Modeling Terrorist Beliefs and Motivations

Transcription

1 CREATE Research Archive Research Project Summaries 2009 Modeling Terrorist Beliefs and Motivations Richard John University of Southern California, Heather Rosoff University of Southern California, Follow this and additional works at: Recommended Citation John, Richard and Rosoff, Heather, "Modeling Terrorist Beliefs and Motivations" (2009). Research Project Summaries. Paper This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CREATE Research Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Project Summaries by an authorized administrator of CREATE Research Archive. For more information, please contact

2 Modeling Terrorist Beliefs and Motivations Richard John and Heather Rosoff, University of Southern California 1. Modeling Terrorist Beliefs and Motivations Overview Research Accomplishments Research Products Presentations Conferences Presentations - Outreach Publications Modeling Terrorist Beliefs and Motivations Overview The objective of this research is to construct a decision analytic framework for better understanding the motivations, objectives, and beliefs that drive terrorist group behavior. Our general approach is to use published terrorist writings and individuals who understand the beliefs and values of particular terror organizations to provide inputs to a proxy decision analysis for terrorist organizations. Key structural elements of the decision analysis model include the following: (1) a fundamental objectives hierarchy representing the short-term and long-term objectives of the terror organization, (2) scales operationalizing each fundamental objective, and (3) an event tree representing the uncertainty involved in carrying out a selected terror attack. Parameters for the model are elicited in the form of probability distributions over responses required for attribute scale values, attribute weights, singleattribute utility functions, and Bernouli probabilities for the binary nodes of the event tree. These probability distributions primarily represent the inherent uncertainty in what we know about terrorist values (attribute weights and utility functions). In the case of the scale scores (alternatives by attributes matrix), the probability distributions also capture the terrorists inherent uncertainty in the outcome of an attack, as well as our uncertainty about terrorist beliefs. Previous work on this project constructed decision analytic models for a terrorist organization such as Al Qaeda for evaluating eight possible alternative attack mode strategies in the US, and a status quo no attack strategy alternative. Using the fully parameterized model, we were able to construct and compare risk profiles (CDFs over aggregate utility) for each attack strategy. This random utility modeling approach also allowed us to estimate the relative likelihood of a terrorist leader (or organization) selecting one of the attack strategies considered. During Year 5 we addressed two separate research questions: (1) How much does the proxy terrorist utility model diverge from using a utility model for the US coupled with a zero-sum assumption? and (2) How do anti-terrorism resource allocations impact terrorist preferences for different attack strategies, and to what extent are estimated relative likelihoods of various attack strategies influenced by anti-terrorism initiatives? To address the first question, we developed (dis-)utility models for evaluating the same attack strategies from the perspective of the US, and compared the resulting risk profiles to those of a terrorist leader. To address the second question, we performed sensitivity analysis over parameters in the terrorist utility model that should be sensitive to different allocations of anti-terrorist resources. Three antiterrorist resources were considered (1) tagging of original radiological and biological sources terms, (2) hardening targets for better protection from attack, and (3) installing screening devices to improve

3 detection of radiological and explosive materials. Each anti-terrorist resource was evaluated in terms of its impact upon proxy terrorist s attribute definitions, probability estimates and ultimately, estimates for the likelihood of various attack strategies. Research progress and accomplishments made throughout Year 5 are described in the subsequent section. 2. Research Accomplishments During Year 5 we completed a number of analyses related to the two research questions described above. With respect to our evaluation of the zero-sum assumption, we demonstrate that quite different preferences and implied relative likelihoods result from our proxy decision analysis of terrorist preferences compared to a more standard economic evaluation of expected losses from the perspective of the US. It is clear from our analysis that terrorist organizations (and their leaders) have very different fundamental objectives that are not captured by a zero-sum assumption applied to an evaluation model constructed from the US perspective. Furthermore, even in cases where there terrorist objects are similar to the mirror (opposite) objectives of the US, there are remarkable differences in attribute scales, attribute weights, and attribute utility functions capturing attitudes toward risk. These differences in values contribute to large differences in the evaluation of alternative attack strategies based on the proxy terrorist decision analytic model and the model assuming US values and a zero-sum game. With respect to our sensitivity analysis of anti-terrorism initiatives, we demonstrate that preferences and relative likelihoods are altered depending upon the anti-terrorism resource under consideration and the proxy terrorist s perceived risk posed by that resource. For example, as seen in Figures 1 and 2, the analysis shows that the tagging countermeasure, did not impact Proxy 1 s attack preferences. However, Proxy 2 s likelihood estimates decreased for those alternatives directly impacted by the anti-terrorism resource (Port nuclear device, dirty bomb, smallpox attack and anthrax release). In doing so, the desirability of Proxy 2 s most preferred attack, the no attack alternative, increased. Figure 1: Proxy 1 Relative Likelihood for Tagging Countermeasure Page 2 of 4

4 Figure 2: Proxy 2 Relative Likelihood for Tagging Countermeasure Interestingly, while anti-terrorism resources alter attribute scales and uncertainties and attack probability estimates, attack strategies preferences could remain unaffected depending on the values assigned to attribute weights and attribute utility functions capturing attitudes toward risk for each alternative. Through the exploration of different anti-terrorism resources impact on proxy terrorist preferences, insight is gained as to the extent to which government actions might influence terrorist decision making. 3. Research Products 3.1. Presentations Conferences 1. Rosoff, H., John, R., Fear and Loathing in Los Angeles and Hollywood, presented at The Subjective, Probability, Utility and Decision Making (SPUDM) 22 Biannual Meeting, Rovereto, Italy, August Rosoff, H., John, R., Risk Perception Driving Factors, presented at the Workshop on Public Response Threat: Cross-Disciplinary Contributions and Collaboration, Eugene, OR, August, Rosoff, H., John, R., Decision Analysis by Proxy for the Rational Terrorist, in proceedings of the 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-09), Workshop on Quantitative Risk Analysis for Security Applications (QRASA), Pasadena, CA, July 11-17, John, R., Rosoff, H., Value Focused Thinking for Counterterrorism Risk Analysis, presented at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Annual Summit Meeting, Washington, DC, March 17-18, John R., A Good Bayesian was Seduced by the Dark Side, paper presented at the Edwards Bayesian Research Conference, Fullerton, CA, January Rosoff, H., John, R., Using Terrorism Risk Perception to Better Understand the Public s Response to Disasters, presented at the 47th Annual Bayesian Research Conference, Fullerton, CA, January John, R., Rosoff, H., The Sum of our Fears and Egocentric Zero-sum Assumptions, HSSAI sponsored paper presentation at the Institute for Operations Research and Management Science (INFORMS), Washington, DC, October 12-15, Rosoff, H., John, R., Estimating the Effects of Counter-terrorism on the Terrorist Threat, presented at the Society for Risk Analysis (SRA) Annual Meeting, Boston, MA, December 7-10, 2008 Page 3 of 4

5 3.2. Presentations - Outreach 1. Rosoff, H., John, R., Using Decision and Risk Analysis to Assist in Policy Making About Terrorism, presented at the School of Policy, Planning, and Development, University of Southern California, May Publications 1. Rosoff, H., Using Decision and Risk Analysis to Assist in Policy Making About Terrorism, doctoral dissertation, Detlof von Winterfeldt, Advisor and Dissertation Chair, School of Policy, Planning, and Development, University of Southern California, May Rosoff, H., John, R., Decision analysis by proxy for the rational terrorist, in proceedings of the 21 st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-09), Workshop on Quantitative Risk Analysis for Security Applications (QRASA), Pasadena, California, July Education and Outreach Products Education and Outreach Initiatives (Please detail below) # # of students supported (funded by CREATE) 3 # of students involved (funded by CREATE + any other programs) 1 Funded by CREATE Heather Rosoff, Doctoral Candidate, University of Southern California (USC) School of Policy, Planning and Development. Page 4 of 4