Automatic Fault Tree Derivation from Little-JIL Process Definitions
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1 Automatic Fault Tree Derivation from Little-JIL Process Definitions Bin Chen, George S. Avrunin, Lori A. Clarke, and Leon J. Osterweil Laboratory for Advanced Software Engineering Research (LASER) University of Massachusetts Amherst April, 2006
2 Accident and Hazard Accident Undesired or unplanned event that results in harm to people or damage to property Hazard A state of a system that, together with certain conditions in the environment, will lead inevitably to an accident e.g. Hazard: Incorrect type of blood is transfused Condition: Patient s blood type is incompatible with the blood transfused Accident: Patient has transfusion reaction
3 Hazard Analysis Types of hazard analysis Identify hazards and evaluate their effects (e.g. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) Identify and evaluate the causal factors of hazards (e.g. Fault Tree Analysis)
4 Hazard Analysis Types of hazard analysis Identify hazards and evaluate their effects (e.g. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) Identify and evaluate the causal factors of hazards (e.g. Fault Tree Analysis)
5 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) A well accepted and widely practiced hazard analysis technique Systematically identifies and reasons about all possible events that could lead to a given hazard by Developing fault trees Analyzing fault trees Analysis results can be used to improve the system
6 Elements of Fault Trees Basic Event: basic initiating faults or conditions Undeveloped Event: events that are not developed any further, either because necessary information for deriving the fault tree leading to these events is unavailable or because these events are considered to have insignificant consequence Intermediate Event: events that need to be developed AND Gate: the output event occurs if all of the input events occur OR Gate: the output event occurs if any of the input events occur
7 Fault Tree A fault tree captures all the parallel and sequential combinations of events that could lead to a given hazard
8 FTA for Process Improvement Apply FTA to improve medical safety processes Case study: The real-world blood transfusion process used at Baystate Medical Center, Massachusetts
9 The Problem Difficult to manually develop correct fault trees for large processes Requires deep understanding of processes Time-consuming Error-prone Errors in fault trees affect the validity of decisions made to improve processes
10 Our Approach Developed an algorithm that automatically develops fault trees from process definitions The algorithm requires the process to be formal defined The idea can be applied to the other process definition languages Extended existing FTA with visualization Evaluated our approach by applying it to the real-world blood transfusion process
11 Roadmap of Presentation Running example Automatically deriving fault trees from process definitions Fault Tree Analysis for process improvement Case Study Related work Conclusions Future work
12 Simplified Blood Transfusion Process Handle Exception : Patient s Blood Type Unavailable
13 Simplified Blood Transfusion Process Steps Handle Exception : Patient s Blood Type Unavailable Step: represents some specified task to be done
14 Simplified Blood Transfusion Process Sub-step sequencing Handle Exception : Patient s Blood Type Unavailable Sub-step sequencing: defines the order in which a step s sub-steps execute
15 Simplified Blood Transfusion Process Sequential Step Handle Exception : Patient s Blood Type Unavailable
16 Simplified Blood Transfusion Process Try Step Handle Exception : Patient s Blood Type Unavailable
17 Simplified Blood Transfusion Process Exception: Patient s Blood Type Unavailable Handle Exception : Patient s Blood Type Unavailable Exception: indicates that execution of a step fails
18 Simplified Blood Transfusion Process Handle Exception : Patient s Blood Type Unavailable Exception handler Exception handler: handles exception
19 Simplified Blood Transfusion Process Handle Exception : Patient s Blood Type Unavailable Control-flow badge Control-flow badge: indicates how the step catching the exception executes after the handler finishes
20 Simplified Blood Transfusion Process Artifact Flow Patient ID Blood Type Blood Unit Patient ID Blood Typ e Patient ID Bl ood Type Handle Exception : Patient s Blood Type Unavailable Artifacts: entities that are used or produced in processes
21 Example Hazard in Simplified Blood Transfusion Process Artifact Flow Patient ID Blood Type Blood Unit Patient ID Blood Typ e Patient ID Bl ood Type Handle Exception : Patient s Blood Type Unavailable Hazard: Blood Unit passed to Perform Transfusion is wrong
22 Automatically Deriving FTs from Little-JIL Process Definitions 17 templates are defined based on Little-JIL semantics Each can be used to develop certain kind of intermediate events A template specifies events related to the intermediate event defines the cause-consequence relationships between those events and the intermediate event
23 Template for Artifact o from S is wrong Artifact o from S is wrong Artifact i1 passed to S is wrong... Artifact ij passed to S is wrong All required artifacts are correct, but S produces the wrong o S is a leaf step o is an OUT parameter of S i 1,, i j are IN parameter of S
24 Apply Template IN: Blood Type OUT: Blood Unit Blood Unit from Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong Blood Type to Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong Input Blood Type is correct, but Pick up Blood from Blood Bank produces wrong Blood Unit
25 Automatic Fault Tree Derivation Algorithm Define the given hazard as the TOP event and put it to the worklist While the worklist is not empty do Remove an event e from the worklist Apply the proper template according to e For each new intermediate event e, add e to the worklist
26 Example Hazard in Simplified Blood Transfusion Process Artifact Flow Patient ID Blood Type Blood Unit Patient ID Blood Typ e Patient ID Bl ood Type Handle Exception : Patient s Blood Type Unavailable Hazard: Blood Unit passed to Perform Transfusion is wrong
27 Fault Tree for Simplified Blood Transfusion Process E1 Blood Unit to Perform Transfusion is wrong E2 Blood Unit from Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong
28 Simplified Blood Transfusion Process Artifact Flow Patient ID Blood Type Blood Unit Patient ID Blood Typ e Patient ID Bl ood Type Handle Exception : Patient s Blood Type Unavailable Blood unit from Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong
29 Fault Tree for Simplified Blood Transfusion Process E1 Blood Unit to Perform Transfusion is wrong E2 Blood Unit from Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong E3 Blood Type to Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong E4 Input Blood Type is correct, but Pick up Blood from Blood Bank produces wrong Blood Unit
30 Simplified Blood Transfusion Process Artifact Flow Patient ID Blood Type Blood Unit Patient ID Blood Typ e Patient ID Bl ood Type Handle Exception : Patient s Blood Type Unavailable Blood Type to Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong
31 Fault Tree for Simplified Blood Transfusion Process E1 Blood Unit to Perform Transfusion is wrong E2 Blood Unit from Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong E3 Blood Type to Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong E4 Input Blood Type is correct, but Pick up Blood from Blood Bank produces wrong Blood Unit E5 Blood Type from Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type is wrong E6 Blood Type from Test Patient 's Blood Type is wrong
32 Simplified Blood Transfusion Process Artifact Flow Patient ID Blood Type Blood Unit Patient ID Blood Typ e Patient ID Bl ood Type Handle Exception : Patient s Blood Type Unavailable Blood Type from Contact Lab for Patient s Blood Type is wrong
33 Fault Tree for Simplified Blood Transfusion Process E1 Blood Unit to Perform Transfusion is wrong E2 Blood Unit from Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong E5 E3 Blood Type from Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type is wrong Blood Type to Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong E6 Blood Type from Test Patient 's Blood Type is wrong E4 Input Blood Type is correct, but Pick up Blood from Blood Bank produces wrong Blood Unit E7 Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type E8 Exception is not thrown by Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type
34 Simplified Blood Transfusion Process Artifact Flow Patient ID Blood Type Blood Unit Patient ID Blood Typ e Patient ID Bl ood Type Handle Exception : Patient s Blood Type Unavailable Contact Lab for Patient s Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type
35 Fault Tree for Simplified Blood Transfusion Process E1 Blood Unit to Perform Transfusion is wrong E2 Blood Unit from Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong E5 E3 Blood Type to Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong Blood Type from Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type is wrong Blood Type from Test Patient 's Blood Type is wrong E6 E4 Input Blood Type is correct, but Pick up Blood from Blood Bank produces wrong Blood Unit E7 E11 Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Patient ID to Blood Transfusion Process Is wrong E12 E8 Input patient ID is correct, but Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Exception is not thrown by Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type
36 Fault Tree for Simplified Blood Transfusion Process E1 Blood Unit to Perform Transfusion is wrong E2 Blood Unit from Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong E5 E3 Blood Type to Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong Blood Type from Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type is wrong Blood Type from Test Patient 's Blood Type is wrong E6 E4 Input Blood Type is correct, but Pick up Blood from Blood Bank produces wrong Blood Unit E7 E11 Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Patient ID to Blood Transfusion Process Is wrong E12 E8 Input patient ID is correct, but Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Exception is not thrown by Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type E9 E11 Test Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Patient ID to Blood Transfusion Process is wrong E10 Input patient ID is correct, but Test Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type E13 Exception is thrown by Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type
37 Analyze Fault Trees - Calculate Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs) Cut set - a set of basic events and/or undeveloped events whose occurrence ensures that the TOP event occurs MCS - a cut set that cannot be further reduced MCSs can be automatically calculated from a fault tree using Boolean algebra
38 Calculate MCSs E2 E1 Blood Unit to Perform Transfusion is wrong Blood Unit from Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong 1 2 E5 E3 Blood Type to Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong Blood Type from Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type is wrong Blood Type from Test Patient 's Blood Type is wrong E6 E4 Input Blood Type is correct, but Pick up Blood from Blood Bank produces wrong Blood Unit E7 E11 Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Patient ID to Blood Transfusion Process Is wrong 6 E12 E8 Input patient ID is correct, but Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Exception is not thrown by Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type E9 E11 Test Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Patient ID to Blood Transfusion Process is wrong 7 E10 Input patient ID is correct, but Test Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type E13 Exception is thrown by Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type Each gate corresponds to an equation
39 Calculate MCSs E2 E1 Blood Unit to Perform Transfusion is wrong Blood Unit from Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong 1 2 E5 E3 Blood Type to Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong Blood Type from Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type is wrong Blood Type from Test Patient 's Blood Type is wrong E6 E4 Input Blood Type is correct, but Pick up Blood from Blood Bank produces wrong Blood Unit E7 E11 Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Patient ID to Blood Transfusion Process Is wrong 6 E12 E8 Input patient ID is correct, but Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Exception is not thrown by Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type E9 E11 Test Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Patient ID to Blood Transfusion Process is wrong 7 E10 Input patient ID is correct, but Test Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type E13 Exception is thrown by Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type Each gate corresponds to an equation 1: E1 = E2
40 Calculate MCSs E2 E1 Blood Unit to Perform Transfusion is wrong Blood Unit from Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong 1 2 E5 E3 Blood Type to Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong Blood Type from Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type is wrong Blood Type from Test Patient 's Blood Type is wrong E6 E4 Input Blood Type is correct, but Pick up Blood from Blood Bank produces wrong Blood Unit E7 E11 Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Patient ID to Blood Transfusion Process Is wrong 6 E12 E8 Input patient ID is correct, but Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Exception is not thrown by Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type E9 E11 Test Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Patient ID to Blood Transfusion Process is wrong 7 E10 Input patient ID is correct, but Test Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type E13 Exception is thrown by Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type Each gate corresponds to an equation 1: E1 = E2 2: E2 = E3 + E4
41 Calculate MCSs E2 E1 Blood Unit to Perform Transfusion is wrong Blood Unit from Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong 1 2 E5 E3 Blood Type to Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong Blood Type from Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type is wrong Blood Type from Test Patient 's Blood Type is wrong E6 E4 Input Blood Type is correct, but Pick up Blood from Blood Bank produces wrong Blood Unit E7 E11 Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Patient ID to Blood Transfusion Process Is wrong 6 E12 E8 Input patient ID is correct, but Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Exception is not thrown by Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type E9 E11 Test Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Patient ID to Blood Transfusion Process is wrong 7 E10 Input patient ID is correct, but Test Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type E13 Exception is thrown by Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type Each gate corresponds to an equation 1: E1 = E2 2: E2 = E3 + E4 3: E3 = E5 + E6 4: E5 = E7 E8 5: E6 = E9 E13 6: E7 = E11 + E12 7: E9 = E11 + E10
42 Calculate MCSs E2 E1 Blood Unit to Perform Transfusion is wrong Blood Unit from Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong 1 2 E5 E3 Blood Type to Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong Blood Type from Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type is wrong Blood Type from Test Patient 's Blood Type is wrong E6 E4 Input Blood Type is correct, but Pick up Blood from Blood Bank produces wrong Blood Unit E7 E11 Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Patient ID to Blood Transfusion Process Is wrong 6 E12 E8 Input patient ID is correct, but Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Exception is not thrown by Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type E9 E11 Test Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Patient ID to Blood Transfusion Process is wrong 7 E10 Input patient ID is correct, but Test Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type E13 Exception is thrown by Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type Derive an equation for E1 by eliminating and substituting the other intermediate events: E1 = ( E4 ) + ( E11 ) + ( E12 E8 ) + ( E10 E13 )
43 Analyze FTs Calculate MCSs (cont d) E1 = ( E4 ) + ( E11 ) + ( E12 E8 ) + ( E10 E13) MCSs: { E4 } { E11 } { E12, E8 } { E10, E13 }
44 Analyze FTs Calculate MCSs (cont d) E1 = ( E4 ) + ( E11 ) + ( E12 E8 ) + ( E10 E13) MCSs: { E4 } { E11 } { E12, E8 } { E10, E13 } Single points of failure!!!
45 Analyze FTs Calculate MCSs (cont d) E1 = ( E4 ) + ( E11 ) + ( E12 E8 ) + ( E10 E13) MCSs: { E4 } { E11 } { E12, E8 } { E10, E13 } The hazard will definitely occur if Pick up Blood from Blood Bank produces wrong Blood Unit (E4) Patient ID to Blood Transfusion Process is wrong (E11)
46 Improve Simplified Blood Transfusion Process Handle Exception : Blood Product Verification Fails Patient ID Blood Type Blood Unit Pa tien t ID Blo od Typ e Blood Type Patient ID Handle Exception : Patient s Blood Type Unavailable
47 On Alternative to Improve Simplified Blood Transfusion Process Handle Exception : Blood Product Verification Fails Patient ID Blood Type Blood Unit Pa tien t ID Blo od Typ e Blood Type Patient ID Handle Exception : Patient s Blood Type Unavailable Add a consistency check step
48 On Alternative to Improve Simplified Blood Transfusion Process Handle Exception : Blood Product Verification Fails Patient ID Blood Type Blood Unit Pa tien t ID Blo od Typ e Blood Type Patient ID Handle Exception : Patient s Blood Type Unavailable Add a consistency check step
49 New Fault Tree E 1 Blood Unit to Perform Transfusion is wrong E 5 E 3 Blood Type to Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong Blood Unit from Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is wrong Blood Type from Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type is wrong Blood Type from Test Patient 's Blood Type is wrong E6 E 2 E4 Input Blood Type is correct, but Pick up Blood from Blood Bank produces wrong Blood Unit E14 Exception is not thrown by Blood Product Verification E 7 E 11 Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Patient ID to Blood Transfusion Process Is wrong E12 E8 Input patient ID is correct, but Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Exception is not thrown by Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type E9 E 11 Test Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type Patient ID to Blood Transfusion Process is wrong E10 Input patient ID is correct, but Test Patient 's Blood Type produces wrong Blood Type E13 Exception is thrown by Contact Lab for Patient 's Blood Type
50 New MCSs { E14, E4 } { E14, E11 } { E14, E12, E8 } { E14, E10, E13 } No single point of failure now
51 New MCSs { E14, E4 } { E14, E11 } { E14, E12, E8 } { E14, E10, E13 } No single point of failure now E14 appears in every MCS, which means Blood Product Verification is important for the new process Thus further improvement could be focused on Blood Product Verification
52 Case Study: Real-World Blood Transfusion Process The real-world blood transfusion process used at Baystate Medical Center, Massachusetts The Little-JIL definition of this blood transfusion process contains 112 steps
53 Blood Transfusion Process
54 Blood Transfusion Process
55 Blood Transfusion Process
56 The Hazard Blood Unit is Wrong!!! Blood Unit to Administer Unit of Blood Product is wrong
57 The Fault Tree Generated
58 Minimal Cut Sets { Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up produces wrong Document, Product Verification fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit } { Release Blood from Blood Bank produces wrong Blood Unit, Product Verification fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit } { Patient s Armband to In Patient Blood Transfusion Process is wrong, Product Verification fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit }
59 Display How a MCS Leads to the Hazard Support two ways to show how events in a MCS cause the hazard to occur Display the sub-tree Display an execution trace of the process
60 Display How a MCS Leads to the Hazard Support two ways to show how events in a MCS cause the hazard to occur Display the sub-tree Display an execution trace of the process
61 Display Trace for a MCS Example: { Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up produces wrong Document, } Product Verification fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit
62 Trace for a MCS MCS "Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up" produces wrong Document "Product Verification" fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit Parameters Physician Order Patient Record Patient Armband Patient State In-Patient Blood Transfusion Process is started Artifacts: Physician Order is right Patient Record is right Patient Armband is right Patient is right
63 Trace for a MCS MCS "Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up" produces wrong Document "Product Verification" fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit Parameters Physician Order Patient Record Patient Armband Patient State Carry Out Physician Order for Transfusion is started Artifacts: Physician Order is right Patient Record is right Patient Armband is right Patient is right
64 Trace for a MCS MCS "Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up" produces wrong Document "Product Verification" fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit Parameters Patient Record Patient Armband Patient Blood Type & Screen State Check for Existence of Type and Screen is started Artifacts: Physician Order is right Patient Record is right Patient Armband is right Patient is right
65 Trace for a MCS MCS "Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up" produces wrong Document "Product Verification" fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit Parameters Patient Record Patient Armband Patient Blood Type & Screen State Check for Existence of Type and Screen produces right Blood Type & Screen Artifacts: Physician Order is right Patient Record is right Blood Type & Screen is right Patient Armband is right Patient is right
66 Trace for a MCS MCS "Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up" produces wrong Document "Product Verification" fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit Parameters Patient Record Patient Armband Physician Order Blood Type & Screen Document State Prepare Document for Blood Pick-up is started Artifacts: Physician Order is right Patient Record is right Blood Type & Screen is right Patient Armband is right Patient is right
67 Trace for a MCS MCS "Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up" produces wrong Document "Product Verification" fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit Parameters Patient Record Patient Armband Physician Order Blood Type & Screen Document State Prepare Document for Blood Pick-up produces wrong Document Artifacts: Physician Order is right Patient Record is right Blood Type & Screen is right Patient Armband is right Patient is right Document is wrong
68 Trace for a MCS MCS "Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up" produces wrong Document "Product Verification" fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit Parameters Document Blood Unit State Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is started Artifacts: Physician Order is right Patient Record is right Document is wrong Patient Armband is right Patient is right
69 Trace for a MCS MCS "Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up" produces wrong Document "Product Verification" fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit Parameters Document Blood Unit State Pick up Blood from Blood Bank is completed and produces wrong Blood Unit Artifacts: Physician Order is right Patient Record is right Document is wrong Patient Armband is right Patient is right Blood Unit is wrong
70 Trace for a MCS MCS "Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up" produces wrong Document "Product Verification" fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit Parameters Patient Record Patient Armband Patient Blood Unit State Perform Transfusion is started Artifacts: Physician Order is right Patient Record is right Blood Unit is wrong Patient Armband is right Patient is right
71 Trace for a MCS MCS "Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up" produces wrong Document "Product Verification" fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit Parameters Patient Record Patient Armband Patient Blood Unit State Single-Unit Transfusion Process is started Artifacts: Physician Order is right Patient Record is right Blood Unit is wrong Patient Armband is right Patient is right
72 Trace for a MCS MCS "Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up" produces wrong Document "Product Verification" fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit Parameters Patient Record Patient Armband Patient Blood Unit State Bedside Checks is started Artifacts: Physician Order is right Patient Armband is right Patient is right Patient Record is right Blood Unit is wrong
73 Trace for a MCS MCS "Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up" produces wrong Document "Product Verification" fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit Parameters Patient Armband Patient State Verify Patient Identification is started Artifacts: Physician Order is right Patient Record is right Blood Unit is wrong Patient Armband is right Patient is right
74 Trace for a MCS MCS "Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up" produces wrong Document "Product Verification" fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit Parameters Patient Armband Patient State Verify Patient Identification is completed Artifacts: Physician Order is right Patient Record is right Blood Unit is wrong Patient Armband is right Patient is right
75 Trace for a MCS MCS "Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up" produces wrong Document "Product Verification" fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit Parameters Patient Record Patient Armband Patient Blood Unit State Product Verification is started Artifacts: Physician Order is right Patient Armband is right Patient is right Patient Record is right Blood Unit is wrong
76 Trace for a MCS MCS "Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up" produces wrong Document "Product Verification" fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit Parameters Patient Record Patient Armband Patient Blood Unit State Product Verification fails to throw exception FailProductCheck given the wrong Blood Unit Artifacts: Physician Order is right Patient Record is right Blood Unit is wrong Patient Armband is right Patient is right
77 Trace for a MCS MCS "Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up" produces wrong Document "Product Verification" fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit Parameters Blood Tube Blood Vial Catheter Labels State Gather Infusion Equipment is started Artifacts: Physician Order is right Patient Record is right Blood Unit is wrong Patient Armband is right Patient is right
78 Trace for a MCS MCS "Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up" produces wrong Document "Product Verification" fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit Parameters Blood Tube Blood Vial Catheter Labels State Gather Infusion Equipment is completed Artifacts: Physician Order is right Patient Record is right Blood Unit is wrong Patient Armband is right Patient is right
79 Trace for a MCS MCS "Prepare Documentation for Blood Pick up" produces wrong Document "Product Verification" fails to throw exception FailedProductCheck given wrong Blood Unit Parameters Patient Blood Unit Blood Tube Blood Vial Catheter Labels Blood Unit is Wrong!!! State Administer Unit of Blood Product is started Artifacts: Physician Order is right Patient Record is right Blood Unit is wrong Patient Armband is right Patient is right
80 Limitations The completeness and correctness of a derived fault tree depends on the completeness and correctness of the process definition The derived fault tree could contain superfluous subtrees if leaf steps do not satisfy the assumption that any OUT parameter depends on all its IN parameters and resources
81 Related Work Cha, Leveson, and Shimeall proposed a partially automated technique that derives fault trees from Ada programs based on templates Ratan, Partridge, Reese, and Leveson proposed a fully automatic technique deriving fault trees from the Requirements State Machine Language (RSML) specifications The approach by Pai and Dugan automatically derives fault trees from UML models McKelvin, Eirea, Pinello, Kanajan, and Sangiovanni- Vincentelli designed an algorithm that derives fault trees from Fault Tolerant Data Flow (FTDF) models Liggesmeyer, and Rothfelder use model checking to generate fault trees
82 Conclusions Demonstrated that FTA can help process improvement Developed an automated fault tree derivation algorithm based upon process definitions Applied the algorithm to analyze a realworld process
83 Future Work Automatically provide recommendations for process improvement based on analysis results of FTA Combine FTA with Finite-State Verification Combine FTA with the other Hazard Analysis techniques (e.g. FMEA)
84 Thank You
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