Assessing the Credibility of Threats Toward Schools

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Transcription:

Assessing the Credibility of Threats Toward Schools

Disclaimer

Sunshine Law Disclaimer CLOSED MEETINGS AND RECORDS 610.021, 610.022 A public governmental body is permitted, to close its records when they relate to certain issues listed in Section 610.021. Matters that may be closed include: Records related to ongoing terrorism threat assessments and emergency response plans related to terrorist threats. 610.021 (18) & (19) (HB 1450):Extends the sunset clause on two exceptions to the Sunshine Law that allow a public body to close certain records that relate to terrorist risk assessments and response plans. The records reflected in this report are directly related to terrorism risk assessment and response plans for the school covered in this report, and are thus exempt from release under Missouri s Sunshine Law.

Risk Assessment Questionnaire: 1. Are motives and goals of the individual or group making the threat identified in the threat? Score: 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 1 = little or no motives/goals identified in the threat 10= great detail re the motives/goals identified in the threat

If little information exists as to the motivation/goals of the person/group making the threat, efforts should be initiated to obtain additional information from local, state, and federal law enforcement organizations. As additional information is developed, the threat should be re-evaluated, and courses of action adjusted to reflect the changing threat level.

2. Any indications of intent articulated in the threat or other communications with the suspect individual or group, with violence being articulated as a justifiable recourse? Score: 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10

1 = little or no indications of intent articulated in the threat or other communications with the suspect individual or group, with violence being articulated as a justifiable recourse? 10= great detail or strong indications of intent articulated in the threat or other communications with the suspect individual or group, with violence being articulated as a justifiable recourse?

If there is no intent articulated in the threat or other communications directly related to the threat in question, additional investigation/research may be warranted to determine if the individual/group suspected to be responsible for the threat has historically embraced violence and/or if they have carried out threatened activity as articulated in their threats.

3. Have there been attack-related behaviors evident or associated with the threat, such as observed pre-attack operational activity? Score: 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10

1 = little or no attack-related behaviors evident or associated with the threat 10 = Considerable attack-related behaviors evident or associated with the threat, to include observing pre-attack operational activity such as evidence of activity that would suggest surveillance of the target to gather target intelligence or dry run rehearsals.

If little information exists as to attack related behaviors of the person/group making the threat, efforts should be initiated to obtain additional information from local, state, and federal law enforcement organizations. As additional information is developed, the threat should be re-evaluated, and courses of action adjusted to reflect the changing threat level.

Risk Assessment associated with threats should focus on behaviors, and not so much the language in the threat. Terrorist pre-attack operational activity warning signs can be found at: https://tinyurl.com/ces-terrorismwarningsigns-1

4. Is there a capacity to act on the part of the suspected individual or group? Score: 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10

1 = little or no evidence of a capacity to act on the part of an individual or group, from either the perspective of technical capabilities, or ability to conduct operations in a specific geographic location 10= strong evidence of a capacity to act on the part of an individual or group, from either the perspective of technical capabilities, or ability to conduct operations in a specific geographic location

The trajectory of the individual or group s behavior from a historical context should be taken into account when assessing the capacity to act. If little information exists as to capacity to act on the part of the person/group making the threat, efforts should be initiated to obtain additional information from local, state, and federal law enforcement organizations. As additional information is developed, the threat should be re-evaluated, and courses of action adjusted to reflect the changing threat level.

5. Is there evidence of a feeling of hopelessness, desperation and/or despair associated with the group s cause, and has the group justified violent acts by tying their activity to these grievances? Score: 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10

1 = little or no evidence of a feeling of hopelessness, desperation and/or despair, and little or no evidence of a resolve to resort to violence to address perceived grievances by the individual or group. 10= Considerable evidence of a feeling of hopelessness, desperation and/or despair, and /or considerable evidence of a resolve to resort to violence to address perceived grievances by the individual or group.

If little historical information exists as to the demonstrated willingness to use violence on the part of the person/group making the threat, efforts should be initiated to obtain additional information from local, state, and federal law enforcement organizations. As additional information is developed, the threat should be re-evaluated, and courses of action adjusted to reflect the changing threat level.

6. Is there candid dialogue and open lines of communications between the individual/group associated with the threat and officials at the school or in the community? Score: 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10

1= strong evidence of candid dialogue and open lines of communications between the individual/group associated with the threat and officials at the school or in the community? 10 = no evidence of any candid dialogue and open lines of communications between the individual/group associated with the threat and officials at the school or in the community?

Ongoing dialogue with a group tends to offer alternate avenues for a group to pursue, short of a violent act. Additional information from local, state, and federal law enforcement organizations will also help in determining what lines of communication, if any exist between the threat group and public officials or the media. As additional information is developed, the threat should be re-evaluated, and courses of action adjusted to reflect the changing threat level.

7. Is there historical evidence the group has used violence to further their cause in the recent past? Score: 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10

1 = little or no evidence that violence is seen as a desirable, acceptable, or only option as a way to deal with the situation by the individual or organization making the threat 10= considerable and documented evidence that the group has utilized violence in the past to further their cause.

Analysis of past history of the group making the threat should be able to inform the likelihood of the group s willingness to embrace violence in the instant threat. Outside law enforcement/intelligence agency collaboration is critical in this assessment piece, as it is in each of the steps in order to make an informed decision as to reactions to any terrorist threat.

8. Is there consistency between the threat and any preliminary information collected as part of the investigation/risk assessment process, such as observed pre-attack activity at or near the threat target site? Score: 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10

1 = little or no consistency between the threat and any preliminary information collected as part of the investigation/risk assessment process. 10= strong consistency between the threat and any preliminary information collected as part of the investigation/risk assessment process.

Outside law enforcement/intelligence agency collaboration is critical in this assessment piece, as it is in each of the steps in order to make an informed decision as to reactions to any terrorist threat. While schools are ill prepared to conduct independent investigation into the credibility and implications of a threat, local law enforcement, state law enforcement to include the state s intelligence fusion center, state school safety centers if they exist, as well as the FBI, DHS Protective Security Advisors, and other federal partners should all be in a position to inform any actions of a school district as the result of a threat.

9. Are other organizations (law enforcement, etc.) concerned about the potential for violence? Score: 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10

1 = little to no discernable concern from law enforcement and other public safety/intelligence organizations that schools are a specific target, or that a specific capability exist to conduct an attack at this time. 10= strong articulated and documented concern from law enforcement and other public safety/intelligence organizations that schools are a specific target, or that a specific capability exist to conduct an attack at this time.

Ultimately, decisions re soft lock-down, canceling school, etc, while they have broad consequences well past the school district, are the legal responsibility of the local school district and school board. Any input to establish perspective from outside agencies should be collectively analyzed and used to help inform decisions by the organization having legal responsibility to make these decisions.

10. What circumstances might influence the likelihood of an attack, such as similar attacks against similar targets in the recent past? Score: 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10

1 = little or no additional or circumstances known that might influence the likelihood of an attack. 10 = Considerable articulated and documented circumstances known that might influence the likelihood of an attack.

Similar threats in other venues both locally and remote and their ultimate outcome should be considered. In the majority of terrorist attacks, seldom are direct threats received immediately prior to an attack. However, each threat must be evaluated on its own merit, and ultimately a decision made based on situational awareness surrounding the situation.

As the situation and information received change, the response can be likewise adjusted, up or down in the response to the threat. Trajectory of a terrorist group s attacks and other activity, in their level of violence, scope, etc., is one example of an outside factor that might influence a decision in conjunction with a direct terrorist threat.

Total score from items 1-10:

Considerations: Score in the range of 10-49:

If total score is less than 50, consideration should be given to embracing mitigation strategies, such as projecting an appearance of heightened security at individual school buildings.

Additionally, it may be appropriate to implement a level of soft lockdown heightened security measures.

Also consider keeping in contact with law enforcement and other stakeholders who can provide ongoing situational awareness. If the threat level changes, consider adjusting the response accordingly, up or down. Local law enforcement should be consulted to assist in projecting a heightened level of security at school buildings in the District.

A Terrorist Threat Heightened Security Response (soft lockdown) template as well as a guide for the warning signs of terrorism can be found at: http://tinyurl.com/ces- HeightenedSecurity

Mitigating activity: School focused Neighborhood Watch program (see www.schoolswatch.org) should also be considered, to increase the sense of community ownership of school safety and counter-terrorism, without unduly alarming students and the community.

Score in the range of 50-74: If the total score is in the range of 50-74, additional actions may be warranted, to include immediate activation of a A Terrorist Threat Heightened Security (soft lockdown) response protocol which should be a part of the school district Emergency Operations Plan. Additionally, heightened security may be warranted as students arrive at and depart school buildings, and also during the normal school day, as well as at other school functions outside of the school day. Local law enforcement should be consulted to arrive at an appropriate course of action during a heightened security response level.

Score in the range of 75-100: If the total score is in the range of 75-100, the treat is deemed significant, and consideration should be given to additional precautions, up to and including canceling of all normal school activity.

Outside evaluation assistance should be sought before making any decisions that would have an adverse effect on the school district

To include consultation with local law enforcement State law enforcement State s intelligence Fusion Center (https://miacx.org/) Federal assets such as the FBI (https://www.fbi.gov/contactus/field/search-by-zip-code) Department of Homeland Security- Protective Security Advisors (PSCDOperations@hq.dhs.gov)

The Center for Education Safety can also provide additional resources and guidelines to assist in formulating a course of action in the event of a significant terrorist threat (info@moces.org)

References: DOJ/OJP Assessing and Managing the Terrorism Threat https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/210680.pdf FEMA Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide http://www.fema.gov/media-librarydata/8ca0a9e54dc8b037a55b402b2a269e94/cpg201_htirag_2nd_edition.pdf Rand Exploring Patterns of Behavior in Violent Jihadist Terrorists http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/rand_tr923. pdf Rand Emerging Threats and Security Planning http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/rand_op256.pdf US Secret Service Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates. https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/threatassessmentguide.pdf

Questions? Paul Fennewald fennewald@msbanet.org