Epistemic Social Dilemmas

Transcription

1 Epistemic Social Dilemmas Kevin J.S. Zollman Carnegie Mellon University

2 Passive individualism

3 Not individual

4 Not passive Inquirers must choose: What to investigate Which hypotheses to pursue How to pursue them How to convert data into evidence

5 Was this the right choice? The world Relevance of problem Informativeness of design What experiments others perform

6 Central claims 1.The epistemic state of nature is not necessarily optimal 2.This suggests a role for epistemic governance

7 Outline 1.Social dilemmas 2.Three examples of epistemic social dilemmas 3.The role of epistemic governance

8 Outline 1.Social dilemmas 2.Three examples of epistemic social dilemmas 3.The role of epistemic governance

9 Social dilemmas Individuals acting on their own make everyone worse of Prisoner s dilemma Tragedy of the commons Public goods problems

10 A false lesson Social dilemmas like the Prisoner s dilemma illustrate a problem with egoism Gauthier, David Reason and Maximization. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):

11 Altruists dilemma

12 Altruists dilemma

13 Altruists dilemma

14 Altruists dilemma

15 Altruists dilemma

16 Altruists dilemma

17 Altruists dilemma

18 Altruists dilemma

19 Altruists dilemma

20 Altruists dilemma Keep Keep Give $10 $15 $10 $0 $0 $5 $15 $5 Give

21 Selfishness vs. altruism In the traditional Prisoner s dilemma altruism solves the problem In the altruist s dilemma selfishness solves the problem Social dilemmas can arise in either context

22 Solutions to social dilemmas Strategic restriction Changing preferences Punishment, reward, enforceable contracting Correlated interaction (including repeated games)

23 Forms of correlation Exogenous correlation Partner choice Structured population + imitation or evolution Repeated games

24 Outline 1.Social dilemmas 2.Three examples of epistemic social dilemmas 3.The role of epistemic governance

25 First example Public versus private knowledge

26 Prof. Crusoe Utility of public knowledge Utility of private knowledge Relative Value of Types of Knowledge

27 Prof. Crusoe Prof's utility Allocation to public knowledge

28 Two Scientists Utility of public truth Utility of private truth

29 Two scientists Prof's utility Allocation to public knowledge a = 0.5

30 Two Scientists Allocation to public knowledge Value of private knowledge

31 Second example Choosing what to learn

32 One doctor PA(Disease 1) =.1 PA(Disease 2) =.5 PA(Error Test 1) = small PA(Error Test 2) = higher <.5

33 One doctor Test 1? Or Test 2?

34 One doctor PA(Disease 1) =.1 PA(Disease 2) =.5 PA(Error Test 1) = small PA(Error Test 2) = higher <.5

35 Error rates Noise in good test Do bad test Do good test Noise in bad test

36 Two doctors PA(Disease 1) =.1 PB(Disease 1) =.5 PA(Disease 2) =.5 PB(Disease 2) =.1 PA(Error Test 1) = small PB(Error Test 1) = higher <.5 PA(Error Test 2) = higher <.5 PB(Error Test 2) = small

37 Two doctors PA(Disease 1) =.1 PB(Disease 1) =.5 PA(Disease 2) =.5 PB(Disease 2) =.1 PA(Error Test 1) = small PB(Error Test 1) = higher <.5 PA(Error Test 2) = higher <.5 PB(Error Test 2) = small

38 Two doctors PA(Disease 1) =.1 PB(Disease 1) =.5 PA(Disease 2) =.5 PB(Disease 2) =.1 PA(Error Test 1) = small PB(Error Test 1) = higher <.5 PA(Error Test 2) = higher <.5 PB(Error Test 2) = small

39 Two doctors PA(Disease 1) =.1 PB(Disease 1) =.5 PA(Disease 2) =.5 PB(Disease 2) =.1 PA(Error Test 1) = small PB(Error Test 1) = higher <.5 PA(Error Test 2) = higher <.5 PB(Error Test 2) = small

40 Games from this interaction Noise in good test Prisoner s dilemma Noise in bad test

41 Why? I am so uncertain about disease 2 that I would rather see two tests for disease 2 than one test for each disease I am so uncertain about disease 1 that I would rather see two tests for disease 1 than one test for each disease

42 A game Dr. B Test 2 Dr. A Test 1 More Dr. A least reliable reliable Test 1 estimate for both Dr. B most Dr. A most Less reliable reliable Test 2 estimate Dr. B least for both

43 Prisoner s dilemma Individually rational actors will perform their worst test, regardless of the action of the other Both scientists will end up with a worst estimate of the disease of the patient than if they had ignored their individual interests

44 Necessary features Diferent abilities Diferent priors (Contra Moss) Moss, Sarah Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise. Mind 120 (480): doi: /mind/fzs007.

45 Third example Taking epistemic risks

46 Bandit problem model Truths Truths

47 Bandit problem model Truths Truths 6

48 Bandit problem model Truths 7 Truths 6

49 Bandit problem model Truths 7 0 Truths 6

50 Bandit problem model Truths 7 0 Truths 6 1

51 Bandit problem model Truths Truths 6 1

52 Bandit problem model Truths Truths 6 1

53 Bandit problem model 1-ε Truths ε Truths 6 1

54 Optimal exploration

55 Utility in social setting Each agent in the community desires to maximize the number of truths they produce They don t care about truths produced by others Selfishness Boundedly rational

56 Choosing exploration Kummerfeld, E., & Zollman, K. J. S. (2015). Conservatism and the Scientific State of Nature. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, forthcoming.

57 Outline 1.Social dilemmas 2.Three examples of epistemic social dilemmas 3.The role of epistemic governance

58 Classic dichotomy Completely private property with enforceable contracting Total government control with heavy regulation

59 Classic dichotomy Completely private property with enforceable contracting Total government control with heavy regulation Most of the institutional arrangements used in the success stories were rich mixtures of public and private instrumentalities. If this study does nothing more than shatter the convictions of many policy analysts that the only way to solve [social dilemmas] is for external authorities to impose full private property rights or centralized regulation, it will have accomplished one major purpose Ostrom, Elinor (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press

60 Classic dichotomy Completely private property with enforceable contracting Total government control with heavy regulation What is needed is further theoretical development that can help identify variables that must be included in any efort to explain and predict when [people in social dilemmas] are likely to self-organize and efective govern their own [dilemmas] and when they are more likely to fail. Ostrom, Elinor (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press

61 Solutions to social dilemmas Strategic restriction Changing preferences Punishment, reward, enforceable contracting Correlated interaction (including repeated games)

62 Central claims 1.The epistemic state of nature is not necessarily optimal 2.The existence of epistemic social dilemmas suggests a role for epistemic governance