Behavioral and Experimental Economics

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1

2 Behavioral and Experimental Economics

3 Behavioral and Experimental Economics Luca Stanca

4 Behavioral and Experimental Economics Luca Stanca University of Milano Bicocca

5 Outline 1 Behavioral Economics 2 Experimental Economics 3 What? Who?

6 Outline 1 Behavioral Economics 2 Experimental Economics 3 What? Who?

7 pleonasm

8 pleonasm The use of more words than are necessary to express an idea; redundancy.

9

10 Richard Thaler,

11

12 Behavioral economics is a pleonasm

13 Behavioral economics is a pleonasm Why do we need a field called behavioral economics?

14 Behavioral economics is a pleonasm Why do we need a field called behavioral economics? Isn t behavior what economics is supposed to be?

15 Object, Methods, Relevance

16 Object, Methods, Relevance Object:

17 Object, Methods, Relevance Object: actual behavior of economic agents

18 Object, Methods, Relevance Object: actual behavior of economic agents Methods:

19 Object, Methods, Relevance Object: actual behavior of economic agents Methods: theoretical models, controlled experiments

20 Object, Methods, Relevance Object: actual behavior of economic agents Methods: theoretical models, controlled experiments Relevance:

21 Object, Methods, Relevance Object: actual behavior of economic agents Methods: theoretical models, controlled experiments Relevance: firms, consumers, policy-makers

22 Outline 1 Behavioral Economics 2 Experimental Economics 3 What? Who?

23 What is an experiment?

24 What is an experiment? A test under controlled conditions

25 What is an experiment? A test under controlled conditions

26 What is an experiment? A test under controlled conditions

27 Why experiments?

28 Why experiments? An untested theory is simply a hypothesis.

29 Why experiments? An untested theory is simply a hypothesis. As such it is part of our self-knowledge.

30 Why experiments? An untested theory is simply a hypothesis. As such it is part of our self-knowledge. Science seeks to expand our knowledge of things by a process of testing this type of self-knowledge.

31 Why experiments? An untested theory is simply a hypothesis. As such it is part of our self-knowledge. Science seeks to expand our knowledge of things by a process of testing this type of self-knowledge. Much of economic theory can be called, appropriately, ecclesiastical theory:

32 Why experiments? An untested theory is simply a hypothesis. As such it is part of our self-knowledge. Science seeks to expand our knowledge of things by a process of testing this type of self-knowledge. Much of economic theory can be called, appropriately, ecclesiastical theory: it is accepted (or rejected) on the basis of authority, tradition, or opinion about assumptions

33 Why experiments? An untested theory is simply a hypothesis. As such it is part of our self-knowledge. Science seeks to expand our knowledge of things by a process of testing this type of self-knowledge. Much of economic theory can be called, appropriately, ecclesiastical theory: it is accepted (or rejected) on the basis of authority, tradition, or opinion about assumptions, rather than on the basis of having survived a rigorous falsification process that can be replicated.

34 Why experiments? An untested theory is simply a hypothesis. As such it is part of our self-knowledge. Science seeks to expand our knowledge of things by a process of testing this type of self-knowledge. Much of economic theory can be called, appropriately, ecclesiastical theory: it is accepted (or rejected) on the basis of authority, tradition, or opinion about assumptions, rather than on the basis of having survived a rigorous falsification process that can be replicated. Vernon Smith (1987)

35 Why experiments?

36 Why experiments? rerum

37 Why experiments? rerum cognoscere

38 Why experiments? rerum cognoscere causas

39 Why experiments? rerum cognoscere causas (felix qui potuit)

40 Aims

41 Aims 1 Speaking to theorists

42 Aims 1 Speaking to theorists 2 Searching for facts

43 Aims 1 Speaking to theorists 2 Searching for facts 3 Whispering in the ears of princes

44 Aims 1 Speaking to theorists 2 Searching for facts 3 Whispering in the ears of princes

45 Classroom experiments

46 Classroom experiments Tell me and I forget

47 Classroom experiments Tell me and I forget Teach me and I remember

48 Classroom experiments Tell me and I forget Teach me and I remember Involve me and I learn

49 Outline 1 Behavioral Economics 2 Experimental Economics 3 What? Who?

50 Research Topics

51 Research Topics Bounded rationality

52 Research Topics Bounded rationality

53 Research Topics Bounded rationality Social preferences

54 Research Topics Bounded rationality Social preferences

55 Research Topics Bounded rationality Social preferences Market design

56 Research Topics Bounded rationality Social preferences Market design

57 Research Topics Bounded rationality Social preferences Market design Social Networks

58 Research Topics Bounded rationality Social preferences Market design Social Networks

59 Research Topics Bounded rationality Social preferences Market design Social Networks Law and economics

60 Research Topics Bounded rationality Social preferences Market design Social Networks Law and economics

61 Research Topics Bounded rationality Social preferences Market design Social Networks Law and economics Neuroeconomics

62 Research Topics Bounded rationality Social preferences Market design Social Networks Law and economics Neuroeconomics

63 Research Topics Bounded rationality Social preferences Market design Social Networks Law and economics Neuroeconomics

64 People

65 Basu, K., Becchetti, L., Stanca, L. (2011) "Experiments with the Traveler s Dilemma: Welfare, Strategic Choice and Implicit Collusion", Social Choice and Welfare, 37(4), Battiston, P., Stanca, L. (2015),?Boundedly Rational Opinion Dynamics in Social Networks: Does Indegree Matter?, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 119, Corazzini, L, Faravelli, M., Stanca, L. (2010) "A Prize to Give for: An Experiment on Public Good Funding Mechanisms", Economic Journal, 120, Faravelli, M. and Stanca, L., (2012) "When Less is More: Rationing and Rent Dissipation in Stochastic Contests", Games and Economic Behavior, 74, Faravelli, M., Stanca L. (2012) "Single versus Multiple Prize Contests to Finance Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 81, Gamba, A. (2013) Learning and evolution of altruistic preferences in the Centipede Game, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 85, Gamba, A., Manzoni, E., Stanca, L. (2017).?Social Comparison and Risk Taking Behavior?, Theory and Decision, 82(2), Ottone S., Ponzano F. (2010), Competition and Cooperation in markets. The experimental case of a winner-take all setting, Journal of Socio-Economics, 39(2), Rizzolli, M., Stanca, L. (2012) Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence, with M. Rizzolli, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 55(2), Sacchi, S., Stanca, L. (forthcoming) Asymmetric perception of gains vs non-losses and losses vs non-gains: The causal role of regulatory focus, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. Stanca, L. "How to be Kind? Outcomes versus Intentions as Determinants of Fairness" (2010), Economics Letters, 106(1), Stanca, L., Gui, M., Gallucci, M. (2013) Attracted but Unsatisfied: The Effects of Sensational Content on Television Consumption Choices, Journal of Media Economics, 26, Stanca, L., Bruni, L., Corazzini L. (2009) "Testing Theories of Reciprocity: Do Motivations Matter?", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 71(2), Stanca, L. (2009) "Measuring Indirect Reciprocity: Whose Back Do We Scratch?", Journal of Economic Psychology, 30(2), Tufano, F. (2010). "Are true preferences revealed in repeated markets? An experimental demonstration of context-dependent valuations," Experimental Economics, 13(1), Tufano, F. (2015), One Swallow Doesn t Make a Summer: How Economists (Mis)Use Experimental Methods and Their Results., with Z. Maniadis and J. List, American Economic Review

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