From Dissonance To Disidentification: Selectivity in the Self-Affirmation Process

Transcription

1 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1995, Vol. 68, No. 6, Copyright 1995 by the American Psychological Association, Inc /95/S3.00 From Dissonance To Disidentification: Selectivity in the Self-Affirmation Process Joshua Aronson Stanford University Hart Blanton Iowa State University Joel Cooper Princeton University Two studies examined the relationship between the content of a self-threat and the attractiveness of available self-affirmations (C. M. Steele, 1988). After self-threat was induced by means of a cognitive dissonance procedure, participants' choices for affirmations were examined in order to explore whether the attractiveness of a given affirmation depends on its relevance to the threatened domain of the self-concept. The authors hypothesized that when faced with a threat to a specific self-conception or standard, individuals may forego affirmations within the threatened self-concept domain in favor of affirmations of unrelated, compensatory domains. Both studies supported this hypothesis and further suggested that such selective self-affirmation can lead individuals to modify their selfconcepts by identifying with self-aspects that justify dissonant behavior and by disidentifying with the standards that such behavior violates. There are many occasions in everyday life in which a person's acts contradict his or her self-views. People may say things at odds with their true beliefs, perform below expected or desired standards, or behave in ways that endanger their own or others' well-being. For over three decades, cognitive dissonance researchers have examined the consequences of such behavior, seeking to specify the conditions under which cognitive inconsistencies will lead to some form of rationalization for example, attitude change (e.g., Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Festinger, 1957; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976). Although enormous progress has been made in this regard, the observation that not every inconsistency between belief and behavior leads to rationalization prompted various theorists to consider alternatives to Festinger's (1957) original notion that dissonance arises from the perception of inconsistent cognitions (e.g., Aronson, 1968; Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Schlenker, 1980; Steele, 1988). This report focuses on an approach that places dissonance Joshua Aronson, Department of Psychology, Stanford University; Hart Blanton, Department of Psychology, Iowa State University; Joel Cooper, Department of Psychology, Princeton University. This article is based on Joshua Aronson's doctoral dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of Princeton University under the supervision of Ned Jones and Joel Cooper. The research was supported by Grant BNS and a James S. McDonnel grant. We thank Ann Faranetta and Cary Booker who served as experimenters, and Geoffrey Cohen, Bill Klein, Mathew McGlone, Debbie Prentice, and Claude Steele for useful suggestions at several stages of the research. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Joshua Aronson, Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, California Electronic mail may be sent via the Internet to joshua@psych.stanford.edu. 986 phenomena under the rubric of self-esteem maintenance (e.g., Aronson, 1968;Greenwald&Ronis, 1978; Steele, 1988; Steele & Liu, 1983). In explicating his self-affirmation theory, Steele (1988) argued that the typical dissonance experiment confounds cognitive inconsistency with a threat to the integrity of the self and, furthermore, that what really motivates individuals to reduce dissonance (by means of attitude change, etc.) is not inconsistency but rather the negative light that inconsistency casts on the self-image. In this view, what prompts rationalization after making a counterattitudinal speech, harming another, or choosing between near-equivalent alternatives is not the inconsistencies inherent in these acts but rather their implication that one is foolish, immoral, or incompetent (Nel, Helmreich, & Aronson, 1969; Scher& Cooper, 1989; Steele, 1975). As a growing body of research is demonstrating, this view has important implications for the reduction of dissonance: if dissonance is aroused by threats to one's general sense of selfintegrity, then people can effectively respond to these threats in ways not documented by the early dissonance researchers that is, by affirming some valued aspect of the self-concept not necessarily related to the threat. For example, a person who smokes cigarettes need not rationalize his or her self-destructive behavior by denying the dangers of smoking if he or she can affirm some valued aspect of the self, such as being a good parent, spouse, or community member. In support of this alternate view of dissonance, Steele & Liu (1983) showed that participants allowed tofill out a selfdescription scale focusing on important personal values after writing a counterattitudinal essay did not rationalize writing the essay by modifying their attitudes. Apparently, the opportunity to affirm important values eliminated the dissonance felt by these participants, despite the attitudes' irrelevance to the essay topic, and thus the dissonance-arousing inconsistency was left unresolved.

2 Self-Affirmation and Self-Discrepancy Effects SELECTIVE SELF-AFFIRMATION 987 More recently, Steele and his colleagues (Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993) have expanded on this logic, suggesting that an abundance of positive self-conceptions may serve to buffer individuals from the need to reduce dissonance through rationalization. This view holds that positive self-conceptions serve as self-affirmational resources from which the individual may draw to counteract the negative implications of a threat to selfesteem. Because those with high self-esteem possess a greater number of these resources, they should be less inclined to rationalize than those with low self-esteem. This prediction was confirmed in Steele et al.'s studies, though only when participants were asked to fill out a self-esteem measure prior to a dissonance induction, which presumably focuses participants on their resources. Taken together with the earlier self-affirmation results, there appears to be ample evidence that individuals need not rationalize in response to dissonance so long as they possess and are allowed to focus on self-esteem resources. In light of thesefindings,it is intriguing that similar self-focusing procedures sometimes produce the opposite effect. For example, a substantial literature on self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Gibbons, 1990; Scheier & Carver, 1977) suggests people dislike self-focus following a dissonant act (Greenberg & Musham, 1981), that self-focus increases ego defensiveness (Federoff & Harvey, 1976), and that negative affect can be amplified by self-awareness (Gibbons, 1987). Similarly, Higgins (1987) showed that negative emotions can be aroused by focus on positive self-standards, presumably because these are compared with current self-appraisals. To the extent that an appraisal falls short of a salient self-standard, one is likely to experience either dejection-related or agitation-related affect. Thus, self-focus can lead to two distinct and opposing tendencies. It can reduce the perception of self-threat, producing a self-affirmation effect. Or, it can increase the perception of selfthreat, resulting in a self-discrepancy effect. We suspect the reason for these contradictory findings lies in the dual function positive self-conceptions play operating as both resources and as standards. When a particular self-conception is threatened, say, by counterattitudinal behavior, focus on that self-conception may increase the sense of threat by invoking the violated standard. But that same self-conception can serve as an affirmational resource in a case where a different, unrelated selfconception is threatened. A source of shame in one situation can be a source of pride in another. Consider the individual in Steele and Liu's (1983) experiment whose self-concept is threatened by having chosen freely to write an essay in favor of a tuition hike. The affirmation in this experiment involved having participants state their aesthetic preferences on a measure of values. For aesthetically oriented individuals, the value measure provides an effective means to affirm the self and successfully eliminates rationalization because it has nothing to do with the domain threatened by the essay. But suppose instead, that the value measure prompted the essay writer to reflect on his or her honesty or integrity. We suspect that because this focuses the individual on the violated standard, the sense of self-image threat (and hence the rationalization) will not be reduced. Conversely, if one receives a low score on a purportedly valid test of artistic creativity, filling out a measure of aesthetic values might be less affirming than focusing on one's honesty. Thus, we suggest that focusing on an aspect of the self-concept impugned by behavior dissonant with that self-concept should offer little relief from the dilemma, whereas focus on unrelated strengths or values may more effectively reaffirm the integrity of the threatened self because it does not invoke standards that can underscore the perception of threat. This reasoning, we believe, may have important implications for how individuals choose to affirm themselves when confronted with a threat to self-esteem. Successful self-affirmation might involve more than simply focusing on self-esteem resources. It may require doing so in a selective manner, focusing on those aspects of self that are unrelated to the threat (affirmational resources) and distancing oneself from related ones (behavioral standards). In line with this reasoning, there is evidence that people respond to threats to a specific self-concept domain by inflating their self-presentations in an unrelated domain (Baumeister & Jones, 1978; Brown & Smart, 1991; Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985). In Study 1, we sought to find evidence for this motivated selectivity in response to a self-esteem threat. We used an induced-compliance dissonance procedure the most thoroughly researched of the dissonance paradigms so that we could be confident that any effect of our manipulations on selfaffirmation choices could be attributed to motivation to reduce an unpleasant arousal (Elkin & Leippe, 1986; Elliot & Devine, 1994; Zanna & Cooper, 1974) as opposed to nonmotivational self-perception processes (Bern, 1967). Participants were induced to write counterattitudinal essays against services for persons with physical disabilities. We reasoned that in the highdissonance conditions of the experiment, writing the essay would threaten participants' image of themselves as compassionate. We then had them choose positive feedback about several distinct self-domains, including their compassion. Half of the participants selected feedback immediately following the dissonance manipulation, and others were given a measure of attitude before choosing feedback. This design allowed us to examine the effects of dissonance on feedback selection as well as the effects of feedback selection on subsequent dissonance reduction by means of attitude change. We predicted that dissonance-induced threat to their compassion would lead participants to want less feedback praising their compassion. Specifically, we expected participants in the high-dissonance condition to select less of the relevant feedback (i.e., feedback relevant to compassion) than a group of participants for whom dissonance was reduced through attitude change, or a group for whom it was not aroused in thefirstplace. As for the effect of selecting feedback on subsequent attitude change, we could not make a firm prediction, given the support in the literature for both affirmation and self-discrepancy effects in response to selffocus. Overview Study 1 Method After taking a multiple-choice personality test, participants wrote counterattitudinal essays under either high- or low-choice conditions as

3 988 J. ARONSON, H. BLANTON, AND J. COOPER part of a campus survey ostensibly unrelated to the personality study. This essay was designed to arouse dissonance in a manner that would threaten participants' sense of compassion. Specifically, participants wrote essays against funding increases for facilities and services for persons with physical disabilities. Participants were later asked to indicate the amount of written personality feedback they wanted to read from each of 10 subcategories purportedly measured by the test. This selection task was performed either before (attitudes second) or after (attitudes first) the presentation of an attitude measure that allowed participants the chance to alleviate any dissonance. Most of the subcategories of feedback pertained to personality domains unrelated to the issue addressed in the dissonant essay, whereas one touched directly on the domain most likely to be threatened by writing the essay. We thus hypothesized an interaction between choice (high vs. low) and order (attitudesfirstvs. attitudes second) such that high-choice-attitudes-second participants would show the least interest in receiving feedback about their compassion. In addition to these two manipulations, we ran two control groups. Participants in thefirstcontrol group (attitude-only) were not asked to write the counterattitudinal essay but did fill out the attitude questionnaire that pertained to services for persons with physical disabilities. The second group (no-attitude) neither wrote the essay nor indicated their attitude. Thus, the experiment compared the feedback choices of the following six conditions: (a) High-choice-attitudes-first, (b) highchoice-attitudes-second, (c) low-choice-attitudes-first, (d) low-choiceattitudes second, (e) no-attitude control, (f) attitude-only control. Procedure Participants were 62 female Princeton students tested in individual sessions and paid for their participation. 1 The data from two participants were deleted due to misunderstandings regarding the use of one of the dependent measures. Participants arrived at the laboratory and were told that the experiment concerned personality structure specifically, how certain personality variables tend to cluster together. The experimenter explained that after taking a standard and well-established measure of personality, the participant, if interested, would be able to read a rather detailed personality profile based on the scoring of her responses to the test. After answering any questions about the personality study, the experimenter explained that the computer took about IS min to access a database and produce a personalized profile and asked the participant if she wouldn't mind using that time to participate in a campus survey being conducted by a graduate student in psychology. All participants agreed to participate in the survey. Participants then took an 83-item test presented on an IBM personal computer. Constructed for the purpose of this experiment, the test consisted of modified items selected from an array of subscales from the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, Vernon-Allport-Lindzey study of values, and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory personality indicators. The sampling and modifications were aimed at presenting a test varied enough to seem a plausible measure of the domains represented by feedback categories presented later in the study. After completing the test, the participant was led to a laboratory in a different wing of the psychology department where she was greeted by Experimenter 2, who administered the dissonance manipulation. After introducing himself, Experimenter 2 explained that the University's Committee of Plans and Resources was in the process of deciding whether or not to increase and expand services for people with physical disabilities including elevators, parking spaces, wheelchair ramps, and physical therapy equipment and personnel. He further explained that, as this was an important decision, the committee was seeking input from undergraduates. At this point, the experimenter randomly assigned each participant one of the six experimental conditions and varied the cover story and procedure in the following manner: Participants in the no-attitude control condition were told that the survey involved a brief discussion with another participant. The experimenter explained that because the other participant had failed to show up, he would have to cancel the discussion and escort her back to the other study. Participants in the attitude-only control condition were told that the committee was interested in their opinion on the issue and were given an attitude scale (described below). After completing this measure, the participant was escorted back to the personality study. Participants in the remaining four conditions (in which essays were to be written) were told that university committees often find it useful to get students to write brief essays either for or against a particular university action because such essays provide useful information about the issues involved in the decision. The participant was told that because most participants had volunteered to write essays in favor of increasing services for persons with physical disabilities, there was a disproportionate number of essays on one side of the debate. Participants in the low-choice conditions were told: "Therefore, I'm going to have you write an essay against expanding these services." Participants in the high-choice conditions were told: "Therefore, I wonder if you wouldn't mind writing an essay against expanding these services." The experimenter then took a form from a folder labeled "Against" and gave it to the participant. The form instructed the participant to write a strong and convincing essay beginning with the statement, "Princeton University should not increase spending for handicap services because...." Participants were given an envelope preaddressed to the committee chairman. They were instructed to seal the essay inside the envelope when they were finished writing. The experimenter allowed each participant 15 min to complete the essay. To reinforce the choice manipulation, high-choice participants were asked to initial a slip of paper that read "I give my consent voluntarily to write this essay." The experimenter wrote his initials beside those of the participant and placed the slip of paper inside the envelope ostensibly to be read by the committee along with the essay. When the participant completed the essay, she was thanked and escorted back to the personality experiment. At this point Experimenter 1 told all participants the following: As I mentioned before, the computer will present a rather detailed personality profile based upon the dimensions you scored positively on that is, where you scored significantly above the median for college students. But there's good news and bad news. The good news is that you scored in a positive direction on very many dimensions which is a good reflection on you. The bad news is that the computer will produce up to 10 paragraphs of information for each of the significantly positive dimensions. Let's see... the computer came up with 10 dimensions for you. The bad news is that we simply don't have time for you to look at all that material. What we do when this happens is to have you tell me how many paragraphs of feedback you want to see about each dimension. So if you want a lot of detail about a personality dimension, you may want to read more about it than another, you indicate that to me, and I'll have the feedback you want to see come up on the computer for you to read. Dependent Measures Personality feedback. After explaining the need for the participant to select from the available positive feedback, the experimenter gave the 1 The choice to use female participants was practical, not theoretical. During a pilot study that recruited both female and male participants for pay, we were chagrined by the fact that men failed to show up for the study approximately twice as often as women.

4 SELECTIVE SELF-AFFIRMATION 989 participant a computer printout listing 10 personality domains. The domains were: open-mindedness,flexibility,sociability, emotional stability, objectivity, impulsivity, compassion, independence, creativity, organization. The participant was instructed to put a number (from 0 to 10) corresponding to the number of paragraphs she wanted to read about her profile on each dimension. To ensure that the participant understood the rating task, the experimenter explained that if the participant wanted to see more detail about her standing on a particular dimension and the situations in which her high standing was likely to serve her well, she should indicate this with higher numbers and to give lower numbers to dimensions she was less interested in reading about. Thus, participants' feedback preference ratings could range from 0 (no interest) to 10 (high interest). Attitude measures. With the exception of participants in the noessay control condition, all participants were asked to indicate their attitude toward expansion of handicap services at Princeton by expressing agreement or disagreement with the statement, "Princeton University should allocate more funds to improving facilities and services for the handicapped." The 15-point rating scale was anchored by the endpoints 1 (strongly disagree) and 15 (strongly agree). As mentioned earlier, attitude-only control participants received this measure after being briefed about the issue and before selecting the personality feedback. Attitude-first participants received this measure after writing the essays and before selecting the feedback. In this condition of the experiment, before the participant was informed about her performance on the personality test, Experimenter 2 entered the lab, apologized for the interruption, and explained that he had forgotten to have the participant provide some information relevant to the handicap issue but not to be sent to the committee. For attitude-second participants, Experimenter 2's arrival with the attitude measure occurred after they had completed the feedback selection measure. In addition to the attitude measure, all participants who wrote essays made two additional ratings a measure of their perception of the strength of their essay and a measure of how free they felt to decline writing the essay. Both were made on 15-point scales. Results Effect ofdissonance on Attitudes Before examining the effect of dissonance on feedback selection, it is necessary to determine whether dissonance was produced. Essay writers' ratings on the attitude scale were submitted to a 2 (choice: high or low) X 2 (attitude: first or second) analysis of variance (ANOVA), which revealed only a main effect of choice, F( 1,36) = 22.50, p < As Figure 1 shows, high-choice participants induced to write against expansion of services for persons with physical disabilities expressed less agreement with expansion than low-choice participants, thus producing the standard effect of dissonance on attitude change. Correlations suggest that participants' attitudes toward this issue varied as a function of perceived decision freedom, r(40) = -.38, p <.05, rather than the perceived strength of their essays, r(40) = Thus, the manipulation of choice appears to have successfully produced differences in dissonance. Effects of Self-Affirmation on Attitudes Interestingly, attitude order had no impact on attitude ratings. Self-affirmation theory makes a specific prediction here: The way in which threats to self are handled is said to be determined by availability that is, attitude change can offset a High Choice Low Choice Control Attitudes-First 0 Attitudes-Second gj Attitude-Only Figure 1. Means for postattitudes by condition. threat to self if it is made available; alternative self-bolstering can be used (e.g., through bolstering values and personality traits) if that is what is made available (Steele, 1988). In this study, attitude-second participants found they had scored unusually well on the personality test and were asked to select the feedback they desired to peruse. Given the effects reported in several self-affirmation studies, it seemed reasonable to assume that learning that one had scored well on a personality test would bolster the self-image of participants, thereby reducing the dissonance aroused by writing the dissonant essay under high choice. This did not occur. The absence of an interaction shows no support for this hypothesis. Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 1, there was a slight increase in attitude change (though not to a significant degree), suggesting that the feedback selection may have increased dissonance arousal. Apparently, participants displayed the self-discrepancy effect perhaps because they were reminded during feedback selection of the personal standard (compassion) they had violated with their counterattitudinal essay. Despite trying to ignore this domain, being informed of their high compassion score may have affected them nonetheless. It is also conceivable that the feedback selection task was simply too abstract to constitute a genuine self-affirmation. That is, although participants learned that they had scored well on several dimensions, they did not get to examine the feedback, and thus were partially denied the opportunity to bask in its positive implications. Effect of Dissonance on Feedback Selection We hypothesized that the desire to avoid this heightened selfdiscrepancy would make positive feedback in the threatened domain of the self-concept less desirable than positive feedback in an unrelated domain. Thus, when given the opportunity to peruse a wide array of self-relevant positive feedback, individuals faced with a threat to the self-concept would choose different kinds of feedback than nonthreatened individuals. Specifically,

5 990 J. ARONSON, H. BLANTON, AND J. COOPER it was predicted that participants experiencing dissonance during the feedback task (high-choice-attitudes-second) would request less feedback about their compassion than those in the other conditions. Index of feedback desirability. Because we were interested in participants' preference for specific domains relative to others, an index of desirability was computed for each participant by dividing the number of paragraphs requested for each domain by the total number of requested paragraphs. 2 The resulting proportions for each feedback domain were submitted to a 2 X 2 multivariate analysis of variance (MANOYA) which revealed only a significant effect of the choice manipulation, F( 10, 27) = 2.57, p <.03. The lack of an interaction suggests that order failed to moderate the effect of choice. In other words, the dissonance (choice) manipulation affected the feedback desirability ratings even after participants were allowed to reduce their dissonance through attitude change. Univariate ANOVAs were conducted to pinpoint the locus of this effect. Desirability of threat-relevant feedback. To test the effect of dissonance on the desirability of the threat-relevant feedback, the proportion of compassion paragraphs participants requested was submitted to a 2 X 2 ANOVA (as described earlier). The prediction that participants in the high-choice conditions would be less interested in positive feedback about their compassion was confirmed by a significant main effect of choice, F{ 1, 36) = 10.19, p <.01: less compassion feedback was requested by high-choice participants (M = 0.07) than by lowchoice participants (A/ = 0.11). This analysis also yielded a main effect for the presentation order of the dependent measures,^!, 36) = 5.12, p<.05, but protected nests (Carmer& Swanson, 1973) demonstrate that this effect is largely due to the significant difference within the high-choice condition: participants in the attitudes-second condition requested about half as much compassion feedback (M = 0.04) as those in the attitudes-first condition {M = 0.09), ;(36) = 2.60, p <.02. These results suggest that reducing dissonance through attitude change also reduced the aversiveness of the threat-relevant feedback. Indeed, as may be seen in Figure 2, high-choice participants who stated their attitudes before selecting feedback did not differ significantly from low-choice participants in their desire to read compassion feedback (t = 1.50, ns). The interpretation that the compassion feedback was made undesirable by writing the dissonant essay receives further support when the desirability indices of the two control groups are considered. For this analysis, the indices were submitted to a univariate ANOV\, which yielded a significant effect of experimental condition, F(5, 54) = 7.12, p < As Figure 2 shows, control participants tended to show about the same degree of interest in the compassion feedback as low-choice participants. Interestingly, attitude-only participants (who stated their attitude on the handicap issue before selecting feedback) wanted the most compassion feedback, which suggests participants may have selected feedback congruent with their recent behavior. Thus, just as high-choice participants, who presumably felt they had not acted compassionately toward persons with physical disabilities, sought relatively little feedback confirming their compassionate dispositions, attitude-only participants, who presumably felt they had promoted the cause of persons with physical disabilities (M = 14.0, SD = 1.16), sought Attitudes-First Q High Choice Low Choice Control Attitudes-Second gj Attitude-Only g No Attitude Figure 2. Desirability of compassion feedback. considerably more, t(54) - 5.8, p < Consistent with this interpretation, the relationship between stated attitudes toward this issue and the desire to see the compassion feedback suggested that the more participants favored increasing services for persons with physical disabilities (as indicated by questionnaire responses), the more compassion feedback they requested,.34,p<.02. Unrelated Feedback Domains In addition to the predicted differences in desire to see the threatrelevant feedback, several unpredicted differences emerged. 3 A main effect of the choice manipulation indicated that high-choice participants wanted to see less positive feedback about their independence, F( 1, 36) = 9.40, p <.01. As with the compassion feedback, high-choice participants tended to be more interested in the independence feedback when first allowed to reduce dissonance through attitude change (M = 0.09, SD = ) than when they were asked to select feedback directly after writing the dissonant essay (M= 0.04, SD = 0.03), *(36) = 2.32, p <.03. There was also a tendency on the part of high-choice participants to request more feedback from particular feedback domains than low-choice participants. The ANO\A revealed significant main effects for feedback pertaining to both objectivity, F( 1, 36) = 8.48, p <.01, and sociability, F( 1, 36) = 6.21, p <.02. Although the 2 Even though initial analyses revealed that dissonance participants did not select more total paragraphs of feedback from all categories than nondissonance participants (F < 1), there were presumably individual differences that make proportions a more precise measure. 3 Several of the effects to be reported did not attain statistical significance when only the mean number of paragraphs were submitted to analysis that is, when they were not first converted to proportions. This can be attributed to individual differences in the number of total paragraphs requested by each participant (overall mean = 37.58, SD = 14.81). The predicted difference for the compassion feedback, however, did emerge when mean paragraphs were considered, revealing the choice main effect, F( 1, 36) = 7.56, p <.01, and a marginal effect of the order of measure, F( 1, 36) = 3.19, p <.09.

6 SELECTIVE SELF-AFFIRMATION 991 Table 1 Mean Desirability of Feedback Domains (Affected by Dissonance) Condition High choice-attitude first High choice-attitude second Low choice-attitude first Low choice-attitude second No essay-control Attitude-only-control Open-minded M b ! lab 0.09 b 0.11* 0.1l lb SD M b 0.12* b Sociability SD Objectivity M b b b 0.07 b 0.07 b SD Independence M b 0.11, , SD M Total Us Note. Values are proportions of all feedback requested for each domain. Means not sharing a common subscript differ at the.05 level or more. 11 = mean number of paragraphs requested across all 10 domains. SD overall main effect of choice for the domain open-mindedness was not significant (p =.11), high-choice participants in the attitudessecond condition requested more of this feedback than their lowchoice counterparts, f(36) = 2.04, p <.05. Means for those domains significantly affected by the dissonance manipulation are presented in Table 1. No significant dissonance-related differences were found for the following domains: creativity, flexibility, emotional stability, organization, and impulsivity. Thus, high-choice participants apparently sought no more feedback in these unrelated domains than their low-choice and control condition counterparts. 4 Discussion The results of this study demonstrate that attitude change following counterattitudinal behavior is not always attenuated by the opportunity to self-affirm. Participants who freely wrote essays against expanding services for persons with physical disabilities changed their attitudes about these services even when they were first provided with an apparent self-affirmation a list of personality domains on which they had received a high score. Although the dissonance attenuating prediction of selfaffirmation theory was not supported, self-affirmation was still found to be alive and well; the threat to self engendered by a dissonant act led people to engage in self-affirmation activities. One of these activities was attitude change. The other was affirmation of a particular and systematic manner. Consistent with the main hypothesis of this study, participants experiencing dissonance about behaving uncompassionately preferred positive feedback unrelated to their compassion. The relationship between dissonance and desire to see feedback about compassion was indicated not only by the difference between the high- and low-choice groups, but also by the difference between the two high-choice groups; participants allowed to reduce their dissonance by changing their attitudes about funding for persons with physical disabilities thus reducing the threat to their sense of compassion went on to select more feedback relevant to this domain. The parallel result with the independence feedback, however, was not predicted. One possibility is that the dissonant situation, in addition to threatening participants' sense of compassion, also posed a threat to their sense of independence. Being coaxed into arguing a position they did not support, and led to believe that in so doing they could be helping to bring about an unwanted consequence not improving conditions for persons with physical disabilities could have led participants to feel they had not behaved as independently as they would have liked. Also intriguing were the particular domains from which high-dissonance participants requested more feedback than low-dissonance participants. Although the preference for sociability feedback fits with the general expectation that threatened participants would show interest in unrelated feedback, there appeared also to be a trend toward selecting feedback from domains that could conceivably justify the decision to write the essay namely, open-mindedness and objectivity domains in which low-choice and control participants expressed relatively little interest, or that became less desirable to high-choice participants if they were allowed to change their attitudes before selecting the feedback. The preference for the behavior-congruent feedback (i.e., objectivity and open-mindedness) makes intuitive sense given the nature of the dissonance manipulation. Further, it is consistent with work demonstrating that dissonance motivation reflects a desire to lower the aversiveness of counterattitudinal behavior (Cooper & Fazio, 1984) or to reduce the threat to global selfesteem (Steele, 1988; Tesser & Cornell, 1991). Dissonance participants selected feedback in ways that not only distanced them from the violated self-standard but also that affirmed them along dimensions that could provide justification for their counterattitudinal behavior. These two affirmational strategies not only counteract an aversive action but also serve to cast the self in a favorable light by putting a positive spin on the aversive behavior. Nonetheless, because these specific differences were not predicted a priori, the possibility that the preferences occurred for artifactual reasons cannot be ruled out entirely. To lend support to the interpretation that the observed pref- 4 Clearly, this does not imply a lack of interest in these categories of feedback. Indeed, inspection of the means in Tables 1 and 2 suggests that high-choice participants were more interested in some domains of what might be called "irrelevant feedback" (e.g., creativity) than they were in what will be referred to shortly as "decision-congruent feedback" (e.g., objectivity). What this does imply is that these domains inspired no particular interest above and beyond a baseline level expressed by the average participants given the same feedback choices.

7 992 J. ARONSON, H. BLANTON, AND J. COOPER erence for objectivity and open-mindedness feedback may have been due to their potential to justify the decision to write the essay, follow-up data were collected from an additional 20 participants. A questionnaire was developed using the self-concept domains presented to participants in the main study. After reading a description of the handicap issue, participants indicated how likely they would be to write an essay taking the position opposed to increasing services for persons with physical disabilities. They then completed 10 items asking them to indicate for each of the personality domains how a plea to remain true to each of the traits (i.e., to be compassionate) would affect their decision to write an essay arguing against an increase in services for the handicapped. Each rating was made on a 15-point scale anchored by the endpoints 1 (much less likely) and 15 (much more likely), and the midpoint (wouldn 't make a difference). Participants' ratings for each of the 10 traits were rank ordered in terms of its effect on their decision. These rankings were submitted to a Friedman ANOVA by ranks. The resulting X 2 was highly significant, x 2 (9) = , p < Consistent with the above interpretation, participants agreed that they would be less likely to write the essay if urged to be compassionate (M = 2.05, SD = 1.14) or independent (M = 3.65, SD = 0.31) whereas they predicted they would be much more likely to agree to write the essay if called on to be open-minded (M = 10.35, SD = 1.14) or objective (M = 9.80, SD = 1.54). Their responses indicated that the remaining pleas would not have affected their decision either way. These results support our contention that high-choice participants in the main study may have in fact avoided the compassion and independence feedback because such qualities were seen to be inconsistent with the decision to write the essay. Furthermore, the results shed light on the relative attractiveness of the open-mindedness and objectivity feedback for these participants as well; the decision to write the essay is apparently facilitated by these values. The finding for only one of the dimensions did not replicate in this study. Participants did not predict that an appeal to their sociability would increase their willingness to write the essay. Perhaps sociability produced multiple interpretations in this context, with some participants reading it as a plea to comply with the experimenter, and others as a call to advance a "social" cause helping persons with physical disabilities. Nevertheless, the overall pattern of results lends support to our interpretation that feedback selection served as a means of self-justification. Thisfindingsuggests a new dimension to selfaffirmation processes, namely, that self-image threat may prompt complex, creative recruitment and use of one's self-esteem resources. Beyond the centrality and positivity of a given resource, individuals apparently give consideration to how well the self-conception makes them feel rational, even righteous. One obvious question is whether the observed selectivity in requesting feedback has implications for the self-image. What could follow from a selective use of one's resources and standards as self affirmations? Various theorists have suggested that an effective means of coping with a threat to a particular selfconception is to reduce its importance to the overall self (e.g., James, 1890; Steele, 1990). For example, Tesser and Campbell (1983) showed that when individuals are outperformed by a close other on a test of skill, they can protect themselves from this unflattering comparison by "de-identifying" or "disidentifying" (Steele, 1990, 1992) that is, by reducing the importance of the skill to their self-definitions. The results of Study 1 raised the possibility that a process of devaluation could occur for such moral standards as compassion when those standards are violated and easy routes of rationalization (i.e., attitude change) are lacking. Moreover, it suggested that such conditions could lead to increased identification with self dimensions that either offset or justify the self-threatening behavior. Study 2 explored this possibility by measuring the impact of dissonance behavior on self-concept ratings. Study 2 In Study 2 we sought to conceptually replicate the effect of dissonance arousal on self-affirmational selectivity and to show how such selectivity could modify the self-concept. Overview Method The procedure used to arouse dissonance was similar to that of Study 1. Participants wrote opinion essays against a proposed increase in services for students with physical disabilities. In the present study, however, the dissonance manipulation was bolstered by varying whether or not participants thought the essays could bring about an "aversive consequence," a perception thought to be necessary for induced compliance to result in dissonance (Scher & Cooper, 1989). To this end, highdissonance participants were asked to write an essay under high-choice conditions and were informed their essays would be used to help the university make its decision (thus, an exact replication of the highchoice condition of Study 1). Low-dissonance participants received low-choice instructions and were led to believe the essay would have no impact on university policy. After writing their essays, participants were dismissed and led to a presumably unrelated experiment where they completed several self-evaluation measures. As in Study 1, half of the participants were given attitude change measures before filling out the self-evaluation measures, and half completed the measures afterwards. Thus, the manipulation of dissonance and dependent-measure order yielded a 2 X 2 factorial design containing the following conditions: (a) dissonance-attitudesfirst, (b) dissonance-attitudes second, (c) low dissonance-attitudesfirst,and (d) low dissonance-attitudes second. Procedure Participants were 63 female Stanford University undergraduates who participated in the study as part of the Introductory Psychology curriculum. Responses from 3 participants were excluded from analysis due to suspicions about the experiment. On arrival at the laboratory, participants were greeted by two male experimenters who stated that, due to the brevity of each of their experiments, they were sharing a time slot a common practice when using the Introductory Psychology participant pool. One of the experimenters departed, leaving the subject with Experimenter 1, who delivered the dissonance manipulation. The participant was then given the same rationale for writing the counterattitudinal essay that was given in Study 1. However, half of the participants (low dissonance) were told that the committee had already made its decision but was interested in soliciting essays "for purposes of comparison" with essays they had already received in order to evaluate the practice of using solicited essays to help them inform future committee decisions. On completion of the essay, participants were directed to the office of Experimenter 2 on another floor and wing of the Psychology depart-

8 SELECTIVE SELF-AFFIRMATION 993 ment. Half of the participants (attitudes-first condition) completed attitude change measures before leaving the "first" experiment; the remaining participants (attitudes-second condition) were given these measures after havingfilledout the self-evaluation measures for Experimenter 2. (As in Study 1, the introduction of the attitude measures were presented as an oversight by the experimenter running the opinion survey, who apologized for interrupting the second experiment.) Experimenter 2 explained that in order to preselect participants for future experiments, he was having people complete a questionnaire. After this explanation, he gave the participants the self-ratings questionnaire. Dependent Measures Personal attributes scale. Participants were asked to make two ratings for each of 10 personal characteristics, an evaluation measure, and an identification measure. The evaluation measure asked for a numerical rating on each trait (i.e., "how studious are you?"). The second rating asked them to indicate the extent to which they were defined by each trait (i.e., "to what extent is your studiousness important to you, that is, how much does it make you who you are?"). Ratings were made on 15-point scales with the endpoints labeled 1 (not at all) and 15 (extremely). The list of dimensions was modified in this study to reduce some redundancy of the former list (i.e., objectivity and openmindedness) and to include a few areas of greater personal importance to college undergraduates and thus provide participants with a better opportunity to affirm themselves (e.g., studious, physical attractiveness, and social sensitivity). The list was comprised of the following dimensions: social sensitivity, compassion, intelligence, physical attractiveness, independence, objectivity, creativity, outgoing/sociable, honesty/ morality, and studious/diligent. All participants received the ratings in the order just presented. Because there is a tendency for people to see themselves as superior to others on most positive attributes (Brown, 1986), the threat was expected to show its effects primarily upon the identification measure, which is presumably less prone to such positivity bias. Self-esteem scale. After completing the personal attributes scale, participants completed a 10-item measure of self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965), included to measure any postmanipulation changes in global self-evaluation. Results Effect ofdissonance on Attitudes To establish the success of the dissonance manipulation, participants' responses on the attitude measure were submitted to a 2 (dissonance: high or low) X 2 (attitude order:firstor second) ANOVA, which yielded only a main effect of choice, F( 1,56) = 34.32, p < In line with dissonance predictions, there was less support for services for persons with physical disabilities expressed by high-dissonance participants in the attitudes-first condition (M = 10.00, SD = 2.73) than by their low-dissonance counterparts (M = 13.4, SD = 1.45). As in Study 1, no significant effects were found for either attitude order or its interaction with the dissonance manipulation. High-dissonance participants in the attitudes-second condition persisted in their attitude change despite the affirmation task (M = 9.27, SD = 1.87). The mean for the low-dissonance/attitudes-second participants was (&D = 2.29). That the self-evaluation procedure failed to reduce attitude change is perhaps even more noteworthy in the current study than thefirstexperiment. Participants were given an additional measure of self-esteem, which, in addition to the personal attri- butes questionnaire, was expected to reduce dissonance by reminding participants of important self-esteem resources (see Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993). Although this does conflict with Steele et al.'s (1993) results, two important procedural differences should be noted. First, participants in their study were selected for having high or low self-esteem whereas our participants were not. Therefore, some of our participants presumably those with moderate or low self-esteem may not have found the self-reflective nature of the self-rating task particularly affirming, thus creating within-group variance and dampening the self-affirmation effect. The correlation between participants' self-esteem and their postattitude toward funding for persons with physical disabilities in the high-dissonance-attitudes-second condition was.20, suggesting a modest (though nonsignificant) tendency for higher self-esteem participants to exhibit less rationalization following self-focus. The second procedural difference involves the magnitude of the self-threat. Steele et al. (1993) used a free-choice paradigm in which participants had to contend with the dissonance aroused by choosing between closely evaluated record albums a rather mild threat to their self-image as a competent decision maker. By contrast, writing an essay that could contribute to an unsympathetic university decision is a far stronger threat and may require a more involved or potent affirmation to reduce its impact. Both of these factors in addition to the presence of the violated standard on the self-ratings questionnaire may account for why the self-discrepancy effect prevailed in this study. Trait Ratings Participants' ratings on the 10 traits were analyzed by means of a 2 (dissonance) X 2 (attitude order) MANOV\. As expected, the dissonance manipulation did not result in differences in self-ratings on any of the traits. Identification Ratings Participants' ratings of how self-defining they considered each of the traits were submitted to a 2 (dissonance) X 2 (order) MANOVA. This revealed a marginally significant effect for the interaction of dissonance and order, F( 10,47) = 2.05, p <.08. Because our hypothesis predicted significant interactions on only three of 10 dependent variables (i.e., compassion, objectivity, and independence) a more liberal criterion justifies further inspection at the univariate level. The means of the importance ratings are presented in Table 2. As predicted, a significant interaction was found for the importance ratings of compassion, F( 1, 56) = 4.45, p <.04, and objectivity, F( 1, 56) = 11.28, p <.001. No significant interaction was found for any of the remaining dimensions or for the self-esteem measure (all Fs < 1). Given the comparable finding in the previous study, it is surprising that no effect of dissonance was observed for the independence domain, which was presumably threatened by agreeing to write the essay. The reasons for this are unclear, but may lie in the difference between the prospect of receiving clearly dissonant positive feedback (Study 1) and the identification measures of the present study. It is un-

9 994 J. ARONSON, H. BLANTON, AND J. COOPER Table 2 Mean Change in Identification Ratings Compassion Attribute Objectivity Condition M SD M SD Dissonance/attitude second Dissonance/attitude first No dissonance/attitude second No dissonance/attitude first ** 12.41** 12.52** * * Note. Higher values indicate greater identification with the attribute. Means with asterisks differ significantly from the dissonance-attitudesecond condition. *p<.05. **p<.01. doubtedly easier to moderate a desire for feedback than it is to change an attitude about the self. An examination of the cell means in Table 2 shows the nature of the two significant interactions. As predicted, dissonance participants not given the opportunity to reduce dissonance by means of attitude change (high dissonance-attitude second) tended to reduce the importance of compassion to their selfdefinition and simultaneously inflate the importance of objectivity. To test for the significance of the observed pattern, we compared the high-dissonance/attitude-second cell to all other cells using protected t tests. As predicted, participants in this condition rated compassion as significantly less important than participants in the other three conditions. When compared to the high-dissonance-attitude-first and low-dissonance-attitudesecond condition, these same participants rated objectivity as significantly more important. This group did not, however, differ significantly from the high-dissonance-attitude-first condition. These results suggest that participants in the dissonance condition, presumably to protect a sense of global self-worth (Steele, 1988), felt pressure to distance themselves from their conception of themselves as compassionate. Paradoxically, this strategy of self-esteem maintenance requires that participants distance themselves from a normatively positive characterization (i.e., compassion). At the same time, participants compensated for this distancing by boosting their identification with objectivity. General Discussion Individuals experiencing dissonance attempted to use self-esteem resources selectively. Specifically, participants appeared to avoid the affirmation most relevant to the threatened domain of their self-concepts while seeking out less related ones. In both studies, participants forwent an affirmation that directly contradicted a dissonance-arousing behavior, either by eschewing information related to their compassion or by downplaying its importance to self-concept. Instead, they chose to increase interest in, or identification with, "decision-congruent" aspects of the self (e.g., objectivity), suggesting that self-image resources may be enlisted in an attempt to rationalize self-image threatening behaviors as well as merely counterbalance them (cf. Steele & Liu, 1983). To date, self-affirmation research has concerned itself with showing that self-esteem maintenance underlies dissonance phenomena. The strategy thus far has involved reminding participants, either before or after inducing dissonance, of an important self-esteem resource (e.g., Steele & Liu, 1983; Steele, Hopp, & Gonzales, 1986 [ as cited in Steele, 1988 ]) or a potential pool of resources (Steele et al., 1993) and then providing a standard measure of dissonance reduction. Although providing compelling support for a reinterpretation of dissonance effects, this method cannot address what we believe to be an important feature of the self-affirmation process how individuals decide which resources they will draw from and which ones they will not. Self-affirmation theory (especially Steele, 1988) suggests the main considerations in selecting an affirmational resource should be its positivity and its importance or centrality to the self. The results of these studies show how each of these considerations may depend on the situation: whether a particular selfconception was enlisted as a resource depended on its relation to the self-threatening behavior on the implications of such an affirmation in the context of the dissonant behavior. For example, participants in Study 1 avoided the compassion feedback, we believe, because the inconsistency between the high compassion score and their decision to write the essay, in effect, turned the feedback into an indictment: "If I'm so compassionate, why did I agree to write such a hardnosed essay?" Given the choice to affirm other self-domains particularly those which recast self-image threatening behavior in a more noble light it is understandable that participants forwent additional focus upon this relevant feedback. The decision to enlist a given resource appears to depend on more than its positivity or centrality to the self. It depends on its potential to put a positive spin on behavior as it occurred in a particular situation. Interestingly, the results of both studies suggest that such selective self-affirmations may not always "work," in the sense of obviating the need for rationalization. Contrary to self-affirmation predictions, in neither of the studies did the affirmation measures the feedback selection task or the self-ratings ultimately lead to reduced attitude change about the issue of services for students with physical disabilities. Indeed, they appeared to have the opposite effect of increasing rationalization. Why did attitude change survive an apparent affirmation? Two possibilities strike us as most plausible. First, even though participants chose not to peruse the compassion feedback, knowing they had scored high on this dimension invoked the behavioral standard to be compassionate, thus keeping the level of dissonance about their uncompassionate behavior high. This is the self-discrepancy effect we believe accounts for the results in many self-awareness studies (e.g., Federoff & Harvey, 1976; Greenberg & Musham, 1981) and that we believe motivated the selective attempts at self-affirmation observed in the present studies. Alternatively, it is possible that the feedback selection and the self-ratings did indeed reduce participants' psychological discomfort about violating their standard of compassion, but because the self-affirmation also provided them with a basis for regarding their uncompassionate behavior as an objective

10 SELECTIVE SELF-AFFIRMATION 995 and, therefore, noble act it also provided a justification for attitude change. Correlating final attitude change with the amount of feedback about objectivity and open-mindedness in Study 1, and identification with objectivity in Study 2, supports the first explanation. The more participants in the high-dissonance-attitudes-second conditions embraced objectivity and open-mindedness, the less they went on to change their attitudes in the direction of their essays. 5 It appears, then, that participants changed their attitudes because the affirmations failed to reduce their discomfort. On the face of it, this would appear to present a problem for self-affirmation theory, which would have predicted that participants would have forgone rationalization if given the opportunity to bolster their self-images. That they persisted in their attitude change despite learning about their high personality scores in Study 1 is especially puzzling in this regard. One would think that because the bulk of feedback portrayed the participant as a fine and worthwhile individual, the violated standard would not loom so large if consistency was secondary to overall self-worth, as self-affirmation theory maintains. Yet the results suggest otherwise. How can we reconcile the present results with thefindingsin support of self-affirmation effects? In addition to the previously noted methodological differences between the present studies and those of Steele and his colleagues (e.g., 1980), we should add the following. In most studies supporting self-affirmation theory, participants are affirmed on dimensions they indicated to be of high personal importance (i.e., a central value). In contrast to these tailor-made versions, our "off-the-rack" affirmations may have lacked the potency necessary to reduce the presumably considerable dissonance participants were experiencing. Clearly, not all affirmations are created equal, but exactly what this implies about the underlying nature of dissonance motivation whether it stems from perceived inconsistency or from threatened self-integrity cannot be determined by the results of this study. We agree with Steele et al.'s (1993) contention that self-affirmation by means of focus on self-esteem resources is not necessarily thefirst response to self-threat. We would add that it may not always be the most effective response either. The present studies suggest that at least under some conditions, rationalization by means of attitude change may be the easiest and most effective way to ease psychological discomfort. When we allowed participants this opportunity, they appeared to feel no need to reevaluate themselves. But certainly, such easy routes of rationalization are not always open to us. Rationalizations, no matter how effectively they might buffer us from self-esteem threats, are nonetheless constrained by facts (cf. Kunda, 1987). It is in such cases that we may see an important aspect of ego-protective processes that have not been made clear in either the dissonance or the selfaffirmation literature: Rationalization and self-affirmation (i.e., self bolstering and disidentification) are not mutually exclusive protective mechanisms; they can occur simultaneously. When a direct route of rationalization (i.e., the attitude measure) was not made available, our participants attempted to reduce their dissonance by modifying their self-views. And when they were subsequently given the opportunity to rationalize, they did that, too. We believe this has important implications. For example, dissonance theory has often been used to explain why an initial behavior is often followed by another behavior of the same kind why, for example, "violence begets violence." Such explanations have typically focused on postdissonance attitudes about the victim: after an initial harmful act, further acts of cruelty become easier because we convince ourselves that our victim deserves abuse (e.g., Davis & Jones, 1960; Glass, 1964). We believe this may tell but half of the story. In many cases in real life, we suspect, individuals will use multiple routes of selfaffirmation, as did one group of our participants who not only changed their attitudes about the issue of services for persons with physical disabilities, but changed relevant attitudes about themselves as well. This suggests that another reason why violence begets violence is that through such processes as disidentification, the actor begins not only to see the victim as deserving of harm but, simultaneously, begins to see him or herself as someone capable of harming. Thus, dissonance can motivate individuals not only to make excuses for their behavior, butgiven certain circumstances to incorporate these excuses into the self-image. Although the changes we observed are undoubtedly minor revisions of what Markus and her colleagues call "the working self-concept" (Markus & Kunda, 1986; Markus & Wurf, 1987), one can imagine deeper levels of disidentification and bolstering in the face of self-threats larger or more chronic than those faced in the psychology laboratory. One can also imagine a cumulative effect, such that changes in the working self-concept spur corresponding changes in behavior which, in turn, reinforce this modified view of the self (e.g., Brown & Smart, 1991; Fazio, Effrein, & Falender, 1981). Having pointed out the potentially lasting effects of selfaffirmation on the self-concept, we should also note that the example of an individual devaluing compassion following uncompassionate behavior, and violence begetting violence paints a rather dim portrait of disidentification. Yet the same process we have outlined can lead to changes of a kinder nature. When, for example, we learn over the years to put decreasing stock in others' negative evaluations of us, or to forgive ourselves for incompetence in a domain, is not such "disidentification" but another name for growth? 5 The correlations were.38,.25, and.56, respectively. References Aronson, E. (1968). Dissonance theory: Progress and problems. In R. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. McGuire, T. Newcomb, M. Rosenberg, & P. Tannenbaum (Eds.), Theories ofcognitive consistency: A sourcebook (pp. 5-27). Chicago: Rand McNally. Baumeister, R. F., & Jones, E. E. (1978). 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