A Belief-Based Account of Decision under Uncertainty. Craig R. Fox, Amos Tversky

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Transcription:

A Belief-Based Account of Decision under Uncertainty Craig R. Fox, Amos Tversky

Outline Problem Definition Decision under Uncertainty (classical Theory) Two-Stage Model Probability Judgment and Support Theory The Case Studies and Discussion

Decision under Uncertainty Judgment of probability Decision under Risk

Two studies 1995 professional basketball playoffs Movement of economic indicators in a simulated economy Results. Consistent with the belief-based account Violated the partition inequality (implied by classical theory of decision under uncertainty)

Decision Making Decision: Depends on the strength of people s belief an event happens. Question: How to measure these beliefs?!

Decision under Uncertainty (classical Theory) derives beliefs about the likelihood of uncertain events from people s choices between prospects whose consequences are contingent on these events. Simultaneous measurement of utility and subjective probability

Challenges From psychological perspective: 1) Belief precedes preference 2) Probability Judgment 3) The assumption of the derivation of belief from preference Belief based approach uses probability judgment to predict decisions under uncertainty

Background Risky prospects known probabilities Decision under risk Non-linear weighting function

Background Real world decisions uncertain prospects Extension to the domain of uncertainty

Cumulative Prospect Theory Assumes that an event has more impact on choice when: Possibility Effect: It turns an impossibility into a possibility Certainty Effect: It turns a possibility into a certainty than when it merely makes a possibility more or less likely. Bounded Subadditivity

Bounded Subadditivity Tested on both risky and uncertain prospects. Data satisfied bounded subadditivity for both risk and uncertainty. Departure from expected utility theory

Two-Stage Model Decision makers: 1) Assess the probability (P) of an uncertain event (A) 2) Then, transform this value using the risky weighting function (w)

Two-Stage Model Terminology Simple prospect: (x, A): Pay $x, if the target event (A) obtains and nothing otherwise. Overall value of a prospect (V): V(x, A) = v(x)w(a) = v(x)w[p(a)] P(A): judged probability of A v: value function for monetary gains w: risky weighting function

Probability Judgment People s intuitive probability judgments are often inconsistent with the laws of chance. Support Theory: Probabilities are attached to description of events (called hypothesis) rather than the events.

Support Theory Hypothesis, A, has a nonnegative support value, s(a). Judged probability P(A, B): Hypothesis A rather than B holds. Interpreted as the support of the focal hypothesis, A, relative to the alternative hypothesis, B.

Support Theory The judged probability of the union of disjoint events is generally smaller than the sum of judged probabilities of these events. Unpacking principle

Support Theory Binary Complementarity: P(A, B) + P(B, A) = 1 Subaditivity: For finer partitioning (i.e., more than 2 events), the judged probability is less than or equal to the sum of judged probabilities of its disjoint components.

Implications Contrast between two-stage modern and expected utility theory with risk aversion: The effect of partitioning

Implications Contrast between two-stage modern and expected utility theory with risk aversion: The effect of partitioning The classical model follows partition inequality: C(x, A): Certainty equivalent of prospect, that pays $x if A occurs, and nothing otherwise. Doesn t necessary hold considering the two-stage model.

Two-Stage Model Predict the certainty equivalent of an uncertain prospect, C(x, A) from two independent responses: The judged probability of the target even, P(A) The certainty equivalent of the risky prospect, C(x, P(A))

Study 1 Four tasks: 1) Estimating subjects certainty equivalents (C) for risky prospects. Random draw of a single poker ship from an urn 2) Estimating subjects certainty equivalents (C) for uncertain prospect. offering reward if a particular team, division, or conference would win the 1995 NBA. 3) An independent test of risk aversion 4) Estimate the probability of target events.

Result of Study 1

Result of Study 1 Fit of the models to the data Unpacking principle VS. monotonicity

Study 2 More simulated environment : Subjects have identical information Compare the judged probabilities vs. actual probabilities

Result of Study 2 Binary partitioning: Judged probabilities (nearly) satisfy binary complementarity Certainty equivalents satisfy the partition inequality Finer partitioning: Subadditivity of judged probabilities Reversal of the partition inequality for certainty equivalents

Discussion The event spaces under study has some structure (hierarchical, product, ) Subaditivity of judged probability is a major cause of violations of the partition inequality Generalization of the two-stage model for source preference. Particular description of events on which outcomes depends may affect a person s willingness to act (unpacking principle)