Taking Foreign Policy Personally:

Transcription

1 Contents Taking Foreign Policy Personally: Personal Values and Foreign Policy Beliefs Supplementary Appendix Last revised: April, Foreign policy instrumentation Personal values instrumentation 3.1 Political knowledge instrumentation Descriptive statistics 5 4 Factor analysis results Foreign policy attitudes Table : Pattern matrix: foreign policy orientations Table 3: Pattern matrix: Schwartz values Personal values Results with additive foreign policy scores 8 Table 4: Value underpinnings of foreign policy orientations (additive): I Table 5: Value underpinnings of foreign policy orientations (additive): II Nonparametric mediation analysis results 11 Figure 1: Nonparametric mediation analysis effect estimates Figure : Nonparametric multiple mediation analysis Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis: Cooperative Internationalism Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis: Militant Internationalism Figure 5: Nonparametric mediation models (using partisanship)

2 1 Foreign policy instrumentation Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement for each item, using the following scale: strongly agree, agree, slightly agree, neither agree nor disagree, slightly disagree, disagree, strongly disagree Militant internationalism 1. Rather than simply countering our opponents thrusts, it is necessary to strike at the heart of an opponent s power.. The United States must demonstrate its resolve so that others do not take advantage of it. 3. The United States should always do what is in its own interest, even if our allies object. 4. The United States should take all steps including the use of force to prevent aggression by any expansionist power. Cooperative internationalism 1. The United States needs to cooperate more with the United Nations.. The United States should contribute forces to international peace-keeping efforts. 3. The use or threat of force sometimes creates more problems than it solves by creating hostility or fear on the part of the opposing side. 4. In deciding on its foreign policies, the U.S. should take into account the views of its major allies. Isolationism 1. The U.S. should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own.. We should not think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems and building up our strength and prosperity here at home.

3 Personal values instrumentation Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and tick the box on each line that shows how much each person is or is not like you. Very much like me Like me Somewhat like me A little like me Not like me Not like me at all Note: descriptions are gender-matched to each respondent (i.e., for female respondents, She instead of He, her instead of him, etc.) Universalism He thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life. He wants everyone to be treated justly, even people he doesn t know. It is important to him to protect the weak in society. Benevolence It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to people close to him. It is important to him to respond to the needs of others. He tries to support those he knows. Self-ion It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free and not depend on others. Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his own original way. Stimulation He likes to take risks. He is always looking for adventures. 3

4 He likes surprises. It is important to him to have an exciting life. Hedonism He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give him pleasure. Achievement He thinks it is important to be ambitious. He wants to show how capable he is. Getting ahead in life is important to him. He strives to do better than others. Being very successful is important to him. He hopes people will recognize his achievements. Power It is important to him to get respect from others. He wants people to do what he says. It is important to him to be in charge and tell others what to do. He likes to be the leader. Security It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety. Having a stable society is important to him. He is concerned that the social order be protected. Conformity He believes that people should do what they re told. He thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching. It is important to him to be obedient. He believes he should always show respect to his parents and to older people. Tradition It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not to draw attention to himself. Tradition is important to him. He tries to follow the customs handed down by his religion or his family..1 Political knowledge instrumentation 1. How many four-year terms can the president of the United States serve? 1 4

5 3 unlimited. Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not? President Congress Supreme Court 3. Can you identify what job or office is currently held by Hillary Clinton? Secretary of Defense Secretary of State U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Attorney General 4. Can you identify which country has the largest economy in the world? China Germany Japan United States 5. Which of the following is a responsibility of the United Nations Security Council? Conducting trials for indicted war criminals Enforcing international trade agreements Authorizing the international use of military force 3 Descriptive statistics 4 Factor analysis results 4.1 Foreign policy attitudes Table depicts the pattern matrix from an exploratory factor analysis with principal axis factoring and varimax rotation, showing the extent to which the foreign policy instrumentation cleanly loads onto three distinct factors. 5

6 Table 1: Descriptive statistics for main independent and dependent variables Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max Schwartz values: additive Conservation 1, Openness 1, Self-enhancement 1, Self-transcendence 1, Schwartz values: factor scores Conservation 1, Openness 1, Achievement 1, Power 1, Universalism 1, Benevolence 1, Foreign policy orientations Cooperative Internationalism 1, Military Internationalism 1, Isolationism 1, Table : Pattern matrix: foreign policy orientations PA1 PA PA3 Militant internationalism Counter thrusts Show resolve Pursue Interest Thwart expansionist power Cooperative internationalism Cooperate with UN Peacekeeping Force creates problems Take allies into account Isolationism Mind own business Concentrate on own problems

7 Table 3: Pattern matrix: Schwartz values PA PA4 PA1 PA3 PA5 PA6 Self-transcendence Universalism (1) Universalism () Benevolence (1) Benevolence () Openness Self-direction () Stimulation (1) Stimulation () Hedonism (1) Self-enhancement Achievement (1) Achievement () Achievement (3) Power (1) Power () Conservation Security (1) Security () Conformity (1) Conformity () Tradition (1) Tradition () Personal values In the analysis in the main text, we represent the Schwartz values in two different ways. First, we used simple additive scores for each of the four superordinate value clusters (openness, selfenhancement, self-transcendence, and conservation). Although parsimonious and straightforward, restricting our analysis to these superordinate categories masks potential heterogeneity within each cluster, and additive scales presume that each indicator contributes equally to a participant s score, when certain questions may more closely proxy the underlying construct being measured than others. We therefore conducted a series of exploratory factor analyses using a model selection perspective (Preacher et al., 013), seeking to balance tradeoffs between model fit and theoretical interpretability. We thereby converged on a six-factor solution, the pattern matrix for which is shown in Table 3. 1 The attraction of the six-factor solution is threefold. First, it is theoretically sensible, preserving two of the metavalues while partitioning two others along theoretically coherent lines: the openness values load on a single factor, the conservation values all load on a single factor, and the two self-transcendence values (universalism, and benevolence) load on separate factors, as do the two self-enhancement values (achievement and power). This solution thereby allows us to focus on our quantities of theoretical interest: we have no theoretical expectations about differentiating self- 1 Following a series of model fit comparisons, we dropped the first self-direction item, which cross-loaded on several factors and whose exclusion therefore significantly improved model fit. 7

8 direction and simulation, for example, while we do have theoretical expectations about the divergent effects of universalism and benevolence. Second, it fits the data well, with a RMSEA of and RMSEA.LB of (both of which are below the conventional 0.05 threshold proposed by Browne and Cudeck 1993 as representing a close fit ), and a TLI of (exceeding the standard 0.95 rule-of-thumb in Hu and Bentler 1999). Although slightly more complex factor solutions feature marginally higher RMSEA statistics and marginally lower TLI statistics, this added complexity comes at the cost of decreased interpretability. Third, we lose this balance between model fit and interpretability when we move towards more complex factor solutions (which have marginally better model fit statistics, but are less theoretically interpretable), or towards simpler ones (which fare worse on both criteria). 5 Results with additive foreign policy scores The results in the main text use factor scores for our dependent variables of interest (the foreign policy orientations of militant internationalism, cooperative internationalism, and isolationism). Tables 4-5 replicate these results, but using additive scores for these three foreign policy orientations. The substantive story remains the same, although there are some minor differences, such as openness now significantly predicting military internationalism in Table 4 (although not in Table 5). 8

9 Table 4: Value underpinnings of foreign policy orientations (additive): I MI CI Isolationism (1) () (3) (4) (5) (6) Conservation (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) Openness (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) Self-enhancement (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) Self-transcendence (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) Male (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) Age (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) High school (0.08) (0.09) (0.035) Some college (0.09) (0.030) (0.036) College/university (0.09) (0.030) (0.036) Graduate/professional (0.03) (0.033) (0.039) Constant (0.09) (0.045) (0.09) (0.046) (0.035) (0.055) N Adjusted R Note: p <.05; p <.01. Models 1,3,5 include survey weights. Schwartz values and foreign policy orientations measured using additive scales, normalized to range from 0-1 for ease of interpretability. 9

10 Table 5: Value underpinnings of foreign policy orientations (additive): II MI CI Isolationism (1) () (3) (4) (5) (6) Conservation (0.030) (0.030) (0.09) (0.030) (0.036) (0.037) Openness (0.030) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.037) (0.037) Achievement (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.038) (0.038) Power (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.04) (0.04) Universalism (0.03) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.039) (0.039) Benevolence (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.045) (0.046) Male (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) Age (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) High school (0.08) (0.07) (0.035) Some college (0.09) (0.08) (0.036) College/university (0.09) (0.08) (0.036) Graduate/professional (0.031) (0.031) (0.039) Constant (0.040) (0.05) (0.038) (0.051) (0.048) (0.064) N ,001 1,001 Adjusted R Note: p <.05; p <.01. Models 1,3,5 include survey weights. Foreign policy orientations measured using additive scales and Schwartz values measured using factor scores, both normalized to range from 0-1 for ease of interpretability. 10

11 6 Nonparametric mediation analysis results The analysis in the main text estimates a set of nonparametric mediation models (Imai et al., 011) where the effect of the Schwartz values on foreign policy attitudes is mediated by political ideology, estimating separate models for high- and low-knowledge respondents. Figure 1 presents the pooled results for the entire sample, calculated using N=1500 simulations and 95% quasi-bayesian confidence intervals, estimated using the mediation package in R (Tingley et al., 01). The results clearly show us that the effects of personal values go beyond that of ideology, in that a majority of the relationship between the personal values of interest and our foreign policy attitudes comes from the direct effect, which represents the personal value s effect on foreign policy attitudes channeled through all mechanisms apart from ideology. Another potential set of mechanisms comes from Hurwitz and Peffley (1987): it might be case that the domain-specific foreign policy values that Hurwitz and Peffley identify ethnocentrism and the morality of force might mediate the relationship between more abstract personal values and specific foreign policy postures. In other words, personal values sit above foreign policy values in the vertical hierarchy. If that were the case, Hurwitz and Peffley s work is not incorrect but simply incomplete. New work does this in the realm of domestic politics. Schwartz, Caprara, and Vecchione (010), for example, show how the Schwartz values inform political values such as egalitarianism, which in turn affect vote choice. These mediated relationships are also theoretically plausible given the findings reported in the main text: for example, if it is the case that conservation values emerge out of the universal requirements for smooth functioning and survival of groups, then their ability to predict hawkish attitudes should be at least partially a function of an identification with the group the military is used to protect. In contrast, since universalism does not serve the smooth functioning or survival of groups, its effect on foreign policy orientations is more likely to be direct rather than mediated by national attachment. The CVP survey was not explicitly designed to test Hurwitz and Peffley s model, but includes a set of related items. To proxy for ethnocentrism we use a four item scale measuring participants degree of national attachment that includes both patriotism and nationalism items (sample item: When I see the American flag flying I feel great ). Ethnocentrism and national attachment are closely related constructs, although conceptually distinct (Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti, 009). To measure beliefs in the morality of force we use a simple two item scale (sample item: war is never justified ). The inclusion of these two scales raises the prospect of estimating a set of nonparametric multiple mediation models, in which the effects of personal values are mediated by each of the three mediators proposed above national attachment, the morality of force, and political ideology. As Imai and Yamamoto (013) show, since we have no theoretical reason to assume that the three mediators are casually dependent upon one another, we can follow the procedure laid out in Imai et al. (011) and estimate each mediation model and sensitivity analysis separately. 11

12 Figure 1: Nonparametric mediation analysis effect estimates a) Cooperative Internationalism b) Militant Internationalism c) Isolationism BenevolenceUniversalism Power Achievement Openness Conservation 1

13 The full set of results are presented in Figure, once again calculated using N=1500 simulations and 95% quasi-bayesian confidence intervals. For each personal value we present four quantities of interest: three average causal mediation effects (s) for our our three mediators, and the total effect of the personal value on the foreign policy orientation of interest. As is standard in mediation analysis, this total effect is the sum of the indirect and direct effects here, and thus corresponds with the regression coefficient estimates from Figure in the main text. The results for political ideology are the same as before, so we set them aside here and focus on the mediation effects for national attachment and the morality of force. These results confirm that conservation s effects on support for hawkish foreign policies is partially channelled through national attachment. A full 61% of conservation s effect on MI is transmitted through national attachment: individuals who place a strong emphasis on conservation values express more nationalist sentiments, which leads them to favour more hawkish foreign policies. However, although national attachment indeed plays an important role in structuring foreign policy attitudes, it does not exhaust the pathways through which personal values exert an influence, as evident both by the 39% of conservation s effect on MI that is not transmitted through national attachment, and the relatively subdued role it plays in channelling the effects of other personal values. Indeed, although universalism s negative relationship with MI is significantly mediated by national attachment or identification with the in-group, the substantive size of the here is smaller, at only 34.9% of the total effect, and it plays no role in mediating the effects of these personal values on cooperative internationalism. We see generally less striking mediation effects for the morality of force, Hurwitz and Peffley s second principle from their hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes. The morality of force is a fairly weak mediator of the effect of conservation on MI (explaining only 1.4%) and universalism on CI (explaining only 9.9%). However, beliefs about the morality of force are relatively more important in accounting for why universalists are generally less hawkish, accounting for around half (55.7%) of universalism s effect on MI. At the same time, however, although we include it in our multiple mediation model here for reasons of completeness, the role of the morality of force here is somewhat unclear, in that it is conceptually difficult to separate our mediator (the presence or absence of ethical qualms about the use of force) from our dependent variable (the support or opposition of militarist policies), so we urge caution in attributing explanatory power to it and do not incorporate it into any further analyses. Figures 3-4 show the results from a series of sensitivity analyses that give us the opportunity of probing the robustness of the mediation effects reported above. Figure 3 reports sensitivity analyses for the mediated effects of universalism and conservation, our two most substantively important personal values, on CI; Figure 4 does the same for their effects on MI. Each column in each panel depicts the sensitivity results for the mediator labeled at the top of the column: thus, the first column reports results for national attachment, the second for ideology. Within each panel, the top 13

14 row plots the mediation effects against sensitivity parameter ρ (the correlation between the error terms in the mediator and outcome models), with shaded 95% CI bands. Thus, for example, the top-left panel in the first row of Figure 4 tells us that ρ must be at least 0.50 for national attachment to no longer significantly mediate the effect of conservation on militant internationalism. In contrast, the third panel in the first row of Figure 4 says that ρ must be at least 0.9 for political ideology to no longer significantly mediate the effect of conservation on militant internationalism: in other words, then, national attachment s mediation effect is somewhat less robust than ideology s. The contour plots in the second and third rows in each figure depict the mediation effect as a function of the proportion of the total variance of the mediator (along the x axis) and outcome variable (along the y axis). In the second row, the unobserved confounder is assumed to shape the mediator and outcome in the same direction; in the third row of plots, the confounder is assumed to affect the mediator and outcome variables in opposite directions. Thus, a comparison of the second and third rows in Figures 3 and 4 tells us that we do not need to be concerned about an unobserved confounder positively correlated with both our mediator and cooperative internationalism, because the never switches sign in the second row of contour plots in Figure 3; nor should we be concerned about an unobserved confounder that pushes our mediators and militant internationalism in opposite directions, because the never switches sign in the third row of contour plots in Figure 4. Instead, the confounding we should be concerned about pushes our mediators and CI in opposite directions, and our mediators and MI in the same direction. Essentially, the results tell us that the mediation results for national attachment are relatively robust: as long as the unobserved confounder does not account for more than 49% (corresponding to 0.401, the RM R Y at which the =0 for national attachment) of the variance of the mediator and DV, the mediation results hold. In contrast, the robustness results for ideology are relatively weaker; there, our results break down if the unobserved confounder accounts for more than 9% ( ) of the variance of the mediator and DV. These results thus offer further evidence for the claim reported in the main text that there is more to personal values than just political ideology. Finally, Figure 5 replicates the informal moderated mediation model from the main text, but using partisanship rather than political ideology as the mediator. Importantly, the results hold. 14

15 Figure : Nonparametric multiple mediation analysis a) Cooperative Internationalism b) Militant Internationalism National Attachment Morality of Force Effect National Attachment Morality of Force Effect National Attachment Morality of Force Effect National Attachment Morality of Force Effect National Attachment Morality of Force Effect National Attachment Morality of Force Effect c) Isolationism BenevolenceUniversalism Power Achievement Openness Conservation s s s s s s 15

16 Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis: Cooperative Internationalism (a) Treatment: Conservation (b) Treatment: Universalism National attachment National attachment Sensitivity Parameter: Sensitivity Parameter: Sensitivity Parameter: Sensitivity Parameter: * Average Mediation Effect * * * * * Average Mediation Effect Average Mediation Effect Average Mediation Effect * *

17 Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis: Militant Internationalism (a) Treatment: Conservation (b) Treatment: Universalism National attachment National attachment Sensitivity Parameter: Sensitivity Parameter: Sensitivity Parameter: Sensitivity Parameter: * Average Mediation Effect * * * * * Average Mediation Effect Average Mediation Effect Average Mediation Effect * *

18 Figure 5: Nonparametric mediation models (using partisanship) a) Cooperative Internationalism b) Militant Internationalism c) Isolationism Conservation Universalism Figure 5 presents selected results from a pair of nonparametric mediation models (Imai et al. 011) calculated using N=1500 simulations and 95% quasi-bayesian confidence intervals, in which personal values effects on foreign policy orientations is mediated through partisanship. The results for low-knowledge respondents is shown in grey, and high-knowledge ones in black. Importantly, although the s differ a greater proportion of the total effect is mediated by partisanship for higher-knowledge participants the total effects do not. 18

19 References Browne, Michael W., and Robert Cudeck Alternative ways of assessing model fit. In Testing Structural Equation Models, ed. Kenneth A. Bollen and J. Scott Long. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage. Herrmann, Richard K., Pierangelo Isernia, and Paolo Segatti Attachment to the nation and international relations: Dimensions of identity and their relationship to war and peace. Political Psychology 30 (5): Hu, Li-tze, and Peter M. Bentler Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal 6 (1): Hurwitz, Jon, and Mark Peffley How are foreign policy attitudes structured? A hierarchical model. The American Political Science Review: Imai, Kosuke, Luke Keele, Dustin Tingley, and Teppei Yamamoto Unpacking the black box of causality: Learning about causal mechanisms from experimental and observational studies. American Political Science Review 105 (04): Imai, Kosuke, and Teppei Yamamoto Identification and Sensitivity Analysis for Multiple Causal Mechanisms: Revisiting Evidence from Framing Experiments. Political Analysis 1 (): Preacher, Kristopher J., Guangjian Zhang, Cheongtag Kim, and Gerhard Mels Choosing the Optimal Number of Factors in Exploratory Factor Analysis: A Model Selection Perspective. Multivariate Behavioral Research 48 (1): Schwartz, Shalom H., Gian Vittorio Caprara, and Michele Vecchione Basic Personal Values, Core Political Values, and Voting: A Longitudinal Analysis. Political Psychology 31 (3): Tingley, Dustin, Teppei Yamamoto, Luke Keele, and Kosuke Imai. 01. mediation 4.0: Statistical Analysis of Causal Mechanisms Using R. Journal of Statistical Software Forthcoming. 19