * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The standardized magnitude is the effect of a one standard deviation increase in genetic distance as a percentage of the mean probability of conflict. Probit marginal effects reported throughout. For dummy variables, marginal effects are for discrete changes from 0 to 1. All marginal effects were multiplied by 100 for readability (underlying average probability of conflict is 0.72%). All specifications were estimated with 517,251 observations from 13,175 country pairs. 12

Table AUR11: Post-1953 panel analysis, controlling for trade variables and absolute income differences (Section 3.5) (Dependent variable: dichotomous indicator of conflict; estimator: probit) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Pairs with Control Additional Add per at least for trade trade capita one OECD terms terms income member a difference Baseline with common sample Add total income difference Fst genetic -0.5195** -0.5267** -0.3419** -0.3253** -0.3689** -0.3301** distance (-6.964) (-4.012) (-5.784) (-5.475) (-5.335) (-4.512) Log geodesic -0.0120-0.0029 0.0056 0.0052 0.0015 0.0031 distance (-1.793) (-0.189) (0.795) (0.721) (0.223) (0.434) 1 for contiguity 0.2856** 0.0560 0.2396** 0.2325** 0.2932** 0.2527** (6.907) (1.141) (7.494) (7.469) (7.620) (7.235) 1 if both countries -0.0412** -0.0745** -0.0321** -0.0249** -0.0214** -0.0257** are democracies (-5.140) (-6.111) (-5.257) (-3.845) (-3.073) (-3.699) Absolute diff. in national 0.4063** 0.2843* 0.1641* 0.1516* 0.1758* 0.2291* capabilities index (5.018) (2.252) (2.116) (1.983) (1.968) (2.325) Log bilateral -0.0405** -0.0386** -0.0349** -0.0387** openness, t-4 (-4.521) (-4.283) (-3.844) (-3.996) Log multilateral 0.0459 0.0512 0.0010 0.0142 openness, t-4 (1.523) (1.735) (0.033) (0.423) Log distance * log -0.0079* -0.0085* -0.0027-0.0045 multilateral openness (-2.034) (-2.249) (-0.681) (-1.062) Log distance * log 0.0052** 0.0050** 0.0045** 0.0050** bilateral openness (4.650) (4.481) (3.910) (4.076) Dummy for zero -0.0176* -0.0173* -0.0146-0.0158* trade, t-4 (-2.524) (-2.557) (-1.947) (-2.050) Free trade area -0.0242** -0.0217* -0.0230* (full set) (-2.824) (-2.260) (-2.533) # of GATT -0.0150** -0.0166** -0.0177** members (-3.723) (-3.893) (-4.149) Absolute diff. in 1.6054** log p.c. income (4.650) Absolute diff. in -0.0519 total GDP (-0.195) # of observations 226,357 91,112 226,357 226,357 202,523 202,523 (# of pairs) (9,127) (2,870) (9,127) (9,127) (9,127) (9,127) Pseudo R 2 0.341 0.283 0.351 0.354 0.357 0.352 Standardized effect -6.576-6.524-4.328-4.118-5.248-4.695 Robust t statistics in parentheses (clustering at the country pair level); * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The standardized magnitude is the effect of a one standard deviation increase in genetic distance as a percentage of the mean probability of conflict. Probit marginal effects reported in all columns. For dummy variables, marginal effects are for discrete changes from 0 to 1. All marginal effects were multiplied by 100 for readability. a : OECD membership defined as of 1975. There is no difference in results when using 2000 membership status as a filter instead. Controls: In addition to reported coefficients, every column includes: Log absolute difference in longitudes, log absolute difference in latitudes, number of landlocked countries in the pair, number of island countries in the pair, dummy=1 if pair shares at least one sea or ocean, log product of land areas in square km, dummy=1 for pairs ever in colonial relationship, dummy=1 if countries were or are the same country, number of peaceful years, number of other wars in year t, dummy for alliance active in year t. 13