Importance of Biosecurity in the Management of Foot and Mouth Disease

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1 Importance of Biosecurity in the Management of Foot and Mouth Disease F R E D L A N D E G 3 0 J A N U A R Y L IĒGE

2 Definition of Biosecurity biosecurity means the sum of management and physical measures designed to reduce the risk of the introduction, development and spread of diseases to, from and within: (a) an animal population, or (b) an establishment, zone, compartment*, means of transport or any other facilities, premises or location; Article 4, 23 of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 (EU Animal Health Law) * compartment means an animal subpopulation contained in one or more establishments and, in the case of aquatic animals, in one or more aquaculture establishments, under a common biosecurity management system with a distinct health status with respect to a specific disease or specific diseases subject to appropriate surveillance, disease control and biosecurity measures;

3 Consequences of Poor Biosecurity On 20 th February 2001 foot and mouth disease was confirmed in UK at an abattoir in Essex. The disease was not eradicated until September 2001 by which time disease had been confirmed on 2032 premises in GB and the epidemic had given rise to limited outbreaks in: Northern Ireland 4 Republic of Ireland 1 France 2 Netherlands 26 The scale of the 2001 epidemic was enormous and the costs huge. The introduction and spread of foot and mouth disease in 2001 can be explained by failures in biosecurity at national, regional and local levels.

4 No cases per week W eek 1 W eek 2 W eek 3 W eek 4 W eek 5 W eek 6 W eek 7 Week 8 Week 9 Week 10 Week 11 Week 12 W eek 13 W eek 14 W eek 15 W eek 16 W eek 17 W eek 18 Week 19 Week 20 Week 21 Week 22 Week 23 W eek 24 W eek 25 Comparison o f E pidemics W eek 26 W eek 27 W eek 28 W eek 29 W eek 30 W eek 31 Week 32 Week 33 Epidemic 2001 Epidemic 67/68

5 Animals Killed FMD s 1821 Welfare Reasons Slaughter on Suspicion DC non contiguous DC Contiguous Total Million 968 Infected Premises Sheep Cattle Pigs

6 Animals Killed for Disease Control and Welfare Reasons Infected Premises DC* Contiguous DC* non contiguous Slaughter on Suspicion Welfare Reasons Total Other Pigs Cattle Sheep Total *DC = Dangerous Contact Other Animals = Goats, Camillids

7 Estimated Direct Costs to the Public Sector FMD m s Compensation paid to livestock farmers 1158 Haulage disposal and additional building work 375 Cleansing and disinfection Business support measures Extra human resource costs Payment to livestock keepers for welfare disposal Administration of livestock welfare disposal scheme Staff time costs Payments to other Government Departments, local authorites, agencies and others Micelaneous Costs Total 3.03 Billion Legal Claims against Department National Audit Office

8 Estimated Costs to the Private Sector FMD 2001 The original estimate of costs to the Private Sector was over 5 billion. This estimate was based on reports from individuals and companies. HM Treasury however considered that many of the loses suffered by individuals and firms gave rise to equivalent sums being spent elsewhere in the economy and the net economic effect was less than 0.2 percent of GDP equivalent to less than 2 billion. Specific factors which impacted on GDP were reduction in foreign tourists, holidays taken aboard rather than in UK, loss of meat and livestock exports and increased imports of meat.

9 Epidemiology EPIDEMIOLOGY OF FMD 2001 DEMONSTRATES FAILURES OF BIOSECURITY

10 Timeline initial infection Illegal imported meat fed illegally as unprocessed waste food to pigs at Waugh, Heddon-on-the Wall. FMD Pan Asia O infects pigs Waugh sends pigs to Cheales Abattoir, Essex FMD Pan Asia O confirmed at Cheales Abattoir Essex 8 Feb Feb Feb. Jan Feb Feb Waugh sends pigs to Cheales Abattoir, Essex OVS reports suspect FMD at Cheales Abattoir Essex 5pm National Livestock Movement Ban imposed.

11 Timeline silent spread cattle and sheep on Ponteland farm 5km from Waugh infected by windborne spread. dealer moves his sheep to Longtown Market where kept overnight. disease confirmed at Cheales; at least 57 premises from south Scotland to Southwest England already infected. 13 Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb sheep from Ponteland farm sold at Hexham Market 9 to a dealer mixed with 175 others overnight. dealers sheep sold at Longtown Market in 21 lots to 9 other livestock dealers from 8 geographic regions. FMD confirmed at Waugh and at Ponteland Farm

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14 National Biosecurity Measures from lessons learnt Prevention is better than cure. Total ban on the feeding of waste food to pigs (UK 2001, EU wide 2002). Contingency Plan to implement a national ban on the movement of susceptible livestock as soon as foot and mouth disease is confirmed. Six day standstill for ruminants and 20 day standstill for pigs. if ruminants are moved on to a premises no ruminants can be moved off for six days (20 days in the case of pigs) exceptions permitted. stops silent spread of disease it is estimated that if the six day standstill had been in place in 2001 the spread through markets would have been stopped and the outbreak would have been limited to less than 100 infected premises. Still at risk from illegal imports of meat and animal products and illegal feeding of waste food to pigs particularly hobby/pet sector.

15 Spread during outbreak BIOSECURITY FAILURES

16 Importance of Outbreak Biosecurity 5% FMD UK 2001 Mode of spread n=2023 2% 4% 1% 1% Local Infected Animal Person Vehicle Airborne Milk tanker 87%

17 60% 75% 85% FMD UK 2001

18 Minimum Area Controls on confirmation of disease

19 Local Spread Local spread is defined as spread between infected premises within 3km of one another, where no specific conveyor or more than one potential conveyor of infection has been identified. The exact mechanisms of local spread have not been fully determined. However it is believed that the majority will be either from local aerosol spread between animals, particularly where the animals are contiguous, or from the movement of contaminated, vehicles, people equipment, fodder and possibly wildlife, which may act as mechanical vectors of disease.

20 Local Spread 10-15% of IPs infected over the fence 85-90% of IPs preventable by blocking through the gate spread (Thrusfield et al 2005; Honhold et al 2004)

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22 Mode of Spread Airborne Milk tanker Infected animals Local Spread Other fomite Cluster Name Anglesey % County Durham % Cumbria % Devon % Essex and Kent % Hereford % North Yorkshire % Northumberla nd % Sporadic % Staffordshire % Wales % Yorks & Lancs % Lancashire % Grand Total % Total percent 0.9% 0.6% 4.5% 78% 0.6% 3.6% 0.0% 1.4% 9.8% 100% Person Waste Food Vehicle Under investigation Total Percent due to local spread

23 Spread during tail of epidemic livestock keepers failing to take biosecurity measures Fragmented livestock premises Common grazing Stock outside at grass Seasonal activities shearing, foot trimming by contractors Loss of confidence in controls Fatigue after months of restrictions Age of livestock keepers

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25 Restricted Infected Areas (RIAs) Introduced end July 2001 Legally enforceable biosecurity rules Area patrolled by police, local authority and SVS. Thousands of inspections and vehicle inspections No vehicles/machinery movements on or off premises without c&d No person shall enter or leave premises with "dirty clothing or boots or without c & d their footwear Any person tending animals before leaving the premises must remove their outer clothing and footwear unless it can be c&d Owners/occupiers shall maintain a footbath containing approved disinfectant at every exit of premises and renew the disinfectant as required No slurry spreading unless licensed No movement on/off premises of milk, silage, fodder or other animal feed unless licensed

26 Enforcement in Thirsk RIA Number of animal health officers Number of police officers Number of vehicles checked Number of notices issued Total footbaths checked Number of notices issued Total referred for prosecution

27 Common Infringements in RIAs dirty vehicles/machinery no footbaths straying livestock dirty clothing/footwear breach of occupational licence (faeces on road, not c & d) spillage of manure on the highway insufficient litter to absorb faeces and urine

28 Conclusions The EU remains at risk of introduction of exotic animal disease including foot and mouth disease. Preventative biosecurity measures are essential to prevent the introduction of foot and mouth disease and limit the silent spread of disease. In the face of an outbreak, biosecurity measures are essential to limit the spread of foot and mouth disease and can be effective. For some livestock keepers taking effective biosecurity measures is time consuming and seen as expensive, particularly in extensive livestock systems. Not all livestock keepers are responsible; enforcement may be required. How do we train and convince livestock keepers of the value of biosecurity? The pubic memory is short and there are always pressures to limit, remove or circumvent biosecurity measures

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31 Thank you for your attention References National Audit Office The 2001 Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease ISBN Gibbens & Wilesmith (2002) Vet Rec 151, Thrusfield et al (2005) Vet Rec 156,