Twentieth century changes in family size in Latin America Analyses through cohort fertility and parity progression

Transcription

1 Twentieth century changes in family size in Latin America Analyses through cohort fertility and parity progression Abstract Everton E.C. Lima, Kryštof Zeman and Tomáš Sobotka We analyze changes in family size in Latin America during the twentieth century. Using population censuses, we reconstruct cohort fertility and parity progression ratios of women born in in twelve countries of the region. Our analysis depicts a massive fertility decline, initiated in most countries among women born in the late 1930s, and bringing the average completed fertility down from about 6 children to 2 3 children among women born in the late 1960s. Although this decline was not uniform, we find remarkable similarities in its parityspecific components, as parity progression ratios to third, fourth, and higher birth order declined simultaneously. At the same time, childlessness in Latin America was relatively low compared to other regions of declining fertility. The resulting rise in the share of women with only onechild is a key feature of Latin American fertility transition pattern outlined in this study. Keywords Latin America, Fertility transition, Low Fertility, Childlessness, Cohort fertility, Census data, Family size, Parity composition Authors Everton E. C. Lima (corresponding author), College of Philosophy and Human Sciences (IFCH) and Population Studies Center (NEPO) at University of Campinas (UNICAMP). everton.emanuel@gmail.com Kryštof Zeman, Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (IIASA, VID/ÖAW, WU), Vienna Institute of Demography (Austrian Academy of Sciences), Vienna. krystof.zeman@oeaw.ac.at Tomáš Sobotka, Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (IIASA, VID/ÖAW, WU), Vienna Institute of Demography (Austrian Academy of Sciences), Vienna. tomas.sobotka@oeaw.ac.at

2 Twentieth century changes in family size in Latin America Analyses through cohort fertility and parity progression 1 Introduction Starting in the 1960s, many countries in Latin America experienced rapid fertility decline, which progressed faster than earlier fertility declines in Europea and North America (Guzmán et al. 2006, Schkolnik 2004, Chakiel and Schkolnik 2004, Wong 2009). With several notable exceptions, including Argentina, Chile, Cuba and Uruguay, period fertility rates in Latin America remained high and without specific parity limitation until the early 1960s, when the period total fertility rates surpassed 6 births per woman in most countries (UN 2017). Two most developed countries in the region, Argentina, and Uruguay, were the forerunners of low fertility in the region. They experienced much earlier onset of fertility decline which progressed in Argentina already at the turn of the 20 th century and in the 1950s recorded relatively low fertility with period TFRs around 3 births per woman, similar to France and the Netherlands and below the US levels at that time. Chile and Cuba occupy intermediate position, with earlier fertility decline, which was progressing slower than in Argentina and Uruguay (Guzmán et al. 2006, Pantediles 1996). Once started, the fertility decline in the region proceeded without interruption: the period TFR plummeted from 5.9 in and reached aroundreplacement level (2.14) in (UN 2017). Since the early 2000s an increasing number of countries including Cuba, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Colombia and Costa Rica, experienced a fall in the TFR to a low level below 2 births per woman, typical of the most developed countries today. In contrast, the less developed countries in the region, including Bolivia, Guatemala and Paraguay, saw a delayed transition and until recently retained higher fertility rates above three births per woman. These demographic changes have intensified the ongoing transition towards older age structure, with significant decrease in the share of the child population (those aged 0 14), and sharp rises in the share of the elderly (Saad 2009, Wong 2009). Past comparative studies of fertility decline in the region focused almost exclusively on the period data. This is typically starting in the 1950s, a period for which United Nations estimates and published estimates of the period total fertility rates for all countries using a number of official data sources available such as vital statistics, censuses, Demographic Health Surveys and household surveys (see e.g., contributions in Guzmán et al. 1996). While these contributions provide useful analysis of fertility transformation in the region, they suffer several 2

3 shortcomings. First, many of the period fertility estimates are subjected to errors and uncertainty due to sampling, non-response and misreporting, often resulting in different alternative estimates of the period TFR for the same country and period (Lima et al 2017; Castanheira and Kohler, 2015). Second, fertility data are very limited for the period before 1950; as a result, the first phase of the fertility decline in the region is often not covered in comparative studies. Finally, the commonly available period fertility data do not allow to analyze parity-specific components of fertility change, which is key to understanding its progression across countries and cohorts and for discussing the future fertility prospects. In contrast, cohort fertility data on fertility, family size and parity composition have been very little used for the region. The major exception is a recent study by Reher and Requena (2014) who use census data to analyze historical pattern of fertility decline, especially fertility changes among women born between 1925 and 1945, who were behind the post-war baby boom in Western societies. We use similar set of census data on children ever born among women of post-reproductive and late reproductive ages (40+) to reconstruct the trajectories of cohort fertility declines in the region, and their parity-specific components among women born since the early 20 th century up until around For most countries, we cover the full course of fertility transition from a large and little-regulated family size to a new demographic regime characterized by a small family size. Besides providing a long-term picture of fertility transition in the region, we discuss differences between countries in the onset of fertility decline, its pace and progression across cohorts. We focus especially on reconstructing the parity-specific trends underlying the cohort fertility declines in the region. We provide a detailed analysis of the shifts in parity progression ratios and parity distributions, mapping cross-country similarities in the shift to a small family size in the course of the fertility transition. We pay special attention to the rapid spread of two-child families, as well as to the changing role of childlessness and, more recently, the rising prevalence of one-child families, which have become more prevalent than childlessness. Finally, we discuss a special case of an unexpected fertility stall and reversal in Argentina, where completed fertility bounced back to 3 births per woman among the women born around Although fertility transition in Latin America was not uniform, we identify a number of similarities shared across the analyzed countries that make the experience of Latin America distinct from that of the other regions. This Latin American fertility transition pattern is 3

4 characterized first by a simultaneous fall in transition rates to fourth- and higher-order births and a more gradual drop in third birth rates. More recently, a gradual decline in second birth rates took place across all studied countries, while first birth rates stayed stable or declined much less. Contemporary Latin American fertility is characterized not only by a rising prevalence of one child families combined with relatively low childlessness, but also by an early pattern of family formation, huge social status differentials in fertility timing, and high share of unwanted pregnancies and births, the features not covered in our analysis (Lima et al. 2017). 2 Background 2.1 Latin American fertility decline and its regional diversity Within half a century, between 1965 and 2015, Latin America experienced dramatic fertility decline from a large family size with little conscious fertility control to a relatively low and regulated fertility with a strong orientation to a two-child family. With a rising number of countries experiencing sub-replacement fertility levels, most of Latin America today has fertility rates close to those of the United States, and not much higher than most countries in Europe, traditionally the region of low and very low fertility. This process of fertility decline did not proceed linearly across countries. Schkolnik (2004) distinguished three phases of this development in the region. The first phase dated between 1950 and 1970, it was characterized by relative stability in the total fertility rate, with the exception of several countries hat experienced falling fertility, notably Brazil and Chile. The second phase, between 1970 and 1985, was a critical juncture, when the most intense fertility decline took place, leading to a subsequent slowing-down in the rate of population growth in the region and dispelling the fears of overpopulation. During the third period between 1985 and 2000, all countries continued downward trend in total fertility rates. Guzmán and colleagues (2006) also mapped the pace, timing and speed to this decline according to the pace and timing of reproductive change in Latin America. They distinguished four groups of countries following different models of fertility transition in the region (pp ). First, Argentina and Uruguay were the forerunners in this process: both countries began their transition early, around the turn of the 20 th century, following a similar pattern as Europe. Much of the period fertility decline in these two countries occurred in the first half of the twentieth century and by the 1950s, their TFR was close to three children on average (Pantediles 1983, Pantelides 1996, UN 2017). Cuba and Chile also belong to this category of countries 4

5 where fertility and mortality declined considerably during the first half of the 20 th century (Guzmán et al. 2006), but their initial decline was slower compared with Argentina and Uruguay. The latter two countries also saw remarkably stable fertility rates in the 1950s-1980s, with a TFR close to 3 births per woman at a time when other countries in the region experienced rapid fertility reductions. We return to this exceptional stability, especially in Argentina, in our analyses and discussion below. The second and largest group consists of countries that follow the most typical transition model over the period, with a rapid and sustained fertility decline between the mid-1960s and around This group includes the region s two largest countries, Mexico and Brazil, along with Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and one Caribbean country, Dominican Republic. In these countries, the natural growth rate reached close to 3% or even well above it in the 1950s 1960s (Guzmán et al. 2006). Another group encompasses a relatively diverse group of Caribbean countries with a rapid fertility transition, which was characterized by varying pace and different periods of reaching a total fertility level below 3 births per woman, starting in the 1970s in Martinique, Barbados, Puerto Rico or Aruba, which had relatively flat fertility in the following decades. The last group comprises relatively less developed countries with a late onset of fertility transition and higher fertility levels (with a TFR around 4 births per woman or higher) until the early 2000s Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay. This is not the only classification available. Chackiel and Schkolnik (2004) provided other classification based on the level of fertility in , considered the onset of period fertility decline in most countries of the region. More recent analyses by Reher and Requena (2014) provide a more detailed look at the early fertility change in ten countries from a cohort perspective, also covering the cohorts (and periods) not discussed in most of the past studies. They show that most of the analyzed Latin American countries experienced an increase in completed fertility among women born between 1910 and 1935 (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay were the exceptions from this increase). Subsequently, women born during the 1940s initiated a precipitous decline in fertility (Reher and Requera 2014). This analysis of the initial stages of demographic transition in the region highlighted large fertility disparities in the early stages of the Latin America fertility transition. 2.2 Determinants of historical fertility decline in Latin America The explanations for this fast decline in period fertility can be attributed to several reasons. In attempted to understand the factors behind the fertility decline, Guzmán (1996) enumerates a 5

6 number of key features related to this process. The first feature describes that at the start of the transition, fertility rates were very high in several countries, reaching 7.5 children or more per woman. A second issue is that not all countries started out from the same level, or followed the same pattern, resulting in large differences between the countries. The third point is the fast onset of use of contraception due to growing demand for fertility control, combined with greater availability and accessibility of contraceptive methods is considered the key factor behind the fertility decline. Another feature is linked to the higher marriage rate in the 1950s, which produced a certain rise in fertility during the pre-transition period following the Second World War (Guzmán and Rodríguez 1993), but does not appear, in general, to have significantly affected the transition process itself. Finally, this general change in fertility is associated with broad social and spatial diversity, which has amplified further in some countries. Chackiel and Schkolnik (2004) also describe the importance of demographic factors such as the decline in infant mortality and subsequent imbalance created by lower mortality, which has been a crucial factor behind fertility decline in Latin America. However, the dramatic changes in space and time generated by the revolution in communications and information have also given new dimensions to this process (CEPAL 2002). These new dimensions include a dissemination of unprecedented changes in the scale of values, lifestyles, ideas and knowledge prevailing elsewhere in the world, which certainly continue to exert a strong ideological and cultural attraction in many Latin American countries. The growing use of contraceptives is another characteristic that enabled small-family preference to become a reality in the region. The development and use of contraceptive methods from the 1970s to the early 1990s was associated with the growing number of couples wishing to limit their family size, and by the progressive disappearance of the many obstacles preventing couples from realizing their preferences (Feyisetan and Casterline 2000). However, the ability to match effective fertility to ideal fertility remains dependent on social status, level of education and other socioeconomic variables, and this combination of factors lays behind the contraceptive revolution (CELADE 2005). One factor is the biotechnological development that allowed increasing production capacity and efficacy and quality of birth control products. The second factor is political the spread of family planning programs of broad coverage and strong official backing. Finally, there are cultural elements linked with the growing psychological acceptance of contraception use and family size control. These factors have not acted simultaneously, or with the same degree of intensity (Guzmán et al. 2006). For instance in Brazil, public policy played no direct role in spreading of contraception, but the Brazilian 6

7 state encouraged structural and socio-cultural transformations by applying policies and programs, which not only reduced child demand, but also helped to gain acceptance for birth control through the market rather than through public policy (Farias 1989, Perpetuo and Wong 2006). Alongside urbanization, the development of media has also played a key role in reinforcing the impact of the other factors (Potter and Farias 1999, La Ferrara 2008, Basten 2010). The fertility decline is also associated with socioeconomic and cultural differences between social groups, classes or strata. Although the decline begun among more educated, higherincome and urban women, this phenomenon gradually spread out to rural women, with low income and few years of schooling (Merrick and Berquo 1983, Wong and Carvalho 2006, Schkolnik and Chackiel 1998). These contextual and socio-economic elements are also commonly linked to other issues such as gender, the role of women, and their participation in the labour market, and at the level of decision-making within and outside the household (Schkolnik 2004, Merrick and Berquo 1983, McDonald 2000, Neyer 2006, Neyer et al 2010, Neyer et al 2013). The progress in access to healthcare, expanding education and greater participation of women in the formal labour market accelerated the fertility decline in the region, but other perspective emphasizes not the role of socioeconomic development, but instead the economic crises and the restrictive macroeconomic policies, commonly present in past Latin America. Financial setbacks and economic restrictions make it difficult for women to obtain the necessary resources to maintain and educate children. As a response, they opt for smaller family sizes, which eventually accelerated the process of fertility decline in the region (Schkolnik 2004). Mother's education was the most significant variable identified among differentials in fertility levels, especially in the context where earlier fertility timing has been imperative for many years. Despite the educational gradient has been a key factor to explain fertility decline in most developed countries, some studies showed that changes in fertility timing do not reflect a trend towards delayed childbearing (Chackiel 2004) like in Western Europe. This may be linked to the fact that most couples prefer to have children immediately after marriage, and that age at marriage was falling or even stabilizing in many Latin-American countries (Guzmán et al. 2006). Although, recent studies indicate that the more educated group of women is starting to display some postponement behaviour and even an increasing rates of childlessness (Bozon, Gayet and Barrientos 2009). More recent study also show the emergence of bimodal schedules of first birth rates, especially in countries where fertility is at sub-replacement level like Chile, 7

8 Uruguay and Brazil. This bimodal profile is characterized by a combination of continuing high rates of childbearing at younger ages with a parallel increase in first birth rates at later reproductive ages (Lima et al. 2017). Esteve, López-Ruiz and Spijker (2013) conducted a study focusing on the role of educational expansion in the postponement of union formation. They highlight the existence of a paradox that union formation has not historically declined with the expansion of educational attainment in the region. According to them, despite adverse economic conditions of the 1980s and early 1990s, there was not much of a delayed union formation prior to the turn of the century, and if there was later marriage it was compensated by a longer period of premarital cohabitation. In addition, the timing of union formation was until then not a major factor capable of producing a delay in the transition to parenthood. By contrast, Esteve et al. (2013) argues that due to the vast expansion of female education in the region over the last 40 years, there is room for an incipient postponement transition in Latin America. Hence, the existence of such a compensating effect points out to the operation of an expansion in the share of college-educated women and a subsequent decline in fertility. Rosero-Bixby, Castro Martín and Martín García (2009) also stress this relationship between the expansion of college-educated women and fertility decline. These authors affirm that the link between fertility and tertiary education is the driving force behind a new low-fertility pattern that has risen in the region. 3 Data and Methods In this paper, we focus on cohort fertility as a measure of fertility developments as cohort perspective is more close to the real family formation. We will discuss the developments in completed cohort fertility (CFR), parity progression ratios (PPR) as well as distribution of women by given parity in twelve Latin American countries. Our regional focus covers all big countries of South American continent (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela) and two countries of Central America (Mexico and Costa Rica). Unfortunately, data for Cuba are not available. The overview of countries and data is given in Table 1. For each country, data from two or three censuses rounds were used. Most of the data comes from IPUMS (Minnesota Population Center 2017, with the exception of Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, where the data was obtained from National Statistical Offices. IPUMS data are 10% weighted samples, data from local sources are full samples. All data were verified against other official sources and checked for consistency between the censuses. We decided not to use data from 8

9 Bolivia and Paraguay 1992 censuses and from Colombia 2005 census because of high share of unknown cases and because both censuses were giving conflicting results when compared to other censuses in respective country. All unknown cases in other countries and censuses were redistributed proportionally 1. All data are available at the Cohort Fertility and Education database (Zeman 2017, We are analyzing retrospective data, when census question given to women (mostly at age 15+) asks How many children have you ever born alive?. In some countries, the question can slightly differ from this UN recommendation, but the data are harmonised using IPUMS methodology, so this should not significantly affect the results. We analyze responses of women aged at the time of the census interview, as younger women still may have additional children, while among older women there is risk of selective mortality and migration, as well as underreporting of deceased children. Table 1 Overview of the analysed countries and data sources. Code Country Censuses Source Data for cohorts ARG Argentina 1980, 1991, 2001 IPUMS BOL Bolivia 2001, (1992 not used) IPUMS BRA Brazil 1980, 1991, 2000, 2010 IBGE CHL Chile 1992, 2002 INE Chile COL Colombia 1985, 1993, (2005 not used) IPUMS CRI Costa Rica 1984, 2000, 2011 IPUMS ECU Ecuador 1990, 2001, 2010 IPUMS MEX Mexico 1990, 2000, 2010 IPUMS PER Peru 1993, 2007 IPUMS PRY Paraguay 1982, 2002, (1992 not used) IPUMS URY Uruguay 1996, 2011 INE Uruguay VEN Venezuela 1990, 2001 IPUMS We measure the cohort fertility level with the completed cohort fertility rate (CFR), calculated as the average number of children born to women from a given cohort c, where W is total 1 We have also evaluated the quality of the data by applying correction method of El-Badry (1961). This method is used for correcting errors in data on children ever born caused by wrongly recording answers of zero to questions on lifetime fertility instead of leaving the response blank. However, our estimates shows that the El- Badry does not improve substantially the estimates of parity. 9

10 number of women and Wi is number of women of given parity i (women who gave birth to exact number of children i): =, (1). Parity progression ratios from parity i to subsequent parity j are calculated as and the proportion of women by given parity is evaluated as, =, (2). =. (3). The continuous data series of respective indicators over several censuses is then produced using locally-weighted non-parametric regression smoothing method 2. For the analysis of cohort fertility decline and changes in parity distribution, we make comparison of fertility in cohort C with a benchmark cohort B. and the change in proportion of women of given parity, (4). = =. (5). For comparisons, we have chosen a benchmark cohort 1935 and there are three reasons for this choice. First, the cohort fertility level of cohort 1935 is at a local maximum in many Latin American countries, after the temporary fertility increase since the cohorts born in s, but before a steady decrease, following the cohorts of the 1940s and 1950s (see Reher and Requena 2014). Second, 1930s are about the last cohorts where the vast majority of women had only primary education and less, right before the start of the educational expansion. Third, cohort behavior captures the whole period of demographic transition in Latin America, with a focus on the second half of the twentieth century. 2 Function loess() in R with α parameter of level of smoothing set at 0.2, which allows for considerable level of smoothness, at the same time preserving the temporary changes in fertility trends. 10

11 4 Results 4.1 Changes in the completed cohort fertility and parity progression ratios There has been great regional variability in completed cohort fertility already from the beginning of the twentieth century. From Figure 1, if we follow the regional classification, described by Guzmán et al. (2006) and discussed earlier, we can also identify certain groups of countries in terms of cohort fertility development. Argentina and Uruguay, for example, are clearly outliers/trendsetters where cohort fertility was at level well below three children per woman already among women born in 1920s (Table 2), and even older cohorts presented the lowest levels of CFR. After period of stabilisation, the level continued to go down in Uruguay, while in Argentina it eventually returned to CFR around 3. Second, we have the sole country of Chile, which started from higher fertility levels of around 4.5, i.e. lower than most other countries, and quickly went down after cohort 1935, crossing over Argentina and catching up with Uruguay in the 1950s cohorts. Third group consists of nine countries where the fertility level went from high levels of children, kept until cohorts , quickly to in 1960s cohorts. The fourth group consists of Bolivia and Paraguay, two countries where the pace of decline was of slower speed, but current level of cohort fertility of 4 5 children has potential of further decline. Figure 1 Completed cohort fertility rate in Latin American countries, cohorts Sources: See Table 1. 11

12 We are aware that there are countries with even higher fertility (estimated at 5 to 6 children) like Guatemala and Haiti. On the other side, in Cuba the completed fertility for recent cohorts is most likely even below two children per woman according to the Encuesta Nacional De Fecundidad 2009 the completed fertility decreased between cohorts 1945 and 1955 from 1.9 to 1.8 (ONE Cuba 2010). It is clear that in all the countries of the region, some more than others, there is still great potential for fertility decline, and that there are factors that can accelerate this decline to below replacement levels, as already verified in recent trends for some countries in the region (Lima et al. 2017). So what are the special features of countries with lowest recent level of fertility, where the level fell below 2.5 children per woman, namely Chile, Brazil and Uruguay (closely followed by Costa Rica)? One interesting point here is that these countries present very distinguished fertility history. For example, CFR in Uruguay was below 2.5 already since cohort 1916, Chile fell below this level much later, but from rather moderate levels of around 4, while Brazil was having high fertility levels not so far in the past, but the drop in CFR was most spectacular, from 5 in cohort 1940 to 2.5 in cohort Table 2 Completed cohort fertility for selected cohorts values below 3 children per woman are shaded in grey Country 1900s s Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Mexico Peru Paraguay Uruguay Venezuela Sources: See Table 1. The speed of decline is also well depicted in Figure 2. While Argentina and Uruguay has stabilised level of fertility over last decades, in Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador and Costa Rica, on the 12

13 other hand, the decline was the fastest, with almost a reduction of three to four children per women over 35 cohorts. In all other countries, women bore on average two to three children less over the pace of 35 cohorts, comparing women born in 1935 with those born around late 1960s and Thus, an important feature of the process is the homogenisation of fertility level over the continent, when the broad range of fertility levels in the 1920s cohort ( ) narrowed to among the late 1960s cohorts. Figure 2 Difference in completed cohort fertility as compared to the benchmark cohort Sources: See Table 1. This picture is much clearer when we look at the developments in parity progression ratios (PPRs) for a number of selected birth cohorts, 1935, 1950 and 1960s (Figure 3). With the exception of Argentina, starting from cohort 1935, there was a massive decline in the PPRs to third, fourth and further children in the whole Latin America. This reduction were more pronounced in Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Mexico, especially in the progression from third to higher birth orders. Most striking finding is that the decline of PPRs in the region was simultaneous and not sequential, as observed in other parts of the world. 13

14 Figure 3 Decline in Parity progression ratios over birth cohorts 1935->1950->late 1960s. Source: See Table 1. One feature the fall in the progression rate to second birth distinguishes Brazil, Uruguay and Chile (and to some extent also Costa Rica) from all other analysed countries in the region. The parity progression ratios fell from around 0.9 to around 0.8 in all of these countries. At the same time, progression to higher parities is even less strong than elsewhere. As a result, share of twochild families increased and became the most popular feature, followed by an increase in onechild family. Uruguay and Brazil also share higher childlessness, currently at 12 13%. The progression of being childless to have one child is kept more or less stable across the cohorts, while in more recent trends we see a lower PPR12 crossing over with the PPR01, indicating that Latin American women would rather have one child than be childless. This is clearer as we see that for women in cohorts born in 1940s the share of one child is increasing (Figure 4), while the childlessness is decreasing (Figure 5). 14

15 Figure 4 Proportion of women with one child, cohorts 1900 to Source: See Table 1. Figure 5 Proportion of childless women, cohorts1900 to Source: See Table Consequences on family size The most important consequence of fertility decline on the family size of Latin American families was the change in family size from big families to smaller ideal size. While around cohort 1900 more than half of women had six or more children (the share was 30% in Chile and less than 20% in Argentina and Uruguay), this proportion went quickly down after cohort (Figure 6). 15

16 Figure 6 Proportion of women who bore six or more children, cohorts Sources: See Table 1. Figure 7 Completed cohort fertility and the prevailing parity, cohorts Sources: See Table 1. Our question is, to which parities the big families shifted? As apparent in almost all countries (Figure 7), the big family ideal was not shifting sequentially to five children, then to four children, and so on, but the prevailing family size jumped immediately into two-child or threechild families. After reaching critical CFR level of about 3.5, the prevailing family size shifts 16

17 directly from 6+ to 3 and 2. This could happen because the parity progression ratios to third, fourth, fifth child declined simultaneously. As another consequence, childlessness in Latin America is at 5 12% quite low compared to other regions of declining fertility (especially Eastern Asia, Southern Europe, Germany), and it was in fact historically much higher than recently (over 20% in Argentina and Uruguay and at 10 15% elsewhere). 4.3 A special case of Argentina: an unexpected fertility reversal? Argentina characterizes a very special case in the region as in the late nineteenth century its fertility levels were comparable to European countries and the United States and, at the same time, the past fertility developments were comparable to many Latin American countries (Pantelides and Rofman 1983). Its demographic transition model is considered unorthodox, because in its earlier stages, mortality and fertility fell almost simultaneously in time and almost no extended natural population growth was recorded (Pantelides 1983, 2002). In other words, there has never been a period of high natural growth in Argentina, commonly present in the beginning of demographic transition (Pantelides 2002). Figure 8 Completed cohort fertility in Argentina and selected countries, cohorts Sources: Cohort Fertility and Education database (Zeman et al. 2017). 17

18 Another unusual feature, its onset of fertility decline is comparable to and close to many European countries in the early twentieth century (Pantelides 2002). The beginning of the transition is placed between 1895 and 1914, and it went with strongly fertility decline until 1947, thereafter followed by a much slower rate of decline (Arretx, Mellafe and Somoza 1977, Pantelides 1984, 1986). What are the reasons behind such unorthodox fertility transition? Pantelides and Rofman (1983) describe that from 1895 on there were already indications of birth control in the country. According to them, one of the main reasons was the large amount of immigrants, originated mainly from Italy, Spain and France, that migrated to the country between around 1850 and during the First and Second World War (Pantelides 1984). These migrations were characterized mainly by males single childless individuals or married men that left their spouses and children behind, until they found themselves economic stability in their adopted country (Pantelides 1984, 1996). Hence, this large number of foreigner's men postponing their transition to union and family formation translated into a partial imbalance in the marriage market and, at the same time, forced Argentinean women into involuntary singleness and childlessness. In addition, there were also reproductive differences between foreigners among themselves. Parity analyses, for example, showed that French migrants inclined to be childless or to have less than 3 children, in comparison with other migrant groups (Pantelides 1992). We speculate that this family choice could also have spread new ideals of small family sizes through the native population in some sort of diffusion process. In sum, this theoretical background may explain the decline of fertility until the early 1920s. Our analysis also confirmed Argentina as an outlier compared with fertility developments in other countries in the region. Already since the beginning of the twentieth century, the country depicted fertility decline similar to European countries rather than the other nations in Latin America (Pantelides 2002, Pantelides 1992, Pantelides and Rofman 1983). The cohort fertility rate was close to 3 and the childlessness was at levels over 20% (Figure 5). However, in contrast to many other countries, CFR reached its lowest point of 2.6 around cohort 1920, and then started increasing back to 3 (Figure 8). This is an unexpected reversal, different from other countries in the region and elsewhere, and not predicted by fertility transition framework. Thus, this unexpected subsequent increase in completed fertility following the cohorts born in 1930s requires more detailed analysis and discussion, which will be elaborated at a later stage. 18

19 5 Discussion To be drafted 19

20 Acknowledgements The research of Everton E. C. Lima was funded by JESH Joint Excellence in Science and Humanities grant by the Austrian Academy of Sciences. The research of Kryštof Zeman and Tomáš Sobotka was funded by the European Research Council under the European Union s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/ ) / ERC Grant agreement n (EURREP project). We thank Ruben Castro, Public Policy Institute, Universidad Diego Portales, for providing us with the census data for Chile and Mathias Nathan, Programa de Población, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República, Uruguay and Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Uruguay, for providing us with the census data for Uruguay. 20

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