Report on Wilton Park Conference WP1029 LATIN-AMERICA: TACKLING THE COCAINE TRADE Monday 19 Wednesday 21 April 2010

Transcription

1 Report on LATIN-AMERICA: TACKLING THE COCAINE TRADE Monday 19 Wednesday 21 April 2010 In co-operation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Key Points In tackling the increasingly complex cocaine trade, and associated organised crime, it is recognised that there is no single solution. A combination of actors and tools are needed as are resources, capacity, experience, and leadership. Progress has been made with recent successes in reducing production in Colombia and in interdicting cocaine in transit to US and European Union (EU) markets as well as West Africa. However, it may be too early to say whether recent successes constitute a long-term trend. There is a recognised shared responsibility between those in producing and consuming countries in tackling this multi-billion dollar business. Bilateral operational co-operation is strong in many instances, but the greater sharing of information is critical and the wider dissemination of best practice between countries and organisations would be beneficial. Such practical co-operation needs to be matched at the political level between countries and across the Andean region and South America more broadly building on Colombian and Brazilian efforts. Equally, increased co-operation is needed across regions through which cocaine is transited, including West Africa, and regions with high levels of demand such as the EU. Law enforcers, it is argued, should also continue to follow the money as well as drugs flows to curb trafficking, increase deterrence efforts, and pursue extradition of suspected drug dealers. Reducing consumption is also a critical element of the policy response with increased efforts focused on prevention, including messages to youngsters, and treatment of users. Page 1 of 16

2 The cocaine trade: measuring the problem 1. Data compiled by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) indicate that in 2008 estimated total cocaine production was divided between Colombia (51 per cent), Peru (36 per cent) and Bolivia (13 per cent) volumes show a 28 per cent fall, a four per cent increase and a nine per cent increase for these countries respectively as compared with the previous year. The estimated total area under coca cultivation was 167,600 hectares (ha), equating to an estimated total cocaine production of 845 metric tons. After allowing for seizures and local use a total of 610 metric tons were estimated to be available for export. UNODC estimates of major trafficking flows from producer countries in 2008 indicate that the destination of 50 per cent of cocaine available for export was North America, 35 per cent went to Europe, and the remaining per cent was distributed amongst other South American countries. 2. UNODC recognise that there are some longstanding issues concerning the robustness and accuracy of data, particularly in relation to prevalence rates (indicating level of drug use), treatment demand, and interdiction rates. In the latter case the reliability of source data is compromised as a result of a lack of consistent standards in calculating the purity of cocaine seized and the ongoing issue of double counting of seizures across international borders (that is, when more than one country submits data to UNODC relating to the same seizure). Recent work has led UNODC to question the accuracy of its cocaine production estimates due to the relatively poor understanding of the conversion process whereby coca is turned into cocaine hydrochloride and the more general question about the efficiency of individual clandestine processing laboratories. Recent evidence of the addition of adulterants to cocaine within producer countries also suggests that the impression of a homogenous product being shipped from producer countries for export is not necessarily an accurate one (and a further complication when assessing seizure data). Further uncertainty exists in relation to estimating the overall demand for cocaine as there is relatively little understanding of the volumes consumed by individuals categorised as either recreational or problematic users. Some reflection on these issues is anticipated in the forthcoming UNODC World Drug Report 2010, with more detailed analysis to follow in due course. Efforts on behalf of UNODC to improve overall and specific data quality about the cocaine trade are ongoing. Page 2 of 16

3 3. Whilst the aforementioned data integrity issues present some clear difficulties it is nevertheless possible to discern several broad trends that have become apparent over the past decade. The first, and most significant, is that the European cocaine market has doubled in size. Second, at the same time, the Americas have seen a decline in the North American cocaine market whilst cocaine use and seizure levels have both been rising in South America. A significant recent increase in the amounts of cocaine seized in source countries has been observed, reflecting a relative switch in emphasis away from crop eradication towards interdiction based on increased sharing of intelligence. Third, the significant rise in cocaine transhipment to Europe via West Africa that emerged between 2004 and 2007 has now begun to show a decline (the reported origin of cocaine consignments seized in Europe in 2008 was 20 per cent in 2008, compared with 34% in 2007). Whilst these trends taken together represent a reliable overview it often remains difficult to provide meaningful explanations for specific international comparisons. For example, evidence from the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) indicates the United Kingdom (UK) and Spain have the highest cocaine prevalence rates in the European Union. Colombia and the cocaine trade 4. The government of Colombia has noted with satisfaction UN data showing coca cultivation in Colombia was 18 per cent lower in 2008 than in Data from the Colombian Drug Observatory indicate that: in 2009 Colombian authorities seized 205 metric tons of cocaine, which is the highest annual amount since 2000; and have destroyed a total of 8,123 illicit laboratories between 2002 and 2009 (1,326 during 2009). The government believes that these achievements indicate significant progress and that they reflect a counter-narcotics strategy based on what is now a well-coordinated network of 40 state institutions working closely together, coupled with a progressive approach to building international cooperation. As a result, it is believed that a turning point has been reached in the struggle against cocaine trafficking, based upon more general evidence of rising prices and reduced purity levels for cocaine. Several longer-term trends are relevant in support of this contention. The once large and notorious Colombian drug-trafficking cartels have been progressively dismantled since the 1990s, leading to a reconfiguration of criminal activity into much smaller trafficking units within the country. Furthermore, Page 3 of 16

4 reductions in cultivation and production within Colombia have led to an observed displacement of production to neighbouring countries (notably Peru and Ecuador). 5. The initial objectives set by the government of Colombia for Plan Colombia were to reduce the production of drugs (mostly cocaine) by 50 per cent in six years, and to improve security in Colombia by reclaiming control of areas held by illegal armed groups. An academic analysis of Plan Colombia (evaluating the period ) has concluded that it achieved mixed results. The number of hectares under coca cultivation decreased rapidly between 2000 and 2003 (down from 160,000 ha to about 80,000 ha), but thereafter remained relatively stable. However, potential cocaine production remained relatively stable from 2000 to 2007, and only in 2008 was a significant reduction measured. The analysis reached the conclusion that it is more cost efficient for the US to reduce the amount of cocaine reaching consumers by financing the Colombian government in its interdiction efforts (including destruction of illicit laboratories) rather than engaging in conflict with drug producers over control of arable land where coca is grown (using tactics such as crop eradication). The analysis also concluded that whilst both the Colombian and US governments ostensibly have the same objective to fight the cocaine trade, in practice the principal US objective is to reduce the volume of drugs reaching its border whereas the principal Colombian objective is to reduce the funds going to armed groups; and that an estimated three-fold increase in annual US funds allocated to Plan Colombia (from about $500 million per year to about $1.5 billion per year) would have been required to reduce the amount of cocaine reaching consumer markets by around 20 per cent. 6. In terms of reducing production, a switch away from aerial fumigation to manual crop eradication reflects the view that the latter provides a demonstrative, physical on-the ground presence for the authorities rather than the more remote aerial option. However, the use of manual eradication does pose a significantly higher risk to those conducting the work (mostly from anti-personnel mines), reflected in the fact that there were 116 deaths of such workers between 2000 and The Colombian government recognises that very significant challenges remain, driven by the strength of global demand for cocaine. The evidence of increased cocaine production in other countries in the region emphasises the need to enhance Page 4 of 16

5 international cooperation regionally, and to share the burden in funding counternarcotics efforts, in order to ensure an appropriate speed and level of response to the problem (acknowledging the negative consequences that arose from past failures). 7. The scale of the threat to national security in Colombia has been significantly reduced over the past 20 years. However, Colombia continues to experience armed conflict, with armed groups operating in many drug producing areas where coca is cultivated and cocaine manufactured. The Colombian government identifies the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as a significant actor in global cocaine distribution. 1 Evidence acquired from captured FARC members indicates it is involved in alliances with those distributing cocaine both regionally to Central America as well as to Europe. Logistical networks used to traffic ammunition, explosives and weapons provide a well-established conduit for cocaine distribution. 8. A key recent trend is the fragmentation of supply across multiple criminal groups, each reliant on overseas alliances. In particular, smaller drug trafficking organisations do not pose the same form of individual or collective threat to national security as compared with the large cartels of the past. A key element of international law enforcement activity within Colombia coheres around the idea of reducing the longevity of criminal careers. By focusing resources on the most significant organisations, as defined through shared intelligence, the capacity of so-called kingpins to become dominant criminal actors has become much more restricted than in the past in terms of the period from their emergence as a significant criminal to their effective restraint by the authorities (it is estimated that surviving a maximum of 18 months as a kingpin has become the norm in this respect). This factor further underlines the transition to more fragmented trade within Colombia that is no longer cartel based. 9. A total of 1,164 individuals have been extradited from Colombia since 2000 (169 in 2009), the vast majority to the United States (US). The Colombian government regards this as a key element of the strategy to tackle the cocaine trade 1 FARC-EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia Ejército del Pueblo) is presently designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the government of the United States under the US Immigration and Nationality Act. Page 5 of 16

6 and one that highlights the need for international cooperation to maintain momentum. The ongoing use of extradition from Colombia to the US (208 cases in 2008, 184 in 2009) is the result of what is now a mature legal process backed up by manifest political willingness to support the strategy. 10. Maintaining momentum in Colombia requires a long-term commitment of resources and the necessary support skills and capabilities to yield decision-making informed by experience. Whilst recent data indicators are positive signs of impact against the cocaine trade they give only an approximation of the true picture; developing a trend line showing sustained reduction in the cocaine trade is the more substantive goal underlying the activities of international law enforcement working in Colombia and across the region. Peru and the cocaine trade 11. Peru is currently the second largest cocaine producing country based on UNODC data. Academic analysis highlights a steady growth trend in coca cultivation in Peru over the past five years or so: from an estimated 38,000 ha in 2000 to 56,000 ha in This should be compared with a peak in Peru of 129,100 ha in 1992, and the 81,000 ha grown in Colombia in The government of Peru permit legal coca cultivation for use in traditional and industrial products: 6,676 of the 56,100 ha grown in 2008 were in this category. The estimated total production of coca in 2008 was 113,300 metric tons, of which 9,000 metric tons 7.35 per cent of the total was legal production (used in pharmaceutical products). Estimated illicit cocaine production in 2008 was 326 metric tons, of which 285 tons was available for export after allowing for seizures totalling 25 tons and 16 tons that were used for domestic consumption. Significantly, this volume of cocaine production required an estimated 36,000 metric tons of precursor chemicals. 12. A government coca crop eradication programme has resulted in significant declines in two provinces (San Martín and Ucayali) in the past 5-10 years, yet all other provinces have seen growth over the same period, including some regions where coca was not previously cultivated. This apparent anomaly is explained by the fact that around 90 per cent of all eradication activity was focused in the two named provinces as well as the significant majority of alternative development funds. A Page 6 of 16

7 number of features characterise the present phase of the cocaine trade within Peru: a move towards micro-scale drug production, use of remote locations, a new cycle of violence (including remnants of the Shining Path guerrilla group now engaged in drug trafficking), and infiltration of political parties by criminals (albeit this is not a new phenomenon). 13. Peru has a relatively poor recent record in making inroads against the drug trade compared with Colombia: coca cultivation shows a growth trend in Peru compared with a falling trend in Colombia; in tons of cocaine and 470 tons of precursor chemicals were seized in Peru compared with respective amounts of almost 200 and 9,637 tons in Colombia. Peru eradicated around 10,000 ha of coca in 2008, compared with 96,000 ha in Colombia. These data point to a real possibility that Peru has the potential to overtake Colombia and become the main coca and cocaine producing country if the present trends are not addressed. Whilst it is clear that to reverse this trend more resources will be needed from the Peruvian government, a regional strategy is also required, incorporating alternative development as well as interdiction and eradication. Support from the international community is also vital to the success of such a strategy. 14. The National Commission for Development and Life without Drugs (DEVIDA) of Peru is responsible for implementing the national drugs strategy. The strategy has three main dimensions: drug prevention and rehabilitation (reflecting particular concern with rising drug use by young people in the past three years); eradication of illicit coca cultivation (as well as opium poppy and marijuana crops) and interdiction (of both drugs and precursor chemicals), and anti-money laundering measures; and alternative development seeking to promote licit economic activities and the improvement of social services and infrastructure in coca-producing areas. Alongside this an important political measure designed to resist the ability of drug traffickers to enter political life has recently been given cross partisan support. However, it is clear that regional factors have a powerful impact, particularly in relation to what occurs in Colombia, and in particular the displacement impact of recent successful efforts against the cocaine trade by the government of Colombia. Page 7 of 16

8 15. One example of overseas assistance to DEVIDA has been UK funding of a fact-finding visit to assess the UK anti-drug education campaign (known as FRANK 2 ) which led to its adaptation for use in Peru (as the Habla Franco campaign). This has helped to support efforts under the national drug strategy that seek to adapt programmes to reflect regional diversity. DEVIDA seeks to build upon examples of successful transformation using alternative development to move communities and individuals away from illicit to licit livelihoods, notably in San Martín province. Increased funding by the government of Peru needs regional and international augmentation: evidence of growing EU commitment is welcome, although US support has declined in relative terms since Important relationships with Colombia, Ecuador, Chile and Argentina as well as Venezuela and Bolivia are vital for future progress. Mexico and the cocaine trade 16. The government of Mexico is profoundly concerned at the rising levels of violence and homicide arising from the drug trade within its country. Its figures suggest 9 out of every 10 intentional homicides are due to drug conflict, however 11.5 such homicides per 100,000 inhabitants is not high by international standards. Colombia s equivalent rate per 100,000 is higher, although unlike Mexico s, is on a downward trend. However, the rates for both countries are considerably lower than neighbouring countries such as Guatemala and El Salvador. In Mexico, the link between poverty and involvement in the drug trade is neither insignificant nor is it a central explanation for a high consumption; a growth in the middle class and generally rising incomes in Mexico have also been contributory factors behind growth in recent years. 17. The government s primary response to tackle the drugs trade has been to strengthen security, political and social institutions, particularly at local government level. As a federal country, Mexico has a highly fragmented criminal justice system (for example, some 2,200 entities have law enforcement responsibilities) and the government recognise that reform is an overdue priority, for which the Merida Initiative has provided welcome funding and impetus. Alongside this the government supports efforts to strengthen social and moral aspects of society against the allure of 2 See paragraph 29 Page 8 of 16

9 the drug trade, but also recognises that reducing demand for drugs in countries outside Mexico is ultimately a critical contributory factor in achieving fundamental change. 18. A recent shift in the emphasis of US drug policy away from cocaine producing countries towards Mexico has been driven by the extraordinarily high levels of violence that have been the hallmark of conflict between Mexican criminal groups involved in drug distribution (predominantly, but not exclusively, cocaine for the US market). Mexico is neither a significant producer country nor a country with traditionally high levels of drug use, but its criminal organisations are involved in supplying nearly all of the cocaine entering the US. The question of US policy goals is central to understanding the likelihood of sustained impact on the cocaine trade, with the persistence of demand for cocaine in the US as evidence of a failure of domestic policy to address this root cause. 19. The Merida Initiative the most tangible expression of recent US regional drug policy is a relatively modest commitment of resources in comparison with US funding of Plan Colombia between 2000 and The Merida Initiative began in 2008 and is envisioned as a three-year programme to provide equipment and training in support of law enforcement operations and technical assistance to promote reform, oversight and professionalisation of security agencies in the target countries. 20. Unlike the situation in Mexico, US goals under Plan Colombia ultimately incorporated a desire to bolster what were seen as long-term weaknesses in the Colombian state (addressing criminal justice reform and human rights concerns) in order to help it address the political factors embedded within the drug trade and its associated violence. The effects of Plan Colombia in helping to reassert the integrity of the Colombian state were not the foremost goals for US drug policy from the outset but nevertheless have been a key outcome, whatever overall view is taken of the success of the initiative in relation to ongoing levels of cocaine importation into the US. The Merida Initiative itself, some argue, currently offers only a marginal impact 3 Note for readers: the vast majority of funding under the Merida Initiative has been allocated for Mexico but it also includes or has included some funding for countries in Central America, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. The US Congress allocated $400 million (M) to Mexico in 2008, $300M and then a further $450M in 2009, and has requested $450M for Page 9 of 16

10 on the cocaine trade relative to other factors. Brazil and the cocaine trade 21. Brazil has significant river networks and shared borders with ten other countries that make it somewhat inevitable that it will be affected by cocaine transhipment. It has now also become a significant drug consumer country. UNODC data for 2006/07 indicate Brazil was the largest individual country market for cocaine in South America in numbers of persons at that time (and it is strongly believed to have expanded since). Organised crime control of retail drug distribution in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo with its associated violence has created significant law enforcement challenges. The issue of precursor chemical control has been a priority in Brazil since 2001 when federal legislation was issued to address the matter. Whilst Brazil has been successful in restricting the flow of precursors to neighbouring countries this has had the unintended and unwelcome effect of leading to more coca paste being imported into Brazil for refining. A related impact has been an expansion in availability (and use) of crack cocaine. Brazilian law enforcement evidence suggests three quarters of cocaine from Bolivia targets Brazilian markets. In response to these developments Brazil has sought to strengthen bilateral law enforcement partnerships with Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay. Cooperation has taken the form of operational data exchange and joint operations (including those specifically targeting clandestine airstrips) as well as more recent joint initiatives to train forensic experts and build capacity in this domain. Despite some good results, much more remains to be done. 22. Brazil seized 18.8, 20.5 and 20.8 tons of cocaine within its own borders in 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively but there is a clear recognition that the wider region (encompassing Central America and the Caribbean as well as South America) needs to do more in a spirit of shared responsibility between law enforcement agencies. The Brazilian Federal Police has been an active supporter of Ameripol since its inception and regard this evolving institution as an important means of strengthening joint law enforcement commitment. Two examples of specific commitment by Brazil are: special resources focused on addressing the problem of drug couriers using the São Paulo international airport (where 1.5 tons of cocaine was seized in 2009); and second, additional measures in the Amazon region to Page 10 of 16

11 counter trafficking activity including the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and federal legislation that permits the Brazilian airforce to shoot down planes without an authorised flight plan (and has resulted in a drastic fall in the number of suspicious flights in the region). A notable success in April 2010 saw the arrest by Brazilian federal police in Rio de Janeiro of a trafficker then listed as number three on the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) list of top fugitives. Transit routes from South America to Europe through West Africa 23. A multiple variety of routes are used by traffickers to ship cocaine from Latin America to Europe. West Africa has been targeted in recent years. The weak state security apparatus resulting from the Civil War in Sierra Leone ( ) has provided a vulnerability that transnational crime has sought to exploit in attempting to use the country as a transhipment point for cocaine. Amidst general evidence of cocaine seizures in neighbouring countries Sierra Leone experienced modest seizures in 2006 and 2007 (a total of 95 kilos) but in July 2007, Venezuelan authorities seized 2.5 metric tons of cocaine on a private plane that was departing for Sierra Leone. In July 2008, kilos of cocaine and 5 AK-47s were seized together with a number of suspects when a light aircraft landed at Freetown international airport. The aircraft interception was made purely by chance even though it subsequently turned out that intelligence existed but had not been shared. As a result of the interdiction a government minister with family connections to a local drug trafficker was forced to resign, highlighting the potential for corruption to reach the highest levels of government. In response to the emergent threat the government formed the Joint Drugs Interdiction Task Force (JDITF) to counter drug trafficking and organised crime. The main aim of the JDITF is to establish standardised policies, procedures, and cooperative relationships across intelligence, enforcement and investigations, and prosecutions functions. Key international partners work with the JDITF including UNPOL UNIPSIL (United Nations Police United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone). 24. Despite the establishment of the JDITF a number of significant challenges remain: Sierra Leone has extremely porous land borders and a largely unpatrolled coastline some 200 miles long; limited ability to monitor its airspace despite the presence of many remote but serviceable airstrips, and continues to be afflicted by Page 11 of 16

12 corruption. Logistics, vehicles, equipment and training for law enforcement all need improvement and at present poor conditions of service do not assist the struggle against corruption. Nonetheless, combating drug trafficking is now fully accepted as a national priority and not just an institutional one. Currently steps are being taken to remodel the JDITF into a Transnational Crime Unit under the aegis of the West African Coast Initiative (WACI) driven by a wider Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) regional action plan to tackle drug and crime issues. The leaders of the Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone signed the WACI Freetown Commitment in February Tackling cocaine trafficking along the supply chain to Europe 25. Over the past three years SOCA has considerably expanded its knowledge of the organised crime groups trafficking cocaine into the UK, and in particular the most significant or, high-value traffickers. It is estimated that, after allowing for seizures, between 25 and 30 tons of cocaine is currently consumed in the UK on an annual basis. Purity at the first point of sale (that is, wholesale) is between 60 and 70 per cent but by the time cocaine is sold at street level purity levels typically fall to between 10 and 20 per cent (though can be even lower). This further highlights the key trend towards extensive adulteration of retail cocaine in the UK market, including substances not intended for human consumption such as a sharp increase in the use of the worming agent levamisole detected by SOCA since SOCA aim to build upon what they believe are signs of progress against cocaine importation into the UK seen during 2009 but recognise that significant challenges remain. Evidence showing displacement of cocaine production towards countries such as Venezuela and Ecuador reflects effective disruption (such as destruction of illicit laboratories) in the main source countries and vigilance and enhanced cooperation is needed to control this development. Operational activity against traffickers serves both to demonstrate justice as well as yielding valuable intelligence about how such groups conduct their business. A Colombian citizen was extradited to the UK in 2009 and has since been convicted and sentenced in the UK for drug-related money laundering offences. Whilst SOCA welcomes this development, the UK legal system (in common with most EU member states) does not yet have the same capacity to utilise extradition to the extent pursued by the US Page 12 of 16

13 authorities. SOCA favour exploration of legal innovations likely to further the use of extradition against drug traffickers, perhaps at a pan-european level, in order to achieve a more equal risk calibration in the minds of traffickers when they consider the potential consequences of their activities in Europe as opposed to those that presently apply in relation to the US. 27. Expanded use of both civil recovery powers to seize criminal assets and targeted fiscal investigations is seen as desirable, coupled with greater exploitation of forensic analysis of seized shipments to inform and target action in source countries. The use of shipping containers as a logistical means for drug shipment is identified as an area in need of particular attention in light of evidence of a growing trend towards use of this method. In general terms the need for greater agility to react to rapid changes in distribution methods and routes is a prerequisite for successful law enforcement against international cocaine traffickers. Cocaine and the UK drug strategy 28. Whilst overall drug use in the UK has shown a decline of around 12 per cent in the past decade, cocaine powder use is rising (use of crack cocaine is stable) and it has the second highest prevalence among the UK population of all illegal drugs after cannabis. The most recent British Crime Survey indicated that 9.2 per cent of the UK population claimed to have used cocaine at least once in their life, with those in the age range indicating a higher rate of 12.2 per cent (substantially higher than around 4 per cent when the question was first asked in 1996). Around twice the proportion of men use cocaine as compared with women, and the archetypical UK cocaine user is 20-29, white, single and frequents night-clubs. The reasons behind the rise in popularity of the drug are unclear but its use as a so-called drug of choice in prosperous areas by high-achieving citizens is now widely acknowledged. 29. The current UK government drugs strategy is entitled Drugs: protecting families and communities. 4 4 It aims to restrict the supply of illegal drugs and reduce the demand for them, based upon four elements: (1) enforcement to tackle drug supply, drug-related crime and anti-social behaviour; (2) preventing harm to children, young people and families affected by drug misuse; (3) delivering new approaches to drug treatment and social re-integration; and (4) public information campaigns, communications and community engagement. This strategy forms the basis for assessing progress against each of these elements. Page 13 of 16

14 The government has made significant investment in education notably through the FRANK campaign targeting the age group. A variant of this campaign first launched in 2008 using a character called Pablo the Drugs Dog targets potential cocaine users in the age group and has achieved high levels of audience recognition (for example, the website has recorded some 735,000 hits). 5 The UK government is also a strong supporter of the Shared Responsibility campaign promoted by the government of Colombia, and has funded a number of related events and initiatives, including an exhibition in Trafalgar Square in central London. Cocaine and the issue of treatment 30. Treatment for drug users is an important part of the overall UK crime reduction agenda. Treatment for cocaine use currently forms around 6 per cent of the total uptake of places (compared with around 48 per cent for heroin), however. The government is concerned about the potential public health consequences of the growing number of adulterants added to cocaine (including phenacetin which has known carcinogenic properties). Some empirical evidence on the dangers of combining alcohol and cocaine leading to violent offending is also emerging, with a recent pilot project across six police force areas finding that approximately 20 per cent of those arrested for violent offences tested positive for cocaine. 31. A perspective from the international non-governmental organisation sector highlighted the absence of agreed international standards for drug treatment despite the important (and welcome) commitment to treatment embodied in the UN drug conventions. A key concern is that the use of non-evidence based treatments can have a number of harmful outcomes including human rights abuses and an ineffective impact upon public health outcomes (for example, spread of HIV). Whilst scientific evidence is available in support of the effectiveness of substitution treatment for heroin use there is no widely accepted equivalent for cocaine use. This poses particular difficulties in producer and transit countries in Latin America where the incidence of cocaine (and notably crack cocaine) use is growing. However, given that the majority of cocaine users do not inject the drug HIV infection is not a direct consequence of rising use, although there is some evidence of growing injecting in 5 For background information see: Accessed 30 April Page 14 of 16

15 the region. However, crack cocaine users are more likely to adopt high risk activity and end up in sexual networks where the spread of HIV becomes a greater risk. In summary, an overall package of policy measures is needed to address the emergent trends regarding drug use patterns. A recent move in some Latin American countries towards a more tolerant approach on personal drug use (that is, setting minimum amounts at or below which users are not prosecuted) is an important statement but the articulation of exactly where this fits into a national drug strategy will necessarily vary by country (as is the case in EU countries, where the Netherlands, Portugal and the Czech Republic have made the most overt legislative attempts to delineate use and trafficking). EU and Latin America cooperation to tackle the cocaine trade 32. The EU has well developed systems of law enforcement cooperation under the framework of Justice and Home Affairs cooperation. Europol, the criminal intelligence hub for EU member states, is uniquely placed to provide an overview on the key trends in the cocaine trade as it impinges upon Europe. Route diversification is regarded as somewhat inherent, with use of routes via the Balkans, South Eastern Europe, and the Baltic states in addition to the recent growth in routes via West Africa. However, at present there is no indication that Mexican crime groups are seeking to conduct operations within the EU. A growing sophistication in both distribution techniques and money laundering methods is also apparent as organised crime groups are strongly drawn to a relatively affluent consumer society of some 500 million citizens. 33. In their efforts to tackle the cocaine trade, EU member states are able to draw upon excellent levels of bilateral cooperation and a series of institutional and legislative arrangements that facilitate cross-border investigation, surveillance and permit Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) to be established. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty a new Standing Committee of the EU Council on operational cooperation on internal security (known by the acronym COSI) has been established with the aim of developing a more cohesive internal security strategy for the EU. COSI has recently been asked to consider a French proposal to network together what are presently four distinct areas of activity that each tackles a different aspect of the drug trade including in large part the cocaine trade as it affects Page 15 of 16

16 Europe. The four initiatives are Maritime Analysis and Operation Centre Narcotics (MAOC-N) which aims to coordinate the fight against drug trafficking in the Atlantic; Centre de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Drogue en Méditerranée (CECLAD-M) which has a similar role in the Mediterranean, and bilateral initiatives in West Africa under the auspices of the governments of the UK (in Ghana), and France (in Senegal). 34. However, overall EU cooperation with Latin America on drug issues remains underdeveloped despite a number of strong examples of bilateral cooperation. Nonetheless, some signs of improvement can be detected: Colombia presently sends operational liaison officers to Europol, and the establishment of Ameripol (Comunidad de Policías de América) is likely to provide opportunities for more systematic cooperation over time. The fact that Europol was a political initiative has yielded certain advantages in terms of political support and resources. Ameripol by contrast is a police-driven initiative and may encounter some barriers in moving from bilateral to multilateral investigation unless political support emerges to overcome constraints rooted in sovereignty issues. Martin Elvins June 2010 Wilton Park Reports are brief summaries of the main points and conclusions of a conference. The reports reflect rapporteurs personal interpretations of the proceedings as such they do not constitute any institutional policy of Wilton Park nor do they necessarily represent the views of rapporteurs. For further information about Wilton Park and upcoming conferences, please consult Page 16 of 16