ENGAGEMENT IN ROLE PLAY, PRETENSE, AND ACTING CLASSES PREDICT ADVANCED THEORY OF MIND SKILL IN MIDDLE CHILDHOOD*

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1 IMAGINATION, COGNITION AND PERSONALITY, Vol. 30(3) , ENGAGEMENT IN ROLE PLAY, PRETENSE, AND ACTING CLASSES PREDICT ADVANCED THEORY OF MIND SKILL IN MIDDLE CHILDHOOD* THALIA R. GOLDSTEIN Yale University ELLEN WINNER Boston College and Harvard Project Zero ABSTRACT Research on theory of mind in typically developing children has focused almost exclusively on universal achievements up to age 5. Far less is known about how theory of mind skills develop in middle childhood and adolescence. We investigated later-developing theory of mind achievements to determine the kinds of behaviors associated with skill in theory of mind. Engaging in role play and pretense, as reported by parents, and engagement in acting classes predicted theory of mind skill in 8- to 11-year-olds independently of socio-economic status (SES), age, and verbal IQ. These findings show that the proclivity to role play is related to the ability to understand and perceive others internal states. *This research was performed while the first author was on appointment as a U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Fellow under the DHS Scholarship and Fellowship Program, a program administered by the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) for DHS through an interagency agreement with the U.S. Department of Education (DOE). ORISE is managed by Oak Ridge Associated Universities under DOE contract number DE-AC05-00OR All opinions expressed in this article are the author s and do not necessarily reflect the policies and views of DHS, DOE, or ORISE , Baywood Publishing Co., Inc. doi: /IC.30.3.c

2 250 / GOLDSTEIN AND WINNER Research into theory of mind has exploded in the last decade. In their original article on the topic, Premack and Woodruff (1978, p. 515) define theory of mind as the imputation of mental states to oneself and others. Since then, researchers have explored children s age of theory of mind attainment, focusing mainly on universal developmental milestones in the first 5 years of life (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and atypical development of theory of mind in autistic children (Baron-Cohen, 2008), with some research also examining individual differences in young children s theory of mind skill (Hughes, Jaffee, Happe, Taylor, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2005; Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007; Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002; Taylor & Carlson, 1997). Very little research has examined later developments in theory of mind. Here we focus on middle childhood and attempt to determine the correlates and predictors of theory of mind skill on both a perceptual and a cognitive theory of mind task. PREDICTORS OF THEORY OF MIND SKILL IN EARLY CHILDHOOD Several factors have been shown to predict individual differences in age of attainment of theory of mind milestones in early childhood. Three of these are environmental factors: socio-economic status (SES) (Cutting & Dunn, 1999), parental use of mental state language (Dunn, Brown, & Beardsall, 1991; Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Telsa, & Youngblade, 1991; Ruffman et al., 2002), and number of older siblings (Peterson, 2001; Ruffman, Perner, Naito, Parkin, & Clements, 1998). And two can be considered correlated kinds of abilities: language ability predicts theory of mind skill (Milligan et al., 2007), as does engagement in fantasy and pretense: amount of role assignment and generation of joint plans in pretend play predicts false belief understanding in 4- and 5-year-olds (Astington & Jenkins, 1995), amount of jointly constructed pretense (as compared to solo pretend play) predicts performance on an appearancereality task in preschoolers (Schwebel, Rosen, & Singer, 1999), and 4-year-olds self-report of imaginary companions predicts performance on false belief and appearance reality tasks (Taylor & Carlson, 1997). The early ability to pretend has been considered a precursor of theory of mind understanding (Leslie, 1987), and socially interactive pretense requires an understanding of the other s mental state (that the other is pretending) as well as the ability to shift perspectives in adopting various roles (Schwebel et al., 1999). THE CURRENT STUDY Researchers have demonstrated that social competence is associated with advanced theory of mind skills in middle childhood (Bosacki, 2000; Bosacki & Astington, 1999), but other factors that might predict advanced theory of mind skills have not yet been explored. The goal of the present study was to determine

3 ROLE PLAY PREDICTS ToM IN MIDDLE CHILDHOOD / 251 whether engagement in role play and pretense continues to predict theory of mind competence in middle childhood as it does in early childhood, as well as to investigate whether other kinds of proclivities might also be associated with advanced theory of mind skill, including involvement in acting classes. Actors must imagine characters personalities, emotions, and desires, and then use this understanding of what motivates the character throughout the play and in each moment (Noice & Noice, 2006). And it has been argued that actors must have strengths in personal intelligence given that they must understand motivations and decisions of others in order to realistically portray characters (Mayer, ). Some previous work has shown that adolescent and adult actors have higher levels of theory of mind (Goldstein, Wu, & Winner, ). We examined three possible correlates of theory of mind skill in middle childhood: engagement in role play and pretense; interest in others; and absorption in imaginary worlds. A finding that engagement in role play and pretense predicts advanced theory of mind would serve to replicate this same finding at younger ages. A finding that a strong interest in others predicts advanced theory of mind would be consistent with studies showing that in middle childhood, individual differences in theory of mind are associated with social competence (Bosacki, 2000; Bosacki & Astington, 1999). A finding that absorption in imaginary worlds predicts advanced theory of mind would suggest that the ability to infer others mental states requires an act of imagination. We also investigated whether children who were involved in acting classes (as compared to children in dance classes or other activities) would show advantages in their theory of mind. There is no consensus yet about what constitutes more advanced theory of mind skill once the ability to represent false belief has been attained (Chandler, 1987; Goldstein & Winner, 2010). Some have suggested that understanding second order and higher levels of false belief is the next step (Kinderman, Dunbar, & Bentall, 1998; Liddle & Nettle, 2006), but second order and higher false belief tasks are more difficult than first order false belief tasks only in the memory and information processing requirements. Theory of mind has been argued to involve two basic components, one socialcognitive and the other social-perceptual (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000), and these components can be assessed in both early and middle childhood. Social-cognitive theory of mind has been assessed by testing participants ability to recognize another s true and false beliefs on the basis of what the person has been able to see and experience, and the ability to explain and predict actions based upon true and false beliefs. In contrast, social-perceptual theory of mind has been assessed by testing the ability to recognize mental states from a person s outward appearance. We assessed advanced theory of mind through two measures, one assessing cognitive theory of mind in which one must determine when a person has committed a faux pas, and the other assessing perceptual theory of mind in which one must identify a person s mental state from a picture of his or her eyes only.

4 252 / GOLDSTEIN AND WINNER METHODS Participants and Procedure Thirty-six children (31 girls, 5 boys) between the ages of 7;9 and 11;6 (M = 9;3, SD = 9 mo.) were recruited from local arts after school programs and summer camps. Eleven children were involved in after school acting classes, 14 in after school dance programs, and 11 from a local summer camp. Neither the children in the dance group nor the children in the summer camp had any training or classes in acting. The acting group s training was a combination of improvisational games (e.g., making one member of the class guess the character that other members of the class were enacting/quickly passing along verbal sounds and gestures/having the students build a machine piece-by-piece with their bodies) and playing short scenes from classic children s plays. Children were tested individually in a quiet room after consent was obtained from a parent. Children were allowed to take a break halfway through the protocol, and measures were counterbalanced by child. Parents completed assessments of children s individual characteristics while their children were working with the experimenter. Materials SES Socio-economic status (SES) was determined by asking students to report the education level of each parent. Following Norton, Winner, Cronin, Overy, Lee, and Schlaug (2005), SES score was calculated as follows: 1. less than high school graduate; 2. high school graduate; 3. some college; 4. BA/BS; 5. MA/MS/MBA; and 6. JD/Ph.D. Verbal IQ The vocabulary subtest of the WISC-III (Wechsler, 1991) was administered. This subtest correlates with full-scale IQ. Age Age was calculated in months from birth until the testing day. If the child s birth date was more than 15 days before the testing date, we counted an additional month.

5 ROLE PLAY PREDICTS ToM IN MIDDLE CHILDHOOD / 253 Theory of Mind Two measures of theory of mind were administered. The Faux Pas test (Baron-Cohen, O Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999) is a cognitive theory of mind task in which participants listen to vignettes in which one character commits a faux pas (e.g., a woman accidentally calls a little girl a boy). Children were read the story and then asked four questions to determine their understanding of the faux pas and their memory for the story; for example: 1. Did someone say something they should not have said? If yes: 2. What did they say that they should not have said? 3. Where did the story take place? 4. Did the woman know the little girl was a girl? They were scored on their ability to detect the faux pas, and on their explanation of the faux pas. We used this task because children do not research ceiling on this task until age 11 or 12. The Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) is a perceptual theory of mind task in which participants are shown black and white photographs of the eye region of the face, taken from pictures of faces in magazines. Each picture is shown with four mental state words, one of which correctly describes the mental state shown by the eyes, and three of which are similarly valenced foils. The mental states to be detected include emotions (e.g., sad, excited) as well as more cognitive states (e.g., thinking about something, remembering). Correct answers were determined by the authors of the task, and then verified by eight expert judges. Children were asked to choose the word that best fit what the person in the picture was thinking or feeling. If they could not choose a word, they were told to make their best guess. Upon request, the researcher defined any word the child did not know. We used this task because even adults do not reach ceiling on this task. Parent Rating Scales Parents were asked three categories of questions about their children and asked to respond using 7-point Likert scale. 1. Engagement in dramatic play: Does your child role play and pretend play a lot? Does your child like to dress up in costumes? Does your child perform for parents/ friends? Does your child enjoy having an audience? 2. Interest in others: Is your child especially attuned to others emotions/ motivations? Is your child a mimic (imitating other s behavior, speech, etc)?

6 254 / GOLDSTEIN AND WINNER 3. Absorption in imaginary worlds: Does your child daydream a lot? Does your child have an imaginary playmate? Does your child like to watch movies? Does your child like to read fiction? Does your child make up his/her own songs, plays, stories, or puppet shows? RESULTS Table 1 lists the mean scores for demographic, dependent, and independent variables by group. Two multiple regressions were performed, one on the Faux Pas scores, and one on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes scores, in order to determine whether any parental ratings predicted performance on either task. Each parental rated characteristic, along with WISC vocabulary score, age, and SES, was entered as independent variables. We entered the vocabulary, age, and SES score so that we could determine whether any parental ratings were predictive over and above these. We used a stepwise regression method in which only predictors at p <.05 are entered into the model. For the Faux Pas test, the final model included two predictors that accounted for 30% of the variance in scores (R 2 =.301), and this was highly significant, F(2, 29) = 5.811, p =.008. Both vocabulary WISC score ( =.369, p =.030) and Role Play and Pretend ( =.378, p =.027) demonstrated significant effects on theory of mind scores. For the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task, the final model included only one predictor, which accounted for 35% of the variance in scores (R 2 =.350), and which was highly significant, F(1, 29) = , p =.001. Again, Role Play and Pretend ( =.591, p =.001) yielded a significant effect on theory of mind scores, replicating the results for the Faux Pas scores. Table 1. Demographic and Score Information by Group Actor Dancer Summer camp Mean age Mean SES WISC vocabulary Role Play/Pretend RME score Faux pas score 113 mo (10 mo) 4.42 (.83) (10.45) 5.82 (1.72) (1.65) (3.45) 112 mo (11 mo) 4.75 (.91) (7.15) 5.14 (1.65) (3.26) (5.54) 109 mo (9.5 mo) 3.56 (1.05) (4.50) 3.00 (1.85) (2.40) (5.35)

7 ROLE PLAY PREDICTS ToM IN MIDDLE CHILDHOOD / 255 We next performed a one-way ANOVA by group (acting, dance, summer camp), with the combined Z-score of both Theory of Mind measures. For this analysis, we looked only at the females (since there was an uneven distribution of females/males by group). There was no difference between groups, F(3, 20) = 2.00, p =.15. However, planned contrasts revealed a significant difference between the acting group and the dancer and summer camp group combined, t (28) = 2.06, p =.05. We were able to combine the non-actor and dancer groups because a planned contrast showed no difference between those two groups, t (28) = 1.15, p =.260. DISCUSSION The fact that vocabulary scores predicted the Faux Pas but not the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test shows that verbal ability is only predictive of theory of mind skill when the task used is a verbal one and in which the child must represent propositions (he thinks that X). When the task is entirely non-verbal and involves reading mental states rather than propositional attitudes, verbal ability appears to be irrelevant. This study extends the finding that engagement in fantasy and pretense is associated with precocity in false belief understanding at age 4 (Astington & Jenkins, 1995; Taylor & Carlson, 1997) to an older age using advanced theory of mind measures. This study provides the first evidence that the proclivity to engage in role play and to pretend in middle childhood is related to both cognitive and perceptual theory of mind skill independently of age, verbal intelligence, and socio-economic status. This study also shows that involvement in acting classes is correlated with higher theory of mind scores than involvement in either dance or summer camp activities. There are several possible explanations for why role play, pretense, and acting should be related to advanced levels of theory of mind. One possibility is that the activity of trying on roles and pretending to be others requires that children step into the shoes of other people and enact mental states that they do not themselves feel. Such practice in trying on others mental states may lead to skill in understanding others beliefs and intentions, including those of story characters (leading to success on the Faux Pas test); such practice may also lead to skill in reading the mental states behind others facial expressions (leading to success on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test). Alternatively, skill in theory of mind may be what propels children to engage in role play, pretend, and acting classes. We cannot determine whether the relationship between these behaviors is a causal one. It is possible that extensive role play helps children understand others, or that children who have a deep understanding of other minds practice this understanding through engagement in role playing, or that some third factor underlies both. Future research should examine the continuity between theory of mind skill in early and middle childhood and investigate whether role play,

8 256 / GOLDSTEIN AND WINNER pretense, and involvement in acting classes in early childhood predicts advanced theory of mind skill in middle childhood. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank the Wheelock Family Theatre, Riverside TheatreWorks, Boston Ballet, Debra Mason Dance, Watertown Children s Theatre, and the St. Collumkille Boston College Summer Camp, for allowing us to conduct our research at their respective schools. We thank Nick Ackerman, Stephanie Hackett, Katelyn Coleman, Kaitilin Mahoney, Ashley Naranjo, Jonathan Romiti, Louis Tullo, and Shelbi Thurau for their help with data collection. Portions of this research were presented as a poster at the meeting of the Cognitive Development Society, Santa Fe, NM, November REFERENCES Astington, J. W., & Jenkins, J. M. (1995). Theory of mind development and social understanding. Cognition and Emotion, 9, Baron-Cohen, S. (2008). Autism and Asperger s syndrome (The facts). New York: Oxford University Press. Baron-Cohen, S., O Riordan, M., Stone, V., Jones, R., & Plaisted, K. (1999). Recognition of faux pas by normally developing children and children with Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 29(5), Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, D., Hill, J., Raste, Y., & Plumb, I. (2001). The reading the mind in the eyes test revised version: A study with normal adults, adults with Asperger s syndrome or high functioning autism. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines, 42, Bosacki, S. (2000). Theory of mind and self-concept in preadolescents: Links with gender and language. Journal of Educational Psychology, 92, Bosacki, S., & Astington, J. W. (1999). Theory of mind in preadolescent: Relations between social understanding and social competence. Social Development, 8, Chandler, M. (1987). The Othello effect: Essay on the emergence and eclipse of skeptical doubt. Human Development, 30, Cutting, A., & Dunn, J. (1999). Theory of mind, emotion understanding, language and family background: Individual differences and interrelations. Child Development, 70, Dunn, J., Brown J., & Beardsall, L. (1991). Family talk about feeling states and children s later understanding of others emotions. Developmental Psychology 27, Dunn, J., Brown, J., Slomkowski, C., Telsa, C., & Youngblade, L. (1991). Young children s understanding of other people s feelings and beliefs: Individual differences and their antecedents. Child Development, 62,

9 ROLE PLAY PREDICTS ToM IN MIDDLE CHILDHOOD / 257 Goldstein, T. R., & Winner, E. (2010). A new lens on the development of social cognition: The study of acting. In C. Milbrath & C. Lightfoot (Eds.), The Arts and Human Development. New York: Taylor and Francis. Goldstein, T. R., Wu, K., & Winner, E. ( ). Actors are experts in theory of mind but not empathy. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 29, Hughes, C., Jaffee, S. R., Happe, F., Taylor, A., Caspi, A., & Moffitt, T. E. (2005). Origins of individual differences in theory of mind: From nature to nurture? Child Development, 76, Kinderman, P., Dunbar, R., & Bentall, R. P. (1998). Theory-of-mind deficits and causal attributions. British Journal of Psychology, 89, Leslie, A. (1987). Pretense and representation: The origins of theory of mind. Psychological Review, 94, Liddle, B., & Nettle, D. (2006). Higher-order theory of mind and social competence in school-age children. Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology, 4(3-4), Mayer, J. D. ( ). Personal intelligence. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 27, Milligan, K., Astington, J. W., & Dack, L. A. (2007). Language and Theory of Mind: Meta-analysis of the relation between language ability and false-belief understanding. Child Development, 78, Noice, T., & Noice, H. (2006). Artistic performance: Acting, ballet and contemporary dance. In K. A. Ericsson, N. Charness, R. R. Hoffman, & P. J. Feltovich (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Norton, A., Winner, E., Cronin, K., Overy, K., Lee, D. J., & Schlaug, G. (2005). Are there pre-existing neural, cognitive, or motoric markers for musical ability? Brain & Cognition, 59, Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month old infants understand false beliefs? Science, 308, Peterson, C. (2001). Influence of siblings perspectives on theory of mind. Cognitive Development, 15, Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1, Ruffman, T., Perner, J., Naito, M., Parkin, L., & Clements, W. (1998). Older but not younger siblings facilitate false belief understanding. Developmental Psychology, 34, Ruffman, T., Slade, L., & Crowe, E. (2002). The relation between children s and mothers mental state language and Theory-of-Mind understanding. Child Development, 73, Schwebel, D. C., Rosen, C. S., & Singer, J. L. (1999). Preschoolers pretend play and theory of mind: The role of jointly constructed pretence. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 17, Tager-Flusberg, H., & Sullivan, K. (2000). A componential view of theory of mind: evidence from Williams syndrome. Cognition, 76(1), Taylor, M., & Carlson, S. M. (1997). The relation between individual differences in fantasy and theory of mind. Child Development, 68,

10 258 / GOLDSTEIN AND WINNER Wechsler, D. (1991). Manual for the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (3rd ed.). San Antonio, TX: The Psychological Corporation. Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: The truth about false belief. Child Development, 72(3), Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of false beliefs in young children s understanding of deception. Cognition, 13, Direct reprint requests to: Thalia R. Goldstein Yale University Department of Psychology P.O. Box New Haven, CT Thalia.Goldstein@yale.edu

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The Singapore Copyright Act applies to the use of this document. Title Understanding how children think: A theory of mind perspective Author(s) Carolyn Tan-Niam S. L. Source REACT, 1998(1), 27-31 Published by National Institute of Education (Singapore) This document