Public Health Emergency Preparedness for Aviation Sector Singapore s Perspective. CAAS 24 Apr 2013 (Wed)

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Public Health Emergency Preparedness for Aviation Sector Singapore s Perspective CAAS 24 Apr 2013 (Wed)

Scope Introduction National Crisis Response Framework Disease Outbreak Response System (DORS) Changi Airport Border Health Control Plan Air Traffic Services BCP for Influenza Pandemic 2

Introduction Singapore s ability to respond to public health threats has improved significantly because of: Its experience in managing the SARS epidemic in 2003 and the Influenza A(H1N1) pandemic in 2009 and Its whole-of-government (WOG) approach in preparing for a pandemic over the past 8 years. 3

National Crisis Response Framework

Homefront Crisis Management System Ministerial Committee Strategic Homefront Crisis Executive Group (HCEG) Lead Crisis Management Group (CMG) Other Crisis Management Groups Operational Crisis Manager Tactical Incident Manager 5

Public Health Crisis (Air Transport Sector) Ministerial Committee Strategic Strategic Homefront Crisis Executive Group (HCEG) CMG (Health) (Lead CMG) (MOH) Tpt CMGs Operational Operational Tactical Tactical Crisis Manager (CAAS) Incident Manager (Changi Airport) 6

CMG (Health) Composition Chairperson PS(Health) MHA MOE MOT MFA MEWR MND MTI MCI Other Ministries or Agencies 7

Mission of CMG (Health) Manage all medical issues during a crisis E.g. civil emergency, mass casualties or disease outbreaks Provide emergency medical services Formulate response plans to deal with medical crises E.g. DORSCON framework Provide policy guidance and advice to responding agencies 8

Disease Outbreak Response System (DORS)

Disease Outbreak Response System (DORS) Colour-coded Graduated Response Framework Based on risk of infection to individuals/community Used in managing infectious disease threats In a Whole-of-Government Approach Establishes common understanding across Government agencies Allows graduated and defined responses Provides recommendations and guidelines for medical and non-medical measures Facilitates decision-making & concurrent actions 10

DORS Conditions (DORSCON) 5-colour DORSCON alert phases indicating increasing spread of a highly virulent disease Each phase with control measures hardwired GREEN 0 GREEN 1 YELLOW ORANGE RED BLACK Increasing spread Containment Mitigation 11 11

DORS Conditions (DORSCON) DORSCON WHO PHASE DEFINITION AIM OF MEASURES No outbreak globally Maintain situational awareness Build capacity GREEN 0 GREEN 1 1 to 3 Outbreak (in single cases) in other countries Low risk of import Step up surveillance Prevent import Raise public vigilance 12 YELLOW 4 ORANGE 5 Elevated risk of import No local secondary transmission Local transmission confined Low risk of community transmission Prevent further import Detect cases early Contain spread Protect essential services Contain spread (break local transmission chain) Suppress and slow down spread Prevent export of cases Enhance public vigilance

DORS Conditions (DORSCON) DORSCON WHO PHASE DEFINITION AIM OF MEASURES RED 6 BLACK 6 High risk of acquiring disease from community Local infection out of control Widespread community transmission Escalating morbidity & mortality rates Gain control of community spread Mitigate consequences of pandemic Continue to prevent export of cases Step up crisis communications Medical & public health measures take precedence over social & economic considerations Limit impact on community Facilitate recovery of healthcare systems 13 13

Lessons from 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Some limitations of DORS were noted: Considered only the spread but not severity No public communication component DORSCON alert phases corresponded to WHO Pandemic Alert Phases for Influenza and not reflective of local situation

Reviewing DORS Framework Take into account the severity (virulence) of the infectious disease, in addition to its spread DORSCON alert phases to be based on MOH s risk assessment of the likely public health impact Provide clear guidance for agencies Balance clarity with flexibility in response Be adaptable and provide for gradation in the suite of measures to be taken Contain a public communications component

Changi Aiport Border Health Control Plan

Border Health Response Measures A phased and gradual approach will be adopted to step up control measures in accordance with developing circumstances as guided by principle of risk management Implementation & subsequent stepping up of various border control measures will be aligned with defined triggers at various DORSCON alert levels with the aim to have early detection & prevention of possible importation of influenza case(s) 17

Border Health Response Measures Include: Health Advisory posters at airports Health Alert Notices (HAN) and Health Declaration Cards (HDC) distribution to pax Contact tracing of close contacts of index cases Temperature screening arriving/departing passengers Quarantine of suspect cases/pax from affected countries 18

Health Advisory Posters Health advisory posters at various points at Changi Airport since 15 Apr 13 In view of Avian Influenza A(H7N9) situation in China and Novel Coronavirus in Middle East 19

Health Alert Notices (HANs) To further enhance public awareness & encourage travellers to seek timely treatment if ill Distribution of Health Alert Notices (HANs) from 20 Apr 13 In 4 official languages in Singapore 20

Health Alert Notices (HANs) Given out to travellers returning from affected countries/areas Reminds travellers to look out for signs and symptoms of flu and seek medical attention if ill with such symptoms 21

Quarantine Government quarantine facility (GQF) to be set-up and on standby upon activation For tourists served with Quarantine Orders (during an infectious disease outbreak scenario) 22

Response Measures at Various DORSCON Alert Levels Green 0-1 Yellow Orange Red Black Possible Scenarios Isolated animal - human infections No human - human transmission Inefficient human-tohuman transmission Small clusters of cases may occur More efficient human-tohuman transmission Larger cluster(s) but human-tohuman spread is still localised Virus is fully transmissible from human-tohuman Communitylevel spread. Mild - moderate morbidity & mortality Pandemic in Singapore with high morbidity and mortality Response measures Update & exercise response plans Health advisory posters Distribution of HAN (targeted) Temperature screening for inbound pax (targeted) Issue of HAN Filling-in of HDC Tracing of close contacts Temperature screening for inbound & outbound pax (full border) Contact tracing Quarantine orders Temperature screening for inbound & outbound pax (full border) Discontinuation of issue of HAN/HDC Temperature screening for inbound & outbound pax (full border) 23

Passenger Screening Scenarios Regional (Targeted) Screening Arrival Screening @ aerobridges Confined to selected piers @ terminals with set up of IFSS, nursing and isolation stations Full Border Screening Screening @ Arrival and Departure Halls with set up of IFSS, nursing and isolation stations IFSS: Infra-red Fever Screening System 24

Deployment for Regional Health Screening (Arrival) T3 A Pier T3 Arr S T2 Arr N T1 Arr E T1 D Pier T2 E Pier Note: HAN/HDC to be distributed when required, as directed 25

Aerobridge Deployment Pax are scanned as they walk past the capture zone of the IFSS camera IFSS Operator Thermal Ref Source IR Camera Pax with high temperature will be channelled for further medical assessments 26

Protocol for Suspect Case Upon detection of pax with high temperature, pax will be diverted to nursing station If doctor assesses that it is a highly possible case, pax will be led to isolation room Healthcare service provider will activate ambulance while airport will facilitate entry of ambulance and access of medical staff Airport will also facilitate immigration and customs clearance for affected pax 27

Deployment for Full Border Health Screening (Arrival) T3 Arr S T3 Arr N T1 Arr W T2 Arr S T2 Arr N T1 Arr E Note: HAN/HDC to be distributed when required, as directed 28

Deployment for Full Border Health Screening (Departure) T3 VIP Dep T3 Dep T1 Dep T2 Dep S T2 Dep N Note: HAN/HDC to be distributed when required, as directed 29

30 Deployment at Arrival Hall (Example)

31 Infrared Fever Screening System

Isolation Room + Nursing Station

Air Traffic Services Business Continuity Plan (BCP) in Influenza Pandemic

SCOPE Introduction Staff well being Segregation Medical cases Overseas travel Vaccinations Monitoring of levels 34

INTRODUCTION Recognize when it is coming Emphasize cleanliness to stop the spread Provide hand cleanser at the doors of the workplace Conduct check on the health 35

STAFF WELL BEING Self check with thermometers Proper records kept Daily reporting to a central body (HR) Suspected cases Contact tracing Rules/laws to stop unwell staff from reporting for work Daily cleaning of the consoles with disinfectant Note: Source of images from Internet 36

SEGREGATION Prevent or minimise contact Ops room Staff uses different routes to get out of the room Work areas and consoles segregated by clusters No rotation of staff from different units Staff lounge/cafeteria Staff are allocated different tables and chairs for their meals Complex Visits All to follow specified segregated routes in and out Stopped until the situation is back to normal 37

SEGREGATION Prevent or minimise contact Segregate office hours staff into two groups One group will report to work on Monday, Wednesday and Friday Another group will report to work on Tuesday and Thursday Weekends all work from home Note: Source of images from Internet 38

MEDICAL CASES Keep records, follow up and close the case Involving staff family members Involving maintenance staff Involving contractors At the workplace Quarantine sick staff in isolated room Ambulance to transfer sick staff to nominated hospital Note: Source of images from Internet 39

OVERSEAS TRAVEL Precautions to be taken Upon return from affected overseas location One week rest at home (work from home) Avoid travelling to Countries/ areas affected unless urgently required Consult doctor if not feeling well Note: Source of images from Internet 40

VACCINATIONS Provide vaccinations to all the essential staff (voluntary) Vaccinations Staff are rostered - not all can go at the same time Cost borned by the organisation Note: Source of images from Internet 41

MONITORING OF LEVELS As advised by MOH MOH is closely monitoring the influenza A (H7N9) situation and will work with Agencies to institute appropriate control measures as situation evolves Will then adopt appropriate measures at workplace commensurate to prevailing health advisories 42

43 THANK YOU