Short Research Note. Reducing intergroup conflict through the consideration of future consequences

Transcription

1 European Journal of Social Psychology Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 39, (2009) Published online 5 January 2009 in Wiley InterScience ( Short Research Note Reducing intergroup conflict through the consideration of future consequences SCOTT T. WOLF 1 *,y, TAYA R. COHEN 1z, JEFFREY L. KIRCHNER 2, ANDREW REA 1, R. MATTHEW MONTOYA 3 AND CHESTER A. INSKO 1 1 Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA 2 BioVid Corporation, Princeton, NJ, USA 3 Harvard University, USA Abstract Basic social psychological research has suggested several interventions to reduce intergroup conflict. Most of these interventions, however, have been indirect and impractical to implement outside laboratory settings. Although past research has demonstrated that indirect manipulations of the consideration of future consequences reduce intergroup competition, no study of interindividual intergroup discontinuity has tested this assumption with a direct manipulation. The present study found that when participants (individuals and members of groups) interacting in an iterated prisoner s dilemma game (PDG) were asked to predict how their opponent s choice on a second trial would be affected by their own choice on an initial trial, intergroup competition was reduced while interindividual competition remained low regardless of the manipulation. On a practical level, implications of this study provide a simple and easily implemented solution to reducing intergroup conflict in non-laboratory situations. Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Are there simple techniques for reducing intergroup conflict? One way may be to get group members to consider the consequences of their actions. Axelrod (1984) wrote about how the shadow of the future can yield mutual cooperation, citing evidence of cooperation between entrenched forces during World War I. Rather than shooting directly at the enemy, soldiers on both sides intentionally fired shots over each others heads, hit soft targets at predictable times, and scheduled no-fire breaks in which soldiers on both sides could move about freely without fear of being shot. Axelrod suggested that this cooperation was due to the recognition that each sides actions had future consequences. This idea had been anticipated by Pruitt and Kimmel s (1977) assertion that cooperative behavior usually results from long-range thinking (p. 375). In the current research, we explored the efficacy of considering future consequences as a simple conflictreduction procedure. The effectiveness of this technique, however, may differ between interindividual and intergroup interactions. As discussed below, there is evidence that groups have more difficulty than individuals in assuming the mutual trust associated with long-range thinking. *Correspondence to: Scott T. Wolf, Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211, USA. wolfst@missouri.edu y Present address: Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri. z Kellogg School of Management and Organizations, Northwestern University. Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Received 27 July 2008 Accepted 21 October 2008

2 832 Scott T. Wolf et al. THE DISCONTINUITY EFFECT One way psychologists have studied conflict is by comparing individual and group behavior in the prisoner s dilemma game (PDG). The PDG represents social interactions in which each side can choose to act either cooperatively or competitively (see Figure 1). Each side can attempt to maximize its outcomes (i.e., earn the most money) by acting competitively, but if both sides choose the competitive choice (Y in Figure 1) they will be worse off than if they had both chosen the cooperative choice (X in Figure 1). Studies using the PDG to examine conflict have revealed a robust tendency for intergroup interactions to be more competitive than interindividual interactions a finding known as interindividual intergroup discontinuity, or the discontinuity effect (see Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003 for a quantitative review). The discontinuity effect refers to the idea that there is a dissociation or disconnect between how individuals behave in one-on-one interactions versus how groups behave in group-on-group interactions in mixed-motive, or conflict situations. In light of the relative cooperativeness of interindividual interactions, research in this area has been guided by the assumption that interindividual relations serve as a control against which the unique qualities of intergroup relations can be identified. While the classic PDG anecdote about two prisoners locked in different cells does not include communication between sides, studies within the discontinuity paradigm generally give the interacting sides an opportunity to communicate before they make their final choices. Because intergroup communication does not tend to be trusted or regarded as credible, while interindividual communication does, studies that include communication between the sides (like the present study) tend to find larger discontinuity effects than studies which do not employ communication periods (Insko et al., 1993; Wildschut et al., 2003). WHY DOES THE DISCONTINUITY EFFECT OCCUR? Whereas various explanations have been proposed for the discontinuity effect, the fear and greed perspective has received the most empirical support (see Wildschut & Insko, 2007 for a review). This perspective assumes that intergroup relations are more contentious than interindividual relations because they are characterized by greater fear or distrust of the other side (Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, & Graetz, 1990; Pemberton, Insko, & Schopler, 1996; Schopler, Insko, Graetz, Drigotas, Smith, & Dahl, 1993; Winquist & Larson, 2004) and greater greed or support for behaviors that help the ingroup and/or hurt the outgroup (Insko et al., 1990; Schopler et al., 1993; Wildschut, Insko, & Gaertner, 2002). That is, intergroup interactions are more competitive than interindividual interactions because groups are more likely to choose the competitive choice out of fear of receiving the lowest possible outcome (either in an absolute or relative sense) or out of greed over receiving the highest possible outcome (either in an absolute or relative sense). As pointed out by Wildschut and Insko (2007), the fear and greed explanation incorporates both the concern with relativistic advantage emphasized by Figure 1. Prisoner s Dilemma Game (PDG) used in the experiment. Values in the matrix represent the amount of money (in US cents) that each side received as a result of the various choice combinations. The outcomes in this matrix were used in the groups condition. Outcomes were divided by three in the individuals condition

3 Consideration of future consequences 833 social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and the concern for tangible economic outcomes emphasized by realistic conflict theory (Campbell, 1965). Kelley and Thibaut s (1978) notion of a transformation of motivation offers a way of conceptualizing the fear and greed perspective (Kelley, Holmes, Kerr, Reis, Rusbult, & Van Lange, 2003). 1 The transformation of motivation proposes that the given matrix in this case the PDG is not always the effective matrix used by a player to make a decision. Instead, the given matrix is psychologically transformed to account for various costs and benefits, resulting in an effective matrix that has a more proximal influence on behavior. Being part of a group and interacting with a group may increase greed and fear motivations and these motives might change the given matrix. The top panel of Figure 2 shows a possible fear or distrust transformation. If a player suspects that the other player will not act cooperatively, the only way to avoid being exploited is to reciprocate the expected competition. Given this expectation of competition, the outcomes associated with mutual cooperation decrease (because this outcome is unlikely) and the outcomes associated with unilateral competition increase (a reward for not allowing one s self to be vulnerable). The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows a possible greed transformation. Players get a 1 unit bonus for selecting the competitive choice (Y) and a 1 unit loss for selecting the cooperative choice (X). 2 These matrix transformations represent only a few of many possible transformations, and the values shown in the matrices are meant to be interpreted symbolically and in relationship to each other. The importance of these transformed matrices lies in their ability to graphically represent psychological shifts in how conflict situations are perceived. Figure 2. panel) Transformations of PDG arising from motivations to (a) fear or distrust the other side (top panel) and (b) act greedily (bottom 1 For a more detailed account of the transformation process in the discontinuity paradigm, see Wolf, Insko, Kirchner, & Wildschut (2008). 2 Note that trust and unselfish transformations and resulting effective matrices can be computed by reversing the transformational weight change signs in both panels of Figure 2.

4 834 Scott T. Wolf et al. HOW DOES THE CONSIDERATION OF FUTURE CONSEQUENCES RELATE TO FEAR AND GREED? The fear aspect of the fear and greed perspective is most directly relevant to the consideration of future consequences. The relative cooperativeness observed in interindividual interactions stems in part from relatively high levels of trust between individuals compared with relatively low levels of trust between groups (Insko, Kirchner, Pinter, Efaw, & Wildschut, 2005). 3 An implication of the fear explanation for the discontinuity effect is that strategies that reduce intergroup distrust should also reduce intergroup competition in a traditional two-choice prisoner s dilemma context. 4 The consideration of future consequences may be such a strategy. Future consideration makes salient the long-term costs of mutual competition (or the long-term benefits of mutual cooperation), and leads groups to expect less competition from the opposing group. Reducing the expectation of competition from the other side minimizes the fear motivation for intergroup competition and results in increases in intergroup cooperation. Insko et al. (1998) provide several possible reasons why a future-oriented perspective reduces competition in intergroup interactions more than in interindividual interactions. First, given that interindividual interactions tend to be characterized by trust of the other side and are already overwhelmingly cooperative when communication between parties is allowed (Insko et al., 1993; Wildschut et al., 2003), the consideration of future consequences should primarily reduce intergroup distrust and competition, thereby reducing the discontinuity effect. Second, compared with individuals, the heightened distrust observed between groups may make it difficult for group members to consider the long-term benefits of mutual cooperation. When one s interaction partner is expected to compete in a PDG, reciprocal competition is the only means to avoid exploitation. Because competition is more likely to be expected in intergroup interactions, group-on-group interactions are more likely to fall into cycles of reciprocal competition. A focus on future consequences could help groups avoid getting locked into these negative cycles of eye-for-an-eye responding. WHAT HAS PRIOR RESEARCH ON THE CONSIDERATION OF FUTURE CONSEQUENCES REVEALED? Three studies within the discontinuity tradition have experimentally tested the hypothesis that future consideration can reduce intergroup conflict (Insko et al., 1998; Insko et al., 2001; see Cohen & Insko, 2008, for a review). In the clearest test of the idea, Insko et al. (2001) compared interindividual to intergroup competition in PDG interactions and varied whether participants expected a single trial or multiple trials. The results indicated that groups expecting multiple trials were less competitive (28%) than groups expecting a single trial (56%), and this reduction in intergroup competition was paralleled by increases in intergroup trust. Consistent with much of the discontinuity literature, individuals were relatively trusting and competed at low levels regardless of whether they anticipated multiple trials. Thus, the discontinuity effect was reduced, though not eliminated, by the anticipation of multiple trials, possibly due to increases in intergroup trust. Similarly, Insko et al. (1998, Experiment 1) compared PDG choices of participants (groups or individuals) interacting with confederates who followed a tit-for-tat strategy to participants in a control condition in which there were no confederates (i.e., actual participants interacted with other actual participants). In the tit-for-tat condition, the confederates cooperated on the first trial and then reciprocated the opponent s choice from the preceding trial on each of the subsequent trials. The relevance of the tit-for-tat strategy to the importance of future consequences flows from the fact that although competing rather than cooperating on the first trial may increase initial outcomes, a tit-for-tat response from the opponent will decrease outcomes on the second trial. Results from Insko et al. (1998, Experiment 1) indicated that relative to the control condition, the tit-for-tat strategy reduced intergroup competition from 28 to only 8%; whereas interindividual competition was low and was unaffected by the tit-for-tat manipulation. 3 Consistent with prior research, we use the term trust to refer to the expectation that the other side will act cooperatively, whereas the term distrust refers to the expectation that the other side will act competitively (Insko et al., 2005). 4 Although it is generally true that trust is associated with cooperation, the situation for competition is more complex. Using a three-choice PDG-Alt matrix that allowed for the separate assessments of cooperation and competition, Insko et al. (2005) found a difference between how trust affected cooperation versus competition. A manipulated minimal groups categorization of similar groups versus dissimilar groups (and associated trust) produced more cooperation with same than different categorization, but less competition only for groups with members low in guilt proneness. Groups with members high in guilt proneness competitively exploited the opposing group when they were assumed to be trustworthy, and thus vulnerable. These results suggest why it may be difficult for groups to make themselves vulnerable by trusting outgroups.

5 Consideration of future consequences 835 The Insko et al. (1998, Experiment 1) tit-for-tat study explored the role of distrust with an open-ended assessment of the reasons participants gave for their PDG choices. Coding of these open-ended assessments for distrust revealed that within the control condition, groups were more distrusted than individuals. However, groups within the control condition were not distrusted significantly more than groups in the tit-for-tat condition. These findings indicate that open-ended selfreports of distrust were not of pivotal importance in reducing intergroup competition. What accounts for the failure to find that tit-for-tat reduced distrust of the other group s behavior? Perhaps tit-for-tat did increase the predictability of the other group s behavior, but since this predictability implied that being wary of the other group was advisable, group members may have been reluctant to indicate on their open-ended statements that such wariness implied trustworthiness. In other less dangerous social contexts, predictability and trustworthiness should be more clearly associated. A third study investigating the consideration of future consequences (Insko et al. 1998, Experiment 2) varied whether the choices of both sides were made simultaneously or successively. In the simultaneous condition, groups and individuals made choices at the same time and did not know what their opponents had chosen until after both sides had made their decisions. In the successive responding or turn-taking condition, groups and individuals alternated the order in which they made their choices. For example, on the first trial, Side A made a choice that Side B saw before deciding on a choice. On the following trial, the order switched so that Side B made a choice that Side A saw before deciding on a choice. This alternation continued throughout all the trials. It was assumed that consideration of future consequences would be greater with successive responding. Responding second on a given trial provided the opportunity to exploit a cooperative opponent. Such exploitation, however, could easily have been reciprocated on the subsequent trial when the order of responding was reversed. Thus, it was assumed that successive responding would more directly emphasize a concern with future consequences than would simultaneous responding. In support of this idea, the results revealed that groups in the successive turn-taking condition competed less than groups in the simultaneous condition (24 vs. 55%). Individuals in both conditions competed at very low levels (7 and 10%, respectively). Thus, successive turn-taking reduced intergroup competition, but not interindividual competition. Although the discontinuity effect was reduced in the successive turn-taking condition, it remained statistically significant. Unfortunately, distrust was not assessed in this study. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FUTURE CONSIDERATION AND PERSPECTIVE TAKING? The consideration of future consequences entails shifting one s perspective to focus on the long-term consequences of how one s behavior affects others. Although this might bear some resemblance to common methods of perspective taking involving the consideration of another individual s or group s perspective, the consideration of future consequences is, in fact, quite different. Ironically, research on perspective taking (i.e., imagining one s self in the other side s shoes ) suggests that taking the perspective of one s opponent in a social dilemma might actually increase competition because of the activation of egoistic motivations (Croson, 2000; Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006; Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008). Epley et al. (2006) call this seemingly counterintuitive finding reactive egoism and define it as self-serving behavior in reaction to the presumably egoistic behavior of others (p. 873). In a series of resource allocation dilemma experiments, Epley et al. (2006) found that although judgments of fairness became less egocentric after considering the perspective of other factions, these reductions were not followed by reductions in egoistic behavior. Instead, these reductions were associated with increased egoistic behavior. Those who took the perspective of other factions thought that the other factions would behave more selfishly, and as a result, behaved more selfishly themselves. Participants in these studies were not asked to consider the effect of their own decision on their interaction partner s behavior. Instead, they were asked to consider what the other player would do, regardless of their own behavior on an earlier trial. Because mixed-motive situations such as the PDG and public goods games pit egoistic concerns against collective concerns, it seems plausible that simply thinking about the choice of one s partner will increase distrust through reactive egoism, and that this increase in distrust will lead to more competitive decisions. However, including the additional instruction of asking how the other side will behave in response to one s own prior behavior adds an additional level of complexity, which was not incorporated in the perspective taking instructions used in the studies on reactive egotism. It is our contention that unlike perspective taking exercises that encourage participants to consider how the other

6 836 Scott T. Wolf et al. side will behave, exercises that encourage participants to consider how their behavior will affect the other side s future behavior will decrease distrust between interacting parties, thereby promoting cooperative behavior. RESEARCH OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESES Building on prior research on the consideration of future consequences (Insko et al., 1998, 2001), we propose that in the context of an iterated two-choice PDG, the consideration of future consequences makes salient the possibility of an interacting party s option to retaliate in response to a non-cooperative choice. Such future-oriented thinking makes it clear that any explicit gain in outcomes obtained through early unilateral competition is negated (and possibly reversed) through the interacting party s option to retaliate in later trials. We hypothesize that the realization that mutual competition is more detrimental than mutual cooperation will make groups more likely to expect cooperation from the other side, and this reduction in intergroup distrust will be associated with corresponding reductions in intergroup competition. Because interindividual interactions are generally not characterized by distrust unless there is a prior history of deception, the consideration of future consequences is likely to be more effective at reducing intergroup competition as opposed to interindividual competition. The goal of this research was to explore the influence of future consideration by directly manipulating it in order to develop an effective and easily implemented conflict reduction method. We tested whether future consideration could be elicited through training, and whether such training could reduce intergroup competition. In addition to testing how future training affected competition, we tested how future training affected distrust, and whether reductions in intergroup distrust mediated the relationship between future training and intergroup competition. We manipulated future consideration by asking participants (either a group interacting with another group or an individual interacting with another individual) how they thought the other side would respond on the second trial of an iterated PDG as a result of their own choice on the first trial. Consistent with the Socratic method of teaching, the intent was to explicitly invite participants to consider the consequences of their trial 1 choice by asking questions. Individuals and groups in the control condition were not provided with this training. We expected that the tendency for groups to be more competitive than individuals would be reduced in the future training condition relative to the control condition, and that this tendency would be mediated by reductions in self-reported distrust of the other side. METHOD Participants were 542 undergraduates (236 men, 306 women), who participated to fulfill a course requirement. Experimental sessions were conducted with up to six participants, all of the same sex. Independent Variables The design of the study was a 2 (groups vs. individuals) 2 (future training vs. control) 2 (gender) factorial design. Groups versus individuals was manipulated by randomly assigning participants to interact with another individual or to interact with a three-person group as a member of another three-person group in an iterated PDG. Future training was manipulated by asking participants to predict their opponent s hypothetical trial 2 choice based on possible trial 1 choices. The gender factor involved a comparison of all male sessions with all female sessions. Procedure Participants reported to a suite that contained one large central room surrounded by smaller rooms. For the individuals condition, one participant was randomly assigned to room A and another to room B. For the groups condition, six

7 Consideration of future consequences 837 participants were randomly separated into two groups of three; one group was assigned to room A and the other to room B. Once situated in their homerooms, an information sheet describing the payoff matrix (Figure 1) was distributed and read aloud by the experimenter. The sheet explained how the choices of the two sides would be combined to determine each side s outcomes (in US cents). Half the participants were randomly assigned to a future training condition, in which they were presented with a series of four two-part questions (for a total of eight questions). The first question read: Imagine that on the first trial, your group [you] chose Y while the other group [person] chose X. (a) With this combination of choices, your group [you] would have earned, and the other group [person] would have earned. (b) If this combination of choices occurred on the first trial, what do you think the other group [person] would choose on the second trial? Three additional questions followed the same format for each of the remaining choice combinations. The other participants were randomly assigned to a control condition in which they were asked several questions designed to test their understanding of the payoff matrix. For example, If Group [Person] A chooses X while Group [Person] B chooses Y, then Group [Person] A gets cents and Group [Person] B gets cents. Unlike the questions in the future-training condition, these questions did not mention trial 2 and did not ask for predictions of the opponents responses. 5 After participants were trained on the payoff matrix, the experiment proceeded in a series of one-minute steps. First, there was a period for each side to think about their choice. In the individuals condition, each side sat alone in their homerooms; in the groups condition, each group had the opportunity to discuss their preferences among themselves. Next, there was a communication period between the two sides. In the individuals condition, each person came out of his or her homeroom to meet with the other individual. In the groups condition, one representative from each side met with the other group s representative. 6 Each group was free to choose their representative and the representatives were free to discuss anything they wished. Following the communication period, participants returned to their homerooms to record their decision. Decisions for groups were based on consensus and it was emphasized to participants that there would be multiple trials. 7 The words cooperation and competition were never mentioned. After the first trial, the experimenter collected and tallied the decisions, and distributed money to each side. Following the payoff matrix interaction, participants were presented with an open-ended assessment of reasons for their PDG choice. Dependent Variables Each side chose either X or Y in the payoff matrix. X represents cooperation (0); Y represents competition (1). The proportion of competition for each session was computed by averaging both sides choices (i.e., both Y ¼ 1.0, one X and one Y ¼.5, both X ¼ 0). 5 Participants were actually assigned to one of two control conditions. One control condition used the standard PDG training procedure that contains four questions. Because the future training condition completed eight questions, we wanted to rule out the possibility of increased familiarity with the matrix as a confounding variable. To address this issue, we included an alternative control condition, which involved presenting participants with four additional questions that reversed the standard questions (for a total of eight questions). For example, one item from the groups condition read, If Group A receives 360 cents and Group B receives 90 cents, then Group A must have picked while Group B must have picked. An ANOVA predicting competition revealed no significant difference between the two control procedures, F(1, 62) ¼.00, p ¼.99, nor any significant interactions, so the two control conditions were collapsed for all analyses. 6 Intergroup interactions have been shown to be more competitive than interindividual interactions regardless of whether group representatives or entire groups meet for the communication period (Insko et al., 1987, 1998). In addition, studies employing written notes (Wildschut et al., 2002; Wildschut, Insko, & Pinter, 2007) or an intercom system (Insko et al., 1993, 1994; Schopler, Insko, Drigotas, Wieselquist, Pemberton, & Cox, 1995) have found discontinuity effects. Further, the discontinuity effect has been found with face-to-face communication between group leaders who have sole decisionmaking power (Pinter, Insko, Wildschut, Kirchner, & Wolf, 2007). 7 Two trials were conducted to avoid deceiving participants. However, because choices on the second trial were influenced by first trial interactions, and because our measure of distrust was only assessed for the initial trial, our analyses are based only on first trial choices.

8 838 Scott T. Wolf et al. Table 1. Proportion of competition and distrust as a function of future training and groups versus individuals (N ¼ 139) Competition Distrust Individuals Groups Individuals Groups Control.05 (.16).42 (.40).00 (.00).12 (.19) Future training.06 (.20).24 (.36).01 (.08).05 (.13) Note: Values represent mean proportions (with standard deviations). All participants were asked if they (or their group) picked X or Y, and their reason(s) for doing so. These responses were coded by two trained raters for the presence of distrust (k ¼.96), among several other possibilities. 8 Distrust was present if there was an explicit statement of doubt about the other side s cooperation (e.g., We just couldn t trust them to pick X ). A coder recorded a 1 if distrust was mentioned and a 0 if it was not. Ratings from all participants within an experimental session (two participants in the individuals condition; six participants in the groups condition) were averaged to form a measure of distrust. RESULTS Because of the non-independence resulting from communication between the two sides, the unit of analysis was the session. There were 73 individual sessions and 66 group sessions (N ¼ 139). A future training groups versus individuals gender ANOVA of the proportion of competition revealed significant effects for future training, F(1, 131) ¼ 3.96, p ¼.04, d ¼.35, groups versus individuals, F(1, 131) ¼ 28.94, p <.001, d ¼.94, and future training groups versus individuals, F(1, 131) ¼ 4.14, p ¼.04, d ¼.36. Future training reduced intergroup competition, F(1, 131) ¼ 7.57, p ¼.007, d ¼.48, but not interindividual competition, F(1, 131) ¼.001, p ¼.97, d ¼.01. Individuals competed at low levels in both conditions; however, groups that received future training competed less than groups in the control condition (see Table 1). Although descriptively smaller in the future-training condition than in the control condition, the discontinuity effect was significant in both the future-training condition, F(1, 131) ¼ 5.50, p ¼.02, d ¼.41, and the control condition, F(1, 131) ¼ 27.97, p <.001, d ¼.92. An ANOVA of distrust revealed significant effects for groups versus individuals, F(1, 131) ¼ 15.62, p <.001, d ¼.69, and future training groups versus individuals, F(1, 131) ¼ 4.61, p ¼.03, d ¼.38. Group members in the future training condition were less likely to report distrust than those in the control condition, F(1, 131) ¼ 6.25, p ¼.01, d ¼.44 (see Table 1). Fewer than 1% of individuals reported distrust and the difference between the control and the future training conditions was not statistically significant for individuals, F(1, 131) ¼.22, p ¼.64, d ¼.08. After ensuring that the homogeneity of regression assumption had been met, we tested whether the results were consistent with possible mediation of the future training groups versus individuals interaction on competition by distrust. When distrust was included as a covariate in the ANOVA predicting competition, distrust was significant, F(1, 130) ¼ , p <.001, d ¼ 1.87, while the future training groups versus individuals interaction was non-significant, F(1, 130) ¼.58, p ¼.45, d ¼.13. The Sobel test using MacKinnon s z 0 critical values (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002) was significant, z 0 ¼ 2.32, p <.01. These results are consistent with the possibility of full mediation by distrust. 9 8 Consistent with prior discontinuity research (e.g., Wolf et al., 2008), the coded motivations also included max own (i.e., the desire to maximize absolute outcomes), max rel (i.e., the desire to maximize relative outcomes), max joint (the desire to maximize joint outcomes), and min dif (the desire to minimize the difference between the two sides outcomes), but none of these additional reasons were affected by the future consideration manipulation either for individuals or groups. 9 Assumptions regarding mediation may be violated. First, because the reasons assessment took place after the assessment of competition, it could be that competition caused participants to report distrust, instead of the reverse. Second, because the reasons assessments contained measurement error, the relationships between the reasons and competition could be spurious. Therefore, although the mediational analyses are consistent with the possibility of full mediation by distrust, they do not provide definitive evidence for this process.

9 Consideration of future consequences 839 DISCUSSION The current situation in Iraq and terrorist attacks around the globe provide obvious illustrations of the importance of reducing intergroup conflict arguably one of the most serious problems facing the world today. While we remain cautious about inferring that a simple strategy such as training groups to think about the future consequences of their behavior would have a meaningful effect on intergroup conflict on a large or international scale, our results do speak to basic psychological processes inherent in intergroup interactions. These results indicate that intergroup competition was reduced from 42 to 24% when groups were instructed to consider how their initial matrix choices would affect their opponent s subsequent choices. Consistent with past results, although these intergroup interactions were more competitive than interindividual interactions, this discontinuity between intergroup versus interindividual competition was reduced when participants were trained to consider the future consequences of their decisions. Competition between individuals was low regardless of these instructions (5 6%). The current findings indicate that future consideration reduces intergroup competition by reducing intergroup distrust. Intergroup distrust was reduced from 12 to 5% when groups were instructed to consider how their initial choices would affect their opponent s subsequent choices (distrust between individuals was less than 1% overall). Future consideration increases awareness of the mutual advantage of cooperation, and the attainment of this shared advantage requires tacit trust of the other side. These findings indicate that intergroup competition, although still present in the context of future consideration, is not immutable. Having group members simply think about the future consequences of their group s actions may lead them to recognize the futility of prolonged conflict and modify their behavior accordingly. The present research adds considerable confidence to the validity of Axelrod s (1984) and Pruitt and Kimmel s (1977) idea that consideration of future consequences is a potential avenue for intergroup conflict reduction. Findings from Insko et al. (2005) provide some insight into why groups were significantly more competitive than individuals, even in the future training condition. After manipulating the perceived trustworthiness of the other side, Insko et al. (2005) found that groups with members high in proneness to guilt (i.e., those that are most likely to adhere to ingroupfavoring norms; Cohen, Montoya, & Insko, 2006) competitively exploited trustworthy outgroups (presumably to help their group maximize outcomes), while individuals did not. Fear of exploitation may be a reason why some groups are reluctant to assume mutual trust, and Insko et al. s (2005) finding that groups sometimes exploit nice trustworthy outgroups indicates that this fear is, in some situations, warranted. Given that leaders of groups are often chosen because of their adherence to ingroup-favoring norms, this may suggest that future-oriented thinking may be relatively less effective at promoting cooperation among group leaders who are extremely loyal to their ingroup. An interesting and important avenue for future research would be to test this idea directly in order to determine the robustness of the consideration of future consequences as a method for reducing intergroup conflict. The current research extends prior work (e.g., Insko et al., 1998, 2001) by highlighting a practical and easilyimplemented solution to reducing competitive behavior between groups. The relative effectiveness of the various methods shown to promote the consideration of future consequences (e.g., tit-for-tat, expectation of multiple trials, alternating choice order) remains an open question as the present study did not directly compare these methods. However, unlike these prior strategies, the current procedure does not require changing the situational structure of the interaction. Situational variables are easily manipulated in laboratory settings, but altering them in non-experimental situations is likely to be far more difficult. Simply asking groups to think about the long-term consequences of their behavior may be sufficient to generate at least a modicum of cooperative behavior toward outgroups. This method of training is not likely to eliminate intergroup competition entirely, but it is a simple tool that could be used by those seeking to promote positive relations between groups. We do not mean to imply that groups neglect to think about the future without being pushed in that direction. Given that most groups in the control condition did not compete, groups might implicitly consider the future consequences of their behavior in situations in which they expect multiple interactions with the other side. However, given the significant difference in competition between the future training condition and the control condition, it would appear that an explicit consideration of future consequences is more effective at reducing intergroup competition than is usual implicit consideration. Although our data do not speak to the issue, it is possible that the future training manipulation used in the current study would work better in non-laboratory settings, where continued interaction often has no foreseeable end.

10 840 Scott T. Wolf et al. Participants in our study knew that the experiment would eventually end, so the shadow of the future (Axelrod, 1984) probably held less weight than it would in international relations in which future interactions are to be expected. The consideration of future consequences is clearly not the only route toward the reduction of intergroup conflict. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest a wide array of effective interventions aimed at reducing intergroup conflict (for reviews, see Cohen & Insko, 2008; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). The consideration of future consequences is helpful at reducing intergroup conflict in situations characterized by intergroup distrust because it lessens the impact of the fear motivation for intergroup conflict. Other strategies might attempt to reduce intergroup conflict by lessening the greed motivation. These types of strategies might be more applicable in situations where conflict is driven by selfish or ingroupfavoring interests. CONCLUSION Establishing a procedure whereby intergroup conflict may be reduced, if not the most important practical problem confronting psychology, is certainly one of the most important problems. The current study suggests a simple and practical method for the effective reduction of intergroup conflict. The consideration of future consequences can be learned through training and can reduce competition between groups, possibly by reducing distrust of outgroups. For both theoretical and practical reasons, we regard these findings as important for the understanding and prevention of intergroup conflict. REFERENCES Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books. Campbell, D. T. (1965). Ethnocentrism and other altruistic motives. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation (Vol. 13, pp ). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. Cohen, T. R., & Insko, C. A. (2008). War and peace: Possible approaches to reducing intergroup conflict. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, Cohen, T. R., Montoya, R. M., & Insko, C. A. (2006). Group morality and intergroup relations: Cross-cultural and experimental evidence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, Croson, R. T. A. (2000). Thinking like a game theorist: Factors affecting the frequency of equilibrium play. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 41, Epley, N., Caruso, E. M., & Bazerman, M. H. (2006). When perspective taking increases taking: Reactive egoism in social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, Galinsky, A. D., Maddux, W. W., Gilin, D., & White, J. B. (2008). Why it pays to get inside the head of your opponent: The differential effects of perspective-taking and empathy in strategic interactions. Psychological Science, 19, Hewstone, M., Rubin, M., & Willis, H. (2002). Intergroup bias. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, Insko, C. A., Kirchner, J. L., Pinter, B., Efaw, J., & Wildschut, T. (2005). Interidividual-intergroup discontinuity as a function of trust and categorization: The paradox of expected cooperation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, Insko, C. A., Pinkley, R. L., Hoyle, R. H., Dalton, B., Hong, G., & Slim, R., et al. (1987). Individual versus group discontinuity: The role of intergroup contact. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 23, Insko, C. A., Schopler, J., Drigotas, S. M., Graetz, K., Kennedy, J., & Cox, C., et al. (1993). The role of communication in interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37, Insko, C. A., Schopler, J., Graetz, K. A., Drigotas, S. M., Currey, D. P., & Smith, S. L., et al. (1994). Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity in the prisoner s dilemma game. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38, Insko, C. A., Schopler, J., Gaertner, L., Wildschut, T., Kozar, R., Pinter, B., et al. (2001). Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity reduction through anticipation of future interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, Insko, C. A., Schopler, J., Hoyle, R. H., Dardis, G. J., & Graetz, K. A. (1990). Individual-group discontinuity as a function of fear and greed. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, Insko, C. A., Schopler, J., Pemberton, M. B., Wieselquist, J., McIlraith, S., Currey, D. P., et al. (1998). Long-term outcome maximization and the reduction of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, Kelley, H. H., Holmes, J. G., Kerr, N. L., Reis, H. T., Rusbult, C. E., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2003). An atlas of interpersonal situations. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kelley, H. H., & Thibaut, J. W. (1978). Interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley.

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