ATTACK MODALITIES. Draft 1 Charles P. Blair

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1 ATTACK MODALITIES Draft 1 Charles P. Blair ATTACK MODALITIES Attack Modalities refers to the actual methods and techniques that terrorists choose to employ to attack particular targets. There are several subfactors in this category, including Choice of Weapons, which is self-explanatory, and Choice of Tactical Methods, which refers to the actual mechanics used to approach the target, carry out the attack, and withdraw after the attack is carried out. Another is Insiders and Outsiders, which refers to whether the terrorist group has infiltrated its own personnel into the facility s workforce or managed to coopt someone who already works there, i.e., has assistance from an insider. For understandable reasons, attacks that are launched with inside help may well have a better chance of success. Depending upon the choice of targets, the potential array of attack modalities can be quite extensive and diverse Choice of Weapons (NON-AGENT / DEVICE / WEAPON), which is self-explanatory 2. Choice of Tactical Methods, actual mechanics used to approach the target, carry out the attack, and withdraw after the attack is carried out. This dovetails with other factors below. 3. Target Selection 1 This in progress work is largely based on the works of Jeffrey M. Bale. Specifically, most of his quotes are drawn from Bales excellent scholarship and analyses in, for example, Gary Ackerman, Praveen Abhayaratne, Jeffrey M. Bale, A Bhattacharjee, Charles P. Blair, L. Hansell, A. Jayne, Margaret Kosal, Sean Lucas, Keven S Moran, L. Seroki and Sundara. Vadlamudi, Assessing Terrorist Motivations for Attacking Critical Infrastructure. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, UCRL-TR , January 2007, and Ackerman, Bale, Blair, Kosal, and Vadlamudi, Chemical & Biological Defense Multivariate Decision Support Tools, Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Research Program (TRP), Center for Nonproliferation Studies, December See also, Gary A. Ackerman, Charles P. Blair, Jeffrey M. Bale, Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, Anatomizing Radiological and Nuclear Non-State Adversaries: Identifying the Adversary, report prepared for the Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, grant number N (College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2009). See Last Updated July Ibid.

2 Target Selection refers to the process by which terrorists first identify and later choose targets to attack. As experienced terrorism researchers know, different groups make decisions somewhat differently, if not in an entirely idiosyncratic manner. That said, this process of selection is normally involves several general stages. First, there is typically a preliminary planning phase in which more than one potential target is considered for attack. Second, those targets are all examined and evaluated, if possible via direct reconnaissance on the ground. If they still seem promising, they may be brought under more regular but discreet surveillance. Less promising targets are progressively weeded out and discarded, leaving only one (or a handful) to be decided upon. In the end, the actual targets are selected on the basis of their perceived importance, vulnerability, and suitability for accomplishing the group s aims Decision Making Entities 5. Attack Timing 6. Order of Attack Planning 7. Agent / Device / Weapon Type Options [CBRN Specific] 8. Agent / Device / Weapon Sub-Type Options 9. Specific Agent / Device / Weapon Selected 10. Acquisition of Materials a. Additional resources to devote b. Raw materials vs. intact weapon / device c. Source of Materials d. Particular knowledge regarding facilities where RN Materials Houses 11. Group s Weaponization of Agent / Device / Weapon(s) 12. Pre-attack Preparations a. Production of weapon /device b. Operational Team c. Familiarity with Targeting Environment(s) d. Target Surveillance e. Operational Security (OPSEC) 13. Ingress in / Egress from Target area 3 Ibid. Working Paper Charles P. Blair, Federation of American Scientists 01/11/13 Page 2 of 6

3 14. Experience with Inter/Intra-State Transfers 15. Insiders and Outsiders Insiders and Outsiders, which refers to whether the terrorist group has infiltrated its own personnel into the facility s workforce or managed to co-opt someone who already works there, i.e., has assistance from an insider. For understandable reasons, attack that are launched with inside help may well have a better chance of success. Depending upon the choice of targets, the potential array of attack modalities can be quite extensive and diverse Transport to Target Area(s) 17. Use of Agent / Weapon / Device 18. Escape Plan 19. Claims of Success / Responsibility 4 Ibid. Working Paper Charles P. Blair, Federation of American Scientists 01/11/13 Page 3 of 6

4 F. APPENDIX Ideological Motivational Factors. Ideological motivational factors are those main factors that frame the basic set of political, social, cultural and/or religious beliefs that members of a particular attacking group hold. In a rudimentary sense, these factors frame what a group is for and what it is against. Any assessment of such factors should include analysis of: general group attitudes and orientations; the substance of its espoused doctrines; and the near unconscious set of values and behavioral precepts the norms that group members have absorbed through their national, cultural and extremist associations. 1 Incentives Achieves goals in an ideologically consistent manner. Certain groups may perceive chemical or biological weapons to be uniquely well suited for achieving particular ends in an ideologically consistent fashion. Apocalyptic groups, for example, might consider biological agents a divine or natural tool for bringing about the end of the world. Racist groups might believe that certain pathogens can be used to selectively target specific populations. And still other extremist groups might seek to conduct chemical or biological attacks simply because of the WMD label associated with biological weapons holds out the promise of extreme, mass consequences. Groups believing that the U.S. military has used chemical or biological agents in the past, may deploy such weapons against U.S. military facilities as a form of just retribution. 5 Enhances status. In that WMD have traditionally been possessed exclusively by state actors with well developed militaries, some groups might seek a chemical or biological weapons capability mainly as a symbol of power and status. This may be particularly true for nonstate actors such as terrorists. Aum leaders, for example, considered their organization a government and military in waiting. Acquiring and using biological (and chemical and even nuclear) weapons was seen as a rational step in the organization s development. Strategic Motivational Factors. Strategic motivational factors are largely concerned with the particular political, social, or religious goals and 5 Ibid. See also, Gary A. Ackerman and Kevin S. Moran, Bioterrorism and Threat Assessment. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Report No 22, Available at: Working Paper Charles P. Blair, Federation of American Scientists 01/11/13 Page 4 of 6

5 objectives a group has established. They concern what the group seeks to achieve and how it intends to accomplish such ends. Incentives Causes specific outcomes. Attackers may use chemical or biological agents to attack because they believe such weapons have the ability to produce specific outcomes. The results most groups are likely to seek from such weapons are: mass casualties; economic damage; target contamination; generation of public fear; strategic function interruption for example, disrupting an essential service such as transportation by targeting key transit nodes; facilitation of terrorism proper by using a WMD attack to generate publicity, foster fear, and undermine public confidence in government officials; or a combination of the proceeding. Serves as a strong blackmail tool. Given the particularly strong public fears associated with chemical and biological attacks, some groups might seek to demonstrable such a capability primarily to leverage the threat of its use as a negotiating tactic. Helps build the organization. Non-state actors seeking to strengthen the image and status of their organization vis-à-vis other similar groups, might conduct chemical or biological attacks, specifically because so few attacks have been done to date. Tactical Motivational Factors. Tactical motivational factors directly concern the methods and techniques that a group employs to achieve its objectives. Incentives Exploits perceived target weaknesses. Accurate or not, a large amount of WMD related media has emphasized the vulnerability of modern society to chemical and (especially) biological attack. Such information might encourage attackers to consider CBW as an asymmetric attack that takes advantage of their enemies particular weaknesses. Working Paper Charles P. Blair, Federation of American Scientists 01/11/13 Page 5 of 6

6 Exploits target characteristics. Many military facilities store large quantities of toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) onsite. Attackers might specifically target such storage areas in an effort to use the chemicals as weapons against the facilities in which they are stored. Facilitates covert development and use. As discussed previously, chemical and biological weapons are extremely well suited for covert development and deployment. Attackers interested in maintaining secrecy for instrumental or operational reasons might find such attacks particularly attractive options. Makes use of dual-use technologies. Most equipment needed for the development of chemical and (especially) biological weapons is dual-use and can be easily acquired for justifiable purposes. Groups seeking a WMD capability may choose to pursue such weapons because of the relative ease with which such weapons production facilities can be established and because of the low security profile such facilities can maintain. Mimics previous attack. Some groups may seek to engage in chemical or biological terrorism simply because they are aware of previous successful or unsuccessful attacks conducted by other groups (e.g. Aum). A state might be particularly willing to attack using such weapons, if it believed it was responding in kind to a similar type of attack already conducted against it. Meets idiosyncratic needs. Some groups may pursue chemical or biological weapons largely because they are driven by a personal, idiosyncratic fascination regarding a specific weapon (or agent). Aum s leader Shoko Asahara, for example, is known to have been obsessed with sarin to the extent that he wrote songs about it. 6 6 See, for example, Jonathan Tucker, War of Nerves (XX:XX, 200X), pp. Xx-XX.s Working Paper Charles P. Blair, Federation of American Scientists 01/11/13 Page 6 of 6