Acute, Generalized Vesicular or Pustular Rash Illness Testing Protocol in the United States

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Acute, Generalized Vesicular or Pustular Rash Illness Testing Protocol in the United States Introduction This protocol has been developed to illustrate the types of laboratory testing to be undertaken in different situations involving patients with acute, generalized vesicular or pustular rash illness. The protocol is composed of four charts, each illustrating a different set of symptoms or circumstances. It has been designed to correlate with Evaluating s for Smallpox: Acute, Generalized Vesicular or Pustular Rash Illness Protocol (www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/diagnosis/riskalgorithm). This is a pre-event algorithm, designed to address testing needs when no poxvirus emergency has been detected or declared. Changes to this algorithm may be required in an event. Any updates to the algorithm will be announced by the Laboratory Response Network. Chart 1 lists the symptoms associated with acute, generalized vesicular or pustular rash illness and categorizes the risk of smallpox according to the patient s signs and symptoms. Chart 2 presents a flow chart for laboratory testing of specimens from patients presenting with acute, generalized vesicular or pustular rash illness, following the assessment per the Acute, Generalized Vesicular or Pustular Rash Illness protocol (see above and chart 1 for abstraction of the protocol). A two-armed algorithm is presented to reduce the time to receive results and to ensure that testing of high-risk specimens is confined to laboratories with appropriate biosafety levels and expertise. The two arms of the testing algorithm are for 1) specimens from individuals with low- and moderate-risk symptoms and 2) specimens from individuals with high-risk symptoms. Major points: a) high-risk specimens/cases require consultation with CDC b) low- or moderate-risk specimens/cases should be worked-up for more common causes of febrile exanthema. Due to the differences in run temperature between the Non-variola Orthopoxvirus PCR and the Orthopoxvirus PCR, the two assays cannot be performed simultaneously. If orthopoxvirus is suspected, then the Non-variola Orthopoxvirus PCR permits the laboratory to identify an orthopoxvirus and reassure that the specimen does not contain variola. The Orthopoxvirus generic PCR can be performed subsequently to provide additional confidence in the result. c) in the absence of endemic smallpox disease, the indiscriminate use of variola tests will lead to false positives. Chart 3 presents a testing algorithm that should be used when a smallpox vaccine adverse event or monkeypox infection is suspected. Chart 4 presents an orthopoxvirus testing algorithm for environmental samples. The testing protocols are supported at Laboratory Response Network (LRN) reference laboratories. Details for performance and interpretation of each assay are specified in each LRN procedure. Details on specimen collection can be found at the following websites: Smallpox vaccine: www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination/vaccinia-specimen-collection.asp Smallpox: www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/response-plan/files/guide-d.pdf Monkeypox: www.cdc.gov/ncidod/monkeypox/diagspecimens.htm rashtestingprotocol.111407 11/14/2007 Page 1 of 5

ACUTE, GENERALIZED VESICULAR OR PUSTULAR RASH ILLNESS PROTOCOL with Acute, Generalized Vesicular or Pustular Rash Illness Institute Airborne & Contact Precautions Alert Infection Control on Admission Low Risk of Smallpox Moderate Risk of Smallpox High Risk of Smallpox History and Exam Highly Suggestive of Varicella Diagnosis Uncertain ID and/or Derm Consultation VZV +/- Other Lab Testing as Indicated ID and/or Derm Consultation Local and State Health Depts Varicella Testing Optional Test for VZV and Other Conditions as Indicated Non-Smallpox Diagnosis Confirmed Report Results to Infx Control No Diagnosis Made Ensure Adequacy of Specimen ID or Derm Consultant Re-evaluate Appropriate Treatment for Varicella/Other Conditions as Clinically Indicated Response Team Advises on Management and Specimen Collection Risk of Smallpox Cannot R/O Smallpox Contact Local/State Health Dept. Testing at CDC High Risk of Smallpox 1. Febrile prodrome AND 2. Classic smallpox lesion AND 3. Lesions in same stage of development NOT Smallpox Continue Diagnostic Testing SMALLPOX Moderate Risk of Smallpox Febrile prodrome AND one other MAJOR smallpox criterion OR Febrile prodrome AND >4 MINOR smallpox criteria Low Risk of Smallpox No febrile prodrome OR Febrile prodrome AND <4 MINOR smallpox criteria Major Smallpox Criteria: Febrile prodrome >101F, 1-4 days prior to rash onset with headache, back ache, or abdominal pain Firm, deep-seated, well-circumscribed vesicles/pustules Lesions in the same stage of development in any one area of the body Minor Smallpox Criteria: Centrifugal distribution of lesions First lesions in the pharynx, oral mucosa appears toxic Slow evolution of rash 1-2 days each stage: macule, papule, vesicle Lesions on the palms and soles Chart 1 11/14/2007 Page 2 of 5

LABORATORY TESTING FOR ACUTE, GENERALIZED VESICULAR OR PUSTULAR RASH ILLNESS IN THE UNITED STATES Take digital photos of clinical presentations for electronic consultations. Low and Moderate Risk Specimens (Green and Yellow Boxes) Evaluated by Healthcare Practitioner, Infectious Disease or Dermatology Specialist High-Risk Specimens (Red Box) If VZV diagnosis is questionable begin lab testing Immediately refer to Variola Testing Laboratory Initiate Chain-of-Custody documentation at FBI direction Sentinel Laboratories and / or LRN Reference Laboratories Use BSL-2 facilities DFA: VZV and HSV PCR: VZV, HSV, Enterovirus (where available) EM: (where available) Viral culture: as appropriate Consider biopsy for erythema multiforme Consider: Tzanck smear (herpesviruses) EM (if available) Consultation with PHL and CDC Rule out variola, prior to other testing, at laboratory with specific variola test capacity. LRN-designated Variola Testing Laboratories and CDC will have this capacity. CDC will test split sample simultaneously. Results must not be released without CDC confirmation. Once reliable performance of assays in surge labs is demonstrated (post-event) CDC confirmation may be discontinued. VZV, HSV, Enterovirus or other non-orthopoxvirus POS Non-orthopoxvirus Diagnosis No further testing (unless clinically indicated) VZV, HSV, Enterovirus and other non-orthopoxvirus NEG Possible Orthopoxvirus Run Non-variola Orthopoxvirus PCR Vaccine-related adverse event or possible monkeypox. For verification of the result, the Orthopoxvirus PCR may be used EM at local facility BSL-3 preparation of grids Variola Testing Laboratories Enhanced BSL-3 required Variola PCR Non-variola orthopoxvirus PCR EM (if available) All other specimens referred to CDC If all tests are NEG: Re-evaluate patient condition and assess need for dermatologic and histologic testing, including tests for erythema multiforme; consider biopsy. For additional confirmation that orthopoxvirus is not present in the specimen, the Orthopoxvirus PCR may be used. If patient symptoms progress to more closely resemble smallpox, refer all specimens to CDC and/or LRN labs with Variola PCR testing capability. Sequester all viral cultures and specimens. Contact PHL for transport of specimens. All orthopox tests NEG: Perform the following: DFA: VZV, HSV PCR: VZV, HSV, Enterovirus Viral culture and other diagnostic tests as clinically indicated. Non-variola orthopox & Orthopox PCR POS & Variola PCR NEG= Vaccine-related adverse event or monkeypox. Variola & Orthopox PCR both POSITIVE HIGHLY suggestive of SMALLPOX CALL CDC immediately prior to release of results Director s Emergency Operation Center (DEOC) Chart 2 11/14/2007 Page 3 of 5

LABORATORY TESTING FOR SUSPECTED SMALLPOX VACCINE (VACCINIA) ADVERSE EVENTS OR MONKEYPOX IN THE UNITED STATES Acceptable specimens: Vesicular touch prep Vesicle roof Vesicular swab Ocular swab or impression slide Biopsy specimens Take digital photos of clinical presentations for electronic consultations. with Suspected Vaccine-Related Adverse Event or Monkeypox** All Sentinel Laboratory and Reference LRN with no Orthopoxvirus PCR capacity Refer only LRN Labs (with PCR capability) Non-variola Orthopoxvirus PCR EM (if available) Note: A non-variola orthopoxvirus PCR POS and orthopoxvirus PCR NEG should not be generated. If that occurs, consult CDC Poxvirus Helpdesk Test Results EM (optional): POS for poxvirus Orthopoxvirus PCR: NEG EM (optional): NEG for poxvirus Vaccine-related adverse event or monkeypox. Evaluate exposure history and contact CDC to submit specimen for confirmatory tests. Re-evaluate patient condition and assess need for dermatologic and histologic testing, including tests for erythema multiforme; consider biopsy. Perform: DFA: VZV, HSV PCR: VZV, HSV, Enterovirus Viral culture and other diagnostic tests as clinically indicated Orthopoxvirus identified - possible variola* Refer immediately to CDC for confirmatory testing Call the Director s Emergency Operation Center (DEOC) ** includes any non-variola orthopoxvirus, such as vaccinia, monkeypox and cowpox. *Note: Could also represent differential sensitivities of the assays Chart 3 11/14/2007 Page 4 of 5

LABORATORY TESTING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES IN THE UNITED STATES Initiate Chain-of-Custody documentation Environmental Samples Law Enforcement Credible Threat Assessment (Explosives, radiation, hazardous chemicals and toxins ruled out) Sentinel Laboratory Refer only LRN Reference Laboratory Non-variola orthopoxvirus PCR EM (with CDC consultation only) Note: A non-variola orthopoxvirus PCR POS and orthopoxvirus PCR NEG should not be generated. If that occurs, contact CDC Poxvirus Helpdesk. Test Results Orthopoxvirus PCR: NEG EM: NEG for poxvirus Orthopoxvirus ruled out. Assess need for further testing with law enforcement. Report negative results to other groups investigating specimens. Orthopoxvirus material identified - most likely non-variola Refer to CDC for confirmatory testing. Orthopoxvirus material identified - possible variola. Refer immediately to CDC for confirmatory testing. Call the Director s Emergency Operation Center (DEOC) Chart 4 11/14/2007 Page 5 of 5