Interim WHO guidance for the surveillance of human infection with swine influenza A(H1N1) virus

Similar documents
Human infection with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus: updated interim WHO guidance on global surveillance

Situation update pandemic (H1N1) 2009

ORIGINAL ARTICLE INFLUENZA A (H1N1) PANDEMIC: PAHANG EXPERIENCE ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION

Influenza at the human-animal interface

Regional Update Influenza (August 16, h GMT; 12 h EST)

Georgia Weekly Influenza Report

Global updates on avian influenza and tools to assess pandemic potential. Julia Fitnzer Global Influenza Programme WHO Geneva

MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE John M. Colmers, Secretary

Highlights. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE Influenza Surveillance Report Week ending January 28, 2017 (Week 4)

Influenza A(H1N1)2009 pandemic Chronology of the events in Belgium

WHO Technical Consultation on the severity of disease caused by the new influenza A (H1N1) virus infections

دکتر بهروز نقیلی استاد بیماریهای عفونی مرکس تحقیقات بیماریهای عفونی و گرمسیری پاییس 88

Georgia Weekly Influenza Report

Georgia Weekly Influenza Report

SURVEILLANCE & EPIDEMIOLOGIC INVESTIGATION NC Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Public Health

Influenza Surveillance in the United St ates

Human Cases of Swine Influenza in California, Kansas, New York City, Ohio, Texas, and Mexico Key Points April 26, 2009

2009 H1N1 (Pandemic) virus IPMA September 30, 2009 Anthony A Marfin

Issue No.1, December 2010 From the WHO Regional Office for Europe, WHO/EURO -

Influenza Activity in Indiana

Flu Watch. MMWR Week 4: January 21 to January 27, and Deaths. Virologic Surveillance. Influenza-Like Illness Surveillance

Influenza Surveillance Report

The Influenza Epidemiological Reporting Form

Surveillance of unusual events in the context of influenza

Influenza-Associated Hospitalization and Death Surveillance: Dallas County

Human Cases of Influenza A (H1N1) of Swine Origin in the United States and Abroad Updated Key Points April 29, 2008: 9:58AM

The role of National Influenza Centres (NICs) during Interpandemic, Pandemic Alert and Pandemic Periods

STARK COUNTY INFLUENZA SNAPSHOT, WEEK 15 Week ending 18 April, With updates through 04/26/2009.

Regional Update Pandemic (H1N1) 2009

Promoting Public Health Security Addressing Avian Influenza A Viruses and Other Emerging Diseases

8. Public Health Measures

2009 (Pandemic) H1N1 Influenza Virus

National Protocol on

Pandemic (H1N1) (August 14, h GMT; 12 h EST) Update on the Qualitative Indicators

Influenza Virologic Surveillance Right Size Roadmap. Implementation Checklists. June 2014

Public Health Agency of Canada Skip to content Skip to institutional links Common menu bar links

Microbiology Laboratory Directors, Infection Preventionists, Primary Care Providers, Emergency Department Directors, Infectious Disease Physicians

Pandemic (H1N1) (August 28, h GMT; 12 h EST) Update on the qualitative indicators

INFLUENZA EPIDEMIOLOGY IN KENYA

NCCID RAPID REVIEW. 1. What are the case definitions and guidelines for surveillance and reporting purposes?

Information collected from influenza surveillance allows public health authorities to:

BC MHOs, PHNLs, ICPs, ERDOCs, IDSPEC, MEDMICRO, AMBULANCE, BCCDC Internal Groups, National Surveillance Network Partners

Weekly Influenza & Respiratory Activity: Statistics Summary

Global Challenges of Pandemic and Avian Influenza. 19 December 2006 Keiji Fukuda Global influenza Programme

Weekly Influenza Activity: Statistics Summary

California Department of Public Health

Regional Update EW 44 Influenza (November 16, h GMT; 12 h EST)

INFLUENZA SURVEILLANCE

Cough, Cough, Sneeze, Wheeze: Update on Respiratory Disease

Regional Update Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (March 15, h GMT; 12 h EST)

Influenza Surveillance to Inform Decision Making

Flu Watch. MMWR Week 3: January 14 to January 20, and Deaths. Virologic Surveillance. Influenza-Like Illness Surveillance

Guideline for the Surveillance of Pandemic Influenza (From Phase 4 Onwards)

Second intercountry meeting on the Eastern Mediterranean Acute Respiratory Infection Surveillance (EMARIS) network

Tarrant County Influenza Surveillance Weekly Report CDC Week 10: March 2-8, 2014

Health Establishments Preparation for Unusual or Unexpected Cases or Clusters of Severe Acute Respiratory Infection (SARI)

Influenza Surveillance In the WHO African Region

Data at a Glance: February 8 14, 2015 (Week 6)

Epidemiological Report: Influenza A/H1N1 Malta 15 July 2009

Issue No. 9, December 2013

CDC Health Advisory 04/29/2009

Tool for Pandemic Influenza Risk Assessment (TIPRA) Presented by Gina Samaan Global Influenza Programme

County of Los Angeles Department of Health Services Public Health

ARIZONA INFLUENZA SUMMARY Week 1 (1/4/2015 1/10/2015)

Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response

Tarrant County Influenza Surveillance Weekly Report CDC Week 20: May 11-17, 2014

Influenza Surveillance Summary: Denton County Hospitals and Providers 17.51% 15.95% 10.94% 7.41% 9.01% 8.08%

Ports, Airports and Ground. Crossings, Lyon Office. 25 June 2009

HEALTH ALERT SWINE INFLUENZA SITUATION UPDATE UPDATED PATIENT TESTING PRIORITIZATION INTERIM GUIDANCE ON ANTIVIRALS

Reporting of Severe and Fatal Pediatric Influenza New Jersey Department of Health Influenza Season

Part 1: The Rationale for Sentinel Surveillance to Monitor Seasonal and Pandemic Influenza

Devon Community Resilience. Influenza Pandemics. Richard Clarke Emergency Preparedness Manager Public Health England South West Centre

Ontario Novel H1N1 Influenza A Virus Epidemiologic Summary June 4, 2009 As of 8:30am, June 4, 2009

6. SURVEILLANCE AND OUTRBREAK RESPONSE

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE. nyc.gov/health

Manitoba Influenza Surveillance Report

Incidence of Seasonal Influenza

Regional Update Pandemic (H1N1) 2009

Surveillance, Reporting and Control of Influenza and Pertussis. Steve Fleming, EdM Hillary Johnson, MHS Epidemiologists Immunization Program, MDPH

Tarrant County Influenza Surveillance Weekly Report CDC Week 35, August 27-September 2, 2017

STRENGTHENING OUTBREAK PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE IN THE AFRICAN REGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT INFLUENZA PANDEMIC

Travel and transport risk assessment. Preparedness for potential outbreak of

School Dismissal Monitoring Revised Protocol Overview July 30, 2009

Influenza-Associated Pediatric Mortality rev Jan 2018

Swine Flu. Background. Interim Recommendations. Infectious Period. Case Definitions for Infection with Swine-origin

Influenza Virologic Surveillance Right Size Project. Launch July 2013

NOVEL INFLUENZA A (H1N1) Swine Flu

Influenza : What is going on? How can Community Health Centers help their patients?

Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Overview

Tarrant County Influenza Surveillance Weekly Report CDC Week 40: Oct 2-8, 2016

Manitoba Influenza Surveillance Report

Manitoba Influenza Surveillance Report 2012/2013 Season

Tarrant County Influenza Surveillance Weekly Report CDC Week 06: February 2-8, 2014

Pediatric Infections caused by the Swine-Origin Influenza A (H1N1) Virus (S-OIV) 5/1/09 Update

Running head: INFLUENZA VIRUS SEASON PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 1

Guideline for Students and Staff at Post-Secondary Institutions and Private Vocational Training Providers

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) and Avian Influenza A (H7N9) update

Weekly Influenza & Respiratory Illness Activity Report

Minnesota Influenza Geographic Spread

Transcription:

Interim WHO guidance for the surveillance of human infection with swine influenza A(H1N1) virus 29 April 2009 Introduction The audiences for this guidance document are the National Focal Points for the International Health Regulations (IHR(2005)) and competent national public health authorities. The primary focus of this guidance document is global surveillance. It also gives some suggestions on the types of signals that Member States and IHR States Parties can capture in their event-based surveillance. These signals can aid identification of individuals for whom investigation of swine influenza A(H1N1) virus infection is warranted. This is an interim WHO guidance on the global surveillance of the emerging swine influenza A(H1N1) virus infection. This is a living document that will be reviewed on a weekly basis and modified in accordance with changes in the epidemiology of this virus. As the event evolves, there will be a need to switch surveillance activities to the longer-term monitoring of the disease. WHO will alert countries when a change in surveillance objectives and methods occurs. WHO s data requirements will remain as flexible as possible to accommodate different surveillance systems and reporting capacity around the world. This document will form part of a suite of guidance documents being produced by WHO in response to this public health emergency of international concern as determined by the Director General of WHO on 25 April 2009. New influenza virus sub-types and clusters of unknown and unusual disease are notifiable to WHO in accordance with the Annex 2 decision instrument of the IHR (2005). At this early stage of the outbreak of swine influenza A(H1N1) virus, the main aims of surveillance are the early warning of virus spread and laboratory confirmation of virus circulating in new geographical areas and countries. Accordingly, WHO encourages all Member States and IHR States Parties to enhance their surveillance and diagnostic capacity for influenza and other acute respiratory infections, building on exiting surveillance structure and resources.

Objectives of enhanced global surveillance for human infections with swine influenza A(H1N1) virus Specific objectives of this surveillance activity are to guide global prevention and control activities through the following actions: 1. Detect and confirm cases of swine influenza A(H1N1) virus infection 2. Establish the extent of international spread of swine influenza A(H1N1) virus infection 3. Assist in the early severity assessment of the disease Case definitions for infections with swine influenza A(H1N1) Virus In order to understand the spectrum of severity of the disease caused by swine influenza A(H1N1) virus infection, the clinical case description includes both mild form of influenza-like illness (ILI) and more severe forms (lower respiratory tract infections including pneumonia and severe acute respiratory illness (SARI)). In addition, asymptomatic laboratory-confirmed infections should be reported. The following case definitions are for the purpose of reporting probable and confirmed cases of swine influenza A(H1N1) virus infection to WHO. Clinical case description Acute febrile respiratory illness (fever >38 C ) with the spectrum of disease from influenza-like illness to pneumonia. 1. A Confirmed case of swine influenza A(H1N1) virus infection is defined as an individual with laboratory confirmed swine influenza A(H1N1) virus infection by one or more of the following tests*: real-time RT-PCR viral culture four-fold rise in swine influenza A(H1N1) virus specific neutralizing antibodies. 2. A Probable case of swine influenza A(H1N1) virus infection is defined as an individual with an influenza test that is positive for influenza A, but is unsubtypable by reagents used to detect seasonal influenza virus infection OR A individual with a clinically compatible illness or who died of an unexplained acute respiratory illness who is considered to be epidemiologically linked to a probable or confirmed case. * Note: The test(s) should be performed according to the most currently available guidance on testing (http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/en/index.html).

Reporting requirements for confirmed and probable cases of swine influenza A(H1N1) Under the IHR (2005), immediate reporting to WHO is required for human influenza due to a new influenza virus sub-type. All information will be treated in accordance with the IHR (2005) provisions. If available, countries should report travel history of case(s). Reports should be sent by the National IHR Focal Point to the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point at the WHO Regional Office, the WHO Country Representative, where applicable, and WHO headquarters in Geneva should be copied on the correspondence (http://www.who.int/csr/alertresponse/ihreventinfo/). Reporting of individual(s) or clusters under investigation for swine influenza A(H1N1) virus infection Countries that identify unusual clusters of acute respiratory illness should immediately notify WHO. These consultations will not be reflected in global statistics until their investigation confirms that they are laboratory-confirmed or probable cases. Definition of cluster A cluster is defined as two or more persons presenting with manifestations of unexplained, acute respiratory illness with fever >38 C or who died of an unexplained respiratory illness and that are detected with onset of illness within a period of 14 days and in the same geographical area and/or are epidemiologically linked. Triggers/signals for the investigation of possible cases of swine influenza A(H1N1) The primary focus of early investigation is to trigger the initial investigation. Specific triggers include: Clusters of cases of unexplained ILI or acute lower respiratory disease Severe, unexplained respiratory illness occurring in one or more health care worker(s) who provide care for patients with respiratory disease Changes in the epidemiology of mortality associated with the occurrence of ILI or lower respiratory tract illness, an increase in deaths observed from respiratory illness or an increase in the occurrence of severe respiratory disease in previously healthy adults or adolescents Persistent changes noted in the treatment response or outcome of severe lower respiratory illness. Epidemiological risk factors that should raise suspicion of swine influenza A(H1N1) include: Close contact # to a confirmed case of swine influenza A(H1N1) virus infection while the case was ill Recent travel to an area where there are confirmed cases of swine influenza A (H1N1) # Close contact: having cared for, lived with, or had direct contact with respiratory secretions or body fluids of a probable or confirmed case of swine influenza A(H1N1).

Member States reporting cases of swine influenza A(H1N1) virus infection for the first time As soon as a the National IHR Focal Point or competent national public health authority notifies WHO of the first laboratory-confirmed or probable case(s) of swine influenza A(H1N1), WHO will make available the case summary form and database for the recording of detailed clinical, laboratory and epidemiological data in accordance with WHO pandemic surveillance guidelines. WHO Swine Influenza A(H1N1) Case Summary Form for case-based data collection [pdf 318kb] http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/swineflu/whocasebasedsummaryform.pdf A(H1N1) daily aggregated indicators [pdf 64kb] http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/swineflu/ah1n1_daily_aggregated.pdf WHO also requires information to assess whether sustained community transmission is occurring. Wherever possible, a detailed exposure history should be collected by Member States and shared with WHO. Member States where cases of swine influenza A(H1N1) virus infection have already been reported Until further notice, the National IHR Focal Points or competent national public health authorities should report to WHO all probable and confirmed cases on a daily basis. Deaths should be reported for both probable and confirmed cases. A reporting format has been posted on the web (link). WHO will present the cumulative number of cases for global reporting back to Member States and the public. This activity will only continue for the initial period of data collection. In order to understand the severity of the disease it is very important that comprehensive data collection and follow up is carried out for all probable and confirmed cases of swine influenza A(H1N1) virus infection. WHO s data requirements are detailed in the Global Surveillance during an Influenza Pandemic Version 1 Updated draft April 2009 (Comprehensive Assessment, Clinical characteristics: Database of information for 100 cases). A WHO Swine Influenza A(H1N1) Case Summary Form has been posted on the web (Link). Member States are encouraged to report on methods used for the selection of cases for inclusion into the dataset in order to assist the interpretation of any result. Confirmed and probable cases reported are to be attributed to the country or territory in which they are currently located or where they have died. The reported case-based data will be used by WHO to assess the clinical disease spectrum and severity, and guide treatment recommendations. National Influenza Centres and National reference centres should continue to report virological information to Flu Net.

Access to Laboratory Confirmation Countries without current capacity to confirm swine influenza A(H1N1) should contact WHO to arrange access to a laboratory with this capability.