African Swine Fever What do we know, what has been done and are there unknown risks? September 27, 2018

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1 African Swine Fever What do we know, what has been done and are there unknown risks? September 27, 2018

2 Overview Intro to CEZD Background, Purpose, CEZD and ASF Brief review of African Swine Fever The global spread of the disease What has been done to protect Canada Risk pathways

3 What is the community for Emerging and Zoonotic Diseases? CEZD is a virtual network that integrates automated information-mining tools with a human-based multidisciplinary analysis. To bring together all stakeholders for integrated evaluation of potential risks. The community generates and distributes timely intelligence reports back to all stakeholders. Vision - multi-disciplinary perspectives to generate anticipatory intelligence for emerging and zoonotic diseases.

4 What are we aiming to achieve? To provide effective and efficient early warning of zoonotic and emerging animal disease risks to Canada To supports decisions about mitigation of the risks to animal and human health

5 Who is part of the community? Industry / government Provincial / Federal Animal Health / Public Health Academia

6 What is CEZD s role in ASF? Identified signals of the disease outbreaks Multi-disciplinary discussions of these events relevance to Canada Early warning sent to the broad community. Ongoing information sharing. Vision - multi-disciplinary perspectives to generate anticipatory intelligence for emerging and zoonotic diseases.

7 Brief Review of African Swine Fever The Hosts The Agent All suids Arbovirus Soft ticks Enveloped dsdna (Ornithodoros spp.) virus NO HUMAN HEALTH CONCERNS Image credit Wikipedia The Environment Survives for long periods in protein rich environment Remains infectious for long periods in blood, feces, uncooked or undercooked pork Inactivated by heat 60C for 20 mins Unaffected by freezing, curing, drying

8 Key Features of the Disease One of the most important viral diseases of pigs Severe hemorrhagic disease Many transmission routes Virulence and mortality varies High virulence = 100% mortality Low virulence = seroconversion All age classes of pigs affected No vaccine No treatment Prevention is completely reliant on biosecurity

sources Fomites (vehicles, equipment) Feces, bedding Infected ticks (Ornithodoros

9 Many Transmission Mechanisms Direct Contact oronasal Pig to pig Wild boar reservoirs Indirect contact Uncooked garbage fed to pigs Contaminated feed sources Fomites (vehicles, equipment) Feces, bedding Infected ticks (Ornithodoros spp) Mechanically by biting flies Contaminated water supplies Incubation period 5 days to 2 weeks

10 Clinical Features of the Disease Dr Chris Oura description of gross pathology h?v=zb-9tdjpxf8 10

11 Timeline of ASF Spread Globally University of Minnesota Center for Animal Health and Food Safety 11

12 ASF introduction is largely human mediated Introduction of domestic pigs to Kenya Importation of meat products first introductions to Europe Importation of live pigs and pork products - Cuba Feeding of airline waste to pigs South America Feeding of ship waste to pigs - Georgia ASF Spread Largely attributed to human activities swill feeding, moving sick pigs, inadequate biosecurity measures Wild boar can function as reservoirs +/- ticks Europe not known to be associated with transmission ASF Conversations - 12

13 Global Distribution Map credit: Danvasilis 13

14 ASF in China 8 Provinces and 25 outbreaks officially reported Prohibition on hog transport in all neighboring provinces Map Credit: Pig Progress

15 Why should ASF in China be a concern to Canada? China is home to about half of the global pig population, with thousands of farms ~ 52 percent of the Chinese herd is in backyard farms. Small holders are less likely to have strong biosecurity Feeding of pork products to backyard pigs Farmers sell sick pigs to market to avoid economic losses A large wild boar population ASF is expected persist and become enzootic in China Large volume of travellers Some feed ingredients originate from China 15

16 Biosecurity practices are not ideal Image Credit: Egan Brockoff

17 Diversity of Production in China Image Credit: pri.org Image Credit: Sciencemag.org

18 What has been done to protect Canada? 18

19 19 What has been done? Import Controls - Pigs, Pork and Pork Products Legal imports are very well controlled. Import controls were already in place due to presence of other foreign animal diseases in China. Canada does not import live pigs or pork products/by-products from China, with the exception of Chinese dumplings. These are produced and cooked in Chinese plants that have been approved by CFIA, and the pork used does not originate from China Canada imports frozen pork from regions of Poland and Hungary that are free of ASF. Pork from any affected zone or any region bordering an affected zone is banned The EU zoning map is being used to avoid importing from contaminated or highrisk zones The Canadian Food Inspection Agency has reviewed, and it is confident in the EU s zoning system for ASF International waste controls are in place to prevent feeding of garbage from foreign countries to livestock

20 What has been done? Border Lookouts Border lookout for China, Russia where active outbreaks are occurring Increased surveillance on meat and meat products Travelers are always asked about farm contact 20

21 What has been done? Feeds Canada does not import feed ingredients of animal origin from China The risk posed by feed ingredients not of animal origin imported from China is unknown, and gaps in information related to contamination in China have been identified. The CFIA is reviewing the information available, and assessing the comparative risk of different ingredients Animal Nutrition Association of Canada has been investigating feed imports from China via industry channels Vast majority of imported ingredients (vitamins, minerals, amino acids) are produced by large multinational corporations for international export; good controls in place and audit by many groups Focus of inquiry therefore on items like soybeans and other feed components 21

22 What has been done? Laboratory Preparedness USA and Canada CVO s tasked staff at the North American Animal Health Committee meeting in August to work together to harmonize prevention, diagnostic and response measures The National FAD Laboratories of the USA, Mexico and Canada are working together to harmonize diagnostic testing. Will verify that correct reagents are available that equivalent results are occurring between the countries. Canadian laboratory specialists are working with Mexican authorities for technology transfer and training. A collaborative research project is currently underway with USDA-APHIS for detection of ASF and FMD Canada s laboratory capacity is currently based at NCFAD in Winnipeg. Currently using the serology ELISA kit from Spain (ASF-OIE reference lab), but developing an inhouse ELISA. RT-PCR is available at NCFAD and discussions are underway to deploy to CAHSN labs.

23 What has been done? Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness Hazard Specific Plans are in place for Foreign Animal Diseases Foreign animal disease control program specialists are reviewing and refining the plans for African Swine Fever

24 What has been done? Communications Ongoing communications between CFIA, Council of Chief Veterinary officers, Canadian Pork Council and between CFIA and USDA-APHIS Canada West Swine Health Intelligence Network hosted a webinar with 200+ producers to raise awareness of the risks Recorded and shared CPC has shared information on ASF on their website CFIA has provided biosecurity recommendations for travelers shared via CPC website Canadian Swine Health Intelligence Network has shared information about ASF and biosecurity in Q2 reports

25 Possible transmission routes for ASF into Canada Legally: o Feed ingredients not of animal origin imported from China originating directly or indirectly pose an unknown risk Recent studies concluded ASF was one of several swine viruses able to survive long distance shipping in common swine feed ingredients. (Dee at al 2018) o People and products (visitors to Canadian farms, returning farm workers, hunters, student exchange) coming from any ASF positive country with contaminated clothing, footwear or equipment, packaging, etc. and coming in contact with domestic pigs. 25

26 Possible transmission routes for ASF into Canada Illegally: o Pork products from ASF affected countries entering Canada in passenger luggage and then being discarded in areas where domestic pigs or wild boars are present; or purposefully feed to pigs o Feed ingredients of animal-origin from China o Swill feeding of international waste (via airlines and ships) originating from ASF affected countries and illegally fed to domestic pigs 26

27 Discussion Are there unknown risks? What concerns/questions are there from the community? What scares you? Is something being missed? What conditions in Canada present a risk?

28 THANK YOU 28

Want to find out more? Or join the community? Contact core team CFIA.CEZD-CMEZ.ACIA@canada.ca Contact one of our engagement team: ana.ulmer-franco@gov.ab.ca andrea.osborn@canada.ca barhamm@uoguelph.

29 Want to find out more? Or join the community? Contact core team Contact one of our engagement team: Check out the CAHSS website

GF - TADs ASF11 steering group of experts. African Swine fever in wild boar in Belgium Warsaw, September 2018

Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain GF - TADs ASF11 steering group of experts African Swine fever in wild boar in Belgium Warsaw, 24-25 September 2018 Dr Jean-François HEYMANS dvm Director