Huntsinger, Response Paper 2

Transcription

1 Huntsinger, Response Paper 2 Resilience is something that all communities should strive for in order to minimize the exposure of both people and property to disaster. However, simply recognizing the benefits of a resilient community does not make the goal an easy one to accomplish. Many barriers stand in the way, including 1) varied and inconsistent definitions of resilience, 2) conflicting goals between national and local policies, and 3) social and economic issues. Looking at past disasters, such as the World Trade Center disaster and Hurricane Katrina, provides insight into key elements necessary to improve community resilience. The definition of resilience is varied and inconsistent across various sources. Resilience can be defined as the capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers (Kendra, 2003). Resilience can also be described as the ability of an individual or organization to implement positive adaptive behaviors that match the situation at hand while at the same time minimizing the associated stress (Kendra, 2003). In another definition resilience is defined as the ability to respond to significant change that disrupts the expected pattern of events without engaging in extended periods of regressive behavior (Kendra, 2003). In this definition Kendra notes that individuals, groups, organizations, or complete systems can display this quality. Engineers describe resilience as a system that has been engineered to endure stress to a certain point without breaking or a system that has been designed in such a way that particular elements of the system can break without the overall system failing (Birkland, 2009). Community resilience is defined as the capability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from significant threats with minimal damage, a definition that captures four key elements of resilience: anticipation, response, recovery, and reduced vulnerability (Colten, 2008). Clearly these definitions have common themes, but they also point to different phases of the disaster cycle. This lack of clarity may lead to communities being overly focused on one or two phases of the disaster cycle rather than recognizing the disaster cycle as an interrelated system that should bend without breaking or fail in such a way that the entire system does not fail. Another challenge that communities face is conflicting goals between local and national governments. From a policy perspective reductions in community vulnerability can be achieved by focusing on mitigation and planning specific to the needs of a particular community rather than a broad-brush approach that may miss place based differences in social vulnerability (Cutter, 2006). Unfortunately national policy cannot get down to the individual level of each community and therefore tends to take a more broad-brush approach. Federal disaster policy is primarily focused on disaster relief and recovery, and does not consider disaster resilience as a major organizing principle (Birkland, 2009). Even when national policy attempts to encourage behavior that would promote resilience, it can not mandate such behavior and as such many communities continue to make development decisions that increase their vulnerability (Birkland, 2009). Not surprising given the reliance of local government on property taxes. There are also social and economic challenges to consider. The issue of economics was touched on previously with respect to a communities tax base and the pressures to develop in order to increase this tax base. Another economic factor that reduces community resilience is dependence on a single sector economic base where there are few alternative sources of employment if the dominant sector sustains long-term damage (Cutter, 2006).

2 Huntsinger 2 Social challenges refer to social vulnerability which results from social inequities (Cutter, 2006). It can be defined as the greater susceptibility of certain social groups to the impacts of disasters and their ability to adequately recover from them (Cutter, 2006). This was clearly an issue with Hurricane Katrina, evidenced from the numerous news reports following the storm. In New Orleans several trends have contributed to increases in social vulnerability including levees and internal drainage that encouraged development in low-lying areas, white flight from the inner city, and no planning for poverty reduction or youthful in-migration (Colten, 2008). It is helpful to look at past disasters, such as the World Trade Center (WTC) disaster and Hurricane Katrina, to garner insight into key elements necessary to improve community resilience. In the case of the World Trade Center disaster several features of resilience can be observed, most notable the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). An EOC is key to disaster response, it centralizes in one location all of the personnel and equipment needed to manage disaster response (Kendra, 2003). During the WTC attack on September 11, 2001, the physical structure of the EOC did not survive; however, the organization itself continued to function (Kendra, 2003). The New Orleans experience with Hurricane Katrina teaches us additional lessons in resilience, not as a resilient community prior to the storm, but how a community can take steps to become more resilient. The city s response to Katrina can hardly be described as resilient, but since then steps have been taken to improve community resilience with respect to anticipation, response, recovery, and reducing future impacts (Colten, 2008). These steps include a move towards more sustainable development, an increased recognition of the role that volunteer and non-governmental stakeholders can play, the incorporation of hazard mitigation plans into the city s long-term plan, and increased redundancy of many safety systems (Colten, 2008). Both examples capture key elements of resilience as defined earlier, the concept of losing key system elements without overall system failure and the ability to bend but not break. While challenges are many, one should not lose hope regarding the fate of communities with respect to long term resilience. History, it seems, is on our side. It has taught us that the modern city has an extraordinary capacity to rebound from even the most catastrophic disasters (Campanella, 2006). This does not mean without change or without loss. Resilience comes from the place the community occupies spatially, but also from the sociocultural place in the community and the economic system in which it is embedded. (Birkland, 2009) References Birkland, Thomas A., and Sarah Waterman The Politics and Policy Challenges of Disaster Resilience. In Resilience Engineering Perspectives. Volume 2: Preparation and Restoration, ed. C.P. Nemeth, E. Hollnagel and S. Dekker. Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Campanella, Thomas J Urban Resilience and the Recovery of New Orleans. Journal of the American Planning Association 72 (2):141-6.

3 Huntsinger 3 Colten, Craig e., Robert W. Kates, and Shirley B. Laska Three Years Lessons for Community Resilience. Environment 50 (5): Cutter, Susan L., and Christopher T. Emrick Moral Hazard, Social Catastrophe: The Changing Face of Vulnerability along the Hurricane Coasts. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 604 (1): Kendra, James M., and Tricia Wachtendorf Elements of Resilience After the World Trade Center Disaster: Reconstituting New Your City s Emergency Operations Centre. Disasters 27 (1):37-53.

4 Defining and Addressing Disaster Resilience and Vulnerability Christopher Jones Disaster resilience and vulnerability are are the focus of this week s readings. As Birkland and Waterman (2009) show, resilience and vulnerability are inter-related. Though vulnerability is assumed in some models, addressing vulnerability is necessary to increasing disaster resilience. Antithetical to this is treating communities as helpless, which can lead to Federal policies that induce moral hazard risk instead of bolstering resilience (Birkland and Waterman 2009). Developing theories and models of resilience and vulnerability are useful in identifying areas that policy-making can address. Resilience is broadly defined as the ability of a community to absorb the shock of disaster, adapt to the situation, and bounce back (Kendra and Wachtendorf 2003, Birkland and Waterman 2009). The MCEER resilience delta further defines resilience as a function of technical, organizational, social, and economic systems (Birkland and Waterman 2009). Further, the resilience of these systems can be evaluated from 3 dimensions: how well the system operated before the disaster, the damage to the system during the disaster, and the system s speed of recovery (Birkland and Waterman 2009). Further complicating the defining of resilience is its place in the long-used disaster cycle model. Should we define resilience as it relates to each stage of the disaster cycle? Rather, as Birkland and Waterman (2009) suggest, it may be useful to think of resilience as a holistic approach to the disaster cycle. From this perspective, the disaster cycle is seen as system, the aspects of which can be either to the detriment or benefit of disaster resilience Defining resilience at the organizational level may also be advantageous to disaster planning. Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003) analyzed the resilience of the EOC following the 2001 WTC attack. They evaluate the EOC from the theoretical framework of high reliability organizations and address the redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity of the EOC system (interesting was that the EOC had little redundancy visà-vis space alternate site planning, but its resourcefulness in using alternate sites such as Pier 92 made up for its lack of pre-assessed alternatives). Rose (2004) focuses on economic resilience, which he narrowly defines as the inherent and adaptive responses to disasters that enable individuals and communities to avoid some potential losses. His approach emphasizes the behavior of individuals, firms, and markets, and places special emphasis on the price mechanisms of markets. Noting that most measurements of disaster loss focus on property damage, Rose uses computed general equilibrium (CGE) modeling to model business losses, which marginally increase even after a disaster has ended. Using CGE to model economic resilience in a water system disruption simulation, Rose shows the usefulness of such models in determining a system s ability to address economic losses. Cutter and Emrich (2006) focus their research on the social vulnerability of communities, which is highly variable across geographic areas and across time. They define community vulnerability by creating a Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) that takes into account socioeconomic, demographic, and builtenvironment variables. From a policy perspective, they take a more normative approach than Rose, arguing that since disasters tend to increase pre-disaster social inequalities, recovery policy should focus on creating a more socially just future. Thus, the SoVI can be used to identify those areas that are most unequal in their social vulnerability to disaster. Vulnerability can be thought of as a pre-state condition that influences a community s resilience to disaster (Cutter and Emrich 2006). Federal policies may increase vulnerability by hiding the risk of living in disaster-prone errors. Further, Federal disaster policies are not holistic, but rather ad hoc and

5 influenced by politics instead of pure need. State and local policies fail to address community vulnerability and increasing resilience because of 1) Federal inducements that create perverse incentives and 2) local factors of influence such as community wealth and previous experience with disasters (Birkland and Waterman 2006). Despite this, greater focus both in academic literature and in policymaking bodies has been placed on addressing resilience. Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003) contribute to identifying what makes organizations resilient to disaster they must be flexible and engaged in creative thinking, and training and preparation are necessary to support these attributes. Rose (2004) shows that economic models may be useful in defining resilience as it relates to a system being able to prevent economic losses. Applegate (2008) shows that some attention to addressing resilience is also coming from the executive branch. The National Science and Technology Council s Subcommittee on Disaster Reduction has identified the ability of communities to assess their own disaster resilience as a major challenge. The Subcommittee has focused on creating standardized methods to do this. As Cutter and Emrich (2006) have shown, however, vulnerability can be defined by a multitude of variables that vary across geographical regions and through time. If defining resilience relies on the identification of vulnerability measures, then creating standardized methods will indeed be a challenge. References Applegate, David "Challenges to building a disaster-resilient nation." Science News, 32. Birkland, Thomas A., and Sarah Waterman "The Politics and Policy Challenges of Disaster Resilience." In Resilience Engineering Perspectives. Volume 2: Preparation and Restoration, ed. C. P. Nemeth, E. Hollnagel and S. Dekker. Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Cutter, Susan L., and Christopher T. Emrich Moral Hazard, Social Catastrophe: The Changing Face of Vulnerability along the Hurricane Coasts. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 604 (1): [PDF] Kendra, James M., and Tricia Wachtendorf Elements of Resilience After the World Trade Center Disaster: Reconstituting New York City's Emergency Operations Centre. Disasters 27 (1): Rose, Adam Defining and Measuring Economic Resilience to Disasters. Disaster Prevention and Management 13(4):

6 Lipka 1 Tim Lipka October 22, 2009 PA 553 Response Paper 1 It seems from the readings that community vulnerability and resilience is dependent on gender, race, and class. The Cutter reading suggests that vulnerability to disasters is based on region. In her opening paragraph, Cutter says: The social vulnerability of the American population is not evenly distributed among social groups or between places. Some regions may be more susceptible to the impacts of hazards than other places based on the characteristics of the people residing within them. This is an interesting comment, and her article, obviously, supports that claim. Based on this, I found an article from the Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology where the authors did a study on the psychological effects of the World Trade Center Disaster. The authors Bonanno, Galea, Bucciarelli, and Vlahov studied the psychological after effects of the World Trade Center Disaster. Bonanno, et al focused on several factors that included additional life stressors to resources and demographic variables. It is interesting to note that Bonanno, et al findings support the claim Cutter makes in her opening paragraph. Depending on the characteristics of the people involved, the resilience factor varies. For example, Bonanno found that adult women of all racial groups were more likely to not be as resilient as others. A common theme through Cutter s article is that minorities have a greater chance of becoming less resilient seems to be disproved in the Bonanno study. Bonanno reported that minorities, when controlled for socioeconomic variables, were rendered nonsignificant when looking at the ability for minority groups to have a lower resilience factor than other groups. A particular ethnic group of interest is Asians. Bonanno

7 Lipka 2 reported that Asians, when controlled for controlled not only for socioeconomic variables but also for the potentially confounding influence of prior trauma, Asian participants were close to 3 times as likely to be resilient as White participants. Cutter seems to focus on the idea that minority groups (and lower socioeconomic status groups) are less likely to be resilient than high income whites. Cutter, in her article, focused on comparing high socioeconomic status individuals with lower socioeconomic status individuals. Cutter argues that people with higher educational opportunities and more income would be more resilaint after a disaster than others. The reasoning behind Cutter s claims is that they have the ability to rebound faster than others on the opposite side of the socioeconomic scale. The Bonanno study however, appears to disprove that theory. Bonanno reports that education is inversely related to resilience factors. Bonanno reports that study participants with a college education were half as likely to be resilient than those without. Bonanno makes the claim that education can actually impede the adaptation to trauma. Bonanno makes the claim that income levels (i.e. Cutter s socioeconomic status claim) rarely explain much of the variance in response to disasters. However, that claim only stands when the study participant maintained his or her income. In this case, Cutter is correct but only half way. Bonanno reports that while those with income are more likely than not to be resilient, those who suffer a loss of income are only half as likely to be resilient after a disaster. As part of Cutter s claim that low socioeconomic status groups tend to not be as resilient as those in higher groups, it could be argued that those in lower status groups tend to have stronger community support. Bonanno reports that, while unrelated, those

8 Lipka 3 who have a perceived lower level of social support were seen to be less resilient than those who have a strong level of social support (i.e. friends, religious groups, etc). Something Cutter does not explore, but Bonanno does, is the presence of additional life stressors. Bonanno looks at the possibility of previous past stressor events (such as a loss of income) and how they could compound the resiliency factor in a current disaster. Here is where Bonanno and Cutter could agree. Cutter argues that residents of the Ninth Ward were less resilient because they had lost almost everything, Bonanno argues that yes, in fact, previous life stressors could compound the person s ability to be resilient after a disaster. [R]esilience was more prevalent among people who reported no prior traumatic events, no recent life stressors, and no experience of additional traumatic events since September 11. Complementarily, participants with the most extreme life stress (e.g., several recent life stressors) were only about one third as likely to be resilient (Bonanno). Cutter and Bonanno could be seen as agreeing here because the loss of your home, and everything with it, combined with the stress of an evacuation to a distance place with no social support, could all result in a negative resiliency factor and could place someone in that last category (one third likely to be resilient). As Bonanno concludes his article, he brings up a point Cutter does not. Cutter focuses on the mass reconstruction of the area to help increase resiliency levels to predisaster levels (status quo ante), Bonanno looks at the most basic needs immediately following the disaster as a way to increase resiliency. As Bonanno reports, early interventions in communities suffering mass trauma should consist of general support and bolstering of the recovery environment would help increase levels and help speed recovery efforts.

9 Lipka 4 It is interesting to see how Cutter seems to focus solely on what appears to be the biggest factor in post-disaster recover: race and wealth. It is clear in the Bonanno study that race and wealth tend to be non-significant when discussing resiliency postdisaster. As Bonanno reported, education (a strong indicator of socioeconomic status) is a major deterrent to resiliency in a population. Bonanno also showed that race is not a factor either. Cutter appears to attempt to prove that an upper class white male will fare better in a disaster than a lower class black male. While one study is not enough to establish proof, the theory that Bonanno puts out that the real factors are pre-disaster stressors and other actions that can be independent of race and wealth is almost the polar opposite of the Cutter theory. It would be interesting to see more studies done and see if the Bonanno theory is true.