REASONS AND RESPONSIBILITY. By Matt Phillips, Daniel Templin, Adam Fishbein, Kris Salerno

Transcription

1 REASONS AND RESPONSIBILITY By Matt Phillips, Daniel Templin, Adam Fishbein, Kris Salerno

2 Fisher and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility For Fisher and Ravizza, moral responsibility involves a certain kind of control, which they call guidance control. Guidance control does not require alternative possibilities or the ability to do otherwise (what they call regulative control ). For F & R, responsibility does not involve the agent s making a choice, but rather what the agent actually does the actual sequence issuing in the action. Thus F & R are compatibilists.

3 Reasons-Responsiveness For F & R, moral responsibility, and thus guidance control, hinge on reasons-responsiveness. The central thesis is that someone exhibits guidance control of an action insofar as the mechanism that actually issues in the action is his own, reasons-responsive mechanism (290). Mechanism refers basically to the process that leads to the action, or the way the action comes about (291). Watson will spend much of the following section describing features of reasons-responsiveness.

4 Reasons-responsiveness (cont.) We can t equate a person s responsiveness to reasons with the quality of being reasonable. We often blame people for their insensitivity to reasons. That is, an unreasonable agent might commit wrongdoing and still be morally responsible for the behavior because they responded to reasons in the relevant sense.

5 Reasons-Responsiveness (cont.) In F&R s early work, their requirements for reasons responsiveness were minimal: the reasons-responsive mechanism need only be sensitive to reasons in that the presence of at least some sufficient reasons to act otherwise would have lead them to act in that way. This is too weak, because these are simply reasons and not moral reasons. In the minimal view, children and wantons would still be morally responsible for their behavior despite their lack of moral understanding. Reasons-responsiveness also cannot simply be responsiveness to any sufficient counter reason because that would rule out agents with weakness of will as being morally responsible for their actions.

6 Moral Competence Thus F&R stipulate the condition of moral competence. The kind of responsiveness required for moral responsibility ought to be characterized not merely as a responsiveness to reason, but rather as a responsiveness to a range of reasons that include moral reasons (292) Thus, if an agent is to be morally responsible for an action, the agent must be responsive not just to reasons in general but to moral reasons. To be morally responsible, the agent must be morally competent. Moral competence is the requirement that an agent have at least the capacity to recognize, if not react to, moral considerations (292).

7 Reactivity and Receptivity F&R argue that there is an asymmetry between responsiveness to reasons and reactivity to reasons. Whereas moral responsibility requires that an agent act on a mechanism that shows regularity in recognizing reasons, this same demand cannot be made with respect to reactivity he must act on a mechanism that is regularly receptive to reasons and at least weakly reactive to them (293).

8 Watson s Critique Reactivity and responsiveness cannot be separated in any case in which the agent s reaction could follow from a general pattern of reasonrecognition. Any instance in which the agent demonstrates possible weak reaction to reasons restricts our interpretation of that agent s reason-recognition.

9 Further Critique Weak reactivity is too weak a condition of moral responsibility: it is arguably consistent with motivational compulsion. (294) Motivational Compulsion: A lack of reasonsresponsiveness resulting from an irresistible physical urge.

10 Competing Compulsions Control cannot be identified with susceptibility to counterincentives. Suppose a certain addict can only avoid his addiction by placing his supply in a cage of hungry rats, of which he is phobic. His phobia and his addiction are at odds and he is controlled by these competing compulsions. He lacks reasons-responsiveness. For reasons-responsiveness (in Watson s view) the (counter)incentive must be non-compulsive.

11 Fisher & Ravizza s Reply Exposure to certain alternative incentives might give rise different mechanism from the actual mechanism. (296) Explains the lack of control on the part of the heroin addict with the rat phobia. The competing mechanisms lack reasons-responsiveness.

12 Watson Replies There is no determining which mechanism is the mechanism that is relevant to the assessment of responsibility. (296) F&R s test for reasons-reactive mechanism: The actual mechanism operates Sufficient reason to do otherwise The agent would act otherwise for this reason

13 An Example of F&R s Test Goldie votes for Nader because the other candidates are corrupt/mediocre Goldie may vote against Nader if she is (confidently) informed the Green Party is a Christian Identity group. Thus she satisfies the condition for reasonsresponsiveness, and thus she exercises guidance control and is morally responsible for her behavior.

14 Examples of F&R s Distinction (cont.) Brown takes a non-addictive, but highly pleasurable drug (Plezu) every morning. The only scenario in which Brown would refrain from taking Plezu is one in which he is confronted with a grave consequence death. F&R argue that Brown is reasons-responsive because his behavior is weakly reactive. Watson argues that Brown (like the heroin addict) is constrained by competing incentives. The desire to get high cannot be a part of the process that leads to the refusal to get high. (297)

15 University Off-ramp When an agent takes the same freeway exit everyday, this choice is no longer deliberated or conscious. If the exit is blocked he automatically responds by taking the next exit from the freeway. (p298) This proves the agent is reasons-responsive because the agent passes the F&R test.

16 University Off-ramp (cont) F&R want to account for responsiblity in cases of habitual and routine behavior. F&R don't want to say that deliberation or practical reflection are the only reasons-responsive mechanisms

17 Watson Responds The agent s habit of taking [the first] offramp is not what leads him or her in the alternative scenario to pass by. (298) Here again Watson highlights the difficulty in determining which mechanism is active in the agents choice. But you could say that the actual mechanism or habit is rather a kind of monitoring capacity governed by my goal of getting to campus.

18 Watson s critique of Mechanisms Watson worries that the notion of a mechanism as a process resulting in behavior is too amorphous a term. He is concerned that mechanisms cannot be properly individuated.

19 F&R return to Brown Watson s objection to F&Rs test: The mechanism on which Brown acts could not have responded differently to the actual incentive to do otherwise. (299) Not sure what point Watson is making here. F&R s reply: As long as the agent reacts to some incentive to do otherwise, the agent could react to any incentive to do otherwise.

20 Watson Responds (?) He says that the solubility of one substance in a liquid does not indicate solubility of that substance in all liquids. Is this argument logically valid? Reaction to one reason does not indicate reaction to any reason

21 Frankfurt Cases In Frankfurt cases there exists a failsafe in place that ensures an individual behaves in a certain way. In this Goldie s case the failsafe would ensure that whether Goldie pushed the lever for Nader or for another candidate, the machine would register her vote for Nader.

22 F&R Respond to Goldie-Frankfurt This modal fact does not entail that her actual voting behavior is not reasons-responsive. They reject the idea that to be responsible the agent must have alternatives to what s/he does. For these sorts of Frankfurt cases F&R say, the agents could not have responded differently in the face contrary incentives but actually operative mechanism could have. (300)

23 Another Kind of Frankfurt Case Watson supposes that, in the example, the Frankfurtian failsafe operates by displacing ones own reason-responsiveness. Goldie would retain reasonsresponsiveness But if the failsafe instead decisively affects how she reasons, wouldn t her actual mechanism be still be operative even if it has been changed in how it weighs the reasons provided? In such a case, Goldie would still be reasons-responsive, but we would like to think she is not morally responsible for her behavior.

24 Discussion Question If Goldie s actual (301) mechanism is influenced by some external source, is her moral responsibility compromised?

25 II: History and Ownership F&R think there is more to responsibility than reasonsresponsiveness. An individual might be animated by reasons, they think are self developed, but which are not actually their own.

26 An Example: Goldie When Goldie was made to vote for Nader by device that affects her deliberative mechanism. (2 nd Frankfurt case) Even though the behavior was the result of a deliberative process, it was not her own deliberation. It undermines her agency not her rationality, though one might say it undermines her rationality.

27 F&R stating the problem It is only important that the acting mechanism be reasons-responsive, but also how that mechanism was put in place. There must be some condition of ownership on the agents part. And any satisfactory theory of responsibility must be historical. It matters how that mechanism was put in place.

28 Watson s Reply Watson agrees that ownership is necessary for an account of reasons-responsiveness, but disagrees that such an account be historical as well.

29 F&R illustrate the historical condition There is no determining the fairness of the distribution of an agents winnings without knowledge of the circumstances under which they were obtained. If the chips were obtained through theft, forgery, etc., the agent would not necessarily deserve the winnings indicated by his/her purse.

30 Further Illustration The authenticity of an [alleged] Picasso cannot be determined merely by the physical properties of the painting at a given time. Rather the work must be traced back to Picasso himself to determine legitimacy.

31 Explanation The properties of being a fair distribution and of being a Picasso are historical in the sense that they cannot be instantiated by a state of affairs or of an object just in virtue of the time slice, properties of the state of affairs or object. (302) A fair account of ownership must include the historical conditions that lead to the state of ownership.

32 Mesh Theories F&R want to argue against ahistorical theories of responsibility on the basis of their conclusions regarding historical conditions. Mesh Theories state that an agent is responsible for an action in so far as a structural conformity obtains between various components leading to behavior. Any view of this kind is ahistorical as it doesnt matter how a structural conformity(mesh) of this kind arose.

33 Watson s Response While the mesh itself may be ahistorical, its components (such as beliefs or values) or their structural relations may be historical in nature. Thus mesh theories may be compatible with F&R s theories of responsibility.

34 Mesh Theories (cont) Watson: What reasons are there for thinking mesh theories must be ahistorical in an objectionable sense? F&R develop two considerations in favor of this conclusion. Tracing Responsibility undermining processes

35 Tracing Roughly; an individual is responsible for less than fully voluntary behavior at one time in virtue of his/her earlier negligent or voluntary conduct. E.G. Driving incompetently while drunk. Mesh theories cannot account for responsibility of this sort because they lack consideration for historical circumstances.

36 Watson s Reply Tracing presents no real problem for mesh theories To accommodate tracing a theory must endorse something like: N: No full description of a persons behavior, dispositions, and capacities at time T entail that he or she should not be held responsible for how she behaves or for what happens at T. (304) A mesh theory can and should accept N because an agent is responsible for some behavior or state of affairs if it is suitably related to the mesh, m, in which responsibility is taken to consist. (305) Such views will accept N because a full description at a time may leave out relevant information about the relation between the behavior or state of affairs and m (the agent's volitions, or values or character). (305)

37 Hierarchical Compatibilism Harry Frankfurt's hierarchical mesh theory (1971). Frankfurt's theory explains freely willed action in terms of actions that issue from desires of a certain sort. In particular, a desire issuing in a freely willed action must suitably mesh within hierarchically ordered elements of a person's psychology. The key idea is that a person who acts of her own free will acts from desires that are nested within more encompassing elements of her self. Hence, Frankfurt develops a source model of control to explain how it is that, when a freely willing agent acts, her actions emanate from her rather than from something foreign. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

38 F&R Critique Mesh Theories Mesh theories hold that responsibility consists in the obtaining of a mesh, or m. M, is a nonhistorical fact: the m could be obtained through processes like post-hypnotic suggestion, subliminal advertising, or direct neurophysiological manipulation, etc. Thus, according to F&R, responsibility cannot consist in the obtaining of m, because any adequate theory of responsibility must be historical in a sense in which mesh theories cannot be (305).

39 Transfer Principle An individual s responsibility cannot be derived by causal necessitation from processes for which the individual is not responsible (306) E.G., an agent is not responsible if they were not responsible for the processes which led to his or her action. If we accept this principle, Watson thinks F&R have a good case against mesh theories.

40 The Transfer Principle and Incompatibilism However, F&R firmly deny the transfer principle; it is often used to justify incompatibilism. If we deny the transfer principle, why should we think such processes for are necessarily responsibility undermining? Watson thinks these processes (for which the agent is not responsible) often are responsibility-undermining, but arguably one could say that these processes can actually prevent the realization of m. For example, being manipulated by someone undermines one s capacity for reflective evaluation (306).

41 F&R s Argument and Compatibilism F&R s argument against mesh theories can be applied to all compatibilist theories. They appeal to an open-ended list of factors that undermine responsibility (such as neurological manipulation, hypnosis, brainwashing, and even more everyday cases) To be a compatibilist is to hold that certain conditions, c, are both sufficient for responsibility and realizable in a completely deterministic world (306). The claim that c obtains is consistent with the claim that c has been produced by one of the factors on F&R s open-ended list. If F&R s argument would allow that c, the conditions for responsibility, is produced by factors that seem to undermine responsibility, then F&R would seem to be providing an argument against compatibilism.

42 Compatibilism (cont.) So why should we only reject those compatibilist theories that hold that c is equivalent with m? Doesn t this line of thinking provide an argument against F&R s own theory of responsibility?

43 Discussion Question Can you think of any historical factors that don t undermine an agent s responsibility (when they lead to the agent s process of action)? Do you think that c is possible? That is, is it possible for a condition to be sufficient for responsibility and be realizable in a deterministic world? Do you think a compatibilist theory of responsibility is possible?

44 III: Ownership and Taking Responsibility F&R's theory of ownership explains ownership, in terms of taking responsibility. The conditions for taking responsibility, are; An individual must see himself as an agent; he must see that his actions and choices as efficacious. (307) he must accept that he is a fair target of the reactive attitudes as a result of how he exercises this agency in certain contexts. (307) The agent must come to have the set of beliefs required by the two previous conditions in the right way (307, footnote 16)

45 Taking Responsibility The process of taking responsibility is: coming to have a certain cluster of beliefs in a certain way. (307) The set of beliefs on which this process culminates is not typically reflective or explicit. (307) F&R conclude from this (?): an agent's being morally responsible is genuinely historical in the sense that it requires an agent to have previously taken responsibility. (307)

46 Two Undermining Factors The process leading to action could undermine responsibility by: preventing reasons-responsiveness subverting ownership Judith is seized by an urge to punch Jane if this process is unreactive, she is not responsible even if she is weakly reactive, but the urge is produced by a process for which she has not taken responsibility (E.G. Martian brain manipulation), she is not responsible

47 Watson's Response Watson agrees that F&R's account of responsibility, as well as mesh theories, require ownership to attribute actions, and thus responsibility, to particular agents. But, he is not convinced that this theory of taking responsibility solves the problem of ownership or that the problem of ownership requires historical theory.

48 Watson's Problems with F&R's Theory of Ownership. Could not the process of taking responsibility, be manipulated, or induced, by an external mechanism. The agent's ignorance about the nature of action doesn't mean that the conditions of taking responsibility have not been met. Could the conditions of taking responsibility, be met even if the agent were not aware of all the manipulations he is subject to.

49 Watson's Alternative The origins of our desires don't matter unless they bear upon how hard it is for us to resist acting upon them What would concern us about Judith (vs Jane) is not how she acquired the urge, but whether she could be reasonably expected to control herself.

50 Judith, Bothersome Judith's case is bothersome, because Judith is not simply implanted with a single desire leaving the rest of her preferences and capacities of resistance intact. They are taking control of her agency. (310) The intervention is incompatible with the integrity of her agency because the depth and breathe of their manipulation indicates that she is not the locus of action, i.e. she is no longer the agent. Such behavior would not become the agent's own even if she had authorized the intervention. (310)

51 Cont. Not everything for which one is rightly held responsible can helpfully be considered one's own. The following are examples of instances where your reasoning processes are not your own, but you are still rightly held responsible. It also matters how the mechanism has been put in place.

52 Examples Suppose that, because of a nuerophysiological problem, Watson is susceptible to certain faulty reasoning. Fortunately, he is able to take a pill which corrects this imbalance. Because he takes the pill deliberately, the resultant reasoning process is his own. Suppose that unbeknownst to Watson carrot juice had the same effect as the pill. He remains responsible for the resultant reasoning processes despite being unaware of the juice's influence. Now suppose that his reasoning processes are being corrected via external stimulation by Martian manipulators. This seems, to Watson, no different from the carrot juice.

53 Cont. These examples go against the claim that you must have the opportunity to be aware of and reflect on the manipulation in order to take responsibility for the mechanisms that result from it. It can make no difference to my agency whether the necessary physical conditions of my competence are induced by natural causes or other agents. (311) The only difference it makes is whether, or not, other agents share some responsibility for the resultant action.

54 Questions of Ownership Recall the case of Goldie, the Nader supporter. If an intervener were to give her better reasons for a better candidate, the intervener undermines Goldie's agency by bypassing her poor deliberative skills so that the intervener's own deliberations are effective in the voting action.

55 Cont. Now suppose that Goldie's deliberative deficiency is due to a neurochemical imbalance. Suppose that she eats a nutrition bar that somehow allows her to overcome this neurochemical imbalance. As a result her vote reflect a new level of analytic skill. should we say that her vote doesn't reflect her capacities, or that her capacities were enhanced momentarily?(3120

56 Watson Reflects Is there any difference between the interviewer altering her deliberation and her (un)knowingly enhancing it with a nutrition bar? Watson claims there is no difference between the two cases. He also asserts that it is problematic to place a great deal of importance on exotic contexts and situations. We need a better framework for discussing questions of ownership.

57 Challenging Compatibilism Watson asks; couldn't the process of taking responsibility be induced or manipulated itself? To take responsibility is to acquire a set of beliefs. Couldn't these be acquired or caused by manipulation?

58 F&R Respond An agent who has been induced to have a relevent view of himself (the first two conditions for taking responsibility ), has not formed these views in the appropriate way. (312) To be appropriate, a belief must have an appropriate relation to the world. (313) If an agent's beliefs were electronically stimulated, they would not be appropriately grounded in reality. The is no incompatibility between a belief's being causally determined and it's being appropriately related to the environment. (313)

59 Tracking Beliefs Could you call a belief that was electronically manipulated a belief at all? Can any state that originates in this way track evidence, in an appropriate way. F&R are confident that none could, Watson is not so certain. Watson claims that such implanted beliefs could possible track in an appropriate way. Consider an implanted, true belief (that grass is green). Simply because it is implanted does not make it any less true or appropriate in the real world. If someone's attitudes were responsive to relevant considerations, however derived, that would settle the question of their appropriateness.

60 Further Questions about Ownership If taking responsibility is a set of attitudes that is needed to ensure ownership of other reasonresponsive processes, what ensures that those attitudes belong to the individual? (313) Appropriateness cannot be a condition for ownership because the appropriateness of an individuals taking responsibility does not suffice to ensure that that attitude is his own.

61 Attitude + Content To say that they are appropriate is to say that the agent is right to take responsibility for acting on certain mechanisms. Her being responsible is constituted by her appropriately holding those attitudes If the attitudes are sound, no further question of ownership arises. (314)

62 Watson's Conclusion What is missing in F&R's account is a set of beliefs, concerns, and skills in virtue of which individuals are capable of reflective critical reason and are therefore capable of participating in the practices of critical evaluation. (315) What is crucial is not a kind of control but the competence required for meaningful response to the norms to which we hold one another responsible. (315)