Ex Phil: Free Will. A. Why it Matters Whether Incompatibilism is Intuitive (29-35)

Transcription

1 Ex Phil: Free Will I. Nahmias, et. al (NMNT) Is Incompatibilism Intuitive? A. Why it Matters Whether Incompatibilism is Intuitive (29-35) 1. Why are philosophers generally concerned with our intuitions about free will? (30; also see p. 34 on this question) 2. What are the three reasons NMNT give for why they believe it is important for incompatibilists to be able to make the case that incompatibilism is in accord with our ordinary intuitions about free will? (30-33) B. Testing Whether Incompatibilism is Intuitive (35-39) 1. How do NMNT understand an intuition? And how does that understanding enable them to make a testable prediction to determine if incompatibilism is intuitive? (35-36) 2. What three tests do NMNT run to test the incompatibilist prediction? What were the results? (36-39) C. Objections, Replies, and Implications (40-50) 1. What concerns do NMNT have with trying to make determinism more salient to ordinary individuals? (40-41) 2. What problem does NMNT find with helping people to understand the implications of determinism for free will? (41-42) 3. How might an incompatibilist suggest that even if the incompatibility of free will and determinism is not intuitive for us, we have libertarian intuitions about freedom which entail the incompatibility of free will and determinism? How do NMNT respond? (42-43) 4. How might an incompatibilist respond by appealing to more basic intuitions about choice and the transfer principle which entail incompatibilism? How might this idea imply that we are mistaken when we judge someone free or responsible under deterministic conditions? How do NMNT reply? (43-45) 5. How does the last indeterminist objection lead to the possibility that we 1

2 have inconsistent intuitions about free will and determinism? How do NMNT argue that this is a problem for the incompatibilist? How do NMNT reply to the suggestion (raised in the previous objection) that we are mistaken when we judge someone free or responsible under deterministic conditions since our more basic intuitions about choice imply otherwise? (45-48) 6. What problem do NMNT see for the incompatibilist if they simply give up the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive? (48-49) II. Nichol s and Knobe s (NK) Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions A. NK s Hypothesis ( ) 1. What is NK s hypothesis? (664) 2. How does the study by Smart and Lowenstein support their claim that even the sort of thinly described philosophical used to elicit subjects intuitions about free will and determinism may also elicit emotional responses on the part of those subjects? ( ) B. What does previous research on intuitions about free will and responsibility suggest about the idea (advanced by NK) that ordinary people embrace an incompatibilist theory of responsibility? ( ) C. How do the results of the first phase of their experimental research support their hypothesis? ( ) D. Psychological Models ( ) 1. How does the performance error model propose to explain NK s experimental results? Does the performance error model suggest we should trust our compatibilist or incompatibilist intuitions? ( ) 2. How does the affective competence model propose to explain NK s experimental results? Does the affective competence model suggest we should trust our compatibilist or incompatibilist intuitions? ( ) 3. How does the concrete competence model propose to explain NK s experimental results? ( ) 4. What hybrid model do NK also consider? How does it propose to 2

3 explain NK s experimental results? Does the hybrid model suggest we should trust our compatibilist or incompatibilist intuitions? ( ) E. Experimental Evidence: Second Phase ( ) 1. How do NK put the concrete competence model (a.k.a., the responsibility module account ) to the test? What results do they get and how do they tell against the concrete competence model? ( ) 2. How do NK argue that their second phase of experimental research also supports the performance error model over the affective competence model while also acknowledging that deciding between the affective performance error and the affective competence models of compatibilist responses is not the sort of issue that will be resolved by a single crucial experiment? ( ) F. Philosophical Implications ( ) 1. What are the implications of the performance error model? (678) 2. What are the implications of the affective competence model? ( ) 3. What are the implications of the concrete competence model? ( ) 4. What does NK s final experiment reveal about how ordinary people themselves would resolve the contradiction between their compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions? ( ) III. Murray and Nahmias (MN) Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions A. Investigating the Meaning of Free Will ( ) 1. How do MN argue for the importance of investigating what ordinary people understand by free will? ( ) 2. How do MN suggest that ordinary people could be confused by what philosophers mean when they speak to them about determinism? What concerns do they have with ordinary people possibly confusing determinism with bypassing? What exactly do they mean by bypassing? ( ) B. Previous Experimental Philosophy on Free Will ( ) 3

4 1. How do MN argue that Nichols and Knobe s (our NK) affective performance error model cannot fully account for the results of Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner s (our NMNT) experimental results? ( ) 2. How do MN suggest that NK s description of determinism might have led their subjects to confuse determinism with bypassing? How do MN account for the different responses subjects gave to their high and low affect cases? ( ) C. Study 1: Measuring Bypassing ( ) 1. How do MN test their hypothesis that it is because NK s subjects confused determinism with bypassing, that they gave incompatibilist responses to their abstract scenarios? What were the results? D. Study 2: Competent Subjects ( ) 1. How did MN s second study attempt to insure that subjects didn t confuse determinism with bypassing? How do the results of this second study further support their contention that subjects who do not confuse determinism with bypassing tend to give compatibilist responses? ( ) 2. How did MN s second study attempt to insure that subjects properly understand that determinism implies that future events cannot occur otherwise than they do if past events and the laws of nature remain the same (what they also refer to occasionally as the modal implications of determinism)? How did the responses of competent subjects (and, by the way, what do they mean precisely by a competent subject?) confirm their prediction that subjects who properly understand what determinism entails and don t confuse it with bypassing tend to give compatibilist responses? ( ) E. Study 2: Choice and the Ability to do Otherwise ( ) 1. How did MN s second study put into question Van Inwagen s claim (the conclusion of his consequence argument) that if we do not have a choice about what has happened in the past and the laws of nature, determinism entails that we do not have a choice about our present actions? How do MN interpret the results of this part of their second experimental study? F. Philosophical Implications ( ) 4

5 1. What do MN suggest is the likely explanation for why ordinary people have a tendency to conflate determinism with bypassing? ( ) 5