Arguments for the Extended Mind Hypothesis (EMH) are a form of the Active Externalist claim that

Transcription

1 1 Can mental states be partially constituted by external vehicles? Arguments for the Extended Mind Hypothesis (EMH) are a form of the Active Externalist claim that the material vehicles of cognition can be spread out across brain, body and certain aspects of the physical environment 1. Active Externalism has its roots in Semantic and Content Externalism but diverges significantly, saying that it is not just meaning or thoughts that can be in part externally constituted, but the cognitive process itself. The EMH is therefore a claim about the ontology of the mind 2 ; that cognition is a higher-order property which can be instantiated in various intracranial and extracranial lower-order systems. I will focus on arguments for the EMH which purport to show that a memory system can be partially constituted by external vehicles. In this essay I am going to argue in favour of the EMH. First, (S1) I will describe the case study of Otto generally used in support of the EMH and the required background assumptions. Next (S2) I will outline two criticisms of the EMH relating to The Mark of the Cognitive and assessing functional equivalence, as well as responses to these criticisms. Lastly (S3) I will assess whether the conservative (intracranial) or extended (extracranial) explanation should be favoured for certain cases and propose a way to increase the intuitive appeal of the EMH. (S1) The Extended Mind Hypothesis To establish a case of extended cognition Clark sets forth the following criteria: (1) All the components of the extended system must play an active causal role 1 Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers, The Extended Mind, Analysis 58.1, (Jan 1998) p.2 2 Robert A. Wilson, Meaning Making and the Mind of the Externalist in The Extended Mind ed. Richard Menary (Cambridge:MIT Press, 2010) p.172

2 2 (2) The components of the system must jointly govern behaviour in the same way that cognition usually does (3) If the extended component was removed, the behavioural competence of the system must drop, just as would happen if we removed a part of an agent s brain 3 In The Extended Mind Clark and Chalmers put forward the case study of Otto and Inga 4. The two arrange to meet at MoMA to see an exhibition. Inga remembers that the gallery is on 53 rd street, so based on her belief, walks there and arrives at the correct time. Otto has Alzheimers and cannot remember the address of MoMA alone. Instead he consults his notebook, (where he had previously written the address) forms the belief that it is on 53 rd street, then also walks there and arrives at the correct time. Counterfactually, if Otto did not have his notebook, or if his notebook did not contain the correct information, he would not have been able to find the gallery. Under Clark s conception, this case study satisfies the three requirements. Since the relationship between Otto and his notebook is dynamic and the notebook actively causes his belief (1) is satisfied. Similarly, Otto s notebook plays a similar role in forming Otto s belief as Inga s memory does in forming her belief, satisfying condition (2). The counterfactual situation demonstrates a drop in behavioural competence, satisfying (3). Background assumptions To establish cases of the Extended Mind, Clark relies on two background assumptions. Firstly a functionalist theory of mind. Functionalism is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal composition, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays in the system of which it is a part 5. This role is determined by the 3 Richard Menary, Introduction: The Extended Mind in Focus in The Extended Mind ed. Richard Menary (Cambridge:MIT Press, 2010) p.3 4 Clarke and Chalmers, Extended Mind, p.12 5 Janet Levin, Functionalism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2016 Edition), forthcoming URL:

3 3 causal relations the state bears to sensory inputs, behavioural outputs and other mental states. Therefore, if functional similarity is upheld, mental states can be multiply realised. For the advocate of the EMH this multiple realisability includes cases of extended cognition. As stated by Chalmers, this does not need to be a very strong form of functionalism, only enough to support the Parity Principle 6. As formulated by Clark and Chalmers, the Parity Principle states: If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is part of the cognitive process. 7 This is essentially an attempt to strengthen the intuition that cognition can be externally located by suggesting that thinking of a cognitive process as only being possible intracranially is a form of location bias. Rather than the location of a process itself determining whether it is part of the mind, the Parity Principle suggests that that what is important is the functional role of the process in a larger system. Clarifications It is important to note that Clark and Chalmers are not claiming that Otto s notebook (or any other extended part of a cognitive system) is a cognitive in itself or possess a mental state. They are rather making the more plausible claim that the cognitive system that gives rise to a belief-state can be partially constituted by an extracranial vehicle i.e. Otto s notebook being a part of a larger cognitive system. Similarly, they do not claim that Inga s bio-memory and the Otto-notebook system are alike in all respects only functionally equivalent in the ways that are important for the case (i.e. to constitute a system that would be classed as a system of memory). Clark also refines the first requirement through the non-triviality clause: if an organism is coupled to an external sub-system that contributes in a non-trivial way to the production of some significant, 6 David Chalmers, Forward, in Supersizing them Mind ed. Andy Clark (Oxford: OUP, 2011) p.xv 7 Clarke and Chalmers, Extended Mind p.29

4 4 cognitive aspect of a cognitive process, then the cognitive process is extended. 8 This requires a stronger dependence of the overall cognitive system on the external process, excluding more tenuous coupling arrangements from being classed as cognitive, such as a gardener with his tools. Menary draws attention to the further requirement of Symmetric influence implied by Clark s account; that the organism can affect the vehicle and vice versa. In his words; the inner and outer features have a mutually constraining causal influence on one another that unfolds over time. 9 (S2) Objections In this section I am going to examine two objections to the EMH, involving the Mark of the Cognitive and the notion of functional equivalence. I am going to outline the cases for these two (related) objections, and argue that both are ineffective if the EMH is properly formulated. Defining the Cognitive Adams and Aizawa claim that A first essential condition on the cognitive is that cognitive states must involve intrinsic, non-derived content 10. They describe this intrinsic non-derived content as The Mark of the Cognitive. Intrinsic, non-derived content is defined as content that has meaning without recourse to collective arrangements 11. This is contrasted with derived content, which is only given meaning by the mutual agreement of a community, such as the language in Otto s notebook. Their argument against the EMH can be summarised as follows: (P1) All processes in a cognitive system must involve some intrinsic, non-derived content 8 Robert d. Rupert, Representation in Extended Cognitive Systems, in The Extended Mind ed. By Richard Menary (Cambridge:MIT Press, 2010) pp (p.327) 9 Menary, Introduction, p.4 10 Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, The Bounds of Cognition, Philosophical Psychology v.14.1, 2001 (p.48) 11 Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, Causal Theories of Mental Content, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ed. Edward N. Zalta, (Spring 2010 Edition), URL:

5 5 (P2) This is true of all processes in intracranial systems (P3) This is not true of all processes in extracranial systems (C) Extracranial systems are not cognitive Adams and Aizawa s claim does not entail that all content in a cognitive system must be nonderived. Their claim is rather that a process in the system cannot be exclusively derived; there cannot be a process that involves no intrinsic content 12 for a system to count as cognitive. They argue that since the notebook in the Otto-notebook system is such a process, the Otto-notebook system does not meet the requirements of being a cognitive system. However, this raises the question: what is so important about intrinsic non-derived content that its absence in the notebook can prevent the Otto-notebook system from being cognitive? Adams and Aizawa claim that there is a significant conceptual difference between how mental objects get their contents and how artefacts outside the mind get theirs 13, i.e. how the two types of content are formed. While derived content gets its meaning from external sources, non-derived content gets its meaning purely internally. Granting the importance that Adams and Aizawa ascribe to intrinsic content, an objection can be raised to (P3). Clark draws attention to the fact that in the whole Otto-notebook system there is intrinsic content 14 because parts of the system are composed of Otto s mind. Although Adams and Aizawa would suggest that the Otto-notebook system violates (P1) because the notebook itself contains only derived content, Clark states that really it is quite unclear how we should distribute this requirement [for intrinsic content] across time and space Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, Defending the Bounds of Cognition in The Extended Mind ed. Richard Menary (Cambridge:MIT Press, 2010) p Ibid. p Andy Clark, Memento s Revenge, in The Extended Mind ed. Richard Menary (Cambridge:MIT Press, 2010) p Andy Clark, Coupling, Constitution and the Cognitive Kind in The Extended Mind ed. Richard Menary (Cambridge:MIT Press, 2010) p.89

6 6 Adams and Aizawa could respond that it is not relevant when or where the intrinsic content is distributed, what is important is rather the relative amount of the system the process with derived content makes up. Adams and Aizawa grant that there can be parts of a process which involve nonderived content, just not a process as a whole. However there is an element of vagueness in being a part-of-a-process and being a process in itself, which Adams and Aizawa do not address. It is not an obvious decision whether the notebook should be classed as a process or merely a part of a process, and Adams and Aizawa give no indication of a cut-off point where a part-of-a-process becomes a process in itself. Therefore, showing that a process in a cognitive system cannot include derived content is not enough to prevent the Otto-notebook system from being classed as cognitive Adams and Aizawa would also have to give some reason as to why the notebook should be counted as a process instead of a part-of-a-process. However, if Adams and Aizawa claim that the important difference between derived and nonderived content is how they are formed, their argument actually fails before the previous objections. This is because the difference in formation of derived and intrinsic content is not as clear as they assume. There is evidence to suggest that some of our internal thoughts are formed in virtue of language (derived content). An example of this can be seen in work by Hermer-Vazquez, Spelke, and Katsnelson 16. Their study shows that pre-linguistic infants are unable to combine certain cues about the combined shape and colour of a room in order to find a toy, while post-linguistic infants can easily recognize these cues (with factors such as age and intelligence resolved for). The pre-linguistic infants could only use cues of colour and shape separately. This shows that our intrinsic conception of a red room (for instance) could not have been formed without language, suggesting that there is not always a sharp distinction between the formation of derived and underived content (as in this case, it is derived 16 Hermer-Vazquez, Spelke, and Katsnelson, Sources of Flexibility in Human Cognition: dual task studies of space and language, Cognitive Psychology, v.39 (1999) p.24

7 7 content that enables the thought).therefore, it is equally possible in certain cases for what appears to be a piece of intrinsic content to be formed by external factors, undermining the conceptual difference in formation between the two types of content. Since there is not a functional difference between intrinsic and derived content in Clark s case study, (the neural process in Inga s bio-memory and language in Otto s notebook have the same effects in their respective systems 17 ) intrinsic and derived content cannot be distinguished though functional role. The aforementioned experiment shows that they cannot necessarily be distinguished by how they are formed either. Since intrinsic and derived content cannot be easily distinguished in either of these ways, the lack of intrinsic content in a single process in a system does not seem to be enough to argue that the whole system is not cognitive, or that a system is cognitive because it has (at least some) intrinsic content in all its processes. Adams and Aizawa seem to be relying on too tentative distinction in a small section of a system to ground such a large claim. Indeed, Clark argues that a Mark of the Cognitive is not conceptually useful when speaking about a cognitive system 18. He supports this by comparing a cognitive system to an irrigation system. We would find it absurd to ask whether a certain part of the irrigation system contains the Mark of the Irrigative. [Rather] what we want to know, of some putative proper part of such a system, is whether it contributes to the functional whole. We may ask ourselves, for example, whether it enables that functional whole to irrigate... to the extent that the answer is positive, the part looks to be part of the system of irrigation, regardless of whether water drizzles out of it. 19 Therefore, instead of looking for a Mark of the Cognitive in putative parts of a cognitive system, it is their functional role and relative composition that is significant. He proposes a tentative definition of a 17 Clark, Coupling p Ibid. p Idid. p.97

8 8 cognitive system as something that gives rise to intelligent behaviour 20 comparable to an irrigative system being something that enables irrigation. Constitution and Functional Similarity The second important issue facing the EMH is how functional equivalence should be determined. Rupert raises the worry that attributes of memory such as the generation effect (subjects gaining a mnemonic advantage by generating their own meaningful connections between paired associate items) could never be found in extended systems 21. He argues that this means the degree of functional similarity will never be fine-grained enough to class extended systems as memorysystems. However, this argument is successfully countered by Wheeler 22. Wheeler puts forward the case of an abnormal subject whose inner cognitive system does not exhibit the fine-grained property of the generation effect, but still continues to achieve the context-sensitive selective storage and retrieval of information 23. Although the subject would differ from what is seen as standard, cognitive scientists would still call the system possessed by them a memory-system, as it would still have all the other recognisable qualities of a memory-system and give rise to belief states. Wheeler concludes that since the absence of the generation effect would not prevent a memory-system being classed as such by cognitive scientists, it must not be an essential feature of a memory-system. 20 Ibid. p Robert D. Rupert, Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition, Journal of Philosophy, (2004). p Micheal Wheeler, In Defence of Extended Functionalism in The Extended Mind ed. Richard Menary (Cambridge:MIT Press, 2010) p Ibid. p.256

9 9 Therefore the lack of it in extracranial systems would not prevent them from being memorysystems. This raises the issue of what to include as the essential features of memory and what to exclude as accidental, in other words setting the appropriate fineness of grain to constitute a memory-system. Clark offers a level of evaluation of functional similarity to be a case of the cognitive system of memory; information storage, transformation and retrieval 24. Clark supports this coarse-grained level of evaluation by drawing attention to the diversity of the detailed causal mechanisms that give rise to memory processes. He argues that this account is sufficient to pin down the essential features of memory and still wide enough to include all the various internal processes that would be classed as memory. He further claims that in general the difference between external-looping (putatively cognitive) processes and purely inner ones will be no greater than those between the inner ones themselves 25. This is based on evidence that some memory processes use a system similar to table look up, which is at a coarse-grained level functionally equivalent to Otto looking in his notebook. Clark concludes that since inner systems already constitute a motley of processes 26, by the Parity Principle, this motley could easily include extracranial systems. He then makes the claim that there is no part of the physical universe so devoid of potentially computationally useful properties, that a part of it could not, under some conceivable circumstances, participate as a crucial element in some extended, recognizably computational process, upon which some cognitive state of some being supervenes 27. However, Adams and Aizawa raise an argument that the account given by Clark as to what counts as a cognitive system should be more restricted than it currently is. They argue that the motley of 24 Clark, Memento s Revenge p Ibid., p Ibid. p Clark, Coupling, p.92

10 10 internal processes is not comparable to the variety of possible extended processes, that tools constitute an open ended set of objects 28 while internal processes, despite being varied, do not constitute a potentially open ended set. This would establish a distinction between intracranial and extracranial processes, which could then be used to show that the former are cognitive, while the latter are not. However, even if there is an unlimited set of possible configurations which could make up an extracranial system, this does not seem to be much of a problem if in actuality there is a very specified set of conditions that have to be met for it to be a cognitive system. What is important is therefore having a refined enough account of what it would take to be a cognitive system to successfully limit what counts as a system of extended cognition to the plausible cases. This issue is laid out in a common argument against the EMH: the Demarcation Problem. Ludwig describes the possible bloat in knowledge which would result if Wikipedia were to be considered a part of a cognitive system 29. He argues that Laura, a Wikipedia editor (and user) would meet Clark s three requirements of functional similarity: the relationship between Laura and Wikipedia would be dynamic (she both reads and edits articles), functionally equivalent in important respects to Otto and his notebook and to Inga and her bio-memory, and behavioural competence would drop if Laura s connection to Wikipedia was removed (the issue can similarly be raised by replacing Otto s notebook with a smartphone). However, including Wikipedia would result in an unfavourable bloat in knowledge: Laura would also have knowledge of the meteorological patterns recorded in Minnesota in the 1950s, for instance. However, this argument does not take into account the symmetricity requirement drawn attention to by Menary. It relies on the idea of Wikipedia being treated as a single process in the system, while 28 Adams and Aizawa, Defending, p David Ludwig, Extended cognition and the explosion of knowledge Philosophical Psychology (forthcoming) URL: Acessed:06/12/16 p.8

11 11 to be a case that would be considered by the advocate of the EMH as cognitive extension, only the articles affected by Laura should be considered. In the Otto-notebook case it is not the physical bounds of the notebook (comparable to the entirety of Wikipedia) which are considered as an extension, but rather the relevant content in the notebook. If someone had secretly written a table recording the meteorological patterns recorded in Minnesota in the 1950s in the back of Otto s notebook that he was unaware of, it would not mean that it constituted a process in his memorysystem, as it would not satisfy the symmetricity requirement. Likewise, the bloat of knowledge in Laura s case only occurs if Wikipedia in its entirety is considered, while the active externalist claim is only relevant to content that has been effected by Laura herself. There is much less problem with saying that Laura s extracranial system is confined to the individual articles she edits. However, it may be that an appeal to functionalism to advocate for the EMH will not be able to settle the debate. Wheeler draws attention to this through the Rowlands Deadlock: Adjudicating between the extended mind and its critics, therefore, seems to require adjudicating between liberal and chauvinistic forms of functionalism. While Wheeler gives reason to favour a more liberal account of functionalism (to exclude accidental features of memory, such as the generation effect, and keep only the coarser-grained essential features), he also draws attention to the fact that the opponent of the EMH could just as easily find a reason to favour a more conservative account, restoring the deadlock. Similarly, empirical evidence cannot decide how to classify a system. As shown by Ross and Ladyman, for neuroscience, scientific practice does not require or determine the individuation of systems in such a way or require a clear distinction between what is a constituent part of a system and what is just an input or cause. 30 Therefore, whether a system is a memory-system is a conceptual question, and should be assessed through the parameters of a conceptual scheme. Although objections to the EMH can be found 30 Don Ross and James Ladyman, The Alleged Coupling-Constitution Fallacy and the Mature Sciences in The Extended Mind ed. Richard Menary (Cambridge:MIT Press, 2010) p.156

12 12 wanting, this does not prove the theory in itself. Whether the extracranial or intracranial account gives a better explanation of the case at hand should be evaluated conceptually in terms of intuitive appeal and simplicity. (S3) Which explanation should be favoured? In this section I am going to argue that the extracranial account of a memory-system is favourable when evaluated as a conceptual scheme. The main objections to the intuitive appeal of the EMH surround it either not giving a fine-grained enough account of memory or taking into account the complexity of what it would take to be a memory-system. However, these objections could be due in part to certain features of the Otto case study. Clark claims that the content in Otto s notebook constitutes an extended memory-system. However, there does seem to be one essential feature of memory that is not included in the Ottosystem; the variation in types of memory. Although the loss of just one feature of memory is not enough to prevent something being a memory-system (as shown by Wheeler) the inability of Otto s notebook to properly store episodic, procedural, implicit or sensory memory seem enough to dispute the claim that it should be classed a complete memory system. Instead, a small modification can be made to Clark s account by instead classing the Otto-notebook system as an extension of semantic memory (a sub-system of memory in general). This slight modification of the claim makes the EMH in this case have a stronger intuitive appeal. Alternatively, a more specified case study could be constructed: Olivia, a patient with Prosopagnosia after a brain injury has special glasses made for her with a facial recognition device encoded. When she approaches someone she has programmed into the device, their name will flash up on the glasses screen, enabling her to form a belief about who she is confronted with. This would constitute

13 13 an extracranial memory-system, as it meets Clark s requirements of playing an active role, nontriviality, functional equivalence and counterfactual incompetence. However, since facial recognition is a much more mundane and simple system than that of memory in general it would have a stronger intuitive appeal. Rupert argues that the EMH does not meet the condition of simplicity 31, as it would violate theoretical conservatism; if it were accepted it would require the whole of developmental science to be reconceptualised. He argues that in the past, developmental science was concerned with seeing humans as persisting systems. Therefore, if the EMH is accepted, the idea of humans as persisting cognitive systems would have to be overturned, rendering all previous progress in developmental science void 32 or requiring complex amendments to be made to account for all the constantly changing extracranial systems. However, Rupert seems to overlook the fact that the extended systems relative to an individual would still maintain the same core; the organism s brain would be a persisting process in the various systems, even if it was at times extended in certain ways. Instead, the EMH is shown by Clark to be a better explanation with regards to simplicity, as it gives a more explanatorily useful account of the systems in question. One could always try to explain the action in terms of internal processes and a long series of internal inputs and actions but this explanation would be needlessly complex 33. Treating the glasses as part of a facial memory system generates a much simpler account than seeing them an input at various levels of an inner process, which would require including many aspects of the process that are not explanatorily relevant for the case. Conclusion 31 Rupert, Representation p Ibid. p Clark and Chalmers, The Extended Mind p.10

14 14 In conclusion, objections to extracranial memory-systems based on the Mark of the Cognitive and Functional equivalence are ineffective if the EMH is properly formulated. This formulation is based on a highly specified account of what would constitute a certain vehicle being a part of an extended memory-system. Similarly, if evaluated in in terms of intuitive appeal and simplicity, the extracranial explanation is favourable to explain Otto s extended semantic memory and Olivia s facial recognition. Therefore, there is reason to believe that in certain cases, a cognitive system that gives rise to a belief can extend beyond the boundaries of the skull.

15 15 Bibliography Primary Sources: Adams, Fred and Aizawa, Ken, Defending the Bounds of Cognition in The Extended Mind ed. By Richard Menary (Cambridge:MIT Press, 2010) pp Clark, Andy and Chalmers, David J. The Extended Mind, Analysis 58.1, (Jan 1998) pp.7-19 Clark, Andy, Coupling, Constitution and the Cognitive Kind in The Extended Mind ed. Richard Menary (Cambridge:MIT Press, 2010) pp Secondary Sources: Adams, Fred and Aizawa, Ken The Bounds of Cognition, Philosophical Psychology v.14.1, (2001) pp Clark, Andy Memento s Revenge, in The Extended Mind ed. Richard Menary (Cambridge:MIT Press, 2010) pp Hermer-Vazquez, Spelke and Katsnelson, Sources of Flexibility in Human Cognition: Dual task studies of space and language. Cognitive Psychology, v.39, (1999) pp.3-36 Ludwig, David, Extended Cognition and the Explosion of Knowledge Philosophical Psychology (forthcoming) URL: Acessed:06/12/16 Menary, Richard Introduction: The Extended Mind in Focus in The Extended Mind ed. By Richard Menary (Cambridge:MIT Press, 2010) pp.1-26 Ross, Don and Ladyman, James The Alleged Coupling-Constitution Fallacy and the Mature Sciences in The Extended Mind ed. Richard Menary (Cambridge:MIT Press, 2010) pp

16 16 Rupert, Robert D. Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition, Journal of Philosophy, (2004) pp Rupert, Robert D. Representation in Extended Cognitive Systems, in The Extended Mind ed. Richard Menary (Cambridge:MIT Press, 2010) pp Wheeler, Micheal In Defence of Extended Functionalism in The Extended Mind ed. Richard Menary (Cambridge:MIT Press, 2010) pp Wilson, Robert A. Meaning Making and the Mind of the Externalist in The Extended Mind ed. By Richrd Menary (Cambridge:MIT Press, 2010) pp Background Sources: Adams, Fred and Aizawa, Ken, "Causal Theories of Mental Content", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ed. Edward N. Zalta, (Spring 2010 Edition), URL: Chalmers, David Foreword, in Supersizing them Mind by Andy Clark (Oxford: OUP, 2011) pp.ix-xvi Levin, Janet, Functionalism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ed. Edward N. Zalta, (Winter 2016 Edition), forthcoming URL: