Supplementary Materials. Distinct mental trainings differentially affect altruistically motivated, norm motivated, and selfreported
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1 Supplementary Materials Distinct mental trainings differentially affect altruistically motivated, norm motivated, and selfreported prosocial behaviour Anne Böckler, Anita Tusche, Peter Schmidt, Tania Singer Supplementary Table S1: Descriptive statistics for all measures of prosociality obtained at T0-T3, depicted separately for each experimental cohort. Supplementary Table S2a: Standardized factor loadings for individual measures of prosociality in the scalar invariance model at all time points. Supplementary Table S2b: Unstandardized factor loadings for individual measures of prosociality in the scalar invariance model at all time points. Supplementary Table S2c: Coefficients of autocorrelations for latent factors across time in the scalar invariance model. Supplementary Table S2d: Coefficients for latent factors correlations within each time point. Supplementary Table S3: Details on drop out and missing data for all measurement time points. Supplement S4: Results for individual measures of strategic prosocial behavior. Supplemet S5: Results for module comparisons
2 Supplementary Table S1: Means and standard deviations (SD) for all measures of prosociality obtained at T0 to T3, depicted separately for each experimental cohort. T0 T1 T2 T3 N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD Group 1 - TC1 DG Strategic giving TG nd PPG rd PPG ZPG helping ZPG cost effect Social Discounting SVO Donation Prosocial Scale Machiavelli Index IRI Group 2 - TC2 DG Strategic giving TG nd PPG rd PPG ZPG helping ZPG cost_effect Social Discounting SVO Donation Prosocial Scale Machiavelli Index IRI
3 Group 3 - TC3 DG Strategic giving TG nd PPG rd PPG ZPG helping ZPG cost_effect Social Discounting SVO Donation Prosocial Scale Machiavelli Index IRI Group 0/4 - RCC DG Strategic giving TG nd PP rd PP ZPG helping ZPG cost_effect Social Discounting SVO Donation Prosocial Scale Machiavelli Index IRI DG =Dictator Game, TG = Trust Game, 2 nd PPG = 2 nd Person Punishment Game, 3 rd PPG = 3 rd Person Punishment Game, ZPG = Zurich Prosocial Game, SVO = Social Value Orientation, IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index
4 Supplements S2: Model specification and solution for multiple time points confirmatory factor analyses (MT-CFAs) Supplementary Table S2a: Standardized factor loadings (β) for individual measures of prosociality in the scalar invariance model at all time points. All factor loadings were significant. Note that the relation between the measure Social Discounting and the factor Self-Reported Prosocial Behaviour was not modelled in present analyses, as it was only added in a data-driven manner in (2, 3). T0 T1 T2 T3 Altruistically Motivated Prosocial Behaviour ZPG Helping SVO Social Discounting TG Donation DG Norm Motivated Prosocial Behaviour 2 nd Party Punishment rd Party Punishment Self-Reported Prosocial Behaviour Prosocialness Scal IRI Machiavelli Scale DG =Dictator Game, TG = Trust Game, 2 nd PPG = 2 nd Person Punishment Game, 3 rd PPG = 3 rd Person Punishment Game, ZPG = Zurich Prosocial Game, SVO = Social Value Orientation, IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index
5 Supplementary Table S2b: Unstandardized factor loadings (β) for individual measures of prosociality in the scalar invariance model at all time points. All factor loadings were significant. T0 T1 T2 T3 Altruistically Motivated Prosocial Behaviour ZPG Helping SVO Social Discounting TG Donation DG Norm Motivated Prosocial Behaviour 2 nd Party Punishment rd Party Punishment Self-Reported Prosocial Behaviour Prosocialness Scal IRI Machiavelli Scale Supplementary Table S2c: Coefficients of autocorrelations for latent factors across time in the scalar invariance model. All correlations were significant. T0 T1 T2 Altruistically Motivated Prosocial Behaviour T1.896 T T Norm Motivated Prosocial Behaviour T1.686 T T Self-Reported Prosocial Behaviour T1.923 T T
6 Supplementary Table S2d: Coefficients for latent factors correlations within each time point. No correlations were significant. T0 T1 T2 T3 AMPB NMPB AMPB SRPB NMPB SRPB AMPB = Altruistically Motivated Prosocial Behaviour; NMPB = Norm Motivated Prosocial Behaviour; SRPB = Self-Reported Prosocial Behaviour
7 Supplementary Table S3: Reasons for missing data within the ReSource Project in the context of which the present study was conducted. Reasons N Participants originally enrolled in the study 332 Drop out during T0 2 Drop out during T1 10 Drop out during T2 7 Drop out during T3 7 Participants with missing measurement(s) at T0 due to scheduling/technical problems 16 Participants with missing measurement(s) at T1 due to scheduling/technical problems 22 Participants with missing measurement(s) at T2 due to scheduling/technical problems 14 Participants with missing measurement(s) at T3 due to scheduling/technical problems 9 Missing data in the social discounting task due to multiple cross-over * or outlier at T0 56 Missing data in the social discounting task due to multiple cross-over or outlier at T1 36 Missing data in the social discounting task due to multiple cross-over or outlier at T2 19 Missing data in the social discounting task due to multiple cross-over or outlier at T3 24 * see Jones & Rachlin, 2006 Study dropout did not differ between TC1, TC2, TC3 and RCC: T0 (TC1, TC2, TC3, RCC): 0, 0, 0, 2; T1: 2, 2, 3, 3; T2: 2 3, -, 2; T3: 4, 1, -, 2.
8 Supplement S4: Results for individual measures of strategic prosocial behaviour. The original model of human prosociality also included measures assessing strategic prosocial behaviour, related to the inclination to make prosocial choices dependent upon whether they benefit oneself (2). However, further investigation is required to confirm whether a separate strategy factor can be established (3). For the sake of completeness, we provide details on individual measures of strategic prosocial behaviour included in the ReSource Project and their training-induced plasticity. Training-induced changes in prosociality Cost-effect. No significant differences in the cost-effect were revealed at baseline (F(3, ) = 1.76, p =.154). The LMM revealed a main effect of time (F(3, ) = 17.98, p =.000), reflecting increases in cost-benefit oriented behaviour over the course of the study. The main effect of group was not significant (F < 1.04). However, the two-way interaction of time and group reached significance (F(7, ) = 2.67, p =.010), due to a strong increase in the cost-effect over time in the RCC (F(3, ) = 14.95, p =.000), but no such effect in the majority of training cohorts (TC1: F(3, ) = 8.19, p =.000; TC2: F(3, ) = 1.37, p =.250; TC3: F(1, ) = 0.66, p =.417). Module-specific analyses showed that the increase in the cost-effect over time was significantly different from zero with a medium effect-size in the RCC (t(83) = 5.14, p = 000, d =.56), suggesting increasing strategic behaviour in this group. A similar, though weaker, effect was found after the Presence Module (t(144) = 2.37, p =.019, d =.20; surviving correction for multiple comparisons), but not after the other training modules (ts 1.53, ps.126). When comparing the increase in cost-benefit oriented behaviour in the RCC and training modules, no significant differences were found, however (ts 1.70, ps.090). These results indicate that over the course
9 of the study, participants increasingly incorporated cost-benefit calculations into their decisions, a tendency that was especially prevalent in the RCC. The absence of a respective increase in most of the training cohorts and after the later modules (Affect and Perspective) suggest that continuous mental training may buffer the increase of strategic behaviour and seld-interest that is otherwise observed when people become familiar with the tasks (and how to increase one s personal gains). Strategic giving. No significant differences in strategic giving were revealed at baseline (F(3, ) = 1.97, p =.117). The LMM revealed a marginal effect of time (F(3, ) = 2.51, p =.058), reflecting a tendency for decreases in strategic giving over the course of the study. The main effect of group was not significant (F(3, ) = 2.25, p =.082) and neither the two-way interaction of time and group (F < 1). These findings suggest that strategic giving is not altered due to any of the mental trainings. Correlations between training-induced changes in prosociality We found a significant correlation between training-induced increases in altruistically motivated prosocial behaviour and training-induced reductions of the cost-effect in the ZPG (r = -.15, p =.022; surviving correction for multiple comparisons). This finding suggests that the more the meditation based training induces altruistic motivations, the more it reduces self-centred strategic considerations when faced with other s needs. Hence, people who became more motivated to enhance others well-being over the course of the training became also less concerned with their own (monetary) advantage in strategic cooperative settings. This finding may point towards a more general antagonistic relationship between altruism and egoism, in that shifts towards the motivation to care for and support others (4, 5) may be inherently linked to shifts away from the motivation to maximize self-interest and own ressources (5, 6).
10 Supplement S5: Results for module comparisons. The main aim of the present study was to investigate which mental training modules effectively enhance which facet of prosociality and, consequently, we compared effects of the three mental training modules to changes in the RCC. To directly address differences between the three training modules (independent of RCC), we performed additional LMMs for each sub-component of prosociality, specifying the factors module (4 levels: Baseline, Presence, Affect, Perspective), time (4 levels: T0, T1, T2, T3), and random intercepts for participants. Continuous time was added as a repeated statement with the AR(1) covariance structure. Gender and age were included as control variables. Altruistically Motivated Prosocial Behaviour. Results of the LMM showed no significant main effect of module and no two-way interaction of time and module (Fs < 1.58, ps.20). This finding suggests that though only the Affect Module significantly enhanced altruistic behaviours above changes in the RCC, training effects did not differ significantly between the modules. Norm Motivated Prosocial Behaviour. Results of the LMM revealed neither a significant main effect of module nor a two-way interaction of time and module (Fs < 2.62, ps.10). This finding further supports previous results, indicating that norm-based behaviours were not (differentially) altered by any form of mental training. Self-Reported Prosocial Behaviour. Neither the main effect of module nor the two-way interaction of time and module reached significance (Fs < 1.1, ps.36). Hence, the training-induced increases in self-reported prosociality did not differ between the training modules. Strategic Behaviour (i.e. Cost-effect and strategic giving). For the Cost-effect, results of the LMM showed no significant main effect of module and no two-way interaction of time and module (Fs < 1.05, ps.31). Similarly, there was neither a significant main effect of module nor a two-
11 way interaction of time and module for strategic giving (Fs < 1.45, ps.23). These results suggest that the training modules did not differ regarding their influence on strategic behaviours.
12 References 1. B. Jones, H. Rachlin, Social discounting. Psychological science 17, (2006). 2. A. Böckler, A. Tusche, T. Singer, The Structure of Human Prosociality Differentiating Altruistically Motivated, Norm Motivated, Strategically Motivated, and Self-Reported Prosocial Behavior. Social Psychological and Personality Science, (2016). 3. A. Böckler, A. Tusche, T. Singer, The Structure of Human Prosociality Revisited: Corrigendum and Addendum to Böckler, Tusche, and Singer (2016). Social Psychological and Personality Science, (2017). 4. W. D. Hamilton, The general evolution of social behavior. II. Journal of Theoretical Biology 7, (1964). 5. J. Heckhausen, Evolutionary perspectives on human motivation. Am Behav Sci 43, (2000). 6. R. Dawkins, The Selfish gene. (Oxford University Press, New York, N.Y., 1976).
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