City of Dallas Pandemic Flu Plans

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City of Dallas Pandemic Flu Plans Part I Specific Pandemic Influenza issues for Public Safety Departments Part II - Continuity of Operations and Government Plans 1

Planning Committee Primary Police, Fire-Rescue, Emergency Management, Dallas County Health & Human Services Secondary all other departments have been contacted to submit information 2

Dallas County Health and Human Services Lead agency for any public health emergency response Coordinates with all cities within the County (City of Dallas primary contacts: EHS and OEM) Coordinate with Department of State Health Services, and federal agencies CDC, DHHS Ongoing disease surveillance and early detection Influenza A/H5 laboratory testing capacity Anti-viral distribution and allocation (purchased for City of Dallas police, fire, and EMS) 3

Dallas County Health and Human Services Extensive public education program including a full-time RN who has worked with several Dallas departments Web site: http://www.dallascounty.org/department/hhservices/s ervices/publichealthalert/pandemic_influenza.html DPD and DFRD have also developed PowerPoint and video training programs on safety and response procedures to deal with influenza patients 4

Challenges History, and the national Center for Disease Control analysis, estimate that we may lose 30-40% of the workforce during a pandemic influenza Obviously that would strain Public Safety operations as well as all City services There is a limited supply of vaccine or antiviral medications 5

Challenges con t. There may be a chain reaction in the supply of critical resources such as: Food, Water Fuel Electricity and other utilities Medical supplies - Including protective equipment for 1 st Responders such as goggles, N-95 masks, and non-latex gloves 6

Recommendations Identify and maintain as many critical services to our citizens as possible Implement a mandatory training and infection control program for critical employees We have both an in-house produced video and PowerPoint training programs ready (in English and Spanish). 7

Medication Distribution Plan There are Federal, State, and City level plans to distribute vaccine or antiviral medications to 1 st Responders and critical employees These medications are currently very limited (and expensive - $19 each) We participated in a statewide Strategic National Stockpile exercise to distribute these meds last year 8

Public Safety Concerns Employees may be sick themselves, tending for sick family members or - with schools closed - staying home to take care of children. 9

Public Safety Concerns EMS and the entire medical community would be overwhelmed with patients The CDC projects a pandemic influenza will directly affect 15-30% of the population with signs & symptoms (180,000-300,000 people in Dallas) In Dallas, thousands would be hospitalized, or home bound (and thousands could die). Up to 500,000 could be either sick or caring for those who are. 10

Public Safety Concerns EMS call volume will probably exceed our capacity to respond in the traditional fashion. We could average 8,000 EMS calls per day our current call volume is just under 500 per day Police calls would increase as well primarily with increased crime reports and citizen assists 11

Public Safety Concerns We would implement a Medical Directed Call Triage for our Dispatch to: Assign priority calls Modify the response as needed Recommend alternative plans for EMS transport or Police response by developing contingencies for providing city-wide coverage with limited personnel. 12

Part II: All-Hazard Continuity Of Operations Planning Continuity of Operations Planning (COOP) is done to assure that we are able to continue providing a stable government and critical services during a pandemic influenza or any other specific threat, hazard, incident, catastrophe, or disaster. It is our worst case scenario plan. 13

What is COOP? (Continuity of Operations Planning) COOP answers these primary questions concerning ANY long term incident that may effect city operations: 1. What are the critical or essential jobs? 2. What are each department s most important activities? 3. Who will be in charge if top leadership is not available? What is the line of succession? How are they contacted? 4. Which services, documents, and information are most vital to maintain? 14

What is COOP? (Continuity of Operations Planning) And these: 1. What other resources will be required to maintain each City service? Food, water, fuel, medical supplies.etc. Intangibles such as passwords to PC s How long can your department wait to restart its essential functions? 12 hours? A day? Three days? Essential functions cannot be disrupted? 15

Objectives of COOP Planning To ensure the continued performance of critical jobs, essential functions, and major operations during a disaster event. To minimize any damage or loss of critical processes and information. To identify essential services and their staffing and resource needs: Zoo, Aviation, Water, Public Safety, etc. 16

Objectives of COOP Planning To ensure succession to office in the event that a disruption renders the agency leadership unavailable to perform their responsibilities. To reduce disruptions to operations and to anticipate what might occur and plan to deal with it despite social distancing and other precautionary requirements.. To ensure that agencies have alternate facilities from which to perform their essential functions during a disaster event. 17

Objectives of COOP Planning To protect essential facilities, equipment, vital records, and other assets. To achieve a timely and orderly recovery from a disaster. To identify a training and exercise program to validate COOP plans. To complete individual department plans by Sept 2007 and an overall City plan by December 2007. 18

Conclusion: The City of Dallas Continuity of Operations Program It is built from the ground up. We are working with each City department to create a specific COOP plan to meet their needs and continue the City s essential functions. We will be regularly testing, training, and exercising the City COOP Plan to determine gaps and weaknesses. This will also ensure all City employees and citizens that the City will continue to operate despite potentially substantial damage to its infrastructure. 19

Conclusion: The City of Dallas Continuity of Operations Program Special thanks to Carol Lawrence, RN of the DFRD and to the DPD Personnel and Development Division for background information and training resources We have representatives of these departments available: Dallas Police Department Dallas Fire-Rescue Department Office of Emergency Management Environmental and Health Services Dallas County Health and Human Services Questions? 20