Divergent Thinking and Evaluation Skills: Do They Always Go Together?

Journal of Creative Behavior MAGDALENA GROHMAN ZOFIA WODNIECKA MARCIN KLUSAK Divergent Thinking and Evaluation Skills: Do They Always Go Together? ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION The aim of the present study was to explore the hypothesized relationship between divergent thinking (DT) and two types of evaluation: interpersonal (judgments about others ideas) and intrapersonal (judgments about one s own ideas). Divergent thinking and evaluation skills were measured by means of a GenEva (Generation and Evaluation) task. There were two conditions of the task: intrapersonal and interpersonal, and two aspects of a given idea were assessed: originality and uniqueness. The main results suggest that (1) overall DT skill is positively related to intrapersonal evaluation of uniqueness; (2) the originality component of DT skill is negatively related to intrapersonal evaluation of uniqueness; (3) overall DT is negatively related to intrapersonal evaluation of originality; (4) underestimation of idea uniqueness is more salient in interpersonal evaluation, particularly in case of those with high DT skill. The results are discussed in terms of author s and observer s perspectives of judgment. Imagine that you have written several limericks. You are reading each of them out loud, and think to yourself: It s nice! I ve done a good work!. Reading them for the second time, you have decided which is the nicest one, the most original, with some creative and unique phrases. However, there is one thing that is bothering you: will others like them just as much as you do? Maybe you like the limericks, because they are products of your thought, your sense of humor, and your knowledge? You may now ponder about the following: were you critical enough about your limericks? You recognized them as quite creative and original, but does that recognition make you a 125 Volume 40 Number 2 Second Quarter 2006 57

Divergent Thinking, Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Evaluation good judge of your work? And, more importantly, does this mean that you will be a good judge of someone else s work? Is there a difference between critical thinking and recognition of originality and creativity? The existing models of the creative process agree on a few distinctive phases of the process: problem finding, recognizing the best-fitting problem representation, generating solutions, and verification or evaluation (Wallas, 1926; Lubart, 1994; Mumford, Mobley, Uhlman, Reiter-Palmon, & Doares, 1991). Most thoroughly studied are two stages: problem finding and generation. The fact that these two stages have been of central interest in research most likely stems from their assumed importance in problem solving. However, recent studies point to the evaluation phase as a critical stage in creative problem solving (Brophy, 1998; Guilford, 1967; Hoover & Feldhusen, 1994; Lubart, 1994; Runco, 1993; Runco, 1991; Runco & Basadur, 1993; Runco and Chand, 1994; Runco & Smith, 1992; Runco & Vega, 1990; Torrance, 1988). According to this view, a creative person not only generates a great number of ideas or solutions to the problem at hand, showing great divergent thinking abilities, but she or he is also able to judge accurately which of the products are original, adequate, or novel. Thus, we can pose a question whether being a successful creator or problem-solver indeed means being able to show both divergent thinking and critical, evaluative skills. If so, then the following questions seem to be relevant: (1) Can an author of an idea be a reliable and accurate critic of products of her own mental processes? (2) Can a creator be a good judge of someone else s ideas? (3) Does the ability to generate numerous and original ideas make a judgment more or less difficult? In other words, is a person with high ability to generate ideas also accurate in judging ideas? And if so, how accurate is such a person? Is there a relationship between generation and evaluation skills in creative individuals? There have been quite a few studies that have directly (Runco, 1990; Runco, 1993; Chand and Runco, 1992; Runco and Chand, 1994) and indirectly (Sternberg and Lubart, 1993, 1995) addressed the three questions highlighted in the previous paragraph. The questions of whether creative individuals can be valuable judges of their own work and the work of others remain, however, still unresolved. The aim of the reported study was to further investigate the relationship between intraand interpersonal evaluation and divergent thinking. Let us first shortly review the most important findings in this area. 126 58

Journal of Creative Behavior As mentioned before, some models of creativity assume the co-existence of divergent and convergent abilities. The former abilities may be related to ideational fluency, flexibility and originality, and the latter refer to critical thinking and evaluation of ideas (Brophy, 1998; Gadzella & Penland, 1995; Guilford 1967; Guilford, 1975; Hoover & Feldhusen, 1994; Runco, 1991; Runco & Chand, 1994; Runco & Chand, 1995; Runco & Vega, 1990). Although almost every student of creativity would agree with the above characteristics of creativity, there is still an ongoing discussion on the nature of relationship between the two sets of abilities. For example, Gadzella and Penland (1995) found a positive relationship between personality traits attributed to creativity and critical thinking tests. According to them, highly imaginative individuals showed higher abilities to make inferences, weigh evidence, and evaluate arguments than their less creative counterparts (but see Bisset, 2000 for discussion of the results). On the other hand, Sternberg (Sternberg and Lubart, 1995, 1993; Lubart & Sternberg, 1995) defines critical thinking in terms of broad and more general analytical abilities, and proposes that they are independent of creativity. For example, a person with analytic abilities will be able to tease a problem apart and look at it critically, but may not be able to produce numerous solutions. On the other hand, a person who scores high in divergent thinking tests, may have difficulties in noticing a problem or in judging whether a solution is an appropriate one. Thus, according to this approach, a good divergent thinker may not necessarily be a good judge of his/her own or others products of creative thought. Runco and his colleagues present quite a different view on the relation between divergent thinking and ability to judge. According to them, real-world creative problem-solving requires a process that will enable a creator to recognize or evaluate originality and creativity of ideas (see Runco, 2003 for a detailed review). According to Runco (1991, 1993, 1994, 2003) evaluation is a selective and critical process in which original, creative or potentially useful ideas are being recognized and chosen over more repetitive, irrelevant and inappropriate ones. In a number of studies, Runco and others (Basadur, Runco & Vega, 2000; Runco, 1991; Runco, 1993; Runco, 1994; Runco & Smith, 1992; Runco & Chand, 1994; Runco & Vega, 1990) give empirical evidence for a relationship between divergent thinking and evaluation. Namely, they show that divergent 127 59

Divergent Thinking, Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Evaluation thinking is associated with intrapersonal evaluation of originality; individuals scoring high on divergent thinking tests are more accurate in recognizing originality of their own ideas. One of the explanatory hypotheses proposed by the authors stresses the role of an expertise of highly original and fluent individuals. Namely, by virtue of generating numerous original ideas, those individuals may be more sensitive to this aspect of the products of the creative process (Runco & Chand, 1994). A question that arises is whether divergent thinking is related not only to evaluation of a creator s own work (intrapersonal) but also to the accuracy of evaluation of somebody else s work (interpersonal). Here, the empirical evidence is not as clear and conclusive as in the case of intrapersonal evaluation. When investigating children s evaluative skills, Runco (1993; 1991) found moderate and significant correlations between divergent thinking indices (fluency and originality) and accuracy of interpersonal evaluation. On the other hand, Runco and Smith (1992), observed a general tendency that interpersonal evaluation accuracy was related to the type of ideas evaluated (popularity), regardless of level of divergent thinking skills. Similar results were obtained in one of our studies (Groborz & Ne c cka, 2003). In this study, we used a GenEva task for generation and evaluation skills, based on Chand and Runco s procedure (Chand & Runco, 1992). In the GenEva task participants had to first generate numerous solutions to realworld problems. After they had completed that part of the task, they were asked to rate their peers solutions in terms of uniqueness, that is the number of occurrences of an idea amongst their peers. The accuracy index was conceived by means of subtracting the given estimation of an occurrence from the actual occurrence of an idea. The greater the index value was, the greater discrepancy between the actual frequency of an idea and a subject s estimation, and thus, the lesser accuracy. It was expected that creative individuals would be more accurate in their judgments of other s work in comparison to their less creative counterparts. We obtained no significant effects of divergent thinking skills on interpersonal evaluation, which suggests that the two sets of abilities in question might be quite independent of one another (Runco and Chand, 1994; Runco and Smith, 1992). The last thing to be considered is a distinction between idea valuation and idea evaluation (Runco, 2003; Runco & Chand, 1994). As mentioned earlier, evaluation is understood in terms 128 60

Journal of Creative Behavior Hypotheses of a selective process that is supposedly related to critical thinking. Critical thinking in this case determines what is wrong with a particular idea or solution. By contrast, valuation reflects appreciation of positive aspects an idea or solution. The distinction is rather theoretical, and in our view, requires empirical exploration. In the study cited above (Groborz & Ne c cka, 2003), we tried to capture the distinction by means of introducing an over- and underestimation index of evaluation. It was assumed that valuation would be related to overestimation of ideas. As expected, participants tended to overestimate their peers ideas. However, the tendency was not related to individual differences in divergent thinking skills. Thus, the main goals of the current study were: (1) to explore tendencies toward over and underestimation of ideas in relation to divergent thinking skills, and (2) to examine the relationship between divergent thinking skills and accuracy of intrapersonal and interpersonal evaluation of ideas. 1. Divergent thinking and intrapersonal evaluation. Following Runco and other s studies, we predict that divergent thinking skills will be related to greater accuracy of intrapersonal evaluation. Particularly, individual differences in fluency, and originality are expected to relate to evaluation accuracy of unique and original examples of one s own ideas (see Runco & Chand, 1994; Runco, 2001). 2. Divergent thinking and interpersonal evaluation. If judgment of someone else s ideas involves recognition of certain quality of ideas then divergent thinking skills would be related to better interpersonal evaluation. This relationship would not occur, however, if interpersonal judgments require different skills or different processes (e.g. taking different perspectives) (Sternberg and Lubart, 1993; 1995, but see also Runco & Smith, 1992). 3. Over- and underestimation in the evaluation process. If the evaluation process requires appreciation or value estimation rather than critical judgment, then overestimation of one s own ideas, and underestimation of others ideas would be observed. The tendency to make inappropriate evaluations will be smaller in the case of individuals skilled in divergent thinking. That is, they would be less likely to both under- and overestimate the quality of their own ideas and others ideas. It is important to note here, however, that these last predictions are exploratory in nature, due to a scarcity of studies on under- and overestimation of ideas. 129 61

Divergent Thinking, Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Evaluation METHOD Participants Measures The sample in this study consisted of 100 participants, students from one of the high-schools in Krakow, Poland. They voluntarily agreed to participate in the study. 81 participants completed the whole study (31 females and 50 males), with the average age being 16.5 years, and the age range being from 15.5-17 years. To test our predictions, modified version of the GenEva procedure (Generation and Evaluation) was applied (see Groborz & Necka, 2003). Generation. In the first part of the procedure, the participant s task was to generate answers to three real-life problems, which belonged to various domains related to adolescents experience (see also Runco, 1991); for instance, relations with peers, family, dealing with objects, and the like. The answers produced by participants were the basis for the following indices of divergent thinking skills: originality (the number of unique solutions, which appeared only once across the sample); fluency (the overall number of produced solutions), and flexibility (the number of solution categories). The overall index of DT skills was also calculated, by means of summing up standardized originality, fluency and flexibility scores (referred to as OFF later in the text). Evaluation. The second part of the GenEva procedure aimed at measuring intrapersonal and interpersonal evaluation skills. To obtain a measure of intrapersonal evaluation skills, we had participants evaluate their own ideas according to the following criteria: Originality and Uniqueness. Originality of ideas was judged by means of 7-point Likert-like scale (where 1 was assigned to unoriginal, and 7 to highly original solutions), and referred to qualitative aspects of a given solution. Uniqueness, on the other hand, served as a more quantitative criterion. In order to evaluate a solution according to this criterion, participants answered the question How many of your peers would have thought about this solution?, by means of giving the percentage of peers (1% meaning that an idea is highly unique, and 100% meaning that an idea is highly popular). Thus, the task was to estimate a hypothetical number of people able to generate a given idea. In this sense, Uniqueness resembles the Popularity criterion used in studies by Runco (1991). To obtain a measure of interpersonal evaluation skills, we had subjects use the same criteria to evaluate their peers solutions. Expert raters. In order to calculate the evaluation indices of Idea Originality (see detailed description below), three trained 130 62

Journal of Creative Behavior Procedure raters judged originality of solutions on a 7-point Likert-like scale, similar to the one used by the subjects. The three raters were graduate students who taught classes on creative thinking techniques, and were therefore regarded as experts in creative thinking product assessments. Their ratings served as a gold standard against which participants ratings of Idea Originality were compared. Evaluation indices. There were four indices of evaluation, ascribed to every participant: accuracy and direction of Idea Originality and accuracy and direction of Idea Uniqueness. Idea Originality Accuracy Index (IOAI) was the mean absolute value of a difference between the evaluation of originality given by a participant and the ratings given by expert raters. The second index Idea Uniqueness Accuracy Index (IUAI) was the mean absolute value of a difference between the estimations given by a subject, and the actual number of occurrences of a given solution across the sample. The IUAI resembles therefore a calibration index used in studies on metacognition and memory (cf. Koriat and Goldsmith, 1996), which is understood as absolute distance between a subject s ratings and an actual frequency of a given idea. The direction of evaluation, on the other hand, is an index of the extent to which participants either under- or overestimate the originality and uniqueness of ideas. It was obtained by means of subtracting objective ratings and estimations from subjective ones. This time, however, we did not calculate absolute values of discrepancies. In this way, measures of Idea Originality Direction Index (IODI) and Idea Uniqueness Direction Index (IUDI) close to 0 were regarded as the most accurate; positive values indicated overestimation and negative underestimation. Consider the following examples. If a participant estimated an idea to appear among 90% of peers, and the actual occurrence of it was 4%, then after subtraction we obtained the difference of 86%. It is interpreted then, that a given solution was seen as less unique (more popular and underestimated) than in reality. In case of Idea Originality evaluation, if an idea was rated as highly original and was given 7 points, and expert raters gave it 1 point, then a subject was overestimating the idea, judging it as more original than it might have been. The experiment was divided into two session, each lasting for approximately 1 hour. During the first session, participants worked on the first part of the GenEva procedure, that is writing down solutions to given problems. Once they had com- 131 63

Divergent Thinking, Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Evaluation pleted that part of the task, they proceeded to the next, in which they evaluated their own solutions. During the second session, participants evaluated solutions given by their peers. To avoid doubling of evaluations to the same solutions, the sample was randomly divided into two subgroups. Each subgroup gave solutions to a different set of problems and, in the end, evaluated a different set of solutions. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Main effects The first part of the GenEva procedure was tested for its internal consistency. Fluency and Flexibility scales were found to be quite reliable, with Cronbach s alpha coefficients of.90 and.92 respectively. The originality scale s internal consistency coefficient was of moderate value, and equaled.54. Inter-rater reliability coefficients for all solutions in the sample ranged from.70 to.85; intra-rater reliability (Cronbach s alpha internal consistency coefficients) equaled.75 for the Rater 1,.80 for Rater 2, and.70 for Rater 3. The following dependent variables were subjected to four separate analyses of variance (ANOVA, repeated measure design): Idea Originality Direction Index (IODI), Idea Uniqueness Direction Index (IUDI), Idea Originality Accuracy Index (IOAI), and Idea Uniqueness Accuracy Index (IUAI). As we have pointed out in the method section, IOAI and IUAI indices inform us about the absolute value of the difference between subjective (participant s) and objective (expert raters, and actual idea occurrence) evaluations. The greater the distance is, the less accurate the participants evaluation. And IODI and IUDI is simply the difference between the subjective and objective ratings. Evaluation Type (intrapersonal vs. interpersonal) served as a within subjects factor. Table 1 shows mean values of evaluation indices in relation to the intra and interpersonal evaluation condition. In the case of both evaluation accuracy indices, IUAI and IOAI, participants showed the tendency to give relatively more accurate ratings in the interpersonal evaluation condition than in the intrapersonal one [F(1,79) = 17.10; p <.000; eta 2 =.17 and F(1,79) = 5.05; p <.02; eta 2 =.060 respectively]. In the case of IUDI, the analysis revealed that subjects tended to underestimate ideas uniqueness in the interpersonal evaluation condition; subjects tended to rate their peers ideas as less unique as they actually were. The participants also underestimated their own ideas but to a significantly lesser extent. In fact, the difference in ratings was close to 0 which corresponds to ideal accuracy [F(1,79) = 25.48; p <.000; eta 2 =.24]. The 132 64

Journal of Creative Behavior TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics for intra and interpersonal evaluation indices of Idea Originality and Idea Uniqueness (N = 80). Evalua- Evalua- 95% C I for Mean tion tion M SD Std Lower Upper indices type Error bound bound IUAI Intra 26.492 6.828.763 24.973 28.012 Inter 22.305 6.406.716 20.879 23.730 IOAI Intra 1.625.595.067 1.492 1.757 Inter 1.479.473.053 1.374 1.585 IUDI Intra.665 16.288 1.821 4.290 2.960 Inter 10.657 11.408 1.276 13.196 8.119 IODI Intra 1.036.931.104.829 1.243 Inter.590.691.077.436.744 IUAI Idea Uniqueness Accuracy Index; IOAI Idea Originality Accuracy Index; IUDI Idea Uniqueness Direction Index; IODI Idea Originality Direction Index. Between subjects effects reverse pattern was observed when IODI was taken into account. The IODI had positive values both in intrapersonal and interpersonal evaluation, which suggests that in both cases subjects showed a tendency to overestimate rated solutions. However, in the case of interpersonal evaluation, the originality of ideas was overestimated to a significantly lesser extent than in the case of intrapersonal evaluation. The participants judged their own solutions as more original than they were assessed by the experts [F(1,79) = 19.38; p <.000; eta 2 =.19]. In order to test individual differences hypotheses, we considered the subjects falling under the lowest (25%) and the highest (75%) quartile in DT indices. The groups sizes, and cut-off points for the DT indices are presented in tables 2. and 3. The data was again subjected to ANOVA, repeated measures designs, with Evaluation Type (intra- versus interpersonal) as a within subjects factor, and each of the evaluation indices as a dependent variable. The analyses were conducted separately for each of the between subjects factors of Originality, Fluency, Flexibility and OFF. They will be presented in the following order: first the results for accuracy indices and then, the results referring to direction indices. The mean values of dependent variables, standard errors and 95% confidence 133 65

Divergent Thinking, Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Evaluation intervals for the means are presented in Tables 2 and 3 separately for subjects in the highest and lowest quartiles of each of the DT indices. IUAI and IOAI. Figure 1 shows the significant interaction between Evaluation Type and Highest and Lowest Originality (F(1,52) = 9.099; p <.003; eta 2 =.11). Two aspects of the interaction are worth noting. First, contrary to H2, in the interpersonal evaluation condition, subjects in the lowest quartile of Originality gave relatively more accurate evaluations of idea uniqueness, than did individuals in the highest quartile of Originality [F(1,52) = 4.05; p <.021; eta 2 =.095]. Second, highly original subjects were equally accurate in their judgments in both evaluation types, intra- and interpersonal. FIGURE 1. Mean values of IUAI in relation to Evaluation Type and Originality. 134 66

Journal of Creative Behavior TABLE 2. DT N M Another significant, although weaker, interaction effect was observed between the composite score of divergent thinking indices, OFF, and Evaluation Type [F(1,67) = 4.46; p <.03; eta 2 =.05). Similarly to the results shown in Figure 1, highly skilled divergent thinkers were equally accurate in their judgments in intra- and interpersonal evaluations of uniqueness (Table 2.). In the intrapersonal evaluation condition, however, the Highest OFF group was significantly more accurate in their judgments, than were the Lowest OFF group [F(1,67) = 3.56; p <.03; eta 2 =.085]. Thus, the difference between highest and lowest OFF groups is in accordance with H1. Mean values of IUAI & IOAI in relation to evaluation type and Divergent Thinking (DT) Indices: Originality (O), Fluency (F), Flexibility (Fx), and composite index OFF. Intrapersonal IUAI Interpersonal 95% C I for Mean 95% C I for Mean Std Lower Upper Std Lower Upper Error bound bound M Error bound bound OFF LQ 38 28.364 1.073 26.227 30.502 21.879 1.043 19.802 23.956 OFF HQ 31 24.095 1.188 21.728 26.462 22.062 1.155 19.762 24.361 O LQ 26 27.205 1.338 24.541 29.868 20.221 1.211 17.811 22.632 O HQ 28 24.966 1.289 22.400 27.533 24.868 1.167 22.546 27.191 F LQ 17 27.755 1.610 24.549 30.960 22.739 1.569 19.615 25.863 F HQ 26 23.742 1.302 21.150 26.334 21.569 1.269 19.043 24.095 Fx LQ 14 27.459 1.741 23.993 30.925 22.871 1.727 19.432 26.309 Fx HQ 25 23.128 1.303 20.535 25.722 21.435 1.292 18.862 24.009 IOAI OFF LQ 38 1.516.095 1.326 1.705 1.513.077 1.361 1.666 OFF HQ 31 1.803.105 1.593 2.012 1.389.085 1.220 1.559 O LQ 26 1.577.118 1.343 1.812 1.575.093 1.390 1.761 O HQ 28 1.581.113 1.355 1.806 1.431.090 1.253 1.610 F LQ 17 1.472.130 1.213 1.731 1.633.114 1.406 1.860 F HQ 26 2.014.105 1.805 2.224 1.501.092 1.318 1.685 Fx LQ 14 1.612.157 1.299 1.924 1.734.124 1.488 1.981 Fx HQ 25 1.818.118 1.584 2.052 1.376.093 1.192 1.561 IUAI Idea Uniqueness Accuracy Index; IOAI Idea Originality Accuracy Index; L Lowest Quartile. H Highest Quartile 135 67

Divergent Thinking, Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Evaluation In the case of IOAI, Fluency, Flexibility and OFF factors interacted with Evaluation Type [F(1,41) = 18.51; p <.000; eta 2 =.20; F(1,37)=12.13; p <.001; eta 2 =.13; F(1,67) = 9.68; p <.002; eta 2 =.14, respectively]. Data in Table 2 show that subjects who scored high in the given divergent thinking index were less accurate when judging their own ideas, than when they evaluated others ideas. Lowest groups in Fluency, Flexibility and OFF did not show significant differences in accuracy levels between the intra- and interpersonal evaluation conditions. Figure 2 illustrates the described tendency for Highest and Lowest groups in Fluency. Contrary to H1, highly fluent individuals were more inaccurate when rating the originality of their own ideas than were subjects in Lower Fluency group [F(1,41) = 10.19; p <.000; eta 2 =.20]. There was no significant difference between the groups in the interpersonal evaluation condition. FIGURE 2. Mean values of IOAI in relation to Evaluation Type and Fluency. 136 68

Journal of Creative Behavior IUDI and IODI. According to hypothesis 3, valuation of ideas would be related to overestimation of one s own ideas and underestimation of others ideas. It was also expected that these tendencies would diminish in individuals highly skilled in divergent thinking. Figure 3 depicts a significant interaction between Evaluation Type and Highest and Lowest OFF groups, with IUDI as a dependent variable [F(1,67) = 7.51; p <.007; eta 2 =.10]. A similar pattern of results was observed in both highest and lowest OFF groups. In the intrapersonal evaluation condition, highly and less skilled subjects judgments oscillated around 0 value, which can be interpreted in terms of almost ideal accuracy. Notice, however, that participants in the highest OFF quartile showed a slight tendency for overestimation, whereas those in the lowest OFF quartile tended to underestimate solutions. In the interpersonal evaluation FIGURE 3. Mean values of IUDI in relation to Evaluation Type and OFF. 137 69

Divergent Thinking, Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Evaluation condition, both groups underestimated solutions produced by their peers. Analysis of planned comparisons revealed also that whereas the Lowest OFF group tended to underestimate solutions in both conditions, subjects highly skilled in OFF were accurate in evaluating their own ideas, and they underestimated others solutions [F(1,67) = 24.95; p <.000; eta 2 =.24]. Similar patterns of results were obtained when the Fluency and Flexibility indices were taken into account [F(1,41) = 13.65; p <.000; eta 2 =.13; and F(1,37) = 13.37; p <.000; eta 2 =.10, respectively]. In both cases the tendencies plotted in Figure 3, were much more salient. Results in Table 3 suggest that both Highest and Lowest groups in Fluency and Flexibility tended to underestimate their peers solutions. In the intrapersonal evaluation condition, however, highly flexible and highly fluent subjects were significantly more accurate (i. e. the accuracy index was close to 0) than their less skilled counterparts [Flexibility: F(1,37) = 2.76; p <.06; eta 2 =.06; Fluency: F(1,41) = 3.73; p <.028; eta 2 =.08]. The presented data provide at least partial support for Hypothesis 3. Although generally subjects did not overestimate their own ideas, they showed a systematic tendency for underestimation of their peers solutions. Originality, as a divergent thinking index, also interacted with Evaluation Type [F(1,52) = 8.87; p <.004; eta 2 =.10]. Analysis of planned comparisons showed a significant difference between the Highest and Lowest groups in the interpersonal evaluation condition [F(1,52) = 6.25; p <.003; eta 2 =.14; tab. 3.]. Although highly and less original participants underestimated their peers solutions, the tendency was greater in the case of highly original individuals. Interactions of divergent thinking indices (OFF, and O, Fluency, Flexibility) and evaluation type when IODI served as dependent variable did not reach expected levels of significance. The main results obtained in the study can be summarized in the following way. First, the GenEva task proved to be a reliable measure of generation and evaluation skills. Main effects show significant differences in evaluation accuracy and direction pertaining to manipulation of evaluation type (Table 1). Interpersonal evaluation resulted in greater accuracy, regardless of a given criterion. As far as the tendency toward overand underestimation of ideas is concerned, the subjects judged their peers ideas as less unique. At the same time, the participants were relatively less inclined to do so when evaluating their own ideas. In fact, the values of IUDI index were closer to 138 70

Journal of Creative Behavior 0 in the intrapersonal evaluation condition than in the interpersonal one. When idea originality served as the evaluation criterion, positive values of IOAI were observed in both conditions of GenEva task. It suggests that the participants judged their own and others ideas as more original than the expert-raters found them to be. This tendency was more salient in the intrapersonal evaluation condition. TABLE 3. DT N M Mean values of IUDI & IODI in relation to evaluation type and Divergent Thinking (DT) Indices: Originality (O), Fluency (F), Flexibility (Fx), and composite index OFF. Intrapersonal IUDI Interpersonal 95% C I for Mean 95% C I for Mean Std Lower Upper Std Lower Upper Error bound bound M Error bound bound OFF LQ 38 3.194 2.639 8.449 2.060 7.276 1.783 10.827 3.725 OFF HQ 31 2.653 2.921 3.164 8.470 12.59 1.974 16.523 8.660 O LQ 26.996 3.227 7.421 5.430 5.789 2.102 9.974 1.603 O HQ 28.866 3.110 5.326 7.057 16.00 2.026 20.036 11.969 F LQ 17 8.562 3.820 16.169.955 7.784 2.775 13.310 2.259 F HQ 26 4.858 3.089 1.294 11.009 12.18 2.244 16.650 7.715 Fx LQ 14 9.622 4.259 18.104 1.141 8.012 3.061 14.107 1.917 Fx HQ 25 2.259 3.187 4.088 8.606 12.46 2.291 17.027 7.904 IODI OFF LQ 38.997.150.699 1.296.576.112.352.799 OFF HQ 31 1.222.166.892 1.552.688.124.440.935 O LQ 26 1.086.183.722 1.450.701.136.431.971 O HQ 28.847.176.496 1.197.442.131.182.703 F LQ 17 1.083.212.660 1.506.536.167.205.868 F HQ 26 1.484.172 1.142 1.826.782.135.513 1.050 Fx LQ 14 1.224.247.731 1.716.579.187.208.951 Fx HQ 25 1.216.185.848 1.585.675.140.397.953 IUDI Idea Uniqueness Direction Index; IODI Idea Originality Direction Index; L Lowest Quartile. H Higherst Quartile. 139 71

Divergent Thinking, Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Evaluation Second, results pertaining to individual differences in DT and accuracy of evaluation form a somewhat complex picture, and thus escape unequivocal interpretation. Individuals highly skilled in originality of thinking were outperformed by their less original counterparts in interpersonal accuracy evaluations of idea uniqueness. On the other hand, highly original subjects were equally accurate in their judgments of intra- and interpersonal evaluation (Fig. 1). Similarly, highly skilled divergent thinkers (Highest OFF group) were equally accurate in their judgments in both evaluation conditions. However, they were more accurate than the Lowest OFF group was in the intrapersonal evaluation condition. The difference between the highest and lowest OFF groups is in accordance with H1 and with studies reported in Chand and Runco (1992; Runco & Chand, 1994), whereas differences between the highest and lowest originality groups do not support H2. Also the lack of differences between intra- and interpersonal evaluation within the group of highly skilled in DT seems to partially confirm hypotheses H1 and H2. When judging idea originality subjects highly skilled in divergent thinking were less accurate when they judged their own ideas than when they evaluated peers solutions. The effect was more apparent for the Highest and Lowest Fluency groups. Thus, contrary to H1, highly fluent individuals were less accurate than the subjects in the Lower Fluency group when rating the originality of their own ideas. Third, in terms of individual differences and over- and underestimation of ideas the following results were observed. In general, the level of divergent thinking skills (OFF) did not predict the tendency toward over- or underestimation of idea uniqueness in the intrapersonal evaluation condition. In both groups the given estimation values were close to 0, and thus close to ideal accuracy (Fig. 3). In the interpersonal evaluation condition, participants showed a clear tendency to underestimate judged ideas. In comparison to subjects who scored low in originality, highly original subjects showed a much greater tendency for underestimation in the interpersonal evaluation condition. In the intrapersonal evaluation condition, the participants skilled in fluency and flexibility were significantly more accurate (closer to ideal accuracy) than less fluent and less flexible, which is in accordance with predictions. Both groups showed an almost equal tendency for underestimation. In all, the observed data neither support nor univocally refute H3. 140 72

Journal of Creative Behavior GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS Individual differences in DT, accuracy of idea evaluation and type of evaluation The aim of the present study was to investigate the relationship between divergent thinking skills and intra- or interpersonal evaluation. In particular, we were interested in the accuracy of intra- and interpersonal evaluation and the tendency toward over or underestimation in individuals that differ in their divergent thinking skills. The results suggest that the relationship between divergent thinking skills and evaluation skills is far more complex than it was initially predicted to be. Our hypotheses have been only partially supported. Two aspects of the obtained data need additional explanation: (a) individual differences in DT in relation to accuracy of idea evaluation and type of evaluation; (b) individual differences in DT in relation to under and overestimation of ideas. In one of their studies, Runco and Smith (1992) proposed a distinction between author s and observer s perspectives in evaluating ideas. It is assumed that knowing the history and context of an idea may bias author s objectivity and result in inaccuracy of judgment. On the other hand, it is well documented that an author is able to recognize rarity of a solution (Chand and Runco, 1992; Runco and Chand,1994). Therefore, if rarity is the only assessed dimension, the author s perspective is likely to lead to greater accuracy. He or she may be more of an objective author. However, when more qualitative aspects of an idea are to be assessed, the author s perspective may bias evaluation. An observer s perspective is characterized by greater objectivity of judgment, in the sense that more objective or socially acceptable criteria of novelty or creativity are probably employed. This, in turn, may lead to less biased judgments. In our study, author s and observer s perspectives are represented by intra- and interpersonal evaluation respectively. Although the relationship between level of DT skills and accuracy of idea evaluation is quite complex, three tendencies of evaluation pertaining to different levels of DT skills and different evaluation criteria can be distinguished. First, similarly to the results obtained by Chand and Runco (1992), highly skilled divergent thinkers seem to be more objective authors when it comes to intrapersonal evaluation of uniqueness in comparison to those less skilled in DT. Second, employing an observer s perspective seems to influence interpersonal evaluation of uniqueness, especially when an observer is at the same time highly original in thinking (Fig. 1.). It may be plausible that experience in generating original ideas, together with awareness of context from which a given idea emerged, are used to 141 73

Divergent Thinking, Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Evaluation Individual differences in DT, under- or overestimation, and type of evaluation form subjective criteria of judgment. Such criteria, in turn, hinder accuracy of evaluation. Third, when more qualitative aspects of an idea are judged, that is originality, a subjective author s perspective seems to be characteristic for highly skilled divergent thinkers (Fig. 2.). This time the awareness of context and history behind an evaluated idea may have formed subjective criteria of judgment that led to lesser accuracy of intrapersonal evaluation. It is also possible that other factors may account for the obtained results. For instance, the tendency of creative individuals to conform their opinions and judgments in some social settings (e.g. in relation to peer group) and not in the others (e. g. in relation to a form of authority, be it a teacher or experimenter) might have hindered evaluations given by highly original subjects (Crutchfield, 1962; Starkweather, 1971; Van Hook & Tegano, 2002). The notion of an objective and skilled observer may also prove to be useful in explaining another set of results. High level of DT seemed to lead also to greater accuracy in interpersonal evaluation of idea originality. Moreover, the results are compatible with studies done by Runco (1991, 1993), in which a high level of divergent thinking skill was also related to a high level of evaluation accuracy. In the present research we have also attempted to investigate the valuation of ideas, which is best defined as an ability to recognize positive or emotionally loaded aspects of an idea (Runco 1993; 2003). To this end, over- and underestimation of ideas was measured, with the assumption that valuation may be reflected in overestimation in intrapersonal evaluation and underestimation in interpersonal evaluation. The following tendencies of idea evaluation were observed in our study. The level of general DT skills (represented as OFF), did not differentiate evaluation of uniqueness. When estimating occurrence of their own ideas, participants were almost ideally accurate (estimation values close to 0), whereas they significantly underappreciated their peers ideas. More salient individual differences in evaluation were observed when originality, fluency and flexibility of thought were taken into account. For instance, less original participants showed only a very slight tendency to underestimate their peers solutions in comparison with their highly original counterparts. It seems plausible that a low level of originality does not predispose somebody to be either an accurate or inaccurate judge of ideas. On the other hand, individuals who were generating only a few ideas, and those who produced almost identical solutions were clearly 142 74

Journal of Creative Behavior underestimating not only their own, but also others solutions. Evaluation of highly fluent and flexible participants was marked by slight overestimation of their own solutions and underestimation of their peers ideas. It seems then, that having little experience with producing numerous and diverse ideas impairs accurate judgment of one s own and others ideas. Also, participants who are highly fluent and flexible appear to be inaccurate when judging their own and others ideas. However, in their case, an expertise in ideation results in a slight overestimation of their own ideas, and more apparent underestimation of others ideas. These observations are in accordance with earlier suggestions that highly skilled divergent thinkers may seem to be more objective authors and less objective observers when it comes to intrapersonal evaluation of uniqueness. The question is, however, what constitutes the objective author s and subjective observer s perspective? It is possible that certain aspects of knowledge of the creative process ( What is new? To what extent an idea has to be new in order to be seen as creative and not as weird and unacceptable? ) may influence the tendency to over and underestimate ideas. The initial questions of present study concerned the relationship between divergent thinking, two types of evaluation (intrapersonal and interpersonal), and the tendency to over and underestimate judged ideas. The obtained results suggest that the relationship between divergent thinking skills and intrapersonal or interpersonal evaluation is far more complex than was initially proposed. Further research should, for instance, aim at controlling such variables as conformism and non-conformism. Additionally, future research should also focus on investigating the implicit knowledge of the creative process with respect to over- or underestimation of ideas. REFERENCES BASADUR, M., RUNCO, M. A., & VEGA, L. (2000). Understanding how creative and thinking skills, attitudes and behaviors work together: A casual process model. The Journal of Creative Behavior, 34, 77-100. BISSET, I. M. (2000). Comment on Gadzella and Penland (1995): Creativity and critical thinking. Psychological Reports, 86, 848-850. BROPHY, D. R. (1998). Understanding, measuring and enhancing individual creative problem-solving efforts. Creativity Research Journal, 2, 123-150. CHAND, I. & RUNCO, M. A. (1992). Problem finding skills as components of the creative process. Personality and Individual Differences, 14, 155-162. 143 75

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Journal of Creative Behavior RUNCO, M. A. & SMITH, W. R. (1992). Interpersonal and intrapersonal evaluations of creative ideas. Personality and Individual Differences, 13, 295-302. RUNCO, M. A. & VEGA, L. (1990). Evaluating the creativity of children s ideas. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 5, 439-452. STARKWEATHER, (1971). Creativity research instruments designed for use with preschool children. Journal of Creative Behavior, 5, 245-255. STERNBERG, R. J. & LUBART, T. I. (1995). Defying the crowd. New York: Free Press. STERNBERG, R. J. & LUBART, T. I. (1993). Creative giftedness: A multivariate investment approach. Gifted Child Quarterly, 1, 7-15. TORRANCE, E. P. (1988). The nature of creativity as manifested in its testing. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity (pp. 43-75). New York: Cambridge University Press. WALLAS, G. (1926). The art of thought. New York: Harcourt. AUTHORS NOTE The work reported herein was first presented during the 27th International Congers of Psychology, Stockholm, Sweden, July 23-28, 2000. Preparation of the article was possible while first author was a Fulbright grantee at Texas A&M University. We thank Katherine Saunders, Texas A&M University, for useful discussions and comments on early draft of this article. For their constructive and insightful criticisms, we thank Thomas Ward, the editor, and an anonymous reviewer of JCB. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Magdalena Grohman, electronic address: mggrohman@rice.edu 145 77

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