IMAGINING THE FUTURE AND PREDICTING EMOTIONS: THE INFLUENCE OF IMAGERY PERSPECTIVE ON ANTICIPATED EMOTIONS DISSERTATION

Transcription

1 IMAGINING THE FUTURE AND PREDICTING EMOTIONS: THE INFLUENCE OF IMAGERY PERSPECTIVE ON ANTICIPATED EMOTIONS DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Karen A. Hines Graduate Program in Psychology The Ohio State University 2014 Dissertation Committee: Professor Lisa K. Libby, Advisor Professor Russell H. Fazio Professor Kentaro Fujita

2 Copyrighted by Karen A. Hines 2014

3 ABSTRACT When people make decisions about the future, they often rely on how they anticipate they will feel to guide their decisions. What factors guide how people arrive at these predictions about how they will feel? One factor which may influence anticipated emotions is imagery perspective. People often picture future events, and they can picture them from a first or third-person perspective. Chapter 1 discusses an imagery perspective model and applies the model to explain how imagery perspective influences anticipated emotions. In this chapter, we make the argument that imagery perspective influences the cognitive style of processing an event. This processing style affects the subjective meaning of the event, which influences anticipated emotions. Specifically, using a first-person perspective causes people to use bottom-up processing, relying on the associations evoked by the concrete features of the event. In contrast, using a third-person perspective causes people to use top-down processing, integrating the event into its broader context. Therefore, if an event is more meaningful in terms of its broader context than its concrete features, picturing the event from a third-person perspective should produce a greater anticipated emotional impact of the event. Chapter 2 presents two studies which demonstrate that if an event is more meaningful in terms of its broader context than its concrete features, picturing the event from a third-person perspective should produce a greater anticipated emotional impact of ii

4 the event. Chapter 3 involves one study which replicates the findings from Studies 1a and 1b, and it also shows that when the meaningfulness of the broader context is removed, those who use a first versus third-person do not differ in their anticipated emotional reactions. Chapter 4 further broadens the predictions of the current model in terms of the influence of imagery perspective on emotion. In this chapter, we examine various aspects of events that might influence the relationship between imagery perspective and emotion, and we also examine how the current model predicts that imagery perspective should influence different types of emotional reports and judgments. iii

5 DEDICATION For my supportive, wonderful parents iv

6 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my dissertation committee members, Russ Fazio and Ken Fujita, for serving on my committee and for all of the helpful feedback they have provided throughout the duration of this project. I would also like to thank the members of the Social Cognition Research Group for providing feedback and asking questions which have shaped the evolution of the project. Several members of the SuPeR Lab deserve recognition for their input, from helping with minuscule study decisions to interpreting the bigger picture. These members include Eric Shaeffer, Alison Pfent, Geoff Kaufman, Tiffany Hardy, Karen MacGregor, Greta Valenti, Janet Rha, Jessica Rea, Micah Goldfarb, Deborah Holoien, Courtney Hsing, and Zach Niese. I would like to extend special thanks to Jessica Rea, who has become my sounding board for ideas, Janet Rha, who has kept me sane throughout the project, and Greta Valenti, who served as a mentor and a great friend throughout my time in grad school. Finally, I would like to thank my advisor, Lisa Libby. I have been repeatedly awed by her ability to provide clarity when faced with complex problems, and I cannot describe the extent to which she has contributed to my understanding of this project and social psychology, generally. I have truly enjoyed working with Lisa over the past several years. v

7 VITA February 19, Born St. Louis, MO B.A. Psychology, B.S. Business Administration, University of Missouri M.A. Psychology, The Ohio State University 2008 to Graduate Student, Department of Psychology, The Ohio State University Publications 1. Libby, L. K., Valenti, G., Hines, K. A., & Eibach, R. P. (in press). Using Imagery Perspective to Access Two Distinct Forms of Self-Knowledge: Associative Evaluations Versus Propositional Self-Beliefs. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. Fields of Study Major Field: Psychology vi

8 TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract... ii Dedication... iv Acknowledgments... v Vita... vi Table of Contents... vii List of Tables... viii List of Figures... ix Chapter 1: Introduction... 1 Chapter 2: Studies 1a and 1b Chapter 3: Study Chapter 4: General Discussion References vii

9 LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Means on measures of anticipated happiness. Across wins and losses in Study 1a and 1b, time had a significant effect on anticipated happiness such that anticipated happiness returned to baseline over time ( t s > 5.20, p s <.01). In both studies for losses only, anticipated happiness returned to baseline more quickly among those who used a third-person (versus first-person) perspective (t s > 2.48, p s <.02) Table 2: Anticipated happiness when thinking about the game one and three days after the game viii

10 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Participants anticipated a greater emotional impact of a football game if they pictured the game from a third-person (versus first-person) perspective Figure 2: Participants anticipated a greater emotional impact of a football game if they pictured the game from a third-person (versus first-person) perspective Figure 3: Participants anticipated a greater emotional impact of a football game when they pictured it from a third-person (versus first-person) perspective Figure 4: When the broader context was meaningful, participants anticipated feeling more unhappy about a loss when they pictured it from a third-person (versus first-person) perspective. When the broader context was meaningless, those who pictured the game from a third-person perspective did not differ in their levels of happiness compared to those who used a first-person perspective Figure 5: Distances of the conceptual and experiential facets of the self ix

11 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION People are constantly faced with decisions that will have bearing on how they will feel in the future, and they often anticipate how they will feel in the future and use their anticipated emotions to help them make decisions (Gilbert & Wilson, 2009; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Mellers, 2000). Therefore, how people arrive at their anticipated emotions is relevant for predicting behavior. For example, Tim may question whether he should RSVP yes to his sister Kris s upcoming party. To help him make his decision, he might try to predict how he would feel if he went to the party. Would he predict that he would feel happy, having good conversations with friends? Maybe he predicts that he would feel stressed out, sensing that he should be working on his term paper instead. Or, he might predict that he would feel bored, wishing that he was being entertained by Law and Order SVU instead of his out-of-touch ex-classmate from high school. These anticipated emotions might dictate his decision about his RSVP. Likewise, Theresa might be attempting to decide whether to invest in paying for a specific cable sports channel so that she can watch her college alma mater s football games. She might consider how she ll feel if she is able to watch the games and keep up with how the team s doing versus how she ll feel if she doesn t have the channel, and these predictions of emotional impact might influence her behavior. Considering that predicted emotions do play a role in determining behavior, how do people make these emotional predictions? 1

12 Imagery Perspective One phenomenon which may come into play when anticipating emotions associated with events is mental simulations of those events. Often people mentally simulate future events, or imagine the events happening in their minds (Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009), and various aspects of these mental simulations may influence their anticipated emotions. Imagery is one common component of mental simulations, and one important aspect of imagery is visual perspective: when people use visual imagery they picture events from either a first-person perspective, seeing the event through their own eyes, or a third-person perspective, seeing the event from an observer s perspective (Nigro & Neisser, 1983). Based on previous research which suggests that people process events differently from a first-person versus third-person perspective, we predict that the perspective that people take to picture potential future events will influence their anticipated emotions resulting from those events. For example, when Tim is thinking about whether or not he should RSVP yes to Kris s party, he might imagine attending the party in his mind s eye. He might picture the party from a first-person perspective, picturing the party through his own eyes as if he was experiencing the party from his own visual perspective, or he might picture the party from a third-person perspective, picturing himself attending the party from the visual point of view that an observer would have. The perspective he takes to picture the party could influence his predicted emotional reactions to the party. Imagery perspective and cognitive processing styles. Why might imagery perspective influence anticipated emotions? Even when picturing the same event, people 2

13 can use different processes to try to understand the event which may therefore influence their perceptions of the subjective meaning of the event. One model suggests that imagery perspective is one factor that influences the cognitive processing style that people adopt (Libby & Eibach, 2011). According to this model, when using a firstperson perspective, people process events bottom-up, using associations evoked by the concrete features of the events to make meaning of the events. Therefore, details relevant to the experience of the event come to mind, activating concepts that are closely associated with these concrete details. When using bottom-up processing to make sense of events, examples of information that would become salient include sensory information from the experience (e.g. sights, sounds, smells, other physical sensations) as well as information associated with contents of the event (e.g. automatically-activated attitudes towards objects, people, or occurrences in the event). For example, if Tim uses bottom-up processing to make meaning of the event of going to Kris s party, he might construe the party as an event involving loud music, at which he ll be hot from all of the people in the same place and he ll talk to his friend Hao. Highly accessible concepts that are associated with these features of the event will be activated, such that other concepts he might associate with the party include Katie, Hao s wife, and automatically-activated evaluations of attitude objects such as being hot: dislike and Hao: like. When using a third-person perspective, people process events top-down, integrating the event into broader contextual frameworks by using propositional logic. In this case, abstract information related to the event shapes the way the event is perceived. Broader contextual information is salient and the event is incorporated into this pre-existing 3

14 framework. When using top-down processing to make sense of events, examples of information that would become salient include the causes (short-term or long-term) and consequences (short-term or long-term) of the event, the broader meaning of the event in one s life, or explicit evaluations of objects, people (including oneself), or occurrences in the event. For example, if Tim is using top-down processing to make meaning of Kris s party, concepts that might come to mind could include the consequences of going or not going (e.g. if he goes the party he will be set back in his schoolwork, if he doesn t go to the party then Kris might be angry at him, he might miss out on something meaningful that could happen at the party) or thoughts about people or objects relevant to the party, including himself (he has a strong social network, he s an extravert, socializing at parties is healthy). The differences in cognitive processing styles produced by first versus thirdperson perspective can lead to different construals of the event with different understanding of the event s subjective meaning. For example, if Tim pictures attending the party from a first-person perspective, he might construe the event as talking to friends and having a good time, and the subjective meaning of the event will stem from his experience at the party. However, if he pictures attending the party from a third-person perspective, he might construe the event as putting off schoolwork. The subjective meaning of the event will stem from the consequences of attending the party. Because imagery perspective has an influence on perceptions of an event s subjective meaning, the visual perspective taken to picture an event can have important consequences for judgment, emotion, and self-insight (Libby & Eibach, 2011). 4

15 Evidence for the influence of visual perspective on processing styles. Previous research provides evidence for the suggested influence of visual perspective on processing styles. People tend to describe events more abstractly after picturing them from a third-person (versus first-person) perspective, suggesting that those who use a third-person perspective integrate the events into a broader context more so than those who use a first-person perspective (Libby, Shaeffer, & Eibach, 2009). Evidence that this difference in event understanding stems from a difference in processing styles comes from a series of experiments in which participants chose more abstract descriptions of events after being primed with photographs depicting actions from a third-person (versus first-person) perspective. The events depicted in the photographs were unrelated to the events that participants described, suggesting that imagery perspective actually influences the style of processing that people use, and the style of processing evoked by the perspective used to picture or view one event can carry over to subsequent unrelated tasks (Shaeffer, Eibach, & Libby, under review). Additional research helps to clarify exactly what type of processing differences occur as a result of using either perspective. One study showed that contextual information related to an event (whether someone who cheated on an exam recently went through a break-up or recently bought a new TV) influenced moral judgments about the cheating behavior only when participants pictured the event from a third-person (not firstperson) perspective (MacGregor & Valenti, manuscript in prep). In another set of studies participants made judgments about future feelings and behavior. Participants associations evoked by the concrete features of the events influenced their judgments 5

16 more when they used a first-person (versus third-person) perspective, and their propositional beliefs influenced their judgments more when they used a third-person (versus first-person) perspective (Libby, Valenti, Hines, & Eibach, in press). For example, in one study participants pictured voting in an upcoming United States Presidential election and made forecasts about which candidate they were likely to vote for. Participants also completed a personalized candidate IAT to measure their associative evaluations of the candidates, which involve more bottom-up processing, and they completed explicit measures about their beliefs and feelings about the candidates to measure their propositional self-beliefs, which involve more top-down processing. Participants associative evaluations influenced their forecasted voting behavior more when they used a first-person (versus third-person) perspective, and their propositional self-beliefs influenced their forecasted voting behavior more when they used a thirdperson (versus first-person) perspective (Libby et al., in press). The Influence of Imagery Perspective on Anticipated Emotions The current studies explore the influence of visual perspective on anticipated emotions. The first-person perspective causes people to process events bottom-up, while the third-person perspective causes people process events top-down. These different processing styles can change the subjective meaning of events, which could lead to different emotional responses. Therefore, the more subjectively meaningful an event seems when the event is processed bottom-up, the greater the anticipated emotion following from the event will be when a first-person perspective is used to picture the event. Likewise, the more subjectively meaningful an event seems when the event is 6

17 processed top-down, the greater the anticipated emotion following from the event will be when a third-person perspective is used to picture the event. According to alternative accounts of imagery perspective s function, first-person imagery is necessarily more emotional than third-person imagery (Kenny et al., 2009, McIsaac & Eich, 2004, Williams & Moulds, 2007). However, we believe that using a third-person perspective should lead to greater anticipated emotion in cases in which an event is more subjectively meaningful when it is processed top-down versus bottom-up. Because this is the case that distinguishes our account, the current studies involve events which are more meaningful when they are processed top-down versus bottom-up. Specifically, the events considered in the current studies are Big Ten football games being viewed on television. Processing the event of watching a Big Ten football game on television bottom-up leads people to consider the concrete features of watching the game (e.g. where they would watch the game and what they would actually view) and any concepts associated with these features (e.g. win is good, loss is bad). The subjective meaning of the game lies in the details of the experience. However, integrating a game into its broader context should heighten the emotional meaning of the game s outcome. In this case, aspects of the broader context include expectations of how the team should perform as well as consequences of winning or losing. For a highly-ranked team in the college football system, winning every game is necessary to keep the team at its current rank and to keep the team in the running to play in a strong bowl game or the National Championship game. Therefore, winning will keep the team at its current level, whereas a loss is devastating. Because these football games seem more emotionally meaningful 7

18 in terms of their broader implications versus the concrete features of watching a game on television, we expect that fans who picture watching the game on television from the third-person perspective will anticipate a greater emotional reaction to the game s outcome than those who use a first-person perspective. In addition, because losses have such a devastating impact on the team s season in general, we expect that those who use a third-person perspective will predict having a particularly strong emotional response to losses. We tested the hypothesis that using a third-person perspective to picture watching a football game would produce a greater anticipated emotional reaction to the game s outcome with two different samples and two different football games. We claim that in these studies, participants anticipate greater emotional reactions when they use a thirdperson (versus first-person) perspective because they ascribe more meaning to the game when they process it top-down, considering its broader causes and consequences (which have more meaning than the associations evoked by concrete features of watching the game on television). In the third study we intend to show that if we remove the potential for the game to be subjectively meaningful, even when integrating the event into its broader context, then those who use a third-person (versus first-person) perspective should not anticipate greater emotional reactions. Overview of the present research In Studies 1a and 1b we manipulated the perspective that Ohio State University students took to picture watching an upcoming OSU football game. They then completed measures of anticipated emotion (anticipated happiness at game end if OSU won or if 8

19 OSU lost). According to the current model, those who use a third-person perspective should integrate the football game into its broader context, considering the consequences of the outcome, while those who use a first-person perspective should rely on associations evoked by the concrete features of the game. Because the consequences of the game are more meaningful than the associations evoked by concrete features of the watching the game, we predict that those who use a third-person perspective will construe the game as more subjectively meaningful and therefore anticipate a greater emotional impact of the outcome of the game than those who use a first-person perspective. In addition, because the consequences of the game are particularly devastating for losses, we expect that the effect of perspective on anticipated emotions may be stronger for losses than for wins. In Study 2, in addition to manipulating perspective, we manipulated the meaningfulness of the broader context of a hypothetical football game. Participants pictured watching the game on television from a first-person or third-person perspective (manipulated) and then anticipated how they would feel if OSU lost. We predicted that those who pictured watching the game from a third-person perspective would anticipate feeling worse about the game (versus those who pictured the game from first-person perspective) if the broader context of the game was meaningful, but that there would be no difference in anticipated emotion as a result of perspective if the broader context of the game was not meaningful. In Studies 1a and 1b, we expect the anticipated emotional impact of the game to be larger among those using a third-person perspective because the subjective meaning of the game seems greater if one integrates the game into its broader 9

20 context as opposed to relying on associations evoked by the concrete features of the game. In Study 2 we intend to show that if we remove the potential for the game to be subjectively meaningful by making the broader context meaningless, then those who use a third-person perspective should no longer anticipate a greater emotional impact of the game than those who use a first-person perspective. 10

21 CHAPTER 2: STUDIES 1A AND 1B In Studies 1a and 1b we manipulated the visual perspective participants used to picture watching an upcoming Ohio State football game and then asked them to anticipate how happy they would feel at the end of the game based on the outcome of the game. We predicted that those who pictured watching the game from a third-person perspective would anticipate that the game would have a greater emotional impact. We also included several exploratory measures. First, we measured anticipated amount of thought about the game at the end of the game based on the outcome of the game. Previous research suggests that in some cases, the amount of anticipated thought mediates anticipated emotional impact (Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000). We included the anticipated amount of thought measures to test for evidence of that account; however, we believe that perspective differences in anticipated emotion should stem from different perceptions of the meaning of the event, not the amount of time participants anticipate thinking about the game. We also included several additional exploratory measures: anticipated happiness across time, anticipated amount of thought across time, and, in Study 1b, predictions of anticipated happiness while thinking about the game at two time points. In Study 1a participants pictured watching an upcoming OSU vs. Wisconsin game; in Study 1b participants pictured watching an upcoming OSU vs. Iowa game. 11

22 Method Study 1a Participants Seventy-seven undergraduates participated in exchange for partial course credit in an introductory psychology course. Study 1b Participants Sixty-five undergraduates participated in exchange for partial course credit in an introductory psychology course. Materials and procedure Participants sat in individual cubicles to complete a computerized questionnaire. Participants were randomly assigned to complete one of two versions of the questionnaire, which differed according to the visual perspective they were instructed to use to picture watching an upcoming OSU football game. First, participants reported their general level of happiness on the scale How happy would you say you are these days?, using a 9-point scale ranging from Not happy (1) to Very happy (9) (Study 1a) or Extremely unhappy (1) to Extremely happy (9) (Study 1b). Next, participants were told that they should picture a future event but would first be given instructions for how to picture it. At this point the perspective manipulation was introduced using the same procedure as in previous research (e.g., Libby, Shaeffer, Eibach, & Slemmer, 2007). In the first-person condition, participants read: 12

23 You should picture the event from a first-person visual perspective. With the first-person visual perspective you see the event from the visual perspective you would have if the event was actually taking place. That is, you are looking out at your surroundings through your own eyes. In the third-person condition, participants read: You should picture the event from a third-person visual perspective. With the third-person visual perspective you see the event from the visual perspective an observer would have if the event was actually taking place. That is, you see yourself in the image as well as your surroundings. Participants then encountered the first manipulation check (third-person condition in italics): Do you understand what we mean by the [first-person/third-person] perspective? Next participants were instructed to close their eyes and form an image of themselves watching the upcoming OSU football game in the environment in which they thought they would actually watch the game. Participants then held the image in mind while answering the second manipulation check on which they chose yes or no in response to the question (third-person condition in italics), As you're picturing it right now, do you see the event from the visual perspective [you would have/an observer would have] if the event was actually taking place? 13

24 Next, participants reported which team they were picturing rooting for and whether rooting for that team stemmed from positivity towards the supported team or negativity towards the opposing team. Participants then answered three questions regarding the vividness, realness, and ease of imagery. After being instructed to again close their eyes, picture watching the game, and hold the image in their mind s eye, participants completed several measures of their anticipated happiness and anticipated amount of thought following the game s outcome. Anticipated emotion. Our key predictions had to do with how participants anticipated they would feel at the game s end, in the event a win and in the event of a loss. Thus our key dependent measures consisted of the following question for a win and for a loss: If the team you re rooting for [wins/loses] the game, what will your general level of happiness be when the game ends?, with a nine-point scale ranging from Not happy (1) to Very happy (9) (Study 1a) or Extremely unhappy (1) to Extremely happy (9) (Study 1b). For exploratory purposes, in both studies we also asked participants to rate their anticipated happiness on each of the four days following the game, in the event of a win and in the event of a loss. These questions always followed the key dependent measure for each outcome and used the same format and same response scales as the key dependent measures. For exploratory purposes, in Study 1b participants rated their anticipated happiness when thinking about the game one and three days following the game, in the event of a win and in the event of a loss. Participants used the same scale as the other anticipated happiness measures to respond to two questions: If the team you re rooting 14

25 for loses the game, how will you feel each time you think about the game [1 day/3 days] after the game? Anticipated amount of thought. Participants answered a series of questions assessing how much they anticipated thinking about the game when it ended and on each of the four days following the game, in the event of a win and in the event of a loss. For example, the question regarding anticipated amount of thought at game end for a loss read, If the team you re rooting for loses the game, how much will you think about the game when the game ends?, The other questions followed the same format and participants responded using a nine-point scale ranging from Not at all (1) to Very often (9). Order of measures. There were 4 blocks of questions: 1.Anticipated happiness if OSU wins at game end Anticipated happiness if OSU wins 1, 2, 3, and 4 days after the game 2.Anticipated amount of thought if OSU wins at game end Anticipated amount of thought if OSU wins 1, 2, 3, and 4 days after the game 3.Anticipated happiness if OSU loses at game end Anticipated happiness if OSU loses 1, 2, 3, and 4 days after the game 15

26 4.Anticipated amount of thought if OSU loses at game end Anticipated amount of thought if OSU loses 1, 2, 3, and 4 days after the game Participants always saw the blocks related to a win (blocks 1 and 2) or a loss (blocks 3 and 4) consecutively. However, we manipulated whether participants saw the blocks related to a win or a loss first, and manipulated whether participants saw the blocks measuring anticipated happiness or anticipated amount of thought first. In Study 1b we also included measures of how participants would feel when thinking about the game one and three days after the game if OSU wins and if OSU loses. These measures immediately followed the anticipated happiness questions for a win and loss, respectively. After completing the anticipated emotion and amount of thought measures, participants completed several individual difference measures including a measure of college football importance and intention to attend the upcoming game. Results Participants Study 1a. Seven participants failed at least one perspective manipulation check. Six participants indicated that they were not rooting for OSU. Data from these participants were excluded from all analyses. Three participants planned to attend the 16

27 game in person, and were also excluded from analyses for the following reason. Participants were told to picture watching the game where they planned to watch it. Although the psychological process would be the same for these participants who did not intend to attend the game, the current model would predict that because these participants were picturing a different event, the outcome of their psychological processes would differ (as will be further explained in the General Discussion). The final sample consisted of 61 participants (27 in the first-person condition and 34 in the third-person condition). Study 1b. Four participants failed either the first or second visual perspective manipulation check. Four participants indicated that they were not rooting for OSU. Six participants planned to attend the game in person. Data from these participants were excluded from all analyses. The final sample consisted of 53 participants (26 in the firstperson condition and 27 in the third-person condition). Anticipated Emotion We predicted that picturing watching the game from the third-person as opposed to first-person perspective would cause participants to anticipate a greater emotional impact of the game s outcome when it ended. To test this prediction we submitted participants anticipated happiness at game end for a win and for a loss to a 2 (outcome: win vs. loss) X 2 (perspective: first-person vs. third-person) MANCOVA with outcome as the within-subjects factor. We included participants baseline ratings of their general happiness as well as their ratings of the importance of football for them as individuals to control for the influence of these factors on their anticipated happiness. 17

28 Study 1a. Not surprisingly, on average, participants anticipated feeling happier if their team won (M 1 = 7.90, SE =.20) than if their team lost (M = 3.30, SE =.29) (F(1,59) = , p <.01). However, in support of our key prediction, this main effect was qualified by a significant interaction (F(1,59) = 6.11, p <.02): using the third-person as opposed to first-person perspective caused participants to anticipate a greater emotional impact of the game s outcome. This effect was driven by predictions about a loss: in the event of a loss, third-person participants anticipated that they would feel more unhappy (M = 2.69, SE =.26) than did first-person participants (M = 4.12, SE =.29) (F(1,57) = 7.78, p <.01). Third-person participants anticipated that they would feel more happy in the event of a win (M = 8.03, SE =.23) than did first-person participants (M = 7.73,SE =.17); however, this effect was not significant (F(1,57) =.95, p =.33) (see Figure 1). 1 All means adjusted 18

29 An#cipated happiness: 1 = Not happy 9 = Very happy first- person third- person win loss Figure 1: Participants anticipated a greater emotional impact of a football game if they pictured the game from a third-person (versus first-person) perspective. Study 1b. Similar patterns occurred in Study 1b. Again, on average, participants anticipated feeling happier if their team won (M = 7.60, SE =.30) than if their team lost (M = 3.31, SE =.32) (F(1,50) = 89.00, p <.01). There was again a significant interaction (F(1,57) = 7.52, p <.01) such that using the third-person as opposed to first-person perspective caused participants to anticipate a greater emotional impact of the game s outcome. This effect was driven by losses: in the event of a loss, third-person participants anticipated that they would feel more unhappy (M = 2.20, SE =.22) than did first-person participants (M = 4.33, SE =.33) (F(1,48) = 14.53, p <.01). Third-person participants anticipated that they would feel more happy in the event of a win (M = 7.88, 19

30 SE =.30) than did first-person participants (M = 7.33, SE =.30); as in Study 1a, this difference was not significant (F(1,48) =.72, p =.40) (see Figure 2). 9 An#cipated happiness: 1 = Extremely 9 = Extremely unhappy happy win loss 1 first- person third- person Figure 2: Participants anticipated a greater emotional impact of a football game if they pictured the game from a third-person (versus first-person) perspective. Exploratory measures Anticipated Amount of Thought. According to our account, perspective differences in anticipated emotion should stem from different perceptions of the meaning of the event. However, previous research suggests that in some cases, the anticipated emotional impact of events is driven by anticipated amount of thought about those events (Wilson et al., 2000). In order to allow for the possibility that such a mechanism was 20

31 contributing to the effect of perspective we included exploratory measures of how much participants anticipated thinking about the game at game end. We conducted a similar analysis as the one we used to look at anticipated emotions: we submitted participants anticipated amount of thought at game end for a win and for a loss to a 2 (outcome: win vs. loss) X 2 (perspective: first-person vs. third-person) MANCOVA with outcome as a within-subjects factor. We again included participants baseline ratings of their general happiness as well as their ratings of the importance of football for them as individuals to control for the influence of these factors on their anticipated amount of thought. In neither study was there a significant effect of perspective on anticipated amount of thought at game end for a loss based on whether participants used a first-person (Study 1a: M = 5.27, SE =.31, Study 1b: M = 5.48, SE =.26) versus a third-person perspective (Study 1a: M = 5.69, SE =.30, Study 1b: M = 5.96, SE =.37) (Study 1a: F(1,57) =.70, p =.41, Study 1b: F(1,48) =.21, p =.65). Therefore, it does not appear that perspective differences in anticipated emotions in the event of a loss were caused by perspective differences in amount of thought. 2 Anticipated happiness one, two, three, and four days after the game. We included participants anticipated happiness across time as exploratory measures: we did not have specific hypotheses related to how imagery perspective would influence 2 We also had measures of participants anticipated happiness and amount of thought about the game one, two, three, and four days after the game. We did not find any significant effects of perspective on anticipated happiness at any of these time points, nor did we find any significant effects of perspective on amount of thought at any of these time points. 21

32 anticipated happiness across time. We ran several analyses using multilevel modeling to look at the effects of time and perspective on anticipated happiness resulting from a game win and a game loss. The five measures of anticipated happiness across time were nested within participants at level 1 while perspective was at level 2. We again included general happiness and importance as covariates in the analyses. Across wins and losses in Study 1a and 1b, time had a significant effect on anticipated happiness ( t s > 5.20, p s <.01). (see Table 1). However, the interaction between perspective and time on anticipated happiness was only significant when participants were anticipating happiness in the event of a loss (t s > 2.48, p s <.02) (see Table 1). Emotional reactions to an event tend to diminish over time, and people generally recognize that this process occurs (Gross, 1998). In line with this, we saw that participants predicted that their anticipated emotional reactions would diminish across time. Therefore, we only saw that perspective influenced happiness across time when participants were anticipating emotions in the event of a loss: anticipated emotional reactions were stronger initially among those who used a third-person perspective, so they diminished at a greater rate among those who used a third-person perspective. 22

33 Study 1a Time Point Loss First-person Loss Third-person Win First-person Win Third-person Game End One Day After Two Days After Three Days After Four Days After Study 1b Time Point Loss First-person Loss Third-person Win First-person Game End One Day After Two Days After Three Days After Four Days After Table 1: Means on measures of anticipated happiness. Across wins and losses in Study 1a and 1b, time had a significant effect on anticipated happiness such that Win Third-person anticipated happiness returned to baseline over time ( t s > 5.20, p s <.01). In both studies for losses only, anticipated happiness returned to baseline more quickly among those who used a third-person (versus first-person) perspective (t s > 2.48, p s <.02). Anticipated happiness while thinking about the game one and three days after the game. We also included anticipated happiness while thinking about the game one and three days after the game as exploratory measures. We did the same analysis for anticipated happiness both one and three days after the game: we examined the effect of perspective and its interaction with game outcome on anticipated happiness while thinking about the game. For each time point, we submitted participants anticipated happiness while thinking about the game to a 2 (outcome: win vs. loss) X 2 (perspective: first-person vs. third-person) MANCOVA with outcome as a within-subjects factor. We 23

34 included participants baseline ratings of their general happiness as well as their ratings of the importance of football for them as individuals as covariates. When looking at anticipated happiness when thinking about the game one day after the game, we found a similar pattern to participants anticipated happiness at game end. On average, participants anticipated feeling happier if their team won (M = 7.34, SE =.28) than if their team lost (M = 3.64, SE =.26) (F(1,50) = , p <.01). There was again a significant interaction (F(1,50) = 6.28, p <.02) such that using the third-person as opposed to first-person perspective caused participants to anticipate a greater emotional impact of the game s outcome. This effect was driven by losses: in the event of a loss, third-person participants anticipated that they would feel more unhappy (M = 2.88, SE =.24) than did first-person participants (M = 4.33, SE =.24) (F(1,48) = 8.04, p <.01). Third-person participants anticipated that they would feel more happy in the event of a win (M = 7.56, SE =.29) than did first-person participants (M = 7.15, SE =.27); however, this difference was not significant (F(1,48) =.37, p =.54) (see Figure 3). 24

35 An#cipated happiness: 1 = Extremely 9 = Extremely unhappy happy win loss 1 first- person third- person Figure 3: Participants anticipated a greater emotional impact of a football game when they pictured it from a third-person (versus first-person) perspective. In terms of anticipated happiness when thinking about the game three days after the game, there was a main effect of outcome (F(1,50) = 69.29, p <.01); however, there was no interaction between outcome and perspective (F(1,50) =.67, p =.42). We also wanted to explore the effect of time on these measures. To test these effects, for both outcomes (a win and a loss), we submitted participants anticipated emotions while thinking about the game one day after and three days after the game to a 2 (time after game: one day versus three days) X 2 (perspective: first-person vs. thirdperson) MANCOVA with time as a within-subjects factor. We again included participants baseline ratings of their general happiness as well as their ratings of the importance of football for them as individuals as covariates. The measures of anticipated 25

36 happiness while thinking about the game across time showed the same pattern as the general anticipated happiness measures: for both a win and a loss, there was a significant effect of time on anticipated happiness such that emotions diminished over time. In addition, there was a significant perspective by time interaction on anticipated happiness about a loss (see Table 2). Again, because emotional reactions were stronger initially among those who used a third-person perspective, they diminished at a greater rate among those who used a third-person perspective. Main Effect of Time Perspective * Time Interaction Loss F(1,50) = 7.42, p <.01 F(1,50) = 13.83, p <.01 Win F(1,50) = 13.66, p <.01 F(1,50) =.89, p =.35 after the game. Table 2: Anticipated happiness when thinking about the game one and three days Discussion As predicted, participants expected a greater emotional impact of the game s outcome when they had pictured watching it from the third-person perspective than from the first-person perspective. This result is consistent with the notion that when using the third-person perspective to form the subjective meaning of a football game, participants processed the event top-down, thinking about the broader context of the game including the causes and consequences of the game. In contrast, those who used a first-person perspective to form the subjective meaning of a football game processed the event 26

37 bottom-up, focusing on the direct experience of watching the game on television. Because the consequences of the game are much more meaningful than the concrete features of the experience of watching the game on television, the game is perceived as more meaningful and therefore has a greater anticipated emotional impact when pictured from a third-person as opposed to first-person perspective. This effect was driven by losses: we believe that this occurred for the following reasons. A loss is very subjectively meaningful if construed in terms of the broader context: a loss causes a significant drop in the team s rankings and puts the team out of the running for a strong bowl game. A win is relatively less subjectively meaningful than a loss if construed in terms of the broader context: the game will result in little to no change in the team s ranking and bowl game eligibility. Therefore, in the event of a loss, the game has much more subjective meaning when processed top-down versus bottom-up, but in the event of a win, it has similar levels of subjective meaning when processed top-down versus bottom-up. Measures of anticipated amount of thought about the game at the end of the game based on the outcome of the game did not mediate the effect of perspective on anticipated happiness, consistent with the idea that perspective differences in anticipated emotion resulted from different perceptions of the meaning of the event, not the amount of time participants anticipated thinking about the game. Exploratory measures of anticipated happiness across time both generally and while thinking about the game revealed that anticipated emotional reactions diminished across time. An exploratory measure of anticipated happiness while thinking about the game one day after the game produced a similar pattern to anticipated happiness at the 27

38 end of the game: participants anticipated a greater emotional reaction to the game when picturing the game from a third-person versus first-person perspective and this effect was driven by losses. Presumably, general anticipated emotions diminish more quickly than anticipated emotions while thinking about an event, which is why this pattern emerged for anticipated emotions when thinking about the game one day after the game, but the pattern did not emerge for general anticipated emotions one day after the game. Overall, in Studies 1a and 1b, the effect of perspective on anticipated emotional impact depended on the outcome of the game such that the anticipated emotional impact of the game was significantly greater when participants used a third-person (versus firstperson) perspective, but this effect was driven by losses. We believe that the greater effect of perspective for losses than for wins resulted because the consequences associated with losses are more extreme than those associated with wins, and thus losses have more meaning in the broader context than wins do. In Study 2 we tested this account by manipulating the potential for a loss to have broader meaning: in one case, there was potential for broader meaning, and in the other, there was not. If our account is correct, perspective should only have the predicted effect in the case where there was potential for broader meaning. 28

39 CHAPTER 3: STUDY 2 In Study 2, in addition to manipulating the visual perspective participants used to picture watching a hypothetical football game, we directly manipulated the potential for the game to be subjectively meaningful by manipulating the meaningfulness of the broader context: in one condition the game had important consequences and in the other condition the game had very minor consequences. After picturing the game, participants anticipated their happiness if the team they were rooting for lost the game. We predicted that those who used the third-person perspective would anticipate feeling significantly more unhappy than those who used the first-person perspective, but only among those who pictured a game which had a meaningful context and therefore potential for subjective meaning. In addition, we predicted that the game s broader context would only influence anticipated happiness when participants used the third-person perspective and not when they used the first-person perspective. Method Participants Eighty undergraduates participated in exchange for partial course credit in an introductory psychology course. Materials and Procedure 29

40 Participants were randomly assigned to complete one of four versions of the questionnaire, which differed by meaningfulness of the broader context (meaningful or meaningless) and the visual perspective they were directed to use to picture watching the game (first-person or third-person). First, participants reported their general level of happiness on the measure What is your general level of happiness these days with a nine-point scale ranging from (1) Extremely Unhappy to (9) Extremely Happy. Next, participants were told that they should picture an event but would first be given instructions for how to picture it. At this point the perspective manipulation and first manipulation check occurred in the same way as in Studies 1a and 1b. Then all participants were instructed to picture watching an event. In the meaningless broader context condition participants were to picture: Watching a meaningless OSU football game. The team lost their previous game, so it s unlikely that the team will advance to a strong bowl game regardless of the outcome of this game. Also, this week, five of the starters have caught the flu and cannot participate in the game. In the meaningful broader context condition participants were to picture: Watching a crucial OSU football game. This is the Big 10 championship game; whichever team wins this game will clinch the Big Ten 30