The assumption of agency: a realist theory of the production of agency in everyday social life

Transcription

1 The assumption of agency: a realist theory of the production of agency in everyday social life Kate Forbes-Pitt Abstract In many theories that explain the transformation of structure, agents who recognize other agents and interact with them are a presumption upon which they rely. In this paper, I describe processes that might produce the agency presumed by existing theories. The everyday and routine processes I outline draw upon a critical realist ontological framework. The longstanding philosophical problem of other minds shows that humans have little knowledge that other humans they encounter are like themselves. This presents a problem for the ignorant human: how to recognize each other as agents and so act and interact socially? This paper argues that many of the properties associated with being a human agent must always remain unknown to all but oneself, but that human ability to assume and test assumption routinely overcomes this knowledge barrier. It proposes the process of the assumption of agency and two types of human agency: a privileged agent known through self-knowledge and agents that are ascribed properties in order that they might be regarded as potential interactees. I argue for the primacy of action and so that the human ability to act necessarily precedes the formation of agency. Because of this, I reject notions that agency is formed by structure, but propose that it is formed through both the necessary selfawareness that one s action is rooted in one s mentality and the interpretation of the actions of others. Using the conditions of agency arising from these arguments, I can illustrate at least the theoretical possibility of non-human agency. Introduction The assumption of agency is a new theory of the production of agency. Existing realist theories of agency can be argued to presume the existence of agents that, despite necessary human knowledge limitations, routinely recognize other agents as agents and interact with them accordingly. Indeed, theories such as Archer s morphogenesis (2000; 2003) or the institutionalism promoted and advanced by Hodgson (2003) are dependent upon action by humans within social interaction in order to achieve the reproduction and transformation of social structure and/or institutions that they theorize. But, how is it that humans become agents? And, perhaps more importantly, how do they recognize one another as agents in order that they might interact to affect the reproduction or transformation of social structure these theories describe? The assumption of agency theory proposes answers to these questions and so posits how the agency presumed by existing theories comes to be. The assumption of agency theory outlined in this paper describes how the application of the human knowledge and ability that routinely overcomes necessary human limitations within everyday interaction produces agency. It takes critical realist ontology as its philosophical foundation; of particular importance are the four categories of ontologically real within critical realism proposed by Fleetwood (2005). It proposes distinct types of human agency which are separated by access to privileged self-knowledge and it posits the processes by which these types of agency are routinely produced and maintained within everyday interaction. As a result of theorizing the production of agency as it does, the theoretical possibility of a non-human agency that is distinct from all types of human agency is proposed. Section 1 below briefly outlines the foundational arguments for this theory, the first of which is the longstanding philosophical problem of other minds. Second is Searle s theory of 1

2 intentionality, which is utilized as the means of linking human mentality to the external (and social) world. I have expanded the notion of the intentional represented object to include Fleetwood s four-fold categorization of ontologically real. Thus Searle is expanded to include socially real and ideally real entities as different categories of possible intentional represented objects. Third is Davidson s widely accepted hypothesis that reasons can be causes. In section 2, the assumption of agency theory and its central concepts are described. The proposed minimum elements necessary for a human to act, deriving from arguments in section 1, are contended as the minimum conditions for agency. These are shown to be necessarily linked to form the mind-action chain. Because the problem of other minds shows unequivocally that the mind-action chain is partly private, the assumption of agency theory proposes two types of human agency: those who have access to privileged self-knowledge in their social world the ego agent and those who do not the ascribed agent. The ascribed agent arises from the process of the assumption of agency in which it is ascribed the elements of elements of the action-mind chain. This agency can be maintained (or it can fail) in the subsequent process of the maintenance of agency. Action and the explanation of action is central to this process, which leads to the theoretical proposition of a non-human agency: the evinced agent. The evinced agent arises as an explanation when spontaneous action with no apparent human cause is observed: it obtains no symmetry with either human agent. The ego agent s link to structure centers on intentionality and the representation of social entities. The distinction of intent and intentionality is crucial throughout. Properly separating and distinguishing these concepts in line with existing theories of philosophy of mind, as I have done in the mind-action chain, is one element of the assumption of agency theory that distinguishes it from existing theories of agency. This distinction shows that the represented social entities are necessarily held before reason and intent. The centrality of mental representation implicitly argues for the separation of subject and object, which underscores that the assumption of agency theory is unambiguously a realist theory. It should be noted that the production of agency and not the reproduction and transformation of structure is the focus of this theory. Nothing contained within the assumption of agency theory negates the process of reproduction or transformation of structure described by Archer as morphostasis or morphogenesis, respectively. The distinction of knowledge proposed by Ryle (1949) into know how human ability and know that theoretical knowledge is often invoked in what follows. This theory is concerned with what a human might know in the moment of interaction, which is firmly rooted in know how. Ryle s distinction is also aligned with Tanney s (2004) of what is the case vs what humans can possibly know and Mouzelis (1995) pragmatic and syntagmatic attitudes. The assumption of agency theory seeks to explain how humans can exercise their know how, to produce, in their pragmatic attitudes, what is the case with regard to everyday social interaction within the knowledge limitations to which humans are necessarily confined. The foundations for the assumption of agency theory may at times seem arcane and are heavily philosophical. It is necessary, however, to outline the philosophy of mind theories before describing the theory. I ask the reader to bear with me, this is a new theory that arises from material that is perhaps unfamiliar to social science and which uses techniques, such as thought experiments, that are not usual in social science. However, I believe it is a theory that offers a new perspective and provides answers as to how agency comes to be and be recognized in order that interaction can begin. 2

3 Section 1: Foundational theories There are three foundational theories on which the assumption of agency theory rests. What follows are brief outlines of each. In part because of brevity, I make no claim that these are either exhaustive summaries or that they address the full detail of what underpins the further work. I have tried to outline salient points that shaped the thinking behind the assumption of agency theory. 1.1: The problem of other minds The longstanding philosophical problem of other minds concerns a fundamental limitation of human knowledge: it might be said to be a truism. It is something with which social science has generally not concerned itself. It shows that self-knowledge is privileged and that similar knowledge cannot be gained about others and therefore it potentially raises awkward questions for social science. In particular it problematizes social interaction by implicitly questioning how one human agent recognizes another in order that interaction might begin. Central to the discussion of the problem of other minds is the concept of mind : a reference to mental events, or collection of mental events. The theory of mind-body supervenience (Davidson, 1970; Kim, 1996) holds that a mental event is not a brain event, but that they are intimately connected. The mind is separate from the brain, but supervenes upon it such that a mental event M 1 at time T 1 takes place only if a brain event B 1 also takes place at time T 1. This is the model of mind that operates as an underlying assumption throughout what follows. While I will not discuss detailed knowledge of mental content, it is difficult, if not impossible, to discuss an empty mind. If a mind is to be discovered but yet has no physical presence, (as is implied above), how could it be identified without content? Evidence of the content of a mental state is, therefore, taken as evidence of mind in this paper. In social science it is usual to theorize agents and their relations to structure; it is unusual to question or theorize how humans are able to interact socially. Indeed, that this is unproblematic is a base assumption for many social theories. However, when routine human-human interaction is approached from the perspective of the necessary limitations in the problem of other minds, it can be seen that the knowledge that the interactor is fundamentally like the interactee is not accessible to either party because there can be no access to mentality outside of their own private mental space. How do I know, for example, that I am dealing with another human agent who will be able to interact and not, say, a nonhuman automata? Social interaction under these circumstances looks more like a remarkable everyday human achievement than something unproblematic for and/or innate to humans. It would appear necessary to be able to ascertain another mind in order to interact. The traditional answer to the problem of other minds has been inference, in the form of the argument from analogy: x applies in case A, case A is relatively similar to case B, therefore x applies in case B In other words, when I see someone else perform the same actions that I would in response to similar stimuli, it is reasonable for me to conclude that they have something very similar to my own mind controlling their responses. This argument is inductive. Induction, however, has long been rejected as a way to generalisable knowledge. Hume (1902) concludes that there is no possible justification for this. He argues that even if the generalized knowledge is restricted to typical cases based on inductive hypotheses, the inductive hypothesis itself is a contingent generalization and so the argument ends in 3

4 infinite regress. This presents problems for the argument from analogy. In fact, even if local induction (such as that promoted by Levi (1967)) is used, it can be shown that each human is left only able to ascertain a mind for any interactee on a case by case basis at best. If we imagine ourselves operating in usual social life, this assertion appears absurd. When I buy a latte in Starbucks, I do not automatically believe the barista to be without a mind because I haven t managed to prove otherwise. Indeed, can it be realistically argued that I would get in my car and drive if I did so in the knowledge that I was the only driver on the road experiencing mental events? The argument from analogy and the metatheoretical difficulties associated with it do not allow me to operate under any other assumption. Pursuing the argument in standard metatheoretical terms, then, doesn t yield much that is useful in explaining the possibility of interaction. All that can be said is that humans seem to be able to act in ways that bear little relation to the knowledge to which they can be shown to have access. There are approaches to similar problems within philosophy of mind. Tanney (2004) argues for the strength and application of what is the case versus what humans can possibly know in the treatment of the concept of zombie. Zombies... are exactly like us in all respects, right down to the tiniest details, but they have no conscious experiences. My zombie twin not only looks, behaves, and is disposed to behave just like me, he is a perfect particle for particle replica. (Kirk, 1974, p.43) Tanney utilizes John and zombie-john to argue that zombie-john could not be perceived as not-conscious. In pursuing her argument, she potentially allows approaches to the questions above to move away from metatheoretical argument into the realms of explanation and meaning. To avoid any potential misunderstandings, however, Tanney s assertions about the limitation of her own argument should be acknowledged:... the possibility of zombies reintroduces the problem of how we could ever know, or be justified in assuming, other minds exist. Someone might thus be tempted to misconstrue the argument of this paper as one that mixes up questions about what one could possibly know with questions about what is the case. But the argument I offer here does not run from epistemology to metaphysics. It is logically prior: it concerns meaning. (ibid., p.180, emphasis added) There is no attempt to misconstrue Tanney. I want to use her to find a way out of a seemingly intractable problem: to account for social interaction in a way that is acceptable to both a metatheoretical analysis and social science. Tanney can be seen to move the argument from theory to meaning: My argument begins by noting that creatures that are behaviourally indistinguishable from their human counterparts [zombies] will meet all the second- and third- person criteria for the ascription of experiential mental predicates in exactly the same situations as their counterparts do. These predicates will include the sensation concepts of seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, and tasting; they will include those containing the term conscious, itself; and they will include the related concepts of the feelings and emotions. (ibid., p.174) Her argument is based on zombie-john s responses to observers around him. She illustrates her point by turning it on its head: 4

5 Suppose for the sake of argument that zombie-john lacks something the human John has: something only accessible privately. Notice how difficult it would be to say what it is that zombie John lacks. For every time we attempt to name something: a feeling, a sensation, an experience, or a perception, zombie John will satisfy us exactly as well as human John by his way of talking, his discriminatory abilities, and by other sorts of responses, that we are correctly attributing these concepts to him and that he is correctly attributing them to himself. (ibid., p.178, emphasis added) Thus when I buy a latte, it is the behavior of the barrista that allows me to apply meaning to them; a meaning I propose that I understand as human. In applying this meaning, I incorporate my understanding of that meaning, which includes mental predicates. As Tanney implies, my application of the meaning of human is logically prior to attempts I might make at induction. Tanney s argument helps unpick such interaction. Using her work, I can utilize the invocation of meaning and sidestep the need for induction in order to be able ascertain a belief in another s mentality (not knowledge of it) 1. I have a method to identify potential social interactors ; if the meaning human can be applied to them. This argument can, I believe, provide a workable solution to the ascription of mentality in social interaction. However, it cannot be substituted for a theoretical answer to the initially posed problem because it relies on meaning, per Ryle s (1949) knowledge distinction. Tanney opposes what humans can possibly know with what is the case, which aligns closely with Ryle s (1949) distinction of knowing that and knowing how. Knowing that refers to theoretical knowledge, aligning with what humans can possibly know, while knowing how references human skill and ability, aligning with what is the case. I raise Ryle s distinction to highlight that one type of knowledge cannot be offered as a solution for the other: no answers based in knowing how can be compatible with questions deriving from knowing that. Thus, in order to pursue this workaround for social science, the problem must be rephrased from a theoretical one to one rooted in human social or practical ability. In this way the question and answer proposed can become compatible. Just as zombie-john s companion relies on his responses and is unable to detect what he lacks, my assumption of the Starbucks barista s mentality is based on what I observe. This is a crucial, basic, fundamental assumption for social interaction because... with mentality goes agency and personhood, and with agency and personhood goes the whole framework that would render these creatures appropriate subjects of respect, dignity, moral praise and blame. (Tanney, 2004.,p.10). I do not wholly agree with Tanney s assertion, but I do feel it is another important signpost. Without mentality and the recognition of it, some reason for social behavior disappears: mentality, or the recognition of it, is at the root of social behavior. So, because of the ability to apply meaning arguably the meaning human and because of the fact that mentality is necessarily incorporated into that meaning, assumption of mind is automatically made within interaction on the basis of meaning and skill, not automatically denied as a function of theoretical knowledge. I cannot overstate the importance of this reversal. The problem of other minds points us to the latter conclusion (denial); the 1 Note that this is inextricably linked to the human I am observing and I am not discussing simply the identification of a mind. 5

6 workaround derived from Tanney points us to the former (assumption). This might be described as substituting the argument from analogy with an argument from assumption as an initial step to describing social interaction. 1.2: Searle s theory of intentionality... intending to do something is just one form of Intentionality along with belief, hope, desire, and lots of others; and I do not mean to suggest that because, for example, beliefs are Intentional they somehow contain the notion of intention or they intend something or someone who has a belief must thereby intend to do something about it... (Searle, 1983, p.3) Thus, intentionality does not mean or imply intended to or done with intent. Neither should it be confused with the term intentional action. Intentionality is a property of some mental states. An intentional mental state is about something; a belief, for example, is a belief about something. The statement I believe the sky is blue is an expression of a mental state about the object sky, as is I hope the sky is blue. These are expressions of different mental states about the same object. Intentionality is a property of mental states about, or directed towards, things. It is not a necessary property of mental states per se, but it is a necessary property of mental states that have direction towards something. Intentionality provides a connection between the mental and that which is external to it. In order to recognize other mentality and/or agency, otherness first needs to be acknowledged: the other needs to be external. Even in these simple terms, the importance of intentionality to the recognition of agency can be seen. Searle asserts that intentional states have a psychological mode and representative content. So, the intentional mental state I want a coffee has the psychological mode want and the representative content coffee. This he writes as S(r) where S is the psychological mode (want) and r the representative content (coffee). The representative content is a represented intentional object: a mental representation or an idea, representation, expression or some such of the external object held mentally Searle characterizes intentionality that shows... i. that represented objects are part of mental states ii. that if these mental states are necessarily intentional, the intentional object cannot be internal iii. that objects must only exist externally and are necessarily separate from the holder of the mental state... which necessarily requires a mental representation of the object. Searle regards the ontological status of intentional states to be a mistaken question (ibid., p.15). This has two consequences. One is that he believes his approach sidesteps the need to answer questions of the ontological status of intentional mental states rather than the status of the state (with or without intentionality) itself. Using this argument he circumvents the need to even address the ontological status of the intentional mental state. The second consequence is that false objects do not need to be created as ontological entities to explain the ontological status of the intentional mental state. For example, if I believe in the existence of a 51 st state of the USA, according to Searle my belief is simply incorrect. Within Searle s theory, there is no need to create an intentional object that has its own ontological status in order to satisfy the ontological status of my intentional state. In Searle s view, my intentional state is simply about nothing because my intentional object does not exist. 6

7 It might be argued that in this Searle applies quite a literal realism. When giving examples of what can be represented, Searle references only tangible objects. But is this all that can be mentally represented? If this is the case, representation is limited to that which obtains the status of actually real within critical realism. I do not believe this limitation is either accurate or desirable, however. I would argue that Searle s strict requirements can be expanded without having to embark upon discussion of the ontological status of the intentional state, create an intentional object for a false belief, or sacrifice any of the ontological status of the external object. I propose that all that obtains an ontological status of real with critical realism be included as that which can be mentally represented within intentional states. An object that is, for example, ideally real can be conceivably represented as a real object and held as part of a mental state. I argue not only that we can hold them as a solid mental representation but further that we can, and do, attach psychological modes to them. In other words, ideally real objects are represented within intentional states; I am not proposing something that isn t already happening. Take Harry Potter, for example. Is it realistic to say that no-one in the world is capable of an intentional mental state towards the fictional wizard? The protests of the campaign groups who sought Harry Potter books banned in certain US 2 State school systems would be hard to describe without accounting for a single intentional mental state towards the fictional character. It is hard to see how such states could be regarded as false. Given that arguments can be made to show both the representation of ideally real entities and intentional states held about them, I propose that ideally real objects be accounted for when characterizing intentional mental states. Where the representational object is ideally real, it might be an ideal representation. In other words, the idea otherwise held mentally becomes represented to the intentional mental state in order to become its content. I propose such intentional mental states are represented as intentional in the form S(i) where S is the psychological mode and (i) the ideal representational content. This is in addition to the form S(r) described earlier. S(i) links ideally real objects to individual mentality and both reinforces their status as objects and allows humans to enter into meaningful relationships with them. There is another important facet to critical realist ontology and another important link with externality for humans: socially real objects. Socially real refers to social structure in general (Fleetwood, 2005, p.201) obtains an ontological status of real. Critical realists use the term social structures as a portmanteau term to refer to configurations of causal mechanisms, rules, resources, relations, powers, positions and practices. (ibid.) I argue that these also can be and are mentally represented. To distinguish the representational object of socially real entities, I will use the form S(s) as after Searle s S(r). In S(s), S is the psychological mode of the intentional state and s is the representation of the socially real object. In this way, a psychological mode of desire can be held either to an institution or a rule contained within it. Just as it is not commonsensical to propose that no 2 'Ban Harry Potter or face more school shootings' A woman who maintains that the Harry Potter books are an attempt to teach children witchcraft is pushing for the second time to have them banned from school libraries. Laura Mallory, a mother of four from the Atlanta suburb of Loganville, told a Georgia Board of Education officer that the books by British author J.K. Rowling, sought to indoctrinate children as Wiccans, or practitioners of religious witchcraft. Harry-Potter-face-school-shootings.html Last updated October 4th

8 intentional state can be held towards Harry Potter, so it is difficult to support the notion that no intentional state can be held towards a law, for example. Intentionality connects mentality with external objects; it is a necessary property of mental states that are about, or directed towards, something. This something is represented mentally and contained, along with a psychological mode, within intentional mental states. Searle characterizes this as S(r). I propose that the possible mental representations include that which is ideally real and socially real within critical realism. The resulting intentional states are expressed as S(i) and S(s), respectively 1.3: Reasons as causes In 1963 Davidson proposed his now widely accepted hypothesis that reasons can be causes. [T]here is a certain irreducible... sense in which every rationalization justifies: from the agent s point of view there was, when he acted, something to be said for the action. (ibid., 2006, pp.27-8) Davidson argues that... the primary reason for an action is its cause. (ibid., p.24) He goes on to set rationalization apart from other causal explanations. If rationalization is, as I want to argue, a species of causal explanation, then justification... is at least one differentiating property. (ibid., p.28) Under the term justification, Davidson includes... that the agent has certain beliefs and attitudes in the light of which the action is reasonable. (ibid.) Note the lack of emphasis on those beliefs being true, in fact this extends to the reason itself. However, simply concentrating on the beliefs and attitudes omits the because : Central to the relation between a reason and an action it explains is the idea that the agent performed the action because he had the reason. (ibid., emphasis added) Davidson refers the because back to reason. He says that the reason is the agent s interpretation of why they performed the action and that either the reason or the interpretation may or may not be true. This interpretation will include the agent s beliefs and attitudes (as well as goals, principles etc.) and will also place the action in context: To learn, through learning the reason, that the agent conceived his action as a lie, a repayment of a debt, an insult, the fulfillment of an avuncular obligation, or a knight s gambit is to grasp the point of the action in its setting of rules, practices, conventions, and expectations. (ibid.) So, Davidson not only brings the because back to reason, but also actions into a situated framework by understanding the interpreted reason for an action to be the cause of that action. His primary reason can thus be understood to be interpreted internally by the agent according to their own pro attitude and set of beliefs. This may then be reported as rationalization the term Davidson uses for a reported reason. So the reason, the cause, is modified by elements the agent holds that are necessarily interpreted. Taken with Davidson s lack of emphasis on the truth of the rationalization, interpretation, context and belief can be seen to play a substantial role in his formulation. There are positions, however, that challenge reason as cause. Davidson defends against six of these in his 1963 paper. He cites the argument that as attitudes and beliefs are dispositions and not events, they cannot be causal. His defense is that dispositions are often named as causes; e.g. a structural defect in a bridge is stated as the cause of its collapse. 8

9 He also defends against the notion that events have to be distinct to constitute a causal explanation: To describe an event in terms of its cause is not to confuse the event with its cause, nor does explanation by redescription exclude causal explanation. (ibid., p.32) He states that causal relations can be logical as well as empirical and defends the idea that causality does not need to be defined by criteria at least not for rationalisation: The person who has a desire (or want or belief) does not normally need criteria at all he generally knows, even in the absence of any clues available to others, what he wants, desires and believes. (ibid.) Davidson discounts the need for laws in rationalizations, eschewing prediction and generalization in dealing with Hume s doctrine. He claims that only the second version of Hume s doctrine... no particular law is entailed by a singular causal claim... (ibid., p.34) fits most causal explanations and that this fits rationalization equally well: The most primitive explanation of an event gives its cause; more elaborate explanations may tell more of the story, or defend the singular causal claim by producing a relevant law or by giving reasons for believing such exists. But it is an error to think no explanation has been given until a law has been produced. (ibid.) He also deals with criticisms based on the issue of the truth of the rationalization. Humans are fallible and may either give a false reason, or believe a false reason to be true (or a true reason to be false) where the true reason is unpalatable to them: they may engage in selfdeception. So, while they believe they are giving a true explanation for their action their reason is, in fact, incorrect. Consider the example of a helper in assisted suicide. It is possible that the reasons for their actions are entirely selfless. It is also possible that while they believe this to be the case the lack of future care incumbent upon them or perhaps the possibility of an inheritance might play a less palatable part in their decision. So, even though the reason given the rationalization is selfless, this may not be a true reflection of their primary reason. This would be held by some to negate reason as a possible cause. Davidson defends against this saying that because the helper in this example may be wrong, it makes no sense to not ask for the evidence. Indeed, on some occasions, those engaged in self deception may accept alternate evidence to concede that their initial reason was false. For Davidson, this indicates that the knowledge for these reasons is inductive... for where there is induction, there is evidence. Does this show the knowledge is not causal? I cannot see that it does. (ibid.) Thus a given reason does not have to be true for it to be causal. Lastly, Davidson dismisses the tendency to not want to link cause and action. Some argue that causes must have agents, thus if mental states are deemed to be causal, there exists an infinite regress. Davidson is vehement against this point: Why on earth should a cause turn an action into a mere happening and a person into a hapless victim? Is it because we tend to assume, at least in the arena of action, that a cause demands a cause, agency and agent?... Some causes have no agents. Among these agentless causes are the states and changes of state in persons which, because they are reasons as well as causes, constitute certain events free and intentional actions. (ibid., pp.35-6) Thus he maintains that cause per se is not dependent upon an agent, there are agentless causes, including changes of state in a person. 9

10 What can be said about rationalization as a result of Davidson s proposition and defence? In his characterization, rationalization is a species of causal explanation with justification as one of its defining properties and which contains a because. This because expresses the agent s interpretation which, in turn, contains their beliefs and attitudes and which contextualizes the rationalization. Rationalization is not a distinct event, it is a logical and not empirical form of causation that offers explanation and not laws. Rationalization may involve induction, but this does not make it non-causal. Lastly, and obviously, rationalization has no agent no homunculus we might cite as agent, flicking switches to initiate a state of desire, for example because if it did there would be infinite regress. This, however, does not negate the existence of the agentless cause, or its causal nature. A primary reason, thus characterized, causes action. Davidson argues, then, that a primary reason containing beliefs and attitudes can be construed as the cause for action. The addition of Davidson to the arguments advanced so far allows me to conjecture that a human is in possession of mentality and that some of the mental states resulting from this possession will be intentional. When this human forms a reason to act, it will include belief and the primary reason formed will be linked to the action by intent. Section 1 summary The assumption of agency theory rests on a problem, a theory and a hypothesis: the problem of other minds, Searle s theory of intentionality and Davidson s hypothesis that reasons can be causes. The problem of other minds questions the unproblematic nature of humanhuman interaction. Tanney s work on zombies is introduced to provide the foundation for the substitution of assumption for analogy, always with the caveat that each references different sides of Ryle s knowledge distinction. Intentionality connects mentality to the external world, in part by utilizing mental representations of it. I propose that these representations include those of ideally real and socially real entities. Finally, Davidson proposes reasons as causes of actions. He includes belief in the characterization of his causal primary reason. He defends his hypothesis consistently bringing the because back to reason. Section 2: The assumption of agency theory Building upon section 1, it is possible to suggest that there are minimum elements in place when a human acts. Mentality is the first necessary element. Without my mentality without a mind it is fairly safe to say that I would not be able to act. Mentality entails mental events and states and these are an obvious prerequisite for intentional mental states. Intentional mental states are a necessary condition for the holding of a primary reason because of the role of belief. A primary reason is the causal basis for action and is linked to action by intent. So, in order for a human to act there are required minimum elements: mentality, intentionality, primary reason (or the ability to hold one), intent and action. Can there be agency where there is no possibility of action? It is hard to see how an argument for agency can be made for a non-acting human. Where agency and structure join, the majority of social theories place action at the centre of arguments accounting for agents reproduction and transformation of structure. Could a non-acting human be regarded as having agency in these theories? I would argue that it is not possible to conceive of an agent that is unable to act and I place the ability to act as central to what it is to be considered an agent. The minimum elements that enable mentality to result in action I have joined by the necessary linkages outlined above as the mind-action chain, shown in figure 1 below: 10

11 Relationship: causes is a necessary condition for is a necessary condition for action Primary reason (rationalization verbally reported) Intentionality Mentality Linked by intent Figure 1: the Mind-Action Chain There are two principal functions of the mind-action chain. It lays out the minimum elements required for a human to act and their necessary connections. If agency is linked fundamentally to the ability to act, which I believe it is, then the minimum elements for action that are shown in the mind-action chain are going to be closely related to the conditions for the presence of agency. Of course per issues highlighted by the problem of other minds, many of the elements within the action-mind chain are necessarily private. The mind-action chain also shows the basis of self-knowledge for any human and what they can know about their own mentality leading to their own action (which is not to say that they do). The mind-action chain concerns a mind that is known. There is, of course, only one case where this is true in any social world. If it is my social world, only I will have access to this knowledge and only about myself; I have first person access to my own mind and no third person access to anyone else s. I can be aware that my mentality leads to my actions and this self-knowledge is privileged knowledge. Thus, I know more about my ability to act than anyone else ever can and, I would argue, I also know more about the origin of my own agency than anyone else ever can (even if it transpires that I actually know very little about myself). Because of this, my own agency is never in doubt for me. I know myself, I know myself to be a conscious being, I know myself to be separate from the things and other humans in the world around me and I know that my consciousness can affect that world. I will use the term ego agent to refer to this privileged agent who has access to private knowledge about themselves. For every human there is one ego agent, and one only, in their world: themselves. There can never be more because of the knowledge restrictions imposed on them about everyone else. Part of, or perhaps the culmination of, the privileged knowledge of the ego agent is the knowledge of what it is to be human. They know that they are conscious, embodied and intelligent. They may well not be aware of all of the individual elements of their mind-action chain, but they know its basic function: the initiation of action arising from mentality. Because of this, the ego agent is also aware and sure of their own humanity and their own agency; they have intimate, unique and privileged knowledge of what it is to be human and what it is to be an agent. The self-knowledge of what it is to be a human agent is the meaning that the ego agent is then able to apply to others. It is deeply rooted and learned from pre-verbal development in the creation of the knowledge of being an individual. Thus, what it is to be an individual, a human, a man or woman and the particular instance of human that is me is all special, privileged knowledge we each have about ourselves but no-one else. We are each an ego agent in our own social world, the differentiation between ourselves and all other agents is inescapable. That our knowledge about what those other agents might be like is necessarily derived from ourselves is inexorable. 11

12 Each ego agent needs to be able to interact with other humans in order to be social and in order to exercise their agency. Given the knowledge limitations previously described and the privileged nature of the knowledge that is available to the ego agent, how is this possible? I have argued, after Tanney, that recognition of mentality other than one s own comes as a function of the application of assumption as a result of the application of the meaning human. I have also argued that inherent in the application of the meaning human are the properties that the ego agent understands as comprising that meaning: the elements of the mind-action chain. So, when an ego agent comes across another human they apply the meaning human to them, which includes mindedness. In this way, they are able to recognize another human who will be a social agent in their world. Everything that the ego agent knows about this other human at this point is, however, only attributed to them as a function of the application of meaning: it is not factual knowledge. The ego agent may gain more knowledge about the other human as they interact. However, as has been shown, some of the knowledge about the other human that the ego agent needs in order to ascertain agency can never be known; it must remain forever attributed. The process that I have described in which the meaning human is applied and which results in an other with whom the ego agent can interact I propose as the process of the assumption of agency. Having applied the meaning of human, and all the attendant properties, to the other in order that they can interact with them, i.e. having completed the process of the assumption of agency, the ego agent has transformed the object in front of them that appears to be human into a human agent. This other human agent can never attain a status that matches the ego agent s own agency (in the ego agent s world) because of necessary knowledge limitations described above. The other agent I propose is an ascribed agent: an agent to whom the ego agent has ascribed mental properties as a function of the process of the assumption of agency. The ascribed agent is distinct from the ego agent. Each ascribed agent is an ego agent in their social world because they will have access to their own private mental space and therefore their own self-knowledge. In other words, each ascribed agent also has privileged access to a private mental space their own and will also be applying their own self-knowledge through the assumption of agency 3. The position of ego agent in every social world is privileged because of this private access: the principal reason for defining two types of human agency. Once the privileged nature of the underlying private knowledge available to each human about themselves is examined, it becomes undeniable that human agency must fall into two types: the ego agent, with privileged knowledge and the ascribed agent to whom meaning is applied and about whom knowledge is (and can only ever be) assumed. So, I have argued that the mind-action chain is part of the self-knowledge that the ego agent understands to form part of being human and, unsurprisingly, I contend that when applying the meaning human this fundamental understanding forms part of the application. The assumption of agency is, however, only an initial process. It transforms the object with which the ego agent is faced into an ascribed agent. However, the ascribed agency needs to persist for the ego agent. This is achieved by the ego agent maintaining their understanding of the ascribed agent s continued possession of the elements that they initially ascribed in the process of the assumption of agency. In this way the application of meaning is not 3 That is, unless the ascription was mistaken and the ascribed agent has no private mental space a la zombie-john. I will examine the possibility of mistaken ascription more closely in chapter 7. 12

13 permanent but once done can fail and then be undone if it was initially mistaken (and the mistake shows itself). In order for the ego agent to be as sure as they can be that their initial ascription was not mistaken and to maintain and update the represented object that they have created for the ascribed agent, they enter the process of the maintenance of agency. The ego agent is limited in this process to what they can observe in the interaction: in other words, to verify the agency before them, they have no choice but to utilize observable elements of the action-mind chain. The only elements of the action-mind chain that are amenable to observation are action itself and the reporting of a primary reason. It makes sense for the ego agent to think of the relationship of action and mentality beginning with mentality with reference to themselves. It makes no sense, however, for them to think this in relation to an ascribed agent and their interaction with them; the relationship with the ego agent and the ascribed agent s (assumed) mentality always begins with the ascribed agent s action (in the form of action or speech). This is the reason for the reversal of the chain that the ego agent knows from the mind-action chain of self-knowledge to the action-mind chain of applied meaning and assumed knowledge. The process of the maintenance of agency is centered on the action-mind chain which is diagrammatically represented in figure 2 below: Relationship: Is caused by has as a necessary condition has as a necessary condition action Linked by intent Primary reason (rationalisation verbally reported) Intentionality Mentality Observation: The overarching contention in the proposition of the process of the maintenance of agency is that the ego agent will effectively monitor interaction for the demonstration of elements of the action-mind chain. Inherent in this proposition is that causal action, in general, demands explanation, however mundane. In attempting to find explanation for observed actions and the cause of the action, the ego agent examines intent and reason. Because action is caused by a primary reason via intent and because of their own selfknowledge, the ego agent is aware that there is something to be said for their own action as a function of their reason. They apply the meaning human to the ascribed agent that is based on their own self-knowledge, so they presume that there is also something that the ascribed agent can say for their action. This is an automatic process that forms part of usual everyday human ability or know how ; it is what results in what is the case. That is, unless or until there exists no obvious or usual reason that the ego agent can presume on the part of the ascribed agent. When the automatic process fails, the reason and/or intent is explicitly sought. In this way, I argue that the action-mind chain is constantly in use when agents interact as part of the process of the maintenance of agency. Every ego agent is someone else s ascribed agent answering for their agency and every ascribed agent is their own ego agent testing 13 Figure 2: action-mind chain (with observation)

14 the agency of others in the process of the assumption of agency. There is no doubt for the ego agent of their own agency and its persistence, but if ascribed agency, via the maintenance of agency, persists throughout the interaction, then each ego agent will leave the interaction with an updated mental representation of the ascribed agent with whom they have interacted. This representation will then incorporate part of the meaning applied to that particular instance of human. Of course, the arguments about zombie-john show that the ego agent may be mistaken in the process of the assumption of agency and yet never discover it. Is this important? Not really. As far as the ego agent is concerned there is no reason to doubt zombie-john and so his agency persists. The ego agent will never have access to the knowledge that zombie-john is not, in fact, human and each time they meet him, he will satisfy all the requirements for the ascription they are making. The assumption of agency, then, is not a definer of human in the social realm, there is too much room for error. What it does is provide a working knowledge of other agents that is, on the whole, efficacious in the enabling of interaction: in other words, it enables what is the case. The agency of the ego agent, in its inception at least, is not shaped or formed by or within social structure. This agency begins in self awareness and the possession of the necessary elements to act that reside within the agent themselves. The ability to act is primary for three reasons: 1) because of the process of self awareness 2) because intentionality connects us with the external world and thus is a basis for action and always prior (because until this connection is made we cannot act) and 3) because action is the fundamental way to identify the agency of others or ourselves as agents. Action not only links the agent and the social in a practical way, without it there is no evidence of agency, apart from our own. Therefore, I assert that it is only through action that any agent can enter interaction with social structures or institutions. The formation of the agent and their subsequent ability to act, I believe, is necessarily prior to their involvement with structure. Two elements from section 1 are important to the relationship of the ego agent with structure and should be briefly restated: the ontological status of structure and the characterization of intentionality and extension of Searle s intentional mental states. Because of my extensions of Searle, I contend that intentional mental states can be directed towards all that is characterized as real, including socially real entities. In my formulation of action shown in the mind-action chain, the mentally represented object is used within intentionality to form action through the linked. An intentional mental state is formed, linking the real object to the mind using the representational object. This is a necessary condition for any primary reason concerning that object. If the reason is acted upon, then the primary reason forms part of the intent that is necessary for action. The primary reason is known to be causal, therefore any action resulting from the primary reason via intent can be said to have been caused. Given my proposition formulation S(s), intentional states can be held towards social structures and the rules of which they are, in part, comprised. Thus, action towards such a rule or structure is caused by a primary reason, of which an intentional state is a necessary condition, and formed via intent. As a represented object, structure can be altered reformed for the ego agent as a result of encounter. Note that I am referring to a change of the represented object, not the object. Describing the change in the external social object is not the aim of this theory. Take school uniform rules as an example. I was a rebellious adolescent who consistently defied such rules. It might be said that I held an intentional mental state(s) belief(s) towards the structure school that included these rules. My beliefs did not include a 14