Threat Sensitivity, Incentive Sensitivity, and the Experience of Relief

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1 Threat Sensitivity, Incentive Sensitivity, and the Experience of Relief Charles S. Carver University of Miami ABSTRACT Relief is a positively valenced affect that occurs when a threat is removed or avoided. Among dimensional theories, this experience is accounted for by appealing to one of two different self-regulatory systems. Some hold that an approach system is responsible for all types of positively valenced affect, including this one. Others hold that an avoidance system is responsible for this particular positive affect. Two studies are reported (total N 5 422) that examined this issue, using a method in which individual differences in overall threat sensitivity and incentive sensitivity were assessed and related to responses to relief-related hypothetical scenarios. Threat sensitivity was the strongest positive correlate of relief in both studies. Reward responsiveness also related positively (independently) to relief. Fun seeking related inversely to relief. Discussion centers on theoretical implications of the findings for viewing effects of threat sensitivity, and on relations between dimensional and appraisalbased views of affective experience. Recent years have seen a new surge of interest in emotional experience (e.g., Barrett, Niedenthal, & Winkielman, 2005; Davidson, Scherer, & Goldsmith, 2003; Frijda, 2007; Lane & Nadel, 2000; Lewis & Haviland-Jones, 2000; Rottenberg & Johnson, 2007; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). Views of emotion vary considerably. Some people view emotions as a set of distinct entities, which sometimes are seen as basic emotions (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1991; Izard & Ackerman, 2000; Levenson, 1994, 1999; Roseman, 1991). Others hold that affects fall along dimensions of variability (e.g., Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Davidson, 1998; Gray, 1994a; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1992, 1998; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999; Yik, Russell, & Barrett, 1999). Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Charles S. Carver, Department of Psychology, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL ccarver@miami.edu. Journal of Personality 77:1, February 2009 r 2008, Copyright the Authors Journal compilation r 2009, Wiley Periodicals, Inc. DOI: /j x

2 126 Carver Among those who hold dimensional views, it is common today to link affective experiences to broad motivational functions. Two classes of motivational systems are generally distinguished from each other. Appetitive motives and approach behavior are believed to be managed by one of these systems, called a behavioral approach system (BAS; Gray, 1972, 1994a), behavioral activation system (Fowles, 1980, 1987), or behavioral facilitation system (Depue & Collins, 1999). When engaged by incentive cues, it is said to be responsible for approach behavior and positive affect (Fowles, 1993; Gray, 1994a, 1994b). The other system has been called a behavioral inhibition system (BIS; Gray, 1972, 1994a) and sometimes a withdrawal system (Davidson, 1992, 1998). When engaged by the perception of threat, it causes inhibition of behavior or withdrawal (Fowles, 1993; Gray, 1994a) and anxiety. As just indicated, there is general agreement among this group of theorists that affects such as eagerness, excitement, and elation relate to approach. There is similar consensus that affects such as anxiety and guilt relate to withdrawal. However, the theories diverge on other points. Some of these views are organized such that affects of one valence are tied to one system and affects of the other valence are tied to the other system. In such a view, each system relates to a unipolar dimension of affect, ranging from absent to intense. For example, Gray (e.g., 1981, 1990, 1994b) held that the BIS is engaged both by cues of punishment and by cues of frustrative nonreward. He held that the BAS is engaged by cues of reward and by cues of escape from (or avoidance of) punishment. BAS is the source of positive feelings, when those kinds of cues are present. Gray s view thus was one in which each motivational system is responsible for affect of one hedonic tone (positive for BAS, negative for BIS). Cacioppo et al. (1999) took essentially the same position, assuming an evaluative space of two unipolar dimensions. Similarly, Watson et al. (1999) wrote that as our view of these dimensions has evolved, we increasingly have come to see them as truly unipolar constructs that essentially are defined by their high poles.... the low poles of these dimensions ultimately reflect the absence of a particular kind of activation rather than the presence of a certain affective state (p. 827, emphasis added). Carver and Scheier (1998) took a different position, deriving from their effort to link behavior to feedback processes. They posited that two kinds of feedback processes underlie approach and avoidance behavior, respectively. Of greater relevance at present, they argued

3 Experience of Relief 127 that affect emerges from a second layer of feedback systems that monitor how well the behavioral systems are doing (Carver & Scheier, 1990). Positively valenced affect is said to emerge when goal-relevant events are going better than expected and negatively valenced affect is said to emerge when goal-relevant events are going worse than expected. Because approach and avoidance are distinct classes of behavior, however, affects may still differ in other ways as a function of which class of behavior approach versus avoidance is being tracked by this second system (see Higgins, 1997, for an approach to this difference that is grounded in different theoretical constructs but makes similar predictions). When approach is going well, positive affect should emerge in the form of happiness, eagerness, or elation. When avoidance or escape from a threat is going well, positive affect should emerge, but in this case in the form of (for example) relief. In the same way, approach going poorly and avoidance going poorly should both yield negative affects: Frustration, anger, and sadness should occur when approach is going badly, and anxiety and fear should occur when avoidance is going badly. In this view, the approach and avoidance systems should both relate to affects of both valences. Support for this view with respect to negative affect is reviewed elsewhere (Carver, 2004; Carver & Harmon-Jones, in press). The work reported here was undertaken to test these contrasting dimensional views with respect to relief as a positive affect. This research employed as a research tool the existence of measurable individual differences pertaining to the sensitivities of the approach and withdrawal systems (Carver, 2004; Underwood, 1975). That is, people differ from one another in incentive sensitivity and (relatively independently) in threat sensitivity. Given cues of an impending reward, persons high in BAS sensitivity experience more transient positive affect than those lower in BAS sensitivity (Carver & White, 1994). Given cues of an impending punishment, persons high in BIS sensitivity experience more transient anxiety than those lower in BIS sensitivity (Carver, 2004; Carver & White, 1994) Extraversion and neuroticism are sometimes used as proxies for incentive sensitivity and threat sensitivity (e.g., Larsen & Ketelaar, 1989), whereas the BAS and BIS scales were designed explicitly with those sensitivities in mind. There is evidence, however, that these measures have a great deal in common empirically (Zelenski & Larsen, 1999).

4 128 Carver These individual differences in threat and incentive sensitivity can also be used as tools to investigate which motivational system underlies other affects. The procedure involves presenting situational cues that are appropriate to create the target affect and then determining which set of individual differences predicts differences in the emerging affective experience. Using that strategy, studies have found that frustration and anger in response to relevant situational cues relate to individual differences in incentive sensitivity rather than to individual differences in threat sensitivity (Carver, 2004). In the studies reported here, situations were created that incorporated clear cues of escape from (or avoidance of) punishing outcomes. Gray (1990, 1994b) argued that this pattern of cues should engage BAS. If the positive affect of interest here (relief) does derive from the BAS, it should relate to individual differences in BAS sensitivity. If, however, the affect derives from the withdrawal system, it should relate to individual differences in BIS sensitivity. STUDY 1 Method Seventy-two undergraduates at the University of Miami (31 male, 41 female) participated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. 2 All completed the BIS/BAS scales and a scenario-based measure of affective responses (both described below) in group sessions. Other measures that are not relevant to this report were administered between the two target measures in order to disguise any connection that might have been seen between them. BIS/BAS scales The BIS/BAS scales (Carver & White, 1994) were developed to measure dispositional sensitivities of the incentive-approach system and the threatavoidance system. Items are first-person statements, with response options ranging from very false for me (1) to very true for me (4). Items of each scale were summed. One scale (seven items) reflects BIS sensitivity, or threat responsiveness (e.g., Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit, I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something important ). Three scales reflect aspects of BAS sensitivity, or incentive 2. Participants sex did not play a significant role in the associations obtained in either sample. Accordingly, this variable is not discussed further.

5 Experience of Relief 129 responsiveness: Fun seeking (four items, e.g., I crave excitement and new sensations ), Drive (four items, e.g., I go out of my way to get things I want ), and Reward responsiveness (five items, e.g., When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized ). The three aspects of BAS sensitivity reflected in these scales derive from theoretical statements about ways in which BAS functioning should be reflected experientially. That is, high BAS sensitivity should cause people to seek new incentives, to be persistent in pursuing incentives, and to respond with positive feelings when incentives are attained. These functions are somewhat distinct from one another, as reflected in these three BAS-related factors, which typically are not strongly correlated with each other (average correlation in this sample was.34). Reward responsiveness correlated with BIS,.31, but Fun seeking and Drive did not, rs 5.10 and.03. Alphas for the scales in this sample were.77 for BIS,.66 for Fun seeking,.65 for Reward responsiveness, and.73 for Drive. Psychometric properties of the BIS/ BAS scales have been examined extensively in previous studies (e.g., Heubeck, Wilkinson, & Cologon, 1998; Jorm et al., 1999; Leone, Perugini, Bagozzi, Pierro, & Mannetti, 2001; Ross, Millis, Bonebright, & Bailey, 2002). Scenarios Several hypothetical scenarios were created for this study, each describing a situation in which an emotional response of a particular kind would be plausible (see Robinson & Clore, 2001, for evidence of the convergence of real and imagined reactions to emotional stimuli). Participants were instructed to try as hard as they could to imagine the events happening to them, then answer the questions that followed, by choosing the most accurate response for them from the options listed. In the target scenarios, a relief response would be appropriate. They were mixed with other scenarios that served as distractors. The target scenarios were the following: 1. You have been taking a class in public speaking where everyone has to give speeches and everyone also has to criticize everyone else s speeches. The other people in the class have been very critical. Every time you ve had to give a speech, it has felt like they were all out to get you. Now, though, the class is over for the semester, and you don t have to face that kind of treatment ever again. 2. You are walking to your car late at night in a poorly lighted parking lot. As you approach your car, you hear the snap of a twig behind you, following by footsteps. There s only one way out of the fenced area, and it s behind you, in the direction the sounds are coming from. You re having trouble getting your car keys out of your coat pocket. You suddenly

6 130 Carver remember reading about muggings in this area. You hear the clearing of a throat, and a voice from behind you says Please be careful out here late at night. You turn and realize the person is a police officer. At the moment you realize it s a policeman instead of a mugger You re in a course that s important to your major. The grade is based partly on class participation. The professor has the reputation of picking on people he thinks haven t done the reading before class. As it happens, you didn t do the reading for today s class, and you re trying to hide. The class isn t going well, and you can tell the professor is getting angry. Class is almost over. He says All right, last question, and asks a question. You have no idea what the answer is. No one speaks. The professor looks around the room, looks right at you, then says Let s stop for today and start with that question next time. At that moment You are shopping at Macy s. Just as you are about to leave, you hear someone shout, Grab that shoplifter and go straight to the manager s office. I ll call security. You look around and see that two clerks are headed in your direction from two other parts of the store, and they are glaring at you. Just before they reach you, the same voice shouts No, not that one it s that guy over there in the blue shirt, and the clerks head off in a different direction. As they veer away from you... After each of these scenarios were items concerning emotional reactions: How relieved would you feel? How nervous would you feel? and How angry would you feel? The latter two items were intended to serve as distractors. Each item was answered on a 5-point scale, with all 5 points labeled, ranging from not at all to quite a lot. Results and Discussion As responses on the four relief items were moderately correlated (a 5.62), they were summed into an index of relief. Relief correlated both with BIS scores, r 5.46, po.001, and with Reward responsiveness scores, r 5.37, po.002. Tendencies toward inverse relations with the other BAS scales were not significant, Fun seeking r 5.18, p4.15, and Drive r 5.09, p4.46. Comparison of the significant correlations using the procedures described by Steiger (1980) indicate that they did not differ significantly from one another. A multiple regression analysis in which all BIS and BAS scales were entered simultaneously as predictors of relief revealed that the two associations were also relatively independent of each other: BIS b 5.33, t(67) , po.01, and Reward responsiveness b 5.29, t(67) , po.03. Thus, relief was predicted both by dispositional levels of threat sensitivity and by dispositional levels of one facet of incentive sen-

7 Experience of Relief 131 sitivity. These findings suggest that the experience of relief in the kinds of situations that were targeted here relate both to an avoidance system and to an approach system. To assess the robustness of this pattern, a second study was conducted, with a larger sample. STUDY 2 Method Participants were 350 undergraduates at the University of Miami (139 male, 210 female, 1 not reporting), participating in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. All completed the BIS/BAS scales and a scenario measure in large group sessions. As in Study 1, other measures were also completed in those sessions (again between the two target measures). The three BAS-related scales correlated an average of.28. Reward responsiveness correlated with BIS, r 5.26, po.001, but correlations for Fun seeking and Drive were weaker, rs 5.11 and.12. Alphas for the BIS/ BAS scales in this sample were.73 for BIS,.66 for Fun seeking,.58 for Reward responsiveness, and.78 for Drive. The scenario measure was more abbreviated than in Study 1, consisting of two target scenarios plus distractors. One target was the same as Scenario 1 above, concerning the public speaking class. The other target was a variation on Scenario 2 above, concerning the deserted parking lot. In this version, however, the voice from behind you says What are you doing out here so late at night? and you immediately recognize the voice as that of your best friend. Results and Discussion The two relief items correlated.46 and were summed for analysis. As in Study 1, the relief index correlated positively with both BIS, r 5.41, po.001, and Reward responsiveness, r 5.26, po.001. Comparison of these correlations by the procedure described by Steiger (1980) indicated that the correlation for BIS was significantly stronger than that for Reward responsiveness, T , po.01. Relief also correlated inversely with Fun seeking, r 5.19, po.001, but was not significantly related to Drive, r A multiple regression model in which all BIS and BAS scales were entered simultaneously as predictors of relief again confirmed that the significant associations were generally separate from one another: BIS b 5.33, t(345) , po.001, Reward responsiveness, b 5.21, t(345) , po.001, and Fun seeking, b 5.20, t(345) , po.001.

8 132 Carver The pattern of associations obtained here was quite similar to that found in the first sample. Reports of relief were predicted both by dispositional threat sensitivity and by the disposition to respond positively to rewards. Given the greater power accruing from this sample size, the association for threat sensitivity was significantly stronger than that for incentive sensitivity. In addition to these, an inverse association emerged with the disposition to seek out new and exciting potential rewards. This latter association was at nearly the same level as in the first sample, but the greater power rendered it statistically significant in Study 2. This is the only one of the associations that was inverse, indicating that people who tend to seek out fun and exciting experiences are less relieved when a threat dissipates than are people lower in this motive. GENERAL DISCUSSION The studies reported here found that people with greater threat sensitivity report more intense relief after imagined escape from or avoidance of a threat than people lower in threat sensitivity. This finding is consistent with the Carver and Scheier (1998) dimensional model, but it is not consistent with dimensional models that assume unipolar dimensions. To account for it in terms of approach and avoidance motivational systems requires that the avoidance system relate to positive as well as negative affects. The finding is limited, of course, by the use of hypothetical situations as the affect-eliciting stimulus. However, concern about that issue is at least partly mitigated by evidence from other laboratories showing good convergence between real and imagined reactions to emotional stimuli (Robinson & Clore, 2001). It bears repeating that the content of the items on the BIS scale all focuses on negatively valenced affect: anxiety. No BIS item mentions any sort of positively valenced affective experience. Given this, it is impossible to attribute this aspect of the results to method variance in the form of a bias toward making responses with a positive valence. To the contrary, it was those who reported having the greatest vulnerability to anxiety who reported the most intense situational relief. This finding complements those reported earlier with respect to anger and sadness (Carver, 2004). Specifically, given appropriate situational cues, those affective experiences were positively related to measures of incentive sensitivity, rather than threat sensitivity. That

9 Experience of Relief 133 pattern is consistent with a view in which the approach system relates to negative as well as positive affect, but not with a view in which affective dimensions are unipolar. BAS Effects The studies reported here also yielded effects for two scales reflecting aspects of BAS sensitivity: effects that were opposite to one another. Participants higher in Reward responsiveness reported more relief at the removal of the threat than did those lower in Reward responsiveness. This would not be expected from the Carver and Scheier (1998) model, whereas it would be from the alternate model. This finding is somewhat harder to interpret than the BIS finding, however, for two reasons. First, it is more open to concern about method variance. That is, the items of the Reward responsiveness scale all refer to positively valenced reactions. It could be argued that the association of this scale with endorsement of relief reflects a broad tendency to report positively valenced experiences. Another possibility is that the situations in the scenarios were not completely devoid of reward potential. It is hard to create situations in which threat avoidance is fully divorced from incentive attainment. In real-life situations the qualities often are hopelessly confounded. An effort was made to focus the scenarios on threat and its removal, but the attempt may not have been fully successful. All the scenarios placed people into situations where other motives (other goals) were implied, even though they were not emphasized. Further, the elimination of a threat, which yields the relatively low-engagement affect of relief, may have secondary consequences. It has been suggested that relatively low-engagement sorts of positive affect induce a kind of coasting response (Carver, 2003), in which attention broadens and the person withdraws part of his or her engagement with the goal value to which the affect pertains (in this case, the threat). That is, the relief (in this case) represents a signal that the person does not have to attend to the threat any longer and attention broadens to consider other available possibilities for goal pursuit (see also Fredrickson, 1998; Isen, 1987). This set of changes may naturally open people up to enhanced awareness of any existing situational incentives (Carver, 2003). If any incentives were available, one would correspondingly expect an association between Reward responsiveness and positively valenced affect. This might

10 134 Carver have been responsible for the association between Reward responsiveness and relief, even though relief as an affect does not optimally reflect approach motivation. In this latter view, the effect of Reward responsiveness would represent a by-product of the relief response. 3 Although Reward responsiveness related positively to relief, another BAS scale Fun seeking related inversely to relief, albeit at a fairly low level. Why this inverse association? There is evidence that Fun seeking differs in a potentially important way from the other two BAS scales: It incorporates elements of sensation seeking and impulsiveness that are absent from the other scales (Carver, 2004; Smillie, Jackson, & Dalgleish, 2006; Zelenski & Larsen, 1999). Perhaps being oriented toward high-engagement experiences, persons high in Fun seeking are relatively immune to the low-engagement affect of relief. Indeed, fun seekers may be motivated by excitement per se, even if the excitement stems from the potential for disaster, and accordingly they are not relieved when the excitement stops. There is evidence that Fun seeking and sensation seeking do not predict affective experiences well (Zelenski & Larsen, 1999); indeed, this factor was inversely related to unactivated pleasant affect ( relaxed and calm ) in a daily diary assessment in that research, consistent with the present results. A methodological point concerning the contrasting outcomes for the BAS scales is worth noting. Carver has consistently suggested that the BAS scales be examined separately rather than combining them (Carver, 2004; Carver & White, 1994). It is apparent that combining scales in this research would have removed any effect of BAS from the picture. (Substituting the average of the standardized BAS scale scores in the regression model of Study 2 yields b 5.01.) That would have left a clearer conclusion. That is, there would have been support for the BIS prediction and none for the BAS prediction. But that procedure would also have been somewhat misleading in obscuring the diverging associations of the two BAS-related scales. Dimensional and Appraisal Theories One more broad issue deserves discussion. The research reported here was undertaken from a dimensional viewpoint on affect, with the intent of contrasting two view on how dimensions should be 3. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

11 Experience of Relief 135 construed. However, many people examine affects from a very different starting point: Appraisal theories treat affects as distinct experiences that derive from various packages of cognitive construal (e.g., Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Roseman, 1991; Scherer et al., 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). The results reported here are in quite good accord with many such theories. For example, Roseman (1991; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996; Roseman & Evdokas, 2004) has discussed appraisals in terms of relevant motivational state (whether the outcome at stake is appetitive or aversive), whether the outcome is consistent with the motivational state (success) or inconsistent with it (failure), and relative certainty of the outcome s occurrence. In his view, relief is the positive emotion that follows an appraisal of certain successful avoidance of an unpleasant outcome (see also Rolls, 1999, 2005, regarding omission of a punisher, and Ortony et al., 1988, regarding disconfirmation of the prospect of an undesirable event). Indeed, Roseman and Evdokas have reported experimental evidence fitting that picture. The present findings thus can be seen as converging with those of Roseman and Evdokas, using an entirely different methodology. This convergence between predictions suggests a potential for integrating across what sometimes seems to be a conceptual chasm between dimensional views and discrete-emotion views. Roseman s theory is one of discrete emotions, but two of the appraisal qualities he treats as critical are conceptually very similar to parameters in the Carver and Scheier (1998) dimensional view. Both assume a central role for the distinction between appetitive and aversive motivations, and both refer to relatively successful and unsuccessful outcomes pertaining to those motivational states (as does that of Higgins, 1997). The views differ with repect to the outcomes under consideration Roseman (1991) typically focuses on ultimate outcomes, whereas Carver and Scheier (1990, 1998) focus on progress toward those ultimate outcomes but this difference is minor in this context. A convergence between dimensional and discrete-emotion viewpoints, which often seem so different from one another, would seem to be highly desirable. It is noteworthy, then, that this particular convergence follows specifically from the Carver and Scheier dimensional model (and the Higgins, 1997, framework). There is no obvious way to derive it from dimensional models in which affects of positive valence relate solely to approach and affects of negative valence relate solely to avoidance. Thus, this dimensional approach

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