Pandemic Influenza Planning Assumptions U n i v e r s i t y o f N o r t h C a r o l i n a a t C h a p e l H i l l August Revised September 2008

Similar documents
University of Colorado Denver. Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan. April 30, 2009

UNC CH Response to H1N1

Business Continuity Planning Template January 2007

Caribbean Actuarial Association

abcdefghijklmnopqrstu

Difference between Seasonal Flu and Pandemic Flu

Unit Pandemic Influenza Plan

County-Wide Pandemic Influenza Preparedness & Response Plan

Influenza Pandemic: Overview of Ops Response. Ministry of Health SINGAPORE

Minnesota s Preparations for H1N1 Influenza. Sanne Magnan, MD, PhD Minnesota Department of Health September 23, 2009

Management of Pandemic Influenza Outbreaks. Bryan K Breland Director, Emergency Management University of Alabama at Birmingham

Fever (up to 104 degrees) and sweating/chills Headache, muscle aches and/or stiffness Shortness of breath Vomiting and nausea (in children)

Conflict of Interest and Disclosures. Research funding from GSK, Biofire

Influenza: The Threat of a Pandemic

Disease Mitigation Measures in the Control of Pandemic Influenza

Peterborough County-City Health Unit Pandemic Influenza Plan Section 1: Background

4.3.9 Pandemic Disease

Preparing for a Pandemic What Business and Organization Leaders Need to Know

I also want to thank the 56 members of the Task Force for all their hard work in helping shape the draft plan for the institution.

How do I comply with the Influenza Control Program Policy this year?

How do I comply with the Influenza Control Program Policy this year?

Best Practice Guideline for the Workplace During Pandemic Influenza OHS & ES

Applicable Sectors: Public Health, Emergency Services.

TABLE OF CONTENTS. Peterborough County-City Health Unit Pandemic Influenza Plan Section 1: Introduction

Pandemic Influenza Plan. Central Georgia Technical College

PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN

H1N1 Vaccine Based on CDCs ACIP Meeting, July 29, 2009

PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: CURRENT THREAT AND CALL FOR ACTION. Kirsty Duncan PhD FSAScot

Pandemic Flu: Preplanning for an Outbreak

Pandemic Influenza: Hype or Reality?

SURVEILLANCE & EPIDEMIOLOGIC INVESTIGATION NC Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Public Health

Influenza Pandemic Planning in Ontario Ontario School Boards Insurance Exchange

Public Health Agency of Canada Skip to content Skip to institutional links Common menu bar links

Guideline for Students and Staff at Post-Secondary Institutions and Private Vocational Training Providers

Supplemental Resources

H1N1 Pandemic The medical background. Marita Mike MD, JD Center for Health and Homeland Security

Devon Community Resilience. Influenza Pandemics. Richard Clarke Emergency Preparedness Manager Public Health England South West Centre

2009-H1N1 Pandemic Influenza: DHS Perspective

2009 H1N1 (Pandemic) virus IPMA September 30, 2009 Anthony A Marfin

Running head: INFLUENZA VIRUS SEASON PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 1

Contents. Flu and Infectious Disease Outbreaks Business Continuity Plan

Costs of School Closure

COMMUNITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM PANDEMIC INFLUENZA INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

North York General Hospital Policy Manual

MARSHFIELD PUBLIC LIBRARY POLICY NUMBER 4.523

COMMUNITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM PANDEMIC INFLUENZA INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

University of Wyoming Pandemic Planning Framework Revised April 27, 2009

Pandemic Influenza Planning for the Workplace

Pandemic Flu: Non-pharmaceutical Public Health Interventions. Denise Cardo,, M.D. Director Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion

Novel H1N1 Influenza. It s the flu after all! William Muth M.D. Samaritan Health Services 9 November 2009

Business Continuity and Crisis Management. Cardinal Health s Approach

Pandemic H1N1 2009: The Public Health Perspective. Massachusetts Department of Public Health November, 2009

2009 Pandemic H1N1 Influenza: Are you prepared for the Fall?

Incidence of Seasonal Influenza

Current Swine Influenza Situation Updated frequently on CDC website 109 cases in US with 1 death 57 confirmed cases aroun

Pandemic Flu Response Plan

Emory Preparedness and Emergency Response Research Center H1N1 Survey of Healthcare Workers in Correctional Facilities

DRAFT WGE WGE WGE WGE WGE WGE WGE WGE WGE WGE WGE WGE WGE WGE GETREADYNOWGE GETREADYNOWGE GETREADYNOWGE GETREADYNOWGE.

H1N1 Response and Vaccination Campaign

Ralph KY Lee Honorary Secretary HKIOEH

Pandemic Influenza Planning Assumptions 1 Department of Global Health, Save the Children (US) Updated, March 24, 2015

Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response

Procedures for all Medical Emergencies

HEALTHCARE WORKER INFLUENZA VACCINATION POLICY

Emerging Infections: Pandemic Influenza. W. Paul Glezen

Pandemic Influenza: Considerations for Business Continuity Planning

County of Los Angeles Department of Health Services Public Health

What is Influenza? Patricia Daly MD, FRCPC Medical Health Officer and Medical Director of Communicable Disease Control

1 INFLUENZA IMMUNIZATION IN YORK REGION: RATES OF UPTAKE AMONG HEALTH CARE WORKERS IN HOSPITALS AND LONG-TERM CARE HOMES

FLU VACCINE MYTHS & FACTS. Get the facts to keep you and your loved ones flu-free. Sponsored by:

Infectious Disease Response Plan

Evaluating the Economic Consequences of Avian Influenza (1) Andrew Burns, Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, Hans Timmer (2)

SPECIAL ISSUES FOR H1N1 FLU SUMMIT II. University of Houston Law Center October 30, Cynthia S. Marietta

in control group 7, , , ,

Annex H - Pandemic or Disease Outbreak

Pandemic Preparedness: Pigs, Poultry, and People versus Plans, Products, and Practice

PANDEMIC INFLUENZA RESPONSE PLAN

What do epidemiologists expect with containment, mitigation, business-as-usual strategies for swine-origin human influenza A?

Situation Manual. 355 Minutes. Time Allotted. Situation Manual Tabletop Exercise 1 Disaster Resistant Communities Group

Pandemic Influenza. Bradford H. Lee, MD Nevada State Health Officer. Public Health: Working for a Safer and Healthier Nevada

Pandemic Influenza Tabletop Exercise For Schools

GOVERNMENT OF ALBERTA. Alberta s Plan for Pandemic Influenza

WHOLE OF - SOCIETY PANDEMIC READINESS

Influenza Backgrounder

Flu Policy. Faculty of Computer Science September, 2009

How do I comply with the Influenza Control Program Policy this year?

Norwich and Pandemic Influenza Planning

RENFREW COUNTY & DISTRICT PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN. A Planning Guide for Community Agencies. October, 2006

University Emergency 911. Pandemic Planning National Campus Safety Summit Las Vegas, Nevada February 23, 2015

Situation Update Pandemic (H1N1) August 2009

Swine Influenza A: Information for Child Care Providers INTERIM DAYCARE ADVISORY General Information: do not

H1N1 Planning, Response and Lessons to Date

AVIAN FLU BACKGROUND ABOUT THE CAUSE. 2. Is this a form of SARS? No. SARS is caused by a Coronavirus, not an influenza virus.

Guidance for Influenza in Long-Term Care Facilities

H1N1 Update. Arizona Department of Health Services Bureau of Public Health Emergency Preparedness. Teresa Ehnert Bureau Chief

How do I comply with the Influenza Prevention Policy this year?

International Co-circulation of 2009 H1N1 and Seasonal Influenza (As of September 4, 2009; posted September 11, 2009, 6:00 PM ET)

Swine Influenza Update #3. Triage, Assessment, and Care of Patients Presenting with Respiratory Symptoms

59 OF 172 / Set 1 Copyright (c) 2000 Los Angeles Times

Response Plan - HINI Influenza UC College of Law October 2009

Transcription:

Pandemic Influenza Planning Assumptions U n i v e r s i t y o f N o r t h C a r o l i n a a t C h a p e l H i l l August 2006 - Revised September 2008 UNC is taking steps to prepare and plan for the possibility of pandemic influenza. This document is to help UNC s pandemic planning by establishing a common set of assumptions. These are only assumptions pandemics are unpredictable, and there is no way to know the characteristics of a pandemic virus before it emerges. The following specific assumptions have been gleaned from a variety of sources or developed from campus consensus. Many of the assumptions were taken from the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan, some verbatim. 1 If you have a question or comment, please contact Mary Beth Koza, UNC EHS Director, at mbkoza@ehs.unc.edu The planning assumptions below are reasonable worst-case assumptions. We all hope that the next pandemic is no worse than the one in 1968, which had a relatively small impact on UNC. However, our plans will be most useful if we prepare UNC for the high risk pandemic predicted by reasonable public health experts. 2 An extreme 1918-like scenario is not considered here. So, keep in mind that these assumptions depend on the severity of the pandemic. We hope our assumptions are pessimistic, and fear that they are not optimistic. A Possible UNC Pandemic Influenza Scenario UNC assumes that the first pandemic influenza outbreaks will occur outside of the U.S., most likely in Southeast Asia. The pandemic s first impact to UNC will likely be to students and faculty who are traveling abroad, or plan to do so. WHO, CDC and UNC will impose travel restrictions. UNC may call some people back and cancel some planned travel. As with SARS, international travelers will be subject to restrictions and screening.unc assumes that in the U.S. the pandemic influenza wave will last pproximately 10 weeks, during which multiple community outbreaks will occur across the country. (10 weeks is the average of 8 to 13 weeks, which 1 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, May 2006, www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/nspi_implementation.pdf, p 25. 2 A pandemic s severity depends on influenza s transmissibility, morbidity and mortality. H5N1 influenza appears to have a high human case fatality rate (over 50%), but experts believe that even a severe pandemic would have a much lower case fatality rate. CDC s pandemic model uses attack rates (people with clinical cases) of 15-35%, which compare to 20, 25 and 40% for seasonal flu, the 1957 pandemic and the 1918 pandemic, respectively. CDC s model uses case fatality rates of 0.2-0.4%, which compare to 0.008, 0.2 and 2.5% for seasonal flu, the 1957 pandemic and the 1918 pandemic, respectively. 1

is the estimated wave length in the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan.) For planning purposes, UNC assumes that the wave will occur during the fall or spring semester. (Historically, the largest waves have occurred in the fall and winter, but the seasonality of a pandemic cannot be predicted with certainty.) We assume that the first U.S. outbreaks will occur in major metropolitan areas where there is a high rate of international travel. On their own initiative, UNC students may begin to leave campus when the first outbreaks occur. We assume that Chapel Hill s outbreak will last approximately 7 weeks. (7 weeks is the average of 6 to 8 weeks, which is the estimated community outbreak length in the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan.) Our greatest risk is an easily transmissible virus and 7,400 students in residence halls living in close proximity and sharing facilities. According to CDC s FluAid Model 3 (see below), 2,600 students in our residence halls would become ill, and 1,900 of those would seek outpatient care at Campus Health Services. Caring for this large number of ill students would severely strain resources of Housing and Residential Education, Campus Health Service and the UNC Healthcare System, especially if the community was similarly impacted and staff resources were similarly depleted. CDC FluAid 2.0 Model Estimates 4 All UNC-Chapel Hill Students Students in Our Residence Halls Students 27,276 7,400 Clinical cases 9,500 2,600 Outpatient visits 7,000 1,900 Hospitalizations 100 28 Deaths 26 7 If a severe outbreak were to occur, we should expect to suspend on-campus classes for 7-10 weeks. We will want to make the class suspension decision 3 FluAid is a software model created by the CDC to assist planners in preparing for the next influenza pandemic by providing estimates of potential impact specific to their population. Compared to the 1918 pandemic, it appears to be conservative. 4 Assuming 35% gross attack rate; student population split 50:50 among 0-18 and 19-64 yrs age groups; using 0.3% case fatality rate (maximum) estimates. The numbers for outpatient visits, hospitalizations and deaths are not inclusive. See http://www2.cdc.gov/od/fluaid/ 2

early in the period of contagion (wave) to allow residential students to return to a less-risky home environment. 5 After the on-campus class suspension decision has been made, it will take about 72 hours (3 days) for students in UNC residence halls to vacate, although about 700 will remain there (see below). Even after on-campus classes are suspended, we assume that 5,700 students and student families will remain in Chapel Hill because of international travel restrictions, other travel difficulties, or because they do not have a suitable alternative living option. These include: o 700 students (e.g., international students) remaining in residence halls. o 1,000 people in family housing. This group may be at somewhat high risk due to the close quarters of apartment-style living and the presence of children, which are likely to have higher illness rates see below. o While classes are suspended, we assume 4,000 students will remain in Chapel Hill, living in off-campus housing (e.g., apartments, fraternities, sororities, Granville Towers, etc.). Of those 5,700 students who will remain in Chapel Hill while classes are suspended, we expect about 1,500 of them will seek outpatient care at Campus Health Services. 6 While Classes are Suspended 7 Students and Student Employees Families People 5,700 11,036 Clinical cases 2,000 3,900 Outpatient visits 1,500 2,000 Hospitalizations 20 50 Deaths 5 8 Impact to UNC Employees UNC s early impact from a community outbreak will be employees who choose to stay home, and employees who need to stay home to care for children (see below). 5 When on-campus classes are suspended, some distance learning, independent study, research activities and study abroad may continue on a case-by-case basis. Specific policies have not yet been developed. 6 In a normal year, CSC provides healthcare services to nearly all undergraduates and professional students, spouses of students, and about half of graduate students. 7 Assuming 35% gross attack rate; student and family population split 50:50 among 0-18 and 19-64 yrs age groups; using 0.2% case fatality rate (most likely) estimates for employees. 3

According to the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan, among working adults, more than 20 percent will become ill during a community outbreak. In accordance with the Implementation Plan, 8 UNC assumes that absenteeism will reach 40 percent for periods of about 2 weeks at the height of a pandemic wave, with lower levels of staff absent for a few weeks on either side of the peak. Absenteeism will increase not only because of personal illness, but also because employees may be caring for ill family members, under voluntary home isolation due to an ill household member, minding children dismissed from daycare or school, following public health guidance, or simply staying at home out of safety concerns. o More Pessimistic Scenario: Employee absenteeism may be worse. Certain public health measures (closing schools, isolation of household contacts of infected individuals, snow days ) are likely to increase rates of absenteeism. A study by the Harvard School of Public Health suggests that approximately 70% of the public will chose to remain at home in an influenza pandemic. o More Optimistic Scenario: Absenteeism may be less severe. Public health officials are planning several measures to quench a pandemic, which would result in fewer infections (see below). Continuity of Operations During a Pandemic The suspension of on-campus classes does not mean that the University will close. Essential functions have been identified and Communicable Disease Emergency Mandatory Employees have also been identified in the event of closure. Continuity of Operations Plans have been developed for nearly all units on campus for and will be activated in the event of closure. During the period of contagion (wave), assume there will be significant economic disruptions, including inventory shortages, shipment delays, and reduced business activity. International shipments and travel may be severely curtailed. Critical supplies may not be available. For planning purposes, assume that 50% of your critical supplies will not be available during the 7-10 week period of contagion. For the purposes of fiscal impact planning, UNC assumes that there will be two 10 week waves, one each during the fall and spring semester. In each wave, UNC will suspend classes and be otherwise impacted for a period of 7-10 weeks. Essential functions must continue. Personnel who support remaining UNC essential functions must report to work, if they have not been exposed. 8 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan, p. 13. 4

Assume that contagious employees will come to work both asymptomatic employees and symptomatic employees who feel compelled to work. Steps need to be taken to minimize this risk. For planning purposes, assume that absent employees include key personnel, who will be unable perform their duties. Key personnel include leaders, heads and essential personnel with primary responsibility for essential functions. After the wave has passed, assume that resumption of normal campus activities will be slow and difficult. There will be grieving and adjustment for those who have lost loved ones, friends and coworkers. Those who became ill and survived may take months to fully recover. Exhausted caregivers will need rest, time off to get their affairs in order, and mental health support. Business will be slow to recover, slow to replenish inventories, and slow to replace labor. Economic losses during the pandemic will cause business to contract, cut costs, and layoff workers. Students, faculty, staff and their families will fear for the next wave. Assumed Characteristics of an Influenza Pandemic We assume that the clinical disease attack rate will be 35 percent in the overall population during the pandemic. Susceptibility to the pandemic influenza virus will be universal. Illness rates will be highest among schoolaged children (more than 40 percent) and decline with age. 9 The typical incubation period (interval between infection and onset of symptoms) for influenza is approximately 2 days. Persons who become ill may shed virus and can transmit infection for onehalf to one day before the onset of illness. Viral shedding and the risk of transmission will be greatest during the first 2 days of illness. Children will play a major role in transmission of infection as their illness rates are likely to be higher, they shed more virus over a longer period of time, and they control their secretions less well. On average, infected persons will transmit infection to approximately two other people. Some persons will become infected but not develop clinically significant symptoms. Asymptomatic or minimally symptomatic individuals can transmit infection and develop immunity to subsequent infection. Risk groups for severe and fatal infection cannot be predicted with certainty but are likely to include infants, the elderly, pregnant women, and persons with chronic or immunosuppressive medical conditions. Department of Environment, Health & Safety, University of North Carolina, 1120 Estes Drive Extension, CB# 1650, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-1650, 9 The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan assumes a 30% attack rate, but CDC s FluAid model uses 35%. The 1918 pandemic had a 40% attack rate. 5